1 M. reiterates this view of the miracles in his Commentary on Abot, V, 6, which enumerates ten things created on the eve of the Sabbath of the week of creation. See Lipmann Heller, in Tosefot Yom-Tob, on this passage; and Hoffman, Mischnaioth, Seder Nezikin, Berlin, 1889, p. 353. Cf. Moreh, I, 66, and Munk, Guide, I, p. 296. M. also supported this view in Moreh, II, 29 where he refers to Genesis Rabbah, V, 4, and Exodus Rabbah, XXI, 6, which read, "When God created the world He made an agreement that the sea should divide, the fire not hurt, the lions not harm, the fish not swallow persons singled out by God for certain times, and thus the whole order of things changes whenever he finds it neces- sary." Consult on this subject Joel, Moses Maimonides, 1876, p. 77; Rosin, Ethik, p. 69, n. 5; "Wolff, Acht Capitel, Excursus, IV; Lazarus, Ethics, II, p. 77, n. 1; Kohler, art. Miracles, in J. E., vol. VIII, pp. 606—607; Geiger, Judaism and its History, p. 348.
1 'Abodah Zarah, 54b. See Lazarus, ibid., II, p. 74 ff.
3 Cf. M.'s Commentary on Abot, IV, 23 (Rawicz, Commentar, pp. 89 — 90); H. Teshubah, V, 4, and Moreh, III, 17, Fifth Theory. See Rosin, Ethik, p. 69, n. 6.
92 THE ETHICS OP MAIMONIDES such as his own free will dictates to him, without any outside influence or restraint, which fact God clearly states in the truth- ful Law, which elucidates this problem, when it says, "Behold, the man is become as one of us to know good and evil".1 The Targum, in paraphrasing this passage, explains the meaning of the words mimmenu lada'at tob wara'. Man has become the only being in the world who possesses a characteristic which no other being has in common with him. What is this characteristic? It is that by and of himself man can distinguish between good and evil, and do that which he pleases, with absolutely no restraint. Since, then, this is so, it would have even been possible for him to have stretched out his hand, and, taking of the tree of life, to have eaten of its fruit, and thus live forever.2 Since it is an essential characteristic of man's makeup that he should of his own free will act morally or immorally, doing just as he chooses, it becomes necessary to teach him the ways of righteousness, to command and exhort him, to punish and reward him according to his deserts. It behooves man also to accustom himself to the practice of good deeds, until he acquires the virtues corresponding to those good deeds; and, furthermore, to abstain from evil deeds so that he may eradicate the vices that may have taken root in him. Let him not suppose that his characteristics have reached such a state that they are no longer subject to change, for any one of them may be altered from the good to the bad, and vice versa; and, moreover, all in accordance with his own free will. To confirm this theory, we have mentioned all these facts concerning the observances and the transgressions of the Law.
It now remains for us to explain another phase of this problem, which arises from the fact that there are several Scriptural passages in which some think they find proof that God pre- ordains and forces man to disobedience. This being an erroneous opinion, it becomes our duty to explain these passages, since so many people are confused regarding them. One of these is that in which God said to Abraham, "and they (the Egyptians) THE EIGHT CHAPTERS— VIII 93 will make them (the Israelites) serve, and they will afflict them".1 "Is it not evident", it is claimed, "that God decreed that the Egyptians should oppress the seed of Abraham? Then, why did He punish them, since, owing to divine predestination, it was inexorably decreed that they should enslave the Israelites?" The answer to this is as follows. Suppose God had said that of those who were to be born in the future, some were to be transgressors and others observers of the Law, some pious and some wicked. Such would take place, but it would by no means follow from this divine decree that a certain individual would necessarily have to do evil, or that another pious individual would be forced to do good. On the contrary, every evil-doer would become such of his own free will; if he preferred to be a righteous man, it would be in his power, and nothing could prevent him from becoming such. Likewise, if every righteous man preferred to do evil, nothing would hinder him, for God's decree was not pronounced against any certain individual, so that he might say, "It has already been decreed that I do this or that", but [these words] applied to the race in general, at the same time allowing every individual to retain his own free will, according to the very makeup of his nature. Consequently, every Egyptian who maltreated or oppressed the Israelites had it in his own power not to do them any injury unless he wanted to, for it was not ordained that any certain individual should harm them.2 The same answer may also apply to another passage in which God says, "Behold, thou shalt sleep with thy fathers; and then will this people rise up and go astray after the gods of the stranger of the land".3 This is no more nor less than if God had said, "Whoever practises idolatry will meet with this or that treatment", but, if no transgressor should ever be found, then the threat of punishment for idolatry would become nullified, and the curses would all be ineffectual.4 The same is true of all punishments mentioned in the Law. As we cannot say that simply because we find the law of stoning for Sabbatht Gen. XV, 13. * Cf. H. Teshubah, VI, 5. s Deut.
XXXI, 16. * Cf. H. T'shubah, loc. cit.
94 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES breakers [in the Torah] that he who desecrates the Sabbath was compelled to violate it, no more can we maintain that because certain maledictions occur there that those who practised idolatry, and upon whom these curses consequently fell, were predestined to be idol-worshippers. On the contrary, every one who prac- tised idolatry did so of his own volition, and so received due punishment, in consonance with the passage, "Yea they have made a choice of their own ways...so will I also make choice of their misfortune".1 As regards, however, the words of God, "and I will harden the heart of Pharaoh",2 afterwards punishing him with death, there is much to be said, and from which there may be deduced an important principle. Weigh well what I say in this matter, reflect upon it, compare it with the words of others,3 and give preference to that which is best. If Pharaoh and his coun- sellors had committed no other sin than that of not permitting Israel to depart, I admit that the matter would be open to great doubt, for God had prevented them from releasing Israel according to the words, "For I have hardened his heart and the hearts of his servants".4 After that, to demand of Pharaoh that he send them forth while he was forced to do the contrary, and then to punish him because he did not dis- miss them, finally putting him and all his followers to death, would undoubtedly be unjust, and would completely contradict all that we have previously said. Such, however, was not the real state of affairs, for Pharaoh and his followers, already of their own free will, without any constraint whatever, had rebelled by oppressing the strangers who were in their midst, having tyrannized over them with great injustice, as Scripture plainly states, "And he said unto his people, Behold, the people of the children of Israel is more numerous and mightier than we, come let us deal wisely with it".5 This they did through the dictates of their own free will and the evil passions of their hearts, with- out any external constraint forcing them thereto. The punishmeans Abraham ibn Ezra and Ibn Baud. See Rosin, Ethik, p. 24. < Ex., X, 1. s Ibid., I, 9, 10.
THE EIGHT CHAPTERS— VIII 95 ment which God then inflicted upon them was that He withheld from them the power of repentance, so that there should fall upon them that punishment which justice declared should he meted out to them. The fact that they were prevented from repenting manifested itself by Pharaoh's not dismissing them. This God had explained and told him, namely, that if He had merely wished to liberate Israel, He would have destroyed him and his adherents, and He would have brought out the Israelites; but, in addition to the liberation of his people, God wished to punish him because of his previous oppression of Israel, as it is said at the beginning of the matter, "And also that nation whom they shall serve will I likewise judge".1 It would have been impossible to have punished them, if they had repented; therefore repentance was withheld from them, and they continued to keep the children of Israel in bondage, as it says, "For even now I have stretched out my hand, etc...but for this cause have I allowed thee to remain".2 No one can find fault with us when we say that God at times punishes man by withholding repentance from him, thus not allowing him free will as regards repentance, for God (blessed be He) knows the sinners, and His wisdom and equity mete out their punishment. Sometimes, He punishes only in this world, sometimes only in the world to come, sometimes in both. Further- more, His punishment in this world is varied, sometimes being bodily, sometimes pecuniary, and sometimes both at once. Just as some of man's undertakings, which ordinarily are subject to his own free will, are frustrated by way of punishment, as for instance a man's hand being prevented from working so that he can do nothing with it, as was the case of Jereboam, the son of Nebat3, or a man's eyes from seeing, as happened to the Sodomites who had assembled about Lot 4, likewise does God withhold man's ability to use his free will in regard to 1 Gen. XV, 14.
2 Ex. IX, 15. 16. The same explanation for the hardening of Pharaoh's heart is given in H. Teshubah, VI, 3. On the withholding of repentance, see Schechter, Some Aspects of BabUnic Theology, p. 332.
96 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES repentance, so that it never at all occurs to liim to repent, and he thus finally perishes in his wickedness. It is not necessary for us to know about God's wisdom so as to be able to ascertain why He inflicts precisely such punishment as He does and no other, just as little as we know why one species has a certain particular form and not another. It is sufficient for us to know the general principle, that God is righteous in all His ways, that He punishes the sinner according to his sin, and rewards the pious according to his righteousness.
If you should inquire why God repeatedly asked Pharaoh to release Israel which he was unable to do — while he, in spite of the plagues which befell him, persisted in his rebellion and stubbornness, which very rebelliousness and stubbornness was his punishment — and yet God would not in vain have asked him to do a thing which he could not do, then know that, this, too, was a part of God's wisdom, to teach Pharaoh that God can suspend man's freedom of will when it pleases Him to do so. So, God said to him (through Moses), "I desire that thou shouldst liberate them, but thou wilt not dismiss them, so that thou shouldst die". Pharaoh should have consented to release them, and therely disprove the words of the prophet (Moses) that he was unable to obey, but he had not the power. Thus, a great wonder was revealed to the people, as it is said, "In order that they may proclaim my name throughout the earth",1 namely, that it is possible for God to punish man by depriving him of his free will respecting a certain deed, while he, though realizing it, is, however, unable to influence his soul, and return to his former state of freedom of the will.
Such was, likewise, the punishment of Sihon, King of Heshbon; for, on account of his former misdeed, to which he was not forced, God punished him by preventing him from granting the request of the Israelites, as a result of which they put him do death, as Scripture says, "But Sihon, the king of Heshbon, would not suffer our passing by him",2 etc. What has made this passage difficult for all commentators is their impression that Sihon was punished for not permitting Israel to pass * Ex. IX, 16. 2 Deut. II, 30. Of. H. Teshubah, VI, 3.
THE EIGHT CHAPTERS— VIII 97 through his land, just as they imagined that Pharaoh and his adherents were punished for not releasing Israel, and so they ask, "How could he (Sihon) be justly punished, since he was not a free agent?" These suppositions are incorrect, and the matter is as we have explained, namely, that Pharaoh and his adherents were punished by G-od because of their previous oppression of Israel, of which they did not repent, so that there befell them all the plagues; while Sihon's punishment, which consisted of his inability to do the will of Israel, thus resulting in his death, was due to the former deeds of oppression and injustice which he had practised in his kingdom.1 God has, moreover, expressly stated through Isaiah that He punishes some transgressors by making it impossible for them to repent, which He does by the suspension of their free will. Thus, He says, "Obdurate will remain the heart of this people and their ears will be heavy and their eyes will be shut, lest...they be converted and healing be granted them".2 The meaning of these words is so plain and obvious that they need no explanation. They are, however, a key to many unopened locks. Upon this principle also are based the words of Elijah (peace be unto him!) who, when speaking of the unbelievers of his time, said of them, "Thou hast turned their hearts back",3 which means that, as they have sinned of their own accord, their punishment from Thee is that Thou hast turned their hearts away from repentance, by not permitting them to exer- cise free will, and thus have a desire to forsake that sin, in consequence of which they persevere in their unbelief. So it is said, "Ephraim is bound to idols; let him alone",4 which means that since Ephraim has attached himself to idols of his own free will, and has become enamoured of them, his punishment consists in his being abandoned to his indulgence in them.
This is the interpretation of the words "Let him alone". To 1 M. cannot, however, point to any biblical passage that substantiates his contention that Sihon had previously committed injustice.
2 Isa. VI, 10, quoted also in H. Teshubah, VI, 3.
3 I K. XVIII, 37, quoted again in H. Teshubah, loc. cit., which also refers to Josh. XI, 20.
* Hos. IV, 17.
98 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES one who understands subtle ideas, this explanation will appeal as being excellent.
Very different, however, is the meaning of what Isaiah said, "Why hast thou let us go astray, oh Lord, from Thy ways, and suffered our hearts to be hardened against Thy fear?" * These words have no bearing upon the foregoing exposition. Their meaning is to be gathered from the context in which they occur.
The prophet, bewailing the captivity, our residence among strangers, the cessation of our kingdom, and the sovereignty of the nations over us, says by way of prayer, "0 God, if Israel continues to see this state of affairs in which the unbelievers wield the power, they will go astray from the path of truth, and their heart will incline away from Thy fear, as if Thou wast the cause of making those ignorant ones originally depart from the path of truth, as our teacher Moses said, 'Then will the nations which have heard Thy fame say in this manner that because the Lord was not able',"2 etc. For this reason, Isaiah said after that, "Return for the sake of Thy servants the tribes of Thy heritage",3 so that there should not be a blasphemy of God's name (by the heathens). Likewise, in the "minor prophets", there is found the opinion of those who, following the truth, were nevertheless conquered by the nations at the time of the exile, which passage, quoting their own words, reads, "Every one that doth evil is good in the eyes of the Lord, and in them he findeth delight, or else, where is the God of justice?"4 The prophet, quoting their own words which were occasioned by the length of the exile, continues, "Ye have said, It is vain to serve God; and what profit is it that we have kept His charge, and that we have walked contritely before the Lord of Hosts? And now we call the presumptuous happy; yea, built are they that practise wickedness"5, etc. Then, however, explicitly stating that God, in the future, will reveal the truth, he says, "And ye shall return, and see the difference between the righteous and the wicked".6 • Isa. LXIII, 17. 2 Num. XIV, 15. 16. 3 Isa., loc. cit.
tti, III, 18. Of. Moreh, III, 19.
THE EIGHT CHAPTERS— VIII 99 These are the ambiguous passages in the Law and Scripture from which it might appear that God compels man to commit transgressions. We have, however, undoubtedly explained the meaning of these verses, and if one examines it very closely, he will find it a truthful explanation. We, therefore, hold to our original contention, namely, that obedience or transgression of the Law depends entirely upon man's free will; that he is the master of his own actions; that what he chooses not to do he leaves undone, although God may punish him for a sin which he has committed by depriving him of his free will, as we have made clear; furthermore, that the acquisition of virtues and vices is entirely in the power of man, in consequence of which it is his duty to strive to acquire virtues, which he alone can acquire for himself, as the Rabbis in their ethical sayings in this very tractate say, "If I am not for myself who will be for me?"»
There is, however, one thing more relating to this problem about which we must say a few words, in order to treat in a comprehensive manner the subject-matter of this chapter. Although I had not intended at all to speak of it, necessity forces me to do so.2 This topic is the prescience of God,3 because it is with an argument based on this that our views are opposed by those who believe that man is predestined by God to do good or evil, and that man has no choice as to his conduct, since his volition is dependent upon God. The reason for their belief they base on the following statement. "Does God know or does He not know that a certain individual will be good or bad? If thou sayest 'He knows', then it ne- cessarily follows that man is compelled to act as God knew beforehand he would act, otherwise God's knowledge would be 1 Abot, I, 14. Cf. M.'s commentary on this passage.
2 M. feels it necessary here to discuss philosophically the prescience of God, which he does reluctantly, as the Perakim are intended for readers not versed in philosophy. See Introduction, p. 11.
3 For M.'s discussion of God's knowledge, see Perek Helelc; H. Teshubah, V, 5; Yesode ha-Torah, II, 8-10; Moreh, I, 58, and III, 19'-21. See Munk a* 100 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES imperfect. If thou sayest that God does not know in advance, then great absurdities and destructive religious theories will result." Listen, therefore, to what I shall tell thee, reflect well upon it, for it is unquestionably the truth.1 It is, indeed, an axiom of the science of the divine, i. e- metaphysics, that God (may He be blessed!) does not know by means of knowledge, and does not live by means of life,2 so that He and His knowledge may be considered two different things in the sense that this is true of man; for man is distinct from knowledge, and knowledge from man, in consequence of which they are two different things. If God knew by means of knowledge, He would necessarily be a plurality, and the primal essence would be composite, that is, consisting of God Himself, the knowledge by which He knows, the life by which He lives, the power by which He has strength, and similarly of all His attributes. I shall only mention one argument, simple and easily understood by all, though there are strong and con- vincing arguments and proofs that solve this difficulty. It is manifest that God is identical with His attributes and His attributes with Him, so that it may be said that He is the knowledge, the knower, and the known, and that He is the life, the living, and the source of His own life, the same being true of His other attributes. This conception is very hard to grasp, and thou shouldst not hope to thoroughly understand it by two or three lines in this treatise. There can only be im- parted to thee a vague idea of it.3 Now, in consequence of this important axiom, the Hebrew language does not allow the expression He Adonai (the life of God) as it does He Fara'oh 4 (the life of Pharaoh), where the 1 For a list and the opinions of Jewish philosophers before M. who discussed this problem, see Rosin, Ethik, p. 73, n. 5.
2 Cf. Moreh, I, 57: SHD! *b JH1M D"ro xh 'n pi, and Yesode ha-Torah, II, 10. See Kaufmann, Attributenlehre, p. 423, and note 94.
3 For an exhaustive discussion of the theories which M. merely mentions here, see Moreh, I, 50-51, on the attributes of God. See Munk, Guide, I, 50, p. 179 ff., passim; Kaufmann, ibid., p. 418 ff.; Cohen, Charakteristik, etc. in Moses ben Maimon, I, pp. 89-90.
« Gen. XLII, 15.
THE EIGHT CHAPTERS— VIII 101 word he (in the construct state) is related to the following noun, for the thing possessed and the possessor (in this case) are two different things. Such a construction cannot be used in regard to the relation of a thing to itself. Since the life of God is His essence, and His essence is His life, not being se- parate and distinct from each other, the word "life", therefore, cannot be put in the construct state, but the expression Hai AdonaiL (the living God) is used, the purpose of which is to denote that God and His life are one.2 Another accepted axiom of metaphysics is that human reason cannot fully conceive God in His true essence, because of the perfection of God's essence and the imperfection of our own reason, and because His essence is not due to causes through which it may be known.3 Furthermore, the inability of our reason to comprehend Him may be compared to the inability of our eyes to gaze at the sun, not because of the weakness of the sun's light, but because that light is more powerful than that which seeks to gaze into it.4 Much that has been said on this subject is self-evident truth.
From what we have said, it has been demonstrated also that we cannot comprehend God's knowledge, that our minds cannot grasp it all, for He is His knowledge, and His knowledge is He. This is an especially striking idea, but those (who raise the question of God's knowledge of the future) fail to grasp it to their dying day.5 They are, it is true, aware that the 1 Ruth, in, 13.
2 Cf. Yesode ha-Torah, II, 10, and Moreh, I, 58 (beg.). See Munk, Guide, I, p. 302, n. 3. The expressions D'nto '•n (II Sam. II, 27), h* -n (Job XXVII, 2), and especially -j»SJ <m nw <n (I Sam. XX, 3; XXV, 26, and II K. II, 2), and Jer. XXXVIII, 16 substantiate this novel linguistic argument of M. Amos VIII, 14 p "pnbx 'n is used in reference to the gods of idolators.
3 See Aristotle's Metaphysics, XXII, 9.
4 Cf. Moreh, I, 59, "All philosophers say, 'He has overpowered us by His grace, and it is invisible to us through the intensity of His light', like the sun which cannot be perceived by the eyes which are too weak to bear its rays". Cf. Bahya, Robot ha-Lebobot, I, 10. See Munk, Guide I, p. 252; Rosin, Ethik, pp.75, n. 4; Kaufmann, Attributenlehre, pp. 324-325; 445, n.128; and Wolff, Acht Capitel, p. 80, n. 1.
102 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES divine essence, as it is, is incomprehensible, yet they strive to comprehend God's knowledge, so that they may know it, but this is, of course, impossible. If the human reason could grasp His knowledge, it would be able also to define His essence, since both are one and the same, as the perfect knowledge of God is the comprehension of Him as He is in His essence, which consists of His knowledge, His will, His life, and all His other majestic attributes. Thus, we have shown how utterly futile is the pretension to define His knowledge. All that we can comprehend is that just as we know that God exists so are we cognizant of the fact that He knows. If we are asked, "What is the nature of God's knowledge?", we answer that we do not know any more than we know the nature of His true existence.1 Fault is found, moreover, with him who tries to grasp the truth of the divine existence, as expressed by the words, "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?"2 Reflect, then, upon all that we have said, namely, that man has control over his actions, that it is by his own determination that he does either the right or the wrong, without, in either case, being controlled by fate,3 and that, as a result of this divine commandment, teaching, preparation, reward, and punish- ment are proper. Of this there is absolutely no doubt. As regards, however, the character of God's knowledge, how He knows everything, this is, as we have explained, beyond the reach of human ken.
This is all that we purposed saying in this chapter, and it is now time for us to bring our words to an end, and begin the interpretation of this treatise 4 to which these eight chapters are an introduction.
1 Cf. Moreh, III, 20-21. 2 Job XI, 7.
s In his Commentary on Abot, III, 15, M. maintains that the phrase "Everything is foreseen (by God), but freedom of choice is given", is in harmony with his theory of the omniscience of God, which does not, however, deprive man of free will. See Rawicz, Commentary p. 75.
4 I. e., Abot INDEX INDEX OF SCRIPTURAL PASSAGES Genesis III. 22. XV. 13. XV. 14., XIX. 11 XLII. 15. XLV. 27 IX. 16.
X. 1.. XIV. 4.
XX. 12.
XXX. 15. 19.
XXXI. 16.