CHAPTER 24 You know of astronomical matters what you have read under my guidance and understood from the contents of the “Almagest.” But there was not enough time to begin another speculative study with you. What you know already is that as far as the action of ordering the motions and making the course of the stars conform to what is seen is concerned, everything depends on two principles: either that of the epicycles or that of the eccentric spheres or on both of them. Now I shall draw your attention to the fact that both those principles are entirely outside the bounds of reasoning1 and opposed to all that has been made clear in natural science. In the first place, if one affirms as true the existence of an epicycle revolving round a certain sphere, positing at the same time that that revolution is not around the center of the sphere carrying the epicycles — and this has been supposed with regard to the moon and to the five planets — it follows necessarily that there l. The Arabic word used is qiyas\ it means “syllogism” (and in a broader sense, “reason¬ ing”) or “analogy.”
52a] The Guide of the Perplexed II -24 ]2) is rolling, that is, that the epicycle rolls and changes its place completely. Now this is the impossibility that was to be avoided, namely, the assumption that there should be something in the heavens that changes its place. For this reason Abu Bakr Ibn al-S33igh2 states in his extant discourse on astronomy that the existence of epicycles is impossible. He points out the necessary inference already mentioned. In addition to this impossibility necessarily following from the assumption of the existence of epicycles, he sets forth there other impossibilities that also follow from that assump¬ tion. I shall explain them to you now.
The revolution of the epicycles is not around the center of the world. Now it is a fundamental principle of this world that there are three motions: a motion from the midmost point of the world, a motion toward that point, and a motion around that point. But if | an epicycle existed, its motion would be neither from that point nor toward it nor around it.
Furthermore, it is one of the preliminary assumptions of Aristotle in natural science that there must necessarily be some immobile thing around which circular motion takes place. Hence it is necessary that the earth should be immobile. Now if epicycles exist, theirs would be a circular motion that would not revolve round an immobile thing. I have heard that Abu Bakr has stated that he had invented an astronomical system in which no epicycles figured, but only eccentric circles. However, I have not heard this from his pupils. And even if this were truly accomplished by him, he would not gain much thereby. For eccentricity also necessitates going outside the limits posed by the principles established by Aristotle, those principles to which nothing can be added. It was by me that attention was drawn to this point. In the case of eccentricity, we likewise find that the circular motion of the spheres does not take place around the midmost point of the world, but around an imaginary point that is other than the center of the world. Accordingly, that motion is likewise not a motion taking place around an immobile thing. If, however, someone having no knowledge of astronomy thinks that eccentricity with respect to these imaginary points may be considered — when these points are situated inside 3 the sphere of the moon, as they appear to be at the outset — as equivalent to motion round the midmost point of the world, we would agree to concede this to him if that motion took place round a point in the zone of 1'ire or of air, though in that 2. I.e., Ibn Bajja. Cf. I 74, n. 10. The work to which the text refers is not known at present. On the philosophic criticism of the Ptolemaic system, cf. Translator’s Introduction.
3. I.e., beneath.
case that motion would not be around an immobile thing. We will, however, make it clear to him that the measures of eccentricity have been demon¬ strated in the “Almagest” according to what is assumed there. And the latter-day scientists have given a correct demonstration, regarding which there is no doubt, of how great the measure of these eccentricities is compared with half the diameter of the earth, just as they have set forth all the other distances and dimensions. It has consequently become clear that the eccentric point around which the sun revolves | must of necessity be outside the concavity of the sphere of the moon and beneath the con¬ vexity of the sphere of Mercury. Similarly the point around which Mars revolves, I mean to say the center of its eccentric sphere, is outside the concavity of the sphere of Mercury and beneath the convexity of the sphere of Venus. Again the center of the eccentric sphere of Jupiter is at the same distance — I mean between the sphere of Mercury and Venus. As for Saturn, the center of its eccentric sphere is between the spheres of Mars and Jupiter. See now how all these things are remote from natural speculation! All this will become clear to you if you consider the distances and dimensions, known to you, of every sphere and star, as well as the evaluation of all of them by means of half the diameter of the earth so that everything is calculated according to one and the same proportion and the eccentricity of every sphere is not evaluated in relation to the sphere itself.
Even more incongruous and dubious is the fact that in all cases in which one of two spheres is inside the other and adheres to it on every side, while the centers of the two are different, the smaller sphere can move inside the bigger one without the latter being in motion, whereas the bigger sphere cannot move upon any axis whatever without the smaller one being in motion. For whenever the bigger sphere moves, it necessarily, by means of its movement, sets the smaller one in motion, except in the case in which its motion is on axis passing through the two centers. From this demonstra¬ tive premise and from the demonstrated fact that vacuum does not exist and from the assumptions regarding eccentricity, it follows necessarily that when the higher sphere is in motion it must move the sphere beneath it with the same motion and around its own center. Now we do not find that this is so. We find rather that neither of the two spheres, the containing and the contained, is set in motion by the movement of the other nor does it move around the other’s center or poles, | but that each of them has its own particular motion. Hence necessity obliges the belief that between every two spheres there are bodies other than those of the spheres. Now if this be so, how many obscure points remain? Where will you suppose the centers of those bodies existing between every two spheres to be? And those bodies should likewise have their own particular motion. Thabit4 has explained this in a treatise of his and has demonstrated what we have said, namely, that there must be the body of a sphere between every two spheres. All this I did not explain to you when you read under my guidance, for fear of confusing you with regard to that which it was my purpose to make you understand.
As for the inclination and deviation that are spoken of regarding the latitude of Venus and Mercury, I have explained to you by word of mouth and I have shown you that it is impossible to conceive their existence in those bodies. For the rest Ptolemy has said explicitly, as you have seen, that one was unable to do this, stating literally: No one should think that these principles and those similar to them may only be put into effect with difficulty, if his reason for doing this be that he regards that which we have set forth as he would regard things obtained bjr artifice and the subtlety of art and which may only be realized with difficulty. For human matters should not be compared to those that are divine.5 This is, as you know, the text of his statement. I have indicated to you the passages from which the true reality of everything I have mentioned to you becomes manifest, except for what I have told you regarding the examination of where the points lie that are the centers of the eccentric circles. For I have never come across anybody who has paid attention to this. However this shall become clear to you through the knowledge of the measure of the diameter of every sphere and what the distance is between the two centers as compared with half the diameter of the earth, according to what has been demon¬ strated by al-QablsI6 in the “Epistle Concerning the Distances.” If you examine those distances, | the truth of the point to which I have drawn your attention will become clear to you.
Consider now how great these difficulties are. If what Aristotle has stated with regard to natural science is true, there are no epicycles or eccentric circles and everything revolves round the center of the earth. But in that case how can the various motions of the stars come about? Is it in any way possible that motion should be on the one hand circular, uniform, and perfect, and that on the other hand the things that are observable should be observed in consequence of it, unless this be accounted 4. Thabit Ibn Qurra, a well-known mathematician, astronomer, philosopher, and translator, who belonged to the pagan community of Harran. He died in 900.
5. Almagest xiii.2.
^26 The Guide of the Perplexed 11-24 [ 54a for by making use of one of the two principles7 or of both of them? This consideration is all the stronger because of the fact that if one accepts everything stated by Ptolemy concerning the epicycle of the moon and its deviation toward a point outside the center of the world and also outside the center of the eccentric circle, it will be found that what is calculated on the hypothesis of the two principles is not at fault by even a minute. The truth of this is attested by the correctness of the calculations — always made on the basis of these principles — concerning the eclipses and the exact determination of their times as well as of the moment when it begins to be dark and of the length of time of the darkness. Furthermore, how can one conceive the retrogradation of a star, together with its other motions, without assuming the existence of an epicycle? On the other hand, how can one imagine a rolling motion in the heavens or a motion around a center that is not immobile? This is the true perplexity.
However, I have already explained to you by word of mouth that all this does not affect the astronomer. For his purpose is not to tell us in which way the spheres truly are, but to posit an astronomical system in which it would be possible for the motions to be circular and uniform and to corres¬ pond to what is apprehended through sight, regardless of whether or not things are thus in fact. You know already that in speaking of natural science, Abu Bakr Ibn al-Sa^igh8 expresses a doubt whether Aristotle knew about the eccentricity of the sun and passed over it in silence — treating of what necessarily follows from the sun’s inclination, inasmuch as the effect of eccentricity is not distinguishable from | that of inclination— or whether he was not aware of eccentricity. Now the truth is that he was not aware of it and had never heard about it, for in his time mathematics had not been brought to perfection. If, however, he had heard about it, he would have violently rejected it 5 and if it were to his mind established as true, he would have become most perplexed about all his assumptions on the subject. I shall repeat here what I have said before.9 All that Aristotle states about that which is beneath the sphere of the moon is in accordance with reasoning;10 these are things that have a known cause, that follow one upon the other, and concerning which it is clear and manifest at what points wisdom and natural providence are effective. However, regarding all that is in the heavens, man grasps nothing but a small measure of what is mathematical; and you know what is in it. I shall accordingly say in the manner of poetical preciousness: The heavens are the heavens of the Lord, 7. I.e., of the epicycles and the eccentric circles. 8. I.e., Ibn Bajja. Cf. n. a, this chap.
54 b ] The Guide of the Perplexed 11-25 327 but the earth hath He given to the sons of man.u I mean thereby that the deity alone fully knows the true reality, the nature, the substance, the form, the motions, and the causes of the heavens. But He has enabled man to have knowledge of what is beneath the heavens, for that is his world and his dwelling-place in which he has been placed and of which he himself is a part. This is the truth. For it is impossible for us to accede to the points starting from which conclusions may be drawn about the heavens $ for the latter are too far away from us and too high in place and in rank. And even the general conclusion that may be drawn from them, namely, that they prove the existence of their Mover, is a matter the knowledge of which cannot be reached by human intellects.12 And to fatigue the minds with notions that cannot be grasped by them and for the grasp of which they have no instrument, is a defect in one’s inborn disposition or some sort of tempta¬ tion. Let us then stop at a point that is within cur capacity, and let us give over the things that cannot be grasped by reasoning15 to him who was reached by the mighty divine overflow so that it could be fittingly said of him: With him do I speak mouth to mouth}* That is j the end of what I have to say about this question. It is possible that someone else may find a demonstration by means of which the true reality of what is obscure for me will become clear to him. The extreme predilection that I have for investigating the truth is evidenced by the fact that I have explicitly stated and reported my perplexity regarding these matters as well as by the fact that I have not heard nor do I know a demonstration as to anything con¬ cerning them.
CHAPTER 25 Know that our shunning the affirmation of the eternity of the world is not due to a text figuring in the Torah according to which the world has been produced in time. For the texts indicating that the world has been produced in time are not more numerous than those indicating that the deity is a body. Nor are the gates of figurative interpretation shut in our faces 11. Ps. 115:16.
13. In Ibn Tibbon’s translation the passage has a different meaning: “The general proof from them is that they indicate the existence of their Mover, but the knowledge of other matters concerning them cannot be reached by human intellects.”
328 The Guide of the Perplexed 11-25 [ 55a or impossible of access to us regarding the subject of the creation of the world in time. For we could interpret them as figurative, as we have done when denying His corporeality. Perhaps this would even be much easier to do: we should be very well able to give a figurative interpretation of those texts and to affirm as true the eternity of the world, just as we have given a figurative interpretation of those other texts and have denied that He, may He be exalted, is a body.
Two causes are responsible for our not doing this or believing it. One of them is as follows. That the deity is not a body has been demonstrated; from this it follows necessarily that everything that in its external meaning disagrees with this demonstration must be interpreted figuratively, for it is known that such texts are of necessity fit for figurative interpretation. However, the eternity of the world has not been demonstrated. Consequent¬ ly in this case the texts ought not to be rejected and figuratively interpreted in order to make prevail an opinion whose contrary can be made to prevail by means of various sorts of arguments. This is one cause.
The second cause is as follows. Our belief that the deity is not | a body destroys for us none of the foundations of the Law and does not give the lie to the claims of any prophet. The only objection to it is constituted by the fact that the ignorant think that this belief is contrary to the text; yet it is not contrary to it, as we have explained, but is intended by the text. On the other hand, the belief in eternity the way Aristotle sees it — that is, the belief according to which the world exists in virtue of necessity, that no nature changes at all, and that the customary course of events cannot be modified with regard to anything— destroys the Law in its principle, necessarily gives the lie to every miracle, and reduces to inanity all the hopes and threats that the Law has held out, unless — by God! — one interprets the miracles figuratively also, as was done by the Islamic internalists;1 this, however, would result in some sort of crazy imaginings.
If, however, one believed in eternity according to the second opinion we have explained2 — which is the opinion of Plato — according to which the heavens too are subject to generation and corruption, this opinion would not destroy the foundations of the Law and would be followed not by the lie being given to miracles, but by their becoming admissible. It would also be possible to interpret figuratively the texts in accordance with this opinion.
1. ahl al-bdtin. In Arabic batin may mean “the internal sense.” The Ismail! and similar sects are often designated as ahl al-bdtin. An allegorical interpretation of the Qur’an was part of their faith.
2. Cf. II 13.
55^ 1 The Guide of the Perplexed II • 25 j 29 And many obscure passages3 can be found in the texts of the Torah and others with which this opinion could be connected or rather by means of which it could be proved. However, no necessity could impel us to do this unless this opinion were demonstrated. In view of the fact that it has not been demonstrated, we shall not favor this opinion, nor shall we at all heed that other opinion, but rather shall take the texts according to their external sense and shall say: The Law has given us knowledge of a matter the grasp of which is not within our power, and the miracle attests to the correctness of our claims.
Know that with a belief in the creation of the world in time, all the miracles become possible and the Law becomes possible, and all questions that may be asked on this subject, vanish. Thus it might be said: Why did God give prophetic revelation to this one and not to that? Why did | God give this Law to this particular nation, and why did He not legislate to the others? Why did He legislate at this particular time, and why did He not legislate before it or after? Why did He impose these commandments and these prohibitions? Why did He privilege the prophet with the miracles mentioned in relation to him and not with some others? What was God’s aim in giving this Law? Why did He not, if such was His purpose,4 put the accomplishment of the commandments and the nontransgression of the prohibitions into our nature? If this were said, the answer to all these questions would be that it would be said: He wanted it this way; or His wis¬ dom required it this way. And just as He brought the world into existence, having the form it has, when He wanted to, without our knowing His will with regard to this or in what respect there was wisdom in His particularizing the forms of the world and the time of its creation — in the same way we do not know His will or the exigency of His wisdom that caused all the matters, about which questions have been posed above, to be particularized. If, however, someone says that the world is as it is in virtue of necessity, it would be a necessary obligation to ask all those questions; and there would be no way out of them except through a recourse to unseemly answers in which there would be combined the giving the lie to, and the annulment of, all the external meanings of the Law with regard to which no intelligent man has any doubt that they are to be taken in their 3. It seems gramatically more correct to interpret the Arabic word “sh.b.h.” as being shubah, the plural of shubho, “an obscure passage,” rather than as shibh, a singular meaning “analogy.” Ibn Tibbon’s translation and that of Munk, which conforms to it, seem to be based on the second interpretation.
4. I.e., if He wished us to accomplish the commandments and not to transgress the prohibitions.
jjo The Guide of the Perplexed II • 26 [ 56a external meanings. It is then because of this that this opinion is shunned5 and that the lives of virtuous men have been and will be spent in investiga¬ ting this question. For if creation in time were demonstrated — if only as Plato understands creation — all the overhasty6 claims made to us on this point by the philosophers would become void. In the same way, if the philo¬ sophers would succeed in demonstrating eternity as Aristotle understands it, the Law as a whole would become void, and a shift to other opinions would take place. I have thus explained to you that everything is bound up with this problem. Know this. | CHAPTER 26 Ihave seen a statement of Rabbi Eliezer the Great, figuring in the celebra¬ ted Chapters 1 known as Chapters of Rabbi Eliezer, which is the strangest statement I have seen made by one who follows the Law of Moses our Master. Hear the text of the statement he made. He says:2 Wherefrom were the heavens created? From the light of His garment. He took some of it, stretched it like a cloth, and thus they were extending continually, as it is said: Who cover est Thyself with light as with a garment. Who stretchest out the heavens like a curtain.3 Wherefrom was the earth created? From the snow under the throne of His glory. He took some of it and threw it, as it is said: For He saith to the snow, Be thou earth? This is the text of the statement made there. Would that I knew what that Sage believed. Did he believe that it is impossible that something should come into being out of nothing and that there must necessarily be matter out of which that which is genera¬ ted is produced? Did he for this reason seek to find wherefrom were created the heavens and the earth? However, whatever results from this answer, he ought to be asked: Wherefrom was the light of His garment created? Wherefrom was the snow under the throne of glory created? Wherefrom was the throne of glory itself created? If, however, he wished to signify by the light of His garment an uncreated thing and similarly by the throne of glory something uncreated, this would be a great incongruity. For he would have admitted thereby the eternity of the world, if only as it is 5. I.e., the affirmation of the eternity of the world a parte ante. 6. Or: incoherent.
1. Peraqim in Hebrew. 2. Chapters of Rabbi Eliezer, III.
566 ] The Guide of the Perplexed II -26 3 y /