the mountain of the Lord, the rod of the Lord. He intends to signify by this that the finger is a created instrument that has cut into the tables through the will of God. I do not know what has led him to make this interpretation. For it would have been more plausible to translate written by the word of the Lord, just as the Scripture says: By the word of the Lord were the heavens made. Do you think that the existence of writing on the tables is any stranger than the existence of stars in the spheres? For just as the stars came into being through the First Will and not through an instrument, so this inscribed writing came into being through the First Will and not through an instrument. You already know | the text of the Mishnah 12 about ten things created in the twilight, 13 among which were the writing and the inscription. This proves that there was a general consensus among the multitude that the writing on the tables was like all the other work in the beginning, as we have made clear in the Commentary on the Mishnah.
CHAPTER 67 CHAPTER 67 As the term to say amir ah] is figuratively used for the will in regard to everything that has been created in the six days of the beginning — with reference to which it is said: He said, He said — the term to rest [shebithah] is derivatively used with reference to the Sabbath as there was no creation on that day. It is accordingly said: And He rested on the seventh day.1 For refraining from speech is likewise called rest. Thus it is said: So these three men ceased 2 to answer Job.3 Similarly the term to repose [nihah] occurs in the sense of refraining from speech. Thus it says: They spoke to Nabal according to all those words in the name of David and reposed 4 \jyanuhu]; the meaning of which in my opinion is: “and then refrained from speech until they heard the answer.” For in the preceding verses there is no mention of their being tired in any way, so that even if they were tired, the term reposed would be quite extraneous to the story. Scripture merely relates that they brought out that speech with its effort at graciousness and then were silent that is, they did not add any other uttered notion to that speech, or any act, that would necessitate his reply to them to be such as 13. Of the sixth day of the days in which the world was created.
162 The Guide of the Perplexed 1-67 [ 86 a he gave. For the purpose of the story is to give an account of [Nabal’s] blameworthiness and to make clear that it was extreme.
In this sense it is likewise said: And He reposed \va-yanaK\ the seventh day.5 However, the Sages and the other commentators have made | out that the signification of the verb derives from that of rest and that it is a transitive verb. Accordingly the Sages, may their memory be blessed, have said: He let His world repose on the seventh day,5 meaning that creation ceased on that day. It is also possible that [the verb va-yanah, meaning He reposed] is one of those verbs the first or the third radicals of which are weak. If this were so, it would mean: He established existence, or He made the latter endure as it was on the seventh day. Thus Scripture would say that on every day of the preceding six, events occurred that did not corre¬ spond to the established nature that exists at present in the whole of existence, whereas on the seventh day the state of things became lasting and established just as it is at present. This assertion made by us is not refuted by observation that the conjugation of the verb in question is not like that of the verbs the first or third radicals of which are weak. For sometimes conjugations are irregular and may be found not to correspond to other analogous examples. This occurs more particularly in the case of these weak verbs. The doing-away with the notion in question, which gives rise to vain imagining, should not be negated because of the rules of conjugation obtaining in the [Hebrew] language, for we know that today we have no complete understanding of the science of our language and that in all languages rules merely conform to the majority of cases. On the other hand, we find in the case of this root that that verb too whose second radical is weak has sometimes the meaning: to set, to establish. Thus the dictum: And she shall be set \va-himihah\ there.1 And similarly: And she suffered neither the birds of the air to be established 8 on them t9. In my opinion the verb has this meaning also in the verse: That I might be established 10 in the day of trouble.^ As for the verb vayyinaphash, 1 2 it is a passive form deriving from the word nephesh [sou/]. Now we have already made clear13 the equivocality of the term soul and have explained that it may have the meaning of purpose and volition. Accordingly it means that His purpose was perfected and all His will realized.
5. Exod. 20:11. 6. Genesis Rabbah, X in fine. 7. Zech. 5:11.
8. Literally: rest (la-nuah). 9. II Sam. 21:10. 10. Literally: rest. 11. Hab. 3:16.
12. Generally translated “to rest.” The verb figures in the following verse: For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and on the seventh day He ceased from work and rested (Exod. 31: 17).
13. Cf. I 41.
CHAPTER 68 You already know that the following dictum | of the philosophers with reference to God, may He be exalted, is generally admitted: the dictum being that He is the intellect as well as the intellectually cognizing subject and the intellectually cognized object, and that those three notions form in Him, may He be exalted, one single notion in which there is no multiplicity.1 We have mentioned this likewise in our great compilation,2 since this, as we have made clear there, is one of the foundations of our Law; I mean the fact that He is one only and that no other thing can be added to Him, I mean to say that there is no eternal thing other than He. For this reason it is said, by the Lord the living, and not, by the life of the Lord. For His life is not something other than His essence, as we have made clear when speaking of the negation of attributes. However, there is no doubt that anyone who has not studied the books that have been composed concerning the intellect has not grasped the essence of the intellect, has not acquired knowledge of its quiddity, and has no understanding of it other than one that resembles his understanding of the notions of blackness and whiteness, has great difficulty in understanding this notion. In fact our saying that He is the intellectual cognition5 as well as the intellectually cognizing subject and the intellectually cognized object will appear to him as if we had said that whiteness, that which has become white, and that which whitens, are one and the same thing. How many ignoramuses there are who hasten to refute us by means of this and similar examples, and how many pretending to knowledge there are who have great difficulties with regard to this and who hold that the minds cannot attain the knowledge that it is correct that this matter should be necessarily true. Yet this notion is a matter of demonstration and is quite clear, as the theologizing4 philoso¬ phers have explained. Here I shall make clear to you that which they have demonstrated.
Know that before a man intellectually cognizes a thing, he is potentially the intellectually cognizing subject. Now if he has intellectually cognized a thing (it is as if you said that if a man has intellectually cognized this piece l. On this dictum, cf. Translator’s Introduction.
2. Cf. Mishneh Torah, Yesodei ha-Torah, I.
3. caql. The term also means “intellect.”
4. al-muta^allihun. This participle sometimes refers to those who become divine (for instance by union with, or imitation of, God). In this context, however, Maimonides seems to have in mind the philosophers interested in the divine science.
164 The Guide of the Perplexed 1-68 [ 87a of wood to which one can point, has stripped its form from its matter, and has represented to himself the pure form — this being the action of the intellect), at that time the man would become one who has intellectual cognition in actu. Intellect realized in actu is the pure abstract form, | which is in his mind, of the piece of wood. For intellect is nothing but the thing that is intellectually cognized. Accordingly it has become clear to you that the thing that is intellectually cognized is the abstract form of the piece of wood, that this form is identical with the intellect realized in actu, and that these are not two things — intellect and the intellectually cognized form of the piece of wood. For the intellect in actu is nothing but that which has been intellectually cognized 5 and the thing by means of which the form of wood was intellectually cognized and made abstract, that thing being the intellectually cognizing subject, is also indubitably identical with the intellect realized in actu. For in the case of every intellect, its act is identical in essence; for intellect in actu is not one thing and its act another thing; for the true reality and the quiddity of the intellect5 is apprehension.
You should not then think that the intellect in actu is a certain thing existing by itself apart from apprehension and that apprehension is some¬ thing else subsisting in that intellect. For the very being and true reality of the intellect is apprehension. Whenever, therefore, you assume that an intellect exists in actu, that intellect is identical with the apprehension of what has been intellectually cognized. This is most clear to whoever has attempted this kind of speculation. Accordingly it is clear that the act of the intellect, which is its apprehension, is the true reality and the essence of the intellect. Consequently the thing by means of which the form of that piece of wood was abstracted and apprehended, which thing is the intellect,6 is also the intellectually cognizing subject. For it is that very intellect that abstracted the form and apprehended it, this being its act because of which it is said to be an intellectually cognizing subject. Now its act is identical with its essence. Accordingly that which has been assumed to be an intellect in actu has nothing belonging to it except the form of the piece of wood. Accordingly it is clear that whenever intellect exists in actu, it is identical with the intellectually cognized thing. And it has become clear that the act of every intellect, which act consists in its being intellectually cognizing, is identical with the essence of that intellect. Consequently the intellect,7 the intellectually cognizing subject, and the intellectually cognized object 5. In this passage this translation seems to be more appropriate than “intellectual cogni¬ tion.” It is, however, impossible to separate the two senses.
6. Or: intellectual cognition. 7. Or: the intellectual cognition 88a ] The Guide of the Perplexed 1-68 i6j are always one and the same thing in the case of everything that is cognized in actu. | If, however, potential cognition is assumed, they — that is, the intellect in potentia and the potentially cognizable object — are necessarily two things. It is as if you said the hylic intellect subsisting in Zayd is a potential intellect, and similarly this piece of wood is in potentia an intellectually cognized object. Indubitably these are two things. When thereupon the intellect becomes actual and the form of the piece of wood is realized as intellectually cognized, then the intellectually cognized form is identical with the intel¬ lect— that very intellect, which is an intellect in actu, being the one by means of which the form was abstracted and intellectually cognized. For everything that has an existing act exists in actu. Thus every intellect in potentia and potentially cognizable objects are two things. Moreover, everything that is in potentia must undoubtedly have a substratum sup¬ porting this potentiality, such a substratum as, for instance, man. Thus there are three things: the man who supports that potentiality and who is the intellectually cognizing subject in potentia 5 the potentiality that is the intellect in potentia; and the thing apt to be intellectually cognized, which is the potentially cognizable object. In the example in question, this would be as if you said: man, hylic intellect, and the form of the piece of wood — these being three separate notions. When, however, the intellect is realized in actu, the three notions become one. Accordingly you will never find in that case that intellect is one thing and the intellectually cognized object another thing, unless they are regarded as being in potentia.
Now when it is demonstrated that God, may He be held precious and magnified, is an intellect in actu and that there is absolutely no potentiality in. Him — as is clear and shall be demonstrated — so that He is not by way of sometimes apprehending and sometimes not apprehending8 but is always an intellect in actu, it follows necessarily that He and the thing apprehended are one thing, which is His essence. Moreover, the act of apprehension owing to which He is said to be an intellectually cognizing subject is in itself the intellect, which is His essence. Accordingly He is always the intel¬ lect as well as the intellectually cognizing subject and the intellectually cognized object. It is accordingly also clear | that the numerical unity of the intellect, the intellectually cognizing subject, and the intellectually cognized object, does not hold good with reference to the Creator only, but also with reference to every intellect. Thus in us too, the intellectually cognizing 8. Cf. Aristotle Metaphysics xii.7. 1 072814 ff.; De Anima iii. 5.430810 ff. Cf. Translator’* Introduction.
subject, the intellect, and the intellectually cognized object, are one and the same thing wherever we have an intellect in actu. We, however, pass intellectually from potentiality to actuality only from time to time. And the separate intellect too, I mean the active intellect, sometimes gets an impedi¬ ment that hinders its act — even if this impediment does not proceed from this intellect’s essence, but is extraneous to it — being a certain motion happening to it by accident.
We do not intend at present to explain this, our intention being to affirm that that which pertains solely to Him, may He be exalted, and which is specific to Him is His being constantly an intellect in actu and that there is no impediment either proceeding from His essence or from another that might hinder His apprehending. Accordingly it follows necessarily because of this that He is always and constantly an intellectually cognizing subject, an intellect, and an intellectually cognized object. Thus His essence is the intellectually cognizing subject, the intellectually cognized object, and the intellect, as is also necessarily the case with regard to every intellect in actu. We have repeated this notion several times in this chapter because the minds of men are very much strangers to this way of representing the thing to oneself. I do not consider that you might confuse intellectual representa¬ tion with imagination and with the reception of an image of a sense object by the imaginative faculty, as this Treatise has been composed only for the benefit of those who have philosophized and have acquired knowledge of what has become clear with reference to the soul and all its faculties.
CHAPTER 69 CHAPTER 69 The philosophers, as you know, designate God, may He be exalted, as | the first cause and the first ground.1 On the other hand, those who are generally known as Mutakallimun avoid these designations very deliberately and designate Him as the maker2 and think that there is a great difference between our saying cause and ground and our saying maker. For they say that if we say that He is a cause, the existence of that which is caused follows necessarily, and that this leads to the doctrine of the 1. The text has al-Hlla al-ula and al-sabab al-awwal. In this context the expressions are synonymous, both of them meaning “the first cause.”
2. The act of making (Jicl) is the same as the “act” spoken of in the preceding chapter.
eternity of the world and of the world necessarily following from God. If, however, we say that He is the maker, it does not necessarily follow that that which is made exists together with Him. For the maker sometimes precedes the act of making. But they only consider a maker as preceding the act of making. Now this is the assertion of people who do not make a distinction between what is in potentia and what is in actu.
But you know that, regarding this subject, there is no difference between your saying a cause and your saying a maker. For if you regard the cause as being likewise in potentia, it precedes its effect in time. If, on the other hand, it is a cause in actu, its effect exists necessarily in virtue of the existence of the cause as a cause in actu. Similarly if you regard a maker as a maker in actu, the existence of that which is made by him follows necessarily. For before he builds a house, a builder is not a builder in actu, but a builder in potentia; just as the matter of a particular house, before it is built, is matter in a state of potentiality. However, when a builder builds, he is a builder in actu, and then the existence of a built thing follows necessarily. Thus we have gained nothing by preferring the term “maker” to the term “cause and ground.” The whole purpose here is to show the equivalence of those two terms. For just as we designate Him as a maker — even if that which is made by Him be nonexistent — because there is no impediment hindering Him from accomplishing the act of making whenever He wills to, we are also permitted to designate Him in very | same sense as a cause and a ground — though that which is caused be nonexistent.
In fact the philosophers were induced to designate Him, may He be exalted, as a cause and not as a maker, not because of their generally known opinion with regard to the eternity of the world, but because of other notions of which I will give you a summary account. In natural science, it has been made clear that there are causes for everything that has a cause; that they are four: namely, matter, form, the efficient cause, and the end; and that some of them are proximate causes and others remote ones. Every cause belonging to one of these four is designated as cause and ground. Now one of the opinions of the philosophers, an opinion with which I do not disagree, is that God, may He be held precious and magnified, is the efficient cause, that He is the form, and that He is the end. Thus it is for this reason that they say that He, may He be exalted, is a cause and a ground, in order to comprise these three causes — that is, the fact that God is the efficient cause3 of the world, its form, and its end.
5. faHl, the Arabic term translated here as “efficient cause,” has been rendered above by the word “maker.”
168 The Guide of the Perplexed 1-69 [89# My purpose in this chapter is to make it clear to you in what respect it is said of Him, may He be exalted, that He is the efficient cause, that He is the form of the world, and that He is its end. You should not busy your mind at this place with the subject of the temporal creation of the world by Him or of its necessarily proceeding from Him, as is the opinion of the philosophers, for there will come subsequently a long discussion of that problem appropriate to the subject. The subject here, on the other hand, is God’s being the efficient cause4 of the partial actions occurring in the world, just as He is the efficient cause of the world as a whole.
I shall accordingly say: It has been made clear in natural science that for every one of the four kinds of causes one also needs to seek a cause. Accordingly, with reference to every generated thing, there are to be found four causes proximate to it, and there are to be found causes for these causes and causes for the causes of the latter until one arrives at the first causes. For instance this effected thing has a certain N as its efficient cause, | and this efficient cause in its turn has an efficient cause 5 and this continues until the first mover is attained, who is in true reality the efficient cause of all these intermediaries. For if the letter Alif is moved by the letter Ba, and the latter is moved by the letter Jim, which is moved by the Dal, moved in its turn by the letter Ha, this process cannot go on endlessly. Thus we have to stop for instance at the letter Ha. And there is accordingly no doubt that the letter Ha is the mover of Alif, of Ba, of Jim, and of Dal. And it is truly said with reference to the motion of Alif that it is due to an action of Ha. In this way every action that occurs in Being is referred to God, as we shall make clear, even if it is worked by one of the proximate efficient causes 5 God, considered as efficient cause, is then the remotest one.5 Similarly we find, when attentively investigating the natural forms subject to generation and corruption, that they are inevitably preceded by another form that gives that particular matter the disposition required for the reception of that particular form; that second form is in its turn preceded by another form until we finally come to the ultimate form that is necessary for the existence of the intermediate forms, while the latter are the cause of the proximate form. This ultimate form for all that exists6 is God, may He be exalted. You should not think that our saying of Him that He is the ultimate form of the whole world refers to the ultimate form of which Aristotle says in the “Metaphysics” that it is not subject to generation and 4. fdcil. Cf. preceding note. 5. Literally: the remotest cause.
6. Literally: in all existence.
go b ] The Guide of the Perplexed 1-69 169 corruption; the form mentioned there is a natural one and is not a separate intellect. For our saying of Him, may He be exalted, that He is the ultimate form of the world does not denote that there is an analogy between Him and the form endowed with matter in its being a form to that particular matter,7 so that | He, may He be exalted, would be a form to a body. It was not said with reference to this point of view. One should rather consider that just as every existent thing endowed with a form is what it is in virtue of its form — in fact its being passes away and is abolished when its form passes away — there subsists the very same relation between the deity and the totality of the remote principles of existence. For the universe8 exists in virtue of the existence of the Creator, and the latter continually endows it with permanence in virtue of the thing that is spoken of as overflow— as we shall make clear in one9 of the chapters of this Treatise.10 Accordingly if the nonexistence of the Creator were supposed, all that exists would likewise be nonexistent; and the essence of its remote causes, of its ultimate effects, and of that which is between these, would be abolished. God has therefore, with reference to the world, the status of a form with regard to a thing possessing a form, in virtue of which it is that which it is: a thing the true reality and essence of which are established by that form. Such is the relation of the deity to the world. In this respect it is said of Him that He is the ultimate form and the form of forms; that is, He is that upon which the existence and stability of every form in the world ultimately reposes and by which they are constituted, just as the things endowed with forms are constituted by their forms. Because of this notion, God is called in our language the Living of the worlds, meaning that He is the life of the world, as shall be made clear.11 Matters are similar with regard to every end, for when a thing has an end you should seek the end of that end. You say, as it were, for instance that a throne has wood as its matter, a carpenter as its efficient cause, squareness of a particular shape as its form, and to be sat upon as its end. You should consequently ask: what is the end of sitting upon the throne? Thereupon it will be said that it consists in the lifting up, and the being elevated above the earth, of the sitter upon the chair. Thereupon you will ask again, saying: what is the end of being lifted up above | the earth? Thereupon you will receive the answer that it consists in the magnification 7. Literally: Our saying that He is the ultimate form of the world is not in the image of the being of the form endowed with matter as a form to that matter.
8. al-kull (the all). The word has a less definite connotation than “universe.”
9. The word bazd may also mean “several.”
I’jo The Guide of the Perplexed 1-69 [91a