M. discusses the nature of the commandments in Moreh, III, 26. He makes, as here, a distinction between commandments whose object is generally evident, such as the prohibition of murder, theft, etc., and those whose object is not generally clear, such as the prohibition of wearing garments of wool and linen, boiling milk and meat together, etc. The former he calls judgments (DSB2»D, termed niSB here), and the latter he designates statutes or ordinances (n^pn). See Scheyer, Dalalat al Haiirin, Part III (Frankfurt am Main, 1838), p. 178, n. 2; and Lazurus, Ethics, I, pp. 118-119.
CHAPTER VII CONCERNING THE BARRIER (BETWEEN GOD AND MAN) AND ITS SIGNIFICATION* MANY passages are found in the Midrash, the Haggadah, and also the Talmud, which state that some of the prophets beheld God from behind many barriers, and some from behind only a few, according to the proximity of the prophet to Him, and the degree of his prophetic power.2 Consequently, the Rabbis said that Moses, our teacher, saw God from behind a single, clear, that is transparent, partition. As they express it, "He (Moses) looked through a translucent specularia".3 Spe- cularia is the name of a mirror made of some transparent body like crystal or glass, as is explained at the end of Tractate i For a discussion of the contents of this chapter, see Jaraczewski, ZPhEr, XL VI, pp. 14—15; Rosin, Ethik, p. 113 ff., and Graetz (Eng. ed.), vol. Ill, pp. 483-484 on M.'s views on prophecy.
J For a detailed discussion of prophecy, see Moreh, II, 32-48. See supra, c. I, p. 45, n. 3. See also Bloch, Charakteristik und Inhaltsangabe des Moreh Nebuchim, in Moses ben Maimon, I, pp. 35-39.
3 Yebamot, 49 b: Sanoi ivm n»a,;rv«& nrtw N^pBDto ibanoi owaan ba nvxan N^pBDKa. Cf. also Leviticus Rabbah, I. In Perek Helek, M. describes the four points in which the prophecy of Moses was distin- guished from^that of the other prophets. See Holzer, Dogmenlehre, pp. 24-25. Cf. also Mishneh Torah, Sefer Madda, I, 7, 6; Moreh, I, Introduction (beg.), and II, 35.
80 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES Let me now explain the above statement. In accordance with what we have made clear in Chapter II, virtues are either intellectual or moral. Similarly, vices are intellectual, as ignorance, stupidity, and want of understanding; or they are moral as inordinate lust, pride, irascibility, anger, impudence, ava- rice, and many other similar defects, a list of which we have given and explained in Chapter IV. Each of these defects is as a partition separating man from God, the Most High. This is what the prophet meant when he said, "But your iniquities have ever made a separation between you and your God";1 which means that our sins — which, as we have said, are the evil qualities — are the partitions which separate us from God.2 Know, then, that no prophet received the gift of prophecy, unless he possessed all the mental virtues and a great majority of the most important moral ones. So, the Eabbis said, "Pro- phecy rests only upon the wise, the brave, and the rich".3 By the word "wise", they undoubtedly refer to all the mental per- fections. By "rich", they designate the moral perfection of contentment, for they call the contented man rich, their de- finition of the word "rich" being, "Who is rich? He who is contented with his lot",4 that is, one who is satisfied with what fortune brings him, and who does not grieve on account of things which he does not possess. Likewise, "brave" stands for a moral perfection; that is, one who is brave guides his faculties in accordance with intelligence and reason, as we have shown in Chapter V. The Rabbis say, "Who is brave? He who subdues his passions".5 1 Isa. LIX, 2.
2 On man's nearness to God being determined by the conduct of man, and God's removal from the earth by sin, see Schechter, Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology, pp. 33, 83, 232-3, 241.
3 Nedarim, 38 a; Shabbat, 92 a:!?W1 nwi TQJ DDn h* tib* mw narstwi v« nwp. Of. Moreh, II. 32. * Abot, IV, 1.
5 Ibid., IV, 1. See, also, Yesode ha-Torah, VII, 1, for an account of the characteristics necessary for a prophet. Cf. Moreh, II, 36, and III, 51, where M. briefly describes those who form the class of prophets as directing all their minds to the attainment of perfection in metaphysics, devoting themselves entirely to God, and employing all their intellectual faculties in the study of the universe, in order to derive a proof for THE EIGHT CHAPTERS— VII 81 It is not, however, an indispensable requirement that a prophet should possess all the moral virtues, and be entirely free from every defect, for we find that Scripture testifies in reference to Solomon, who was a prophet, that "the Lord ap- peared to Solomon in Gibeon",1 although we know that he had the moral defect of lust, which is plainly evident from the fact that he took so many wives, a vice springing from the disposition of passion which resided in his soul. It plainly says, "Did not Solomon sin by these things?"2 Even David — a prophet, according to the words, "To me spoke the Rock of Israel" 3 — we find guilty of cruelty, and, although he exercised it only against the heathens, and in the destruction of non- believers, being merciful towards Israel, it is explicitly stated in Chronicles that God, considering him unworthy, did not permit him to build the Temple, as it was not fitting in His eyes, because of the many people David caused to be killed. So, God said to him, "Thou shalt not build a house to my name, because much blood hast thou shed".4 We find, also, that Elijah gave vent to his anger, and although he did so only against unbelievers, against whom his wrath blazed up, the sages declared that God took him from the world, saying to him, "He who has so much zeal as thou hast is not fit to guide men, for thou wilt destroy them".5 Likewise, we find that Samuel feared Saul, and that Jacob was afraid to meet Esau. These and similar characteristics were so many partitions between the prophets (peace be unto them!) and God. He of them who had two or three qualities which did not maintain the proper medium, as is explained in Chapter IV, is said to have seen God from behind two or three partitions.
Thou must not be surprised to learn, however, that a few moral imperfections lessen the degree of prophetic inspiration; in fact, we find that some moral vices cause prophecy to be entirely withdrawn. Thus, for instance, wrath may do this, as our the existence of God, and to learn in every way possible how God rules things.
F 82 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES Rabbis say, "If a prophet becomes enraged, the spirit of pro- phecy departs from him".1 They adduce proof for this from the case of Elisha, from whom, when he became enraged, pro- phecy departed, until his wrath had subsided, at which he ex- claimed, "And now bring me a musician!"2 Grief and anxiety may also cause a cessation of prophecy, as in the case of the patriarch Jacob who, during the days when he mourned for Joseph, was deprived of the Holy Spirit, until he received the news that his son lived, whereupon Scripture says, "The spirit of Jacob, their father, revived",3 which the Targum* renders, "And the spirit of prophecy descended upon their father, Jacob". The sages, moreover, say, "The spirit of prophecy rests not upon the idle, nor upon the sad, but upon the joyous".5 When Moses, our teacher, discovered that there remained no partition between himself and God which he had not removed, and when he had attained perfection by acquiring every possible moral and mental virtue, he sought to comprehend God in His true reality, since^. there seemed no longer to be any hindrance thereto. He, therefore, implored of God, "Show me, I beseech Thee, Thy glory".6 But God informed him that this was im- possible, as his intellect, since he was a human being, was still influenced by matter. So, God's answer was, "For no man can see me and live".7 Thus, there remained between Moses and his comprehension of the true essence of God only one trans- parent obstruction, which was his human intellect still resident i Pesahim 66 b. Cf. Moreh, II, 36 (end).
1 M. attached a great deal of importance to the Targum of Onkelos in the elucidation of many biblical passages, and refers to it many times in the Moreh. In Moreh, I, 27, he speaks of Onkelos, the proselyte, as being thoroughly acquainted with the Hebrew and Chaldaic languages. See Frankel, Hodegetik, p. 322, and Bacher, Die Bibelexegese Moses Maimunis, pp. 38-42.
5 Shabbat, 30 b; Pesahim, loc. cit.: tibi fi^s» ^no vh mi» ru'stwi yw im -pflo »b» n^eo nnm -pro vb »N-I nibp -pro «"?i pint? -pro *6i nusj? hvf nnD». Cf. Moreh, II, 36 (end). Ex. XXXIII, 18. 7 ibid., XXXIII, 20.
THE EIGHT CHAPTERS— VII 83 in matter. God, however, was gracious in imparting to him, after his request, more knowledge of the divine than he had previously possessed, informing him that the goal (he sought) was impossible of attainment, because he was yet a human being. 1 The true comprehension of God, Moses designates by the term "beholding the Divine face", for, when one sees another person face to face his features become imprinted upon the mind, so that one will not confuse him whom he has seen with others; whereas, if he sees only his back, he may possibly recognize him again, but will more probably be in doubt, and confuse him with others. Likewise, the true comprehension of God is a conception of the reality of His existence fixed in the mind (of the knower) which, as concerns this existence, is a conception not shared by any other being; so that there is firmly implanted in the mind of the knower a knowledge of God's existence absolutely distinct from the knowledge the mind has of any other being (that exists). It is impossible, however, for mortal man to attain this high degree of comprehension, though Moses (peace be unto him) almost, but not quite, reached it, which thought is expressed by the words, "Thou shalt see my back parts".2 I intend more fully to discuss this subject in my Book on Prophecy.* So, since the sages (peace be unto them) knew that these 1 The corporeal element in man is a screen and partition that prevents him from perceiving abstract ideals, as they are. It is absolutely impossible for the human mind to comprehend the Divine Being, even though the corporeal element were as pure as that of the spheres. The Scriptural passages Ps. XCVII, 2 and XVIII, 12 express in figurative language this idea, that, on account of our bodies, we are unable to comprehend God's essence (Moreh, III, 9).
» Ex. XXXIII, 23. Cf. Yesode ha-Torah, I, 10. "But my face shall not be seen" (Ex. XXXIII, 23) means that*God's true existence, as it is, cannot be comprehended (Moreh, I, 37), and "thou shalt see my back" (Ex. loc. cit.) signifies that!; God allowed Moses to see that which follows Him, is similar to Him, and is the result of the Divine Will, i. e., all things created by God (Moreh, I, 39). Cf. also Moreh, I, 21 and 54. See, on the interpretation of "my back" ('inN) and "my face" ("iB), Kaufmann, Attributenlehre, p. 405, and n. 72.
F* 84 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES two classes of vices, that is, the mental and the moral, separated man from God, and that according to them the rank of the prophets varied, they (the Rabbis) said of some of their own number, with whose wisdom and morality they were ac- quainted, "It is fitting that the spirit of God should rest upon them as it did upon Moses, our teacher".1 Do not, however, mistake the intention of the comparison. They did, indeed, compare them with Moses, for they were far (God forbid!) from giving them equal rank. In the same way they speak of others, characterizing them as being "like Joshua".
This is what we intended to explain in this chapter.
CHAPTER VIII CONCEKNING THE NATURAL DISPOSITION OF MAN t IT is impossible for man to be born endowed by nature from his very birth with either virtue or vice, just as it is im- possible that he should be born skilled by nature in any part- icular art. It is possible, however, that through natural causes he may from birth be so constituted as to have a predilection for a particular virtue or vice, so that he will more readily practise it than any other.2 For instance, a man whose natural constitution inclines towards dryness, whose brain matter is clear and not overloaded with fluids, finds it much easier to learn, remember, and understand things than the phlegmatic man whose brain is encumbered with a great deal of humidity. But, if one who inclines constitutionally towards a certain excellence is left entirely without instruction, and if his faculties are not stimulated, he will undoubtedly remain ignorant. On the other hand, if one by nature dull and phlegmatic, possessing an abun- dance of humidity, is instructed and enlightened, he will, though with difficulty, it is true, gradually succeed in acquiring know- ledge and understanding. In exactly the same way, he whose blood is somewhat warmer than is necessary has the requisite 1 The title applies only to the first part of the chapter which is mainly a discussion of human free will, and is be supplemented by parts of M.'s Commentary on Abot, by H. Teshubah, V and VI, and Moreh, III, 16 — 21. On the contents of this chapter, see Jaraczewski, ZPhKr, XL VI, pp. 15 — 15; and Rosin, Ethik, p. 62 ff.
2 Of. Eth. Nic., II, 1, "The virtues, then, come to be in us neither by nature nor in despite of nature, but we are furnished with a capacity for receiving them, and are perfected in them through custom". This applies to nations as well as to individuals; see Pirke Mosheh, c. XXV, fol. 53 a.
86 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES quality to make of him a brave man. Another, however, the temperament of whose heart is colder than it should be, is naturally inclined towards cowardice and fear, so that if he should be taught and trained to be a coward, he would easily become one. If, however, it be desired to make a brave man of him, he can without doubt become one, providing he receive the proper training which would require, of course, great exertion.
I have entered into this subject so thou mayest not believe the absurd ideas of astrologers, who falsely assert that the con- stellation at the time of one's birth determines whether one is to be virtuous or vicious, the individual being thus necessarily compelled to follow out a certain line of conduct. We, on the contrary, are convinced that our Law1 agrees with Greek philosophy, which substantiates with convincing proofs the con- tention that man's conduct is entirely in his own hands, that no -compulsion is exerted, and that no external influence is brought to bear upon him that constrains him to be either virtuous or vicious, except inasmuch as, according to what we have said above, he may be by nature so constituted as to find it easy or hard, as the case may be, to do a certain thing; but that he must necessarily do, or refrain from doing, a certain thing is absolutely untrue.2 Were a man compelled to act ac- » Of. Moreh, HI, 17, Fifth Theory.
1 Saadia was the first Jewish philosopher to dwell at length upon the question of free will (Emunot we-Deot, III), being influenced by the dis- cussions of Arabic theologians, although Philo, who generally followed the system of the Stoics, professed a belief in this doctrine (Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis, ed. Mangey, p. 279). He was followed by Bahya (Hobot ha-Lebabot, III, 8); Ibn Zaddik ('Olam Raton, p. 69, ed. Jellinek, Leipzig, 1854); Yehudah ha-Levi (Cuzari, pt. V, ed. Cassel, p. 418); Abraham Ibn Ezra ( Yesod Morah, VII); and Ibn Baud (Emunah Bamah, p. 96, ed. Weil, Frankfurt a. M., 1842). For references to passages in M.'s works where he discusses free will, see p. 85 n. 1. M. undoubtedly had Eth. Nic. Ill in mind when he said that "Our Law agrees with Greek philosophy". See especially Eth. Nic. Ill, 5. 7, where are found the following statements, "So it seems as has been said, that man is the originator of his actions", and "if it is in our power to do and to forbear doing what is creditable or the contrary, and these respectively constitute the being good or bad, then the being good or vicious characters is in our power". See Rosin, THE EIGHT CHAPTERS— VIII 87 cording to the dictates of predestination, then the commands and prohibitions of the Law would become null and void, and the Law would be completely false, since man would have no freedom of choice in what he; does. Moreover, it would be use- less, in fact absolutely in vain, for man to study, to instruct, or attempt to learn an art, as it would be entirely impossible for him, on account of the external force compelling him, ac- cording to the opinion of those who hold this view, to keep from doing a certain act, from gaining certain knowledge, or from acquiring a certain characteristic. Reward and punishment, too, would be pure injustice, both as regards man towards man, and as between God and man.1 Suppose, under such conditions, that Simeon should kill Reuben. Why should the former be punished, seeing that he was constrained to do the killing, and Reuben was predestined to be slain? How could the Almighty, who is just and righteous, chastise Simeon for a deed which it was impossible for him to leave undone, and which, though he strove with all his might, he would be unable to avoid? If such were the true state of affairs, all precautionary measures, such as building houses, providing means of subsistence, fleeing when one fears danger, and so forth, would be absolutely use- less, for that which is decreed beforehand must necessarily happen. This theory is, therefore, positively unsound, contrary to reason and common sense, subversive of the fundamental principles of religion, and attributes injustice to God (far be it from Him!). In reality, the undoubted truth of the matter is that man has full sway over all his actions. If he wishes to do a thing, he does it; if he does not wish to do it, he need not, without any external compulsion controlling him. Therefore, God very properly commanded man, saying, "See I have set before thee this day life and the good, death and evil...therefore choose thou life",2 Ethik, p. 5, n. 4, and p. 66, n. 1. Consult on this subject I. Broyde, in J. E; vol. V, art. Free Will, and works mentioned there; Wolff, Acht Ca- pitel, Excursus, III, pp. 84 — 85; and Cohen, Characteristik, etc., in Moses ben Maimon, I, p. 76.
1 M. mentions the same argument in the Moreh, but it had often been advanced before him. See Rosin, Ethik, p. 67, n. 2.
88 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES giving us, as regards these, freedom of choice. Consequently, punishment is inflicted upon those who disobey, and reward granted to the obedient, as it is said, "If thou wilt hearken", and "If thou wilt not hearken".1 Learning and teaching are also necessary, according to the commands, "Ye shall teach them to your children",1* "and ye shall do them and observe to do them",2 and, similarly, all the other passages referring to the study of the commandments. It is also necessary to take all the precautionary measures laid down in the Law, such as, "Thou shalt make a battlement for thy roof; that thou bring not blood upon thy house",3 "lest he die in the battle",4 "wherein shall he sleep?"5, and "no man shall take to pledge the nether or the upper millstone",6 and many other passages in regard to precautions found in the Law and the Prophets.7 The statement found in the sayings of the Rabbis, "All is in the power of God except the fear of God" 8 is, nevertheless, true, and in accord with what we have laid down here. Men are, however, very often prone to err in supposing that many of their actions, in reality the result of their own free will, are forced upon them, as, for instance, marrying a certain woman, or acquiring a certain amount of money. Such a supposition is untrue. If a man espouses and marry a woman legally, then she becomes his lawful wife, and by his marrying her he has fulfilled the divine command to increase and multiply. God, however, does not decree the fulfillment of a commandment. If, on the other hand, a man has consummated with a woman an unlawful marriage, he has committed a transgression. But God does not decree that a man shall sin. Again, suppose a man robs another of money, steals from him, or cheats him, and then uttering a false oath, denies it; if we should say that God had destined that this sum should pass into the hands of the one and out of the possession of the other, God would ^ See H. Teshubah, V, 4, and Moreh, III, 20; cf. Ibn Baud, Emunah Ramah, II, 6, 2, p. 96.
THE EIGHT CHAPTERS— VIII 89 be preordaining an act of iniquity. Such, however, is not the case, but rather that all of man's actions, which are subject to his free will, undoubtedly either comply with, or transgress, God's commands; for, as has been explained in Chapter II, the commands and prohibitions of the Law refer only to those actions with regard to which man has absolute free choice to do, or refrain from doing. Moreover, to this faculty of the soul (i. e. the freedom of the will) "the fear of God" is subservient, and is, in consequence, not predestined by God, but, as we have explained, is entirely in the power of the human free will. By the word "all" (^OH), the Rabbis meant to designate only natural phenomena which are not influenced by the will of man, as whether a person is tall or short, whether it is rainy or dry, whether the air is pure or impure, and all other such things that happen in the world, and which have no connection with man's conduct.
In making this assertion that obedience or disobedience to the Law of God does not depend upon the power or will of God, but solely upon that of man himself, the sages followed the dictum of Jeremiah, who said, "Out of the mouth of God there cometh neither the bad nor the good".1 By the words "the bad" he meant vice, and by "the good", virtue; and, ac- cordingly, he maintains that God does not preordain that any man should be vicious or virtuous. Since this is so, it be- hooves man to mourn and weep over the sins and the trans- gressions he has committed, as he has sinned of his own free will in accordance with what the prophet says, "Wherefore should a living man mourn? Let every man mourn because of his sins".2 He continues, then, to tell us that the remedy for this disease is in our own hands, for, as our misdeeds were the result of our own free will, we have, likewise, the power to repent 1 Lam. Ill, 38. This verse is, however, generally translated, "Out of the mouth of God, the Most High, cometh there not evil as well as good?", which is exactly the opposite of M.'s interpretation. This verse is also quoted in H. Teshubah, V, 2, where M. states that it is wholly in the power of man to be as righteous as Moses or as wicked as Jeroboam.
2 Lam. Ill, 39.
90 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES of our evil deeds, and so he goes on to say, "Let us search through and investigate our ways, and let us return to the Lord. Let us lift up our heart with our hands to God, in the heavens".1 As regards the theory generally accepted by people, and likewise found in rabbinical and prophetical writings, that man's sitting and rising, and in fact all of his movements, are governed by the will and desire of God, it may be said that this is true only in one respect. Thus, for instance, when a stone is thrown into the air and falls to the ground, it is correct to say that the stone fell in accordance with the will of God, for it is true that God decreed that the earth and all that goes to make it up, should be the centre of attraction, so that when any part of it is thrown into the air, it is attracted back to the centre. Similarly, all the particles of fire ascend according to God's will, which preordained that fire should go upward.2 But it is wrong to suppose that when a certain part of the earth is thrown upward God wills at that very moment that it should fall. The MutdkaUimun^ are, however, of a different opinion in this regard, for I have heard them say that the Divine Will is constantly at work, decreeing everything from time to time.4 We do not agree with them, but believe that the Divine Will ordained everything at creation, and that all things, at all times, are regulated by the laws of nature, and run their natural course, in accordance with what Solomon said, "As it was, so it will ever be, as it was made so it continues, and there is nothing new under the sun".5 This occasioned the sages to say that all miracles which deviate from the natural course of events, whether they have already occured, or, according to promise, are to take place in the future, were fore-ordained 1 Ibid., HI, 40^1. Of. H. Teshubah, loc. cit.
2 Aristotle uses the example of a stone and fire, in Eth. Nic., II, 1, to show that nature is not affected by custom. A stone by custom can never be brought to ascend, nor fire do descend. Moral virtues are, however, the result of custom.
THE EIGHT CHAPTERS— VIII 91 by the Divine Will during the six days of creation, nature being then so constituted that those miracles which were to happen really did afterwards take place. Then, when such an occurence happened at its proper time, it may have been regarded as an absolute innovation, whereas in reality it was not.1 The Rabbis expatiate very much upon this subject in the Mi- drash KoheUth and in other writings, one of their statements in reference to this matter being, "Everything follows its natural course".2 In everything that they said, you will always find that the Rabbis (peace be unto them!) avoided referring to the Divine Will as determining a particular event at a particular time. When, therefore, they said that man rises and sits down in accordance with the will of God, their meaning was that, when man was first created, his nature was so determined that rising up and sitting down were to be optional to him; but they as little meant that God wills at any special moment that man should or should not get up, as He determines at any given time that a certain stone should or should not fall to the ground.3 The sum and substance of the matter is, then, that thou shouldst believe that just as God willed that man should be upright in stature, broad- chested, and have fingers, likewise did He will that man should move or rest of his own accord, and that his actions should be