The Guide of the Perplexed

8. Mishnah, Aboth, II l. 9. ra-yon. This Hebrew word usually means “thought.”

10. Jer. 49:20. The quotation as given by Maimonides is not accurate. The word equivalent to the Lord does not occur in the portion of the verse quoted in the text. However, this inaccuracy does not lead to an alteration of the meaning of the verse, nor does it entail the invalidation of the point that Maimonides makes.

11. Jer. 10:12.

106 The Guide of the Perplexed 1-48 [ 54 b predicate of Him that which is manifestly a deficiency. When, however, the true reality is investigated it will be found - as shall be demonstrated — that He has no essential attribute12 existing in true reality, such as would be superadded to His essence.

CHAPTER 48 CHAPTER 48 In all cases in which the notion of hearing occurs with reference to God, may He be exalted, you will find that Onqelos the Proselyte avoids the expression and has interpreted its meaning as signifying that the matter in question reached Him, may He be exalted, or that He apprehended it. Or if it occurs with regard to a prayer, he interprets its meaning as signifying that He accepted it or did not accept it. Thus when interpreting the words, The Lord heard, he always says, It was heard before the Lord. And with regard to prayer, he translates, I will surely hear his cry? by the phrase, I will surely accept.2 This happens continually in his interpretation, and he does not deviate from this usage in any place.

As for the expressions denoting sight that occur with reference to Him, may He be exalted, Onqelos varies with regard to them in a strange way, the purpose and intention of which are not clear to me. For in some place he interprets the words, And the Lord saw, by the words, And the Lord beheld-, whereas in other passages he interprets these as follows: | And it was revealed before the Lord. Now the fact that in his interpretation he uses the words, And the Lord beheld, is a clear proof that the word to behold is equi¬ vocal in the Syriac3 language, inasmuch as it indicates both the notion of an apprehension of the intellect and that of an apprehension of the senses. This being so, according to his opinion, would that I knew why in some cases he avoids the expression and interprets the Hebrew words as: And it was revealed before the Lord. When I examined the copies of this translation that I could find and withal what I had heard in the course of instruction, I discovered that in the cases in which the word seeing is found in conjunction 12. The word translated “attribute” derives from the same root as the verb translated “to predicate of.”

1. Exod. 22:22. 2. In Aramaic.

3. surydniyya. Syriac being a dialect of Aramaic, the Arabic word is applied by Mai- monides and other writers also to the language of Onqelos, which is another dialect of Aramaic.

55 a ] The Guide of the Perplexed I • 48 io] with wrongdoing or harming and committing an act of aggression, he inter¬ prets it as: It was revealed before the Lord. Thus there is no doubt that the word to behold has in that language4 the meaning: to apprehend and to establish the thing apprehended as it is apprehended. Therefore when seeing is mentioned in connection with wrongdoing, he did not say, And He beheld, but, And it was revealed before the Lord. For I found that he used the word to behold to interpret the term seeing in all the passages in the whole of Torah in which the [Hebrew] word is used with reference to God, except in the verses that I am about to cite to you. Because the Lord hath seen my affliction,5 translated by him: Because my affliction was revealed before the Lord. For I have seen all that Laban doeth unto thee,6 translated by him: For before me it is revealed,• although in this case the speaker is but an angel, an apprehension indicative of his establishing the fact apprehended by him cannot be ascribed to him because this fact consists in wrongdoing. And God saw the children of Israel,1 translated by him: And the enslave¬ ment of the children of Israel was revealed before the Lord. I have surely seen the affliction of My people,8 translated by him: The enslavement of My people was surely revealed before Me. And I have also seen the oppression,9 translated by him: And the oppression was also revealed before Me. And that He had seen their affliction, 10 translated by him: For their enslavement was revealed before Him. I have seen this people,u translated by him: This people was revealed before me — for the meaning of this verse is: I saw their disobedience; just as in the verse, And God saw the children of Israel,12 the meaning is that He saw their misery. And when the Lord saw [zf], He abhorred \therri\ff translated by him: And it was revealed before the Lord. When He seeth that their power is gone,1 4 translated by him: For it was revealed before Him — for this | too is a state when wrong was done to them and when the enemy was dominant. All these passages are consistent and take into account the verse: And Thou const not look on iniquity. 15 Thus it is on this account that [Onqelos] translates every reference to enslavement or disobedience by: It was revealed before Him, or It was revealed before Me.

However, this excellent and lengthy explanation,16 which is not sub¬ ject to doubt, is spoilt for me by three passages that, if the analogy held good,17 ought to have been interpreted by him: And it was revealed before the Lord. But in the copies of his translation we find that he translates: 4. I. e., Syriac or Aramaic. 5. Gen. 29:32. Maimonides’ quotation is slightly inaccurate.

10. Exod. 4:31. 11. Exod. 32:9. 12. This verse is quoted earlier in this chapter.

17. Literally: according to this analogy (or syllogism).

108 The Guide of the Perplexed 1-49 [ 55 b And the Lord beheld. These passages are: And the Lord saw that the wickedness of man was great,18 And God saw the earth and, behold, it was corrupt;19 And the Lord saw that Leah was hated.20 The explanation that seems to me the most probable is that those are mistakes that have crept into the copies of the translation, for we do not have Onqelos' autograph of these passages 5 if we had, we should have said that perhaps21 he had in mind some interpretation with regard to this. As for his interpreting the verse, God will see for Himself the lamb,22 by the words, The lamb is revealed before the Lord, this is so either because this does not suggest to the estimative faculty that God, may He be exalted, will start to seek the lamb and to bring it into existence, or because from the standpoint of the [Syriac] language it was considered shocking that His apprehension should be connected with such an individual as an animal devoid of reason. As far as these passages are concerned,23 a careful investigation should be made with a view to correcting the copies of the translation. If, however, the passages are found to have the text we cited, I do not know what purpose [Onqelos] had in translating them in this manner.24 CHAPTER 49 CHAPTER 49 The angels too are not endowed with bodies, but are intellects separate from matter. However, they are the objects of an act,1 and God has created them, as will be explained.2 The Sages say in Bereshith Rabbah;3 The flaming sword which turns every way* is called thus with reference to the verse: His ministers a flaming fire.5 [The expression], which turns every way, | alludes to the fact that sometimes they turn into men, sometimes into women, sometimes into spirits, and sometimes into angels. Through this dictum they have made it clear that the angels are not endowed with matter and 21. Literally: Onqelos’ autograph in this so as to say that perhaps...22. Gen. 22:8.

23. Maimonides evidently has in mind the three passages in which Onqelos’ translation does not eliminate the suggestion that God apprehends evil.

24. Literally: I do not know for him a purpose in this.

1. mafculuna, which is the past passive participle of the verb facala: “to act” or “to do.” 2. Cf. II 2 and 6. 3. Genesis Rabbah, XXI in fine. 4. Gen. 3:24.

5. Ps. 104:4. Literally: The flaming of the sword which turns every way, upon the name His ministers a flaming fire.

56 a ] The Guide of the Perplexed 1-49 109 that outside the mind they have no fixed corporeal shape, but that all such shapes are only to be perceived in the vision of prophecy in consequence of the action of the imaginative capacity, as will be mentioned in connection with the notion of the true reality of prophecy. As for their dictum, sometimes into women — which implies that the prophets likewise sometimes see the angels in the vision of the prophecy in the form of women — it refers to the dictum of Zechariah, peace be on him: And, behold, there came forth two women, and the wind was in their wings, and so on.6 Now you already know that it is very difficult for man to apprehend, except after strenuous training, that which is pure of matter and absolutely devoid of corporeality. It is particularly difficult for one who does not differentiate between that which is cognized by the intellect and that which is imagined and who tends mostly toward imaginative apprehension alone. For such a one everything that is imagined exists or can exist, whereas that which does not enter within the net of imagination is in his opinion non¬ existent and incapable of existing. Accordingly, to individuals of this kind — and they form the majority of those engaged in speculation — the true reality of a notion never becomes known, nor does a difficulty ever become clear to them. Because of the difficulty of this matter, the books of the prophets likewise contain dicta whose external sense can be understood as signifying that the angels are corporeal, that they move, that they are in the form of men, that they are given orders by God, and that they carry out His orders and do what He wishes in virtue of His orders. All this is said so as to guide the mind to a knowledge of their existence and of their being alive and perfect, as we have explained with regard to God.7 However, if one would stop at this imagining with regard to the angels, their true reality and essence would be like the essence of God as it is con¬ ceived in the imagination of the multitude. For about God too, | statements are made from whose external sense it appears that He is a living, mobile8 body, having the form of a man. Therefore the mind is guided toward a knowledge of the fact that the rank of the existence of the angels is below the rank of the deity through the admixture with their shape of something belonging to the shape of irrational animals, so that what is understood with regard to the existence of the Creator should be more perfect than what is understood with regard to their existence, just as man is more perfect than the irrational animals. However, an animal shape is attributed to them by attribution of wings only and in no other way. For flying cannot be rep¬ resented to oneself without wings, just as walking cannot be represented to no The Guide of the Perplexed I • 49 [ 56 b oneself without legs. For the existence of these faculties cannot possibly be represented to oneself except in so far as they subsist in these substrata. The motion of flying has been chosen in order to point to the angels being living beings. For it is the most perfect and the noblest of the motions of the irrational animals, and man believes it to be a great perfection; so that he even wishes to fly in order that it might be easy for him to flee from all that harms him and that he might betake himself swiftly to whatever agrees with him, even if it be far off. Accordingly this motion is ascribed to the angels. Moreover, a bird appears and is hidden, approaches and moves far away, in very quick time; and all these are characteristics that, as shall be explained,9 it behooves us to believe that the angels possess.

However, this which is deemed to be perfection, I mean the motion of flying, is not in any way ascribed to God, because it is a motion pertaining to an animal not endowed with reason. For you should not make a mistake with regard to the dictum, And He rode upon a cherub, and did fly,10 for it is the cherub that did fly. And this parable is merely intended to indicate the swiftness of the coming to pass of that matter.11 Similarly Scripture says: Behold, the Lord rideth upon a swift cloud, and cometh unto Egypt, 12 which refers to the swiftness of the descent upon them of the calamity referred to.

Nor should you be led into error by what you find especially in Ezekiel with regard to the face of an ox and the face of a lion and the face of an eagle and the sole of the foot of a calf.15 For this has [ another inter¬ pretation, which you will hear.14 It is also merely a description of the animals. These intentions will be explained by means of hints sufficient to awaken the attention.

As for the motion of flying, it occurs in the texts in every passage, and it cannot be represented to oneself without a wing. Accordingly it was supposed that the angels had wings in order that guidance be given concerning the state of their existence, but not with a view to obtaining knowledge of the true reality of their essence. Know that everyone who accomplishes a very swift movement is described as flying so as to indicate the swiftness of the movement. Thus Scripture says: As the eagle swoopeth down.15 For the eagle is swifter in his flight and swoop than any other bird; for this reason it is used in the parable. Know also that the two wings are the causes of flying. For this reason the number of wings seen in the prophetic vision corresponded to that of the causes of motion of a moving16 thing. However, this is not the subject of this chapter.

9. Cf. II 42. 10. Ps. 18:11. li. The word also means “command.” 12. Isa. 19:1.

CHAPTER 50 Know, thou who studiest this my Treatise, that belief is not the notion that is uttered, but the notion that is represented in the soul when it has been averred of it that it is in fact just as it has been represented. If you belong to those who are satisfied with expressing in speech the opinions that are correct or that you deem to be correct, without representing them to yourself and believing them, and still less without seeking certain knowl¬ edge regarding them, you take a very easy road. In accordance with this, you will find many stupid people holding to beliefs to which, in their representation, they do not attach any meaning whatever. If, however, you belong to those whose aspirations are directed toward ascending to that high rank which is the rank of speculation, and to gaining certain knowledge with regard to | God’s being One by virtue of a true Oneness, so that no composition whatever is to be found in Him and no possibility of division in any way whatever — then you must know that He, may He be exalted, has in no way and in no mode any essential attribute, and that just as it is impossible that He should be a body, it is also impossible that He should possess an essential attribute. If, however, someone believes that He is one, but possesses a certain number of essential attributes, he says in his words that He is one, but believes Him in his thought to be many. This resembles what the Christians say: namely, that He is one but also three, and that the three are one. Similar to this is the assertion of him who says that He is one but possesses many attributes and that He and His attributes are one, while he denies at the same time His being corporeal and believes in His absolute simplicity; as if what we aimed at and investigated were what we should say and not what we should believe. For there is no belief except after a representation 5 belief is the affirmation that what has been rep¬ resented is outside the mind just as it has been represented in the mind. If, together with this belief, one realizes that a belief different from it is in no way possible and that no starting point can be found in the mind for a rejection of this belief or for the supposition that a different belief is possible, there is certainty. When you shall have cast off desires and habits, shall have been endowed with understanding, and shall reflect on what I shall say in the following chapters, which shall treat of the negation of attributes, you shall necessarily achieve certain knowledge of it. Then you shall be one of those who represent to themselves the unity of the Name 1 12 The Guide of the Perplexed 1-51 [ 57 b and not one of those who merely proclaim it with their mouth without representing to themselves that it has a meaning. With regard to men of this category, it is said: Thou art near in their mouth, and far from their reins } But men ought rather to belong to the category of those who represent the truth2 * * to themselves and apprehend it, even if they do not utter it, as | the virtuous are commanded to do — for they are told: Commune with your own heart upon your bed, and be still. Selah.5 CHAPTER 51 There are many things in existence that are clear and manifest: primary intelligibles and things perceived by the senses and, in addition, the things that come near to these in respect to their clarity. If man had been left as 1 he [naturally] is, he would not have needed a proof of them — for instance, for the existence of motion, the existence of man’s ability to act, the manifestations of generation and corruption, the natures of the things that are apparent to the senses, like the hotness of fire, the cold¬ ness of water, and many other things of this kind. Yet since strange opinions have arisen due either to people who committed errors or to people who acted with some end in view, so that professing such opinion they ran counter to the nature of existence and denied a sensibly perceived thing or wished to suggest to the estimative faculty the existence of a nonexistent thing, the men of science have had to resort to proving those manifest things and to disproving the existence of things that are only thought to exist. Thus we find that Aristotle establishes the fact of motion, as it had been denied, and demonstrates the nonexistence of atoms, as their existence had been asserted.2 To this category belongs the denial of essential attributes to God, may He be exalted. For that denial is a primary intelligible, inasmuch as an attribute is not the essence of the thing of which it is predicated, but is a certain mode of the essence and hence an accident. If, however, the attribute were the essence of the thing of which it is predicated, the attribute 1. Jer. iz:z. 2. The word may also mean “God.” g. Ps. 4:5.

1. In accordance with the readings of several MSS, I read kamd instead of tva-ma, figuring in the text of Joel’s edition.

2. The word athbata, translated “asserted,” is also used by Maimonides in this chapter and elsewhere to denote the fact that true opinions were proved to be such. In those cases it is translated “establish” or “establish the truth of,” would be either a tautology3 — as if you were saying that man is man¬ or the attribute would be a mere explanation of a term — as if you said that man is a rational living being. For being a rational animal ] is the essence and true reality of man, and there does not exist in this case a third notion, apart from those of animal and of rational, that constitutes man. For man is the being of which life and rationality are predicated. Thus those attributes4 merely signify an explanation of a term and nothing else. It is as if you said that the thing denoted by the term “man” is the thing composed of life and rationality. It is then clear that an attribute may be only one of two things. It is either the essence of the thing of which it is predicated, in which case it is an explanation of a term. We, in this respect, do not consider it impossible to predicate such an attribute of God, but do consider it impossible in another respect, as shall be made clear.5 Or the attribute is different from the thing of which it is predicated, being a notion superadded to that thing. This would lead to the conclusion that that attribute is an accident belonging to that essence.

Now by denying the assertion that terms denoting accidents are attributes of the Creator, one does not deny the notion of accident. For every notion superadded to an essence is an adjunct to it and does not perfect its essence, and this is the meaning of accident. This should be considered in addition to the circumstances that there would be many eternal things if there were many attributes. For there is no oneness at all except in believing that there is one simple essence in which there is no complexity or multipli¬ cation of notions, but one notion only 5 so that from whatever angle you regard it and from whatever point of view you consider it, you will find that it is one, not divided in any way and by any cause into two notions 5 and you will not find therein any multiplicity either in the thing as it is outside of the mind or as it is in the mind, as shall be demonstrated in this Treatise.6 In discussing this subject, some people engaged in speculation have ended by saying that His attributes, may He be exalted, are neither His essence nor a thing external to His essence. This is similar to what others say, namely, that the modes — by which term they mean the universals — are neither existent nor nonexistent, and, again similar to what others say, that the atom | is not in a place, but occupies a locality, and that there is no act of a man but that there may be an acquisition of an act by him. These are things that are merely said; and accordingly they subsist only in 3. The Arabic word tikraran means “several times.”

4. In the singular in the Arabic. The attributes in question are life and rationality.

5. In the next chapter. 6. Cf. II 22.

words, not in the mind 5 all the more, they have no existence outside of the mind. But as you know and as everyone knows who does not deceive himself, these assertions are defended by means of many words and falsifying parables and are proved correct by shouting defamatory polemics and various complicated kinds of dialectic arguments and sophistries. Should, however, the man who proclaims these things and attempts to establish them in the ways indicated, reflect upon his belief, he would find nothing but confusion and incapacity. For he wants to make exist something that does not exist and to create a mean between two contraries that have no mean. Or is there a mean between that which exists and that which does not exist, or in the case of two things is there a mean between one of them being identical with the other or being something else? What forces him to this is, as we have said, the wish to preserve the conceptions of the imagination and the fact that all existent bodies are always represented to oneself as certain essences. Now every such essence is of necessity endowed with attributes, for we do not ever find an essence of a body that while existing is divested of every¬ thing and is without an attribute. This imagination being pursued, it was thought that He, may He be exalted, is similarly composed of various notions, namely, His essence and the notions that are superadded to His essence. Several groups of people pursued the likening of God to other beings and believed Him to be a body endowed with attributes. Another group raised themselves above this consequence and denied His being a body, but preserved the attributes. All this was rendered necessary by their keeping to the external sense of the revealed books as I shall make clear in later chapters that will deal with these notions.7 | CHAPTER 52 In attribute predicated of any thing, of which thing it is accordingly said A that it is such and such, must necessarily belong to one of the following five groups: The first group is characterized by the thing having its definition predicated of it— as when it is predicated of man that he is a rational living being. This attribute, which indicates the essence and true reality of a thing, is, as we have already made clear,1 merely the explanation of a term and 7. Cf. I 53.

1. Cf. I 51.

59 b ] The Guide of the Perplexed 1-52 j/j nothing else. This kind of attribute should be denied to God according to everybody. For He, may He be exalted, has no causes anterior to Him that are the cause of His existence and by which, in consequence, He is defined. For this reason it is well known among all people engaged in speculation, who understand what they say, that God cannot be defined.

The second group is characterized by the thing having part of its definition predicated of it — as when it is predicated of man that he is a living being or a rational being. This attribute signifies an inseparable connection. For our saying, every man is rational, signifies that reason must be found in every being in whom humanity is found. This kind of attribute should be denied to God, may He be exalted, according to everybody. For if He has a part of an essence, His essence must be composite. The absurdity of divine attributes belonging to this group is like the absurdity recognized with regard to the first group.