there being an accident in it — all of these things belong to the class of the impossible according to all men of speculation. Likewise that God should bring into existence someone like Himself, or should annihilate Himself, or should become a body, or should change — all of these things belong to the class of the impossible; and the power to do any of these things cannot be attributed to God. Regarding the question whether He is able to bring into existence an accident that exists alone, not in a substance, a group among the men of speculation, namely, the Muctazila, have imagined this and held that it was possible, whereas others have asserted that it was impossible. It is true that those who assert that an accident may exist without a substratum are not led to this affirmation by speculation alone, but wished to safeguard thereby certain doctrines2 of the Law that are violently rebutted by specula¬ tion; thus the assertion in question was a way out for them. Similarly the bringing into being of a corporeal thing out of no matter whatever, be¬ longs — according to us — to the class of the possible, and to the class of the impossible — according to the philosophers. The philosophers say similarly that to bring into being a square whose diagonal is equal to one of its sides or a corporeal angle encompassed by four plane right angles and other similar things belong all of them to the class of the impossible; and some of those who are ignorant of mathematics and, concerning these matters, know only the words by themselves and do not conceive their notion, think that they are possible.
Would that I knew whether this gate is open and licit, so that everyone can claim and assert with regard to any notion whatever that he conceives: This is possible; whereas someone else says: No, this is impossible because of the nature of the matter. Or is there something that shuts and blocks this gate so that | a man can assert decisively that such and such a thing is impossible because of its nature? Should this be verified and examined with the help of the imaginative faculty or with the intellect? And by what can one differentiate between that which is imagined and that which is cognized by the intellect? For an individual sometimes disagrees with someone else or with himself with regard to a thing that in his opinion is possible, so that he asserts that by its nature it is possible; whereas the objector says: This assertion that it is possible is the work of the imagination and not due to consideration by the intellect. Is there accordingly something that permits differentiation between the imaginative faculty and the intellect? And is that thing something altogether outside both the intellect and the imagination, or is it by the intellect itself that one distinguishes between that which is 2. Literally: matters.
30 a ] The Guide of the Perplexed III 16 461 cognized by the intellect and that which is imagined? All these are points for investigation, which may lead very far. However, this is not the object of this chapter.
It has then become clear that, according to every opinion and school, there are impossible things whose existence cannot be admitted. Power to bring them about cannot be ascribed to the deity. The fact that He does not change them signifies neither inability nor deficiency of power on His part. Accordingly they are necessarily as they are and are not due to the act of an agent. It has then become clear that the point with regard to which there is disagreement concerns the things that could be supposed to belong to either of the two classes — whether they belong to the class of the possible or to the class of the impossible. Learn this.
CHAPTER 16 in aberrant opinion is professed by the philosophers concerning God, may He be exalted, with respect to His knowledge of what is other than He; and it is a very great aberration, and they have stumbled in such a way that neither they nor those who follow them with regard to this opinion can find absolution. I shall let you hear the difficulties through which they were plunged into aberrant opinion, j I shall also let you hear the opinion of our Law about this and our opposition to them in regard to their evil and incon¬ gruous opinions concerning God’s knowledge.
That which in the first place was mainly responsible for plunging them into, and impelling them toward, this opinion is what appears at first sight to be a lack of order in the circumstances of the human individuals and the fact that among the Adamites some excellent individuals are in a sorry and grievous plight whereas some wicked individuals are in good and pleasurable circumstances. This impelled them to formulate the division that you will now hear. They said: One of two things must be true: God either knows nothing about these individual circumstances and does not comprehend them, or He knows and apprehends them. This is a necessary division. Thereupon they said: If He apprehends and knows them, one of three things must be true: either He orders them, settling them according to the best, the most perfect, and the most accomplished order; or He is incapable of establishing order in them and has no power over them; or again He knows j62 The Guide of the Perplexed III 16 [ 306 and is able to establish excellent order and governance, but neglects to do it in consequence of His disdain and contempt or in consequence of His jealousy — just as we find among human beings a man who is able to procure a benefit for another individual and who is aware of the latter’s need to obtain this benefit from him, but who out of his ill-nature, his wickedness, and his jealousy, begrudges him this benefit and hence does not procure it. This division is likewise necessary and correct. I mean to say that everyone who knows a certain matter must necessarily either exercise care in the governance of what he knows, or neglect it — as a man, for instance, neglects the governance of the cats in his house or of even more contemptible beings; again sometimes he who exercises care with regard to some matter may be incapable of governing it, though willing to do so. After they had established this division, they decided categorically that two of the three cases — one of which must necessarily be valid with regard to everyone that knows — are impossible with respect to God, may He be exalted; namely, the case in which He would have no power or the case in which He would have power, but not care for the things He knew. For this would create in Him evil or incapacity, and He is exalted above these two things. Thus in the whole division only the following cases remain: either He knows nothing at all of these circumstances, or He knows them and establishes in them the most excellent order. But we at any rate find that they are without order, do not observe analogies, and have no continuity such as they ought to have. Consequently this is a proof that He does not know these circumstances in any way or through any cause whatever. This is what has plunged them at first into this very aberrant opinion. You will find that all that I have summarized for you concerning their divisions and the point I made calling attention to the fact that this is where they erred are clearly set forth in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ treatise “On Governance.”1 See and marvel how they plunged into something worse than that which they tried to avoid and how they were ignorant of a matter to which they were constantly drawing our attention and that they were always explaining to us. As for their plunging into something worse than that which they tried to avoid, it consisted in the fact that in trying to avoid imputing negligence to God, they decided that He is ignorant and that everything that is in this lowly world is hidden from Him, and He does notapprehend it. As for their being ignorant of that to which they were constantly drawing our attention, it consists in their considering what exists from the point of 1. Fi’l-tadbir. On this treatise of Alexander of Aphrodisias and its use by Maimonides, cf.
Translator’s Introduction.
3iaJ The Guide of the Perplexed III • 16 463 view of the circumstances of human individuals. But the evils befalling the latter derive from them or from the necessity of the nature of matter, as [the philosophers] always say and make clear. We have already made clear what was necessary regarding this.2 After having established this founda¬ tion that destroys every good foundation and deforms the beauty | of every correct opinion, they tried to eliminate its disgracefulness through thinking that the knowledge of these things is impossible for the deity for various reasons. One of them is as follows: Particular things are apprehended by means of the senses only and not by the intellect 5 but God does not appre¬ hend by means of a sense. Another one is as follows: Particular things are infinite, whereas knowledge consists in comprehending;5 but what is infinite cannot be comprehended through knowledge. Again another one is as follows: The knowledge of things being produced in time, which are indubitably particular, would necessitate some change in Him; for it in¬ volves a renewal of knowledge after knowledge. Because we, the com¬ munity of those who adhere to Law', claim that He had known them before they came about, they charge us with tw'o disgraceful opinions: first, that science can be attached to pure nonbeing; and second, that the knowledge of a thing being in potentia and of its being in actu is one and the same thing. Their thoughts were sometimes opposed to one another: some* of them said that He knows only the species and not the individuals; whereas others5 said that He knows nothing at all outside Himself, so that, according to this opinion, there is no multiplicity of cognitions there. There are also some philosophers who believe, as we do, that He, may He be exalted, knows everything arid that nothing secret is at all hidden from Him. These are great men,6 prior in time to Aristotle, who are also mentioned by Alexander in that treatise. But he rejects their opinion, saying that it is principally refuted by the fact that we see that good men are attained by evils and evil men obtain the good things.
To sum up: It has become clear to you that all of them, if they had found that the circumstances of the human individuals are well ordered — according to what appears as order to the multitude — w'ould not at all have plunged into all this speculation and would not have grown confused.7 What first impelled them toward this speculation was the fact that they considered 2. Cf. Ill 12.
3. The two senses of this word seem more or less to approximate the two senses of the word ihata used by Maimonides, which means both “to understand” and “to embrace,” “to surround.”
4. Or: one. 3. Or: another. 6. Of the philosophers.
7. Or: would not have been overhasty.
464 The Guide of the Perplexed III - 1 7 [ 31& the circumstances of people, | of the wicked and the good, and that in then- opinion these matters wrere not well ordered; as was said by those among us who were ignorant: The way of the Lord is not well ordered.8 After I have explained that the discussion concerning knowdedge9 and that concerning providence are connected, I shall begin to explain the opinions of those engaged in speculation concerning providence. After that I shall begin to resolve the doubts expressed with regard to the deity’s knowledge of particular things.
CHAPTER 17 CHAPTER 17 The opinions of people about providence are five in all. 1 And all of them are ancient 5 I mean that they are opinions that have been heard at the time of the prophets, since the true Law has appeared that has illumined all this darkness.
The first opinion is the profession of those that consider that there is no providence at all with regard to anything whatever in all that exists; that everything in it, the heavens and the things other than they, has happened by chance and in accordance with the way things were predis¬ posed; and that there is no one who orders, governs, or is concerned with anything. This is the opinion of Epicurus. He also professes that there are atoms, and holds that they mingle according to chance and that what is generated out of them, is generated by chance. Those in Israel who were unbelievers also professed this opinion; they are those of whom it is said: They have belied the Lord, and said: It is not He.2 Aristotle has demon¬ strated that this opinion is inadmissible; that it cannot be true that all things should have been generated by chance; and that, on the contrary, there is someone who orders and governs them. In what precedes we have already mentioned something of this.3 The second opinion is the opinion of those who hold that providence watches over certain things and that these exist through the governance | and the ordering of one who governs and orders, whereas other things are left to chance. This is the opinion of Aristotle. I will sum up for your benefit 1. On Maimonides’ sources for this chapter, cf. Translator’s Introduction.
32&] The Guide of the Perplexed III * 17 465 his opinion on providence. He holds that God, may He be exalted, takes care of the spheres and of what is in them and that for this reason their indi¬ viduals remain permanently as they are. Alexander has formulated this, saying that in Aristotle’s opinion God’s providence ends at the sphere of the moon. This is a branch deriving from his root doctrine concerning the eternity of the world, for he believes that providence corresponds to the nature of what exists. Accordingly with regard to the spheres, whose individuals are permanent, and what is in them, providence regarding them means that they remain permanent in a changeless state. But just as the existence of other things — whose individuals have not, but whose species have, an enduring existence — derives necessarily from theirs, there is like¬ wise an overflow from the providence in question, which overflow necessi¬ tates the durability and permanence of the species, though the durability of the latter’s individuals be impossible. However, the individuals of every species are also not neglected in every respect. For in all portions of this matter that have been purified to the point of receiving the form of growth, there are placed faculties that preserve them for a certain time through attracting toward them that which agrees with them and through repelling that which is not useful for them. Again in those portions of the matter in question that have been purified to a greater extent so that they received the form of sensation, there are placed other faculties, which preserve and safeguard them, as well as another capacity: namely, that of moving so as to direct themselves toward that which agrees with them and so as to flee from that which disagrees. Furthermore every individual has been given that which the species he belongs to needs. Finally such portions of the matter in question that have been purified to the point of receiving the form of the intellect have been given another faculty through which every one of them, according to the perfection of the individual in question, governs, thinks, and reflects on what may render possible the durability of himself as an individual and the preservation of his species. As for the other motions4 that occur in all | individuals of a species, they occur by chance and do not, according to Aristotle, come about through the governance or ordering of one who governs or orders. For instance, if a hurricane or a wind of less than hurricane force should blow, it would indubitably bring some leaves of this particular tree to fall, break a branch of another tree, topple a stone from a certain fence, raise up the dust so that it covers a certain plant and causes its destruction, and agitate great waves in the water so that a ship that is there would founder and so that all the people that are on board, or at least some 4. Or: all the motions.
4 66 The Guide of the Perplexed III 17 [ 53a of them, would be drowned. Consequently, according to him,5 there is no difference between the fall of the leaf and the fall of the stone, on the one hand, or the drowning of the excellent and superior men that were on board the ship, on the other. Similarly he does not differentiate between an ox that defecates upon a host of ants so that they die, or a building whose foundations are shaken upon all the people at their prayers who are found in it so that they die. And there is no difference, according to him, between a cat coming across a mouse and devouring it or a spider devouring a fly, on the one hand, or a ravenous lion meeting a prophet and devouring him, on the other. To sum up, the basis of his opinion is as follows: Everything that, according to what he saw, subsisted continuously without any corruption or change of proceeding at all — as, for instance, the states of the spheres — or that observed a certain orderly course, only deviating from it in anom¬ alous cases — as, for instance, the natural things — was said by him to sub¬ sist through governance; I mean to say that divine providence accompanied it.6 On the other hand, all that, according to what he saw, does not subsist continuously or adhere to a certain order — as, for instance, the circum¬ stances of the individuals of every species of plants, animals, and man — are said by him to exist by chance and not through the governance of one who governs $ he means thereby that they are not accompanied by divine provi¬ dence, and he also holds that it is impossible that providence should accom¬ pany these circumstances. This is consequent upon his opinion concerning the eternity of the world | and the impossibility of that which exists being in any respect different from what it is. Those who, deviating from our Law, believed in this opinion were those who said: The Lord hath forsaken the earth.1 The third opinion is opposed to this second opinion, being the opinion of those who hold that in all that exists there is nothing either among universal or particular things that is in any respect due to chance, for every- things comes about through will, purpose, and governance. Now it is clear that everything that is governed is also known.8 This is the opinion of the Islamic sect, the Ashcariyya.9 Great incongruities are bound up with this opinion, and those who hold it are burdened with them and obliged to accept them. Thus they agree with Aristotle regarding the equality that he establishes between the fall of a leaf and the death of a human individual. They say: This is so; but the wind does not blow by chance, for God sets it in 8. Or: that everyone that governs also knows.
9. On this sect, cf. Translator’s Introduction.
33 b] The Guide of the Perplexed III • 17 46] motion.;, and it is not the wind that causes the leaves to fall, for every leaf falls through an ordinance and a decree of God; and it is He who causes them to fall now in this particular place; it is not possible that the time of their falling should be postponed or retarded; nor is it possible that they should fall in another place than this, for all this has been everlastingly decreed. In consequence of this opinion, they are obliged to think that every motion and rest of animals has been decreed and that man has in no way the ability to do or not to do a thing. It is likewise a consequence of this opinion that the nature of the possible is abolished regarding these matters, so that all things are either necessary or impossible. They were accordingly obliged to accept this and said that the matters that we designate as possible — such as Zayd’s standing up and 'Umar’s coming — are only possible with reference to us, but that there is nothing whatever possible in them with reference to Him, may He be exalted; rather | they are either necessary or impossible. It also follows necessarily from this opinion that what the Laws entail is quite useless; for man for whose benefit every Law has come, has not the ability to do anything either to fulfill what he has been commanded or to avoid what he has been forbidden. In fact this sect says that He, may He be exalted, willed this: to send messengers, to command, to forbid, to threaten, to give hope, and to instill fear, even though we do not have the ability to do anything of our own accord; it is permissible that He should impose upon us impossible things; and it is likewise permissible that, having obeyed His order, we should be punished; and that, having transgressed it, we should be rewarded. It also necessarily follows from this opinion that His actions, may He be exalted, have no final end. They bear the burden of all these incongruities for the sake of the integrity of this opinion. They go so far as to hold that if we see an individual who was born blind or a leper, although we are unable to say that he might have deserved this because of a previous sin of his, we should say: He has willed this. And if we see that an excellent man who was devoted to God’s worship has been killed through torture, we should say: He has willed this. And in this there is no injustice, for according to them, it is permissible for God to punish one who has not sinned and to reward a sinner with benefits. Their dicta on these matters are well known.
The fourth opinion is the opinion of those who hold that man has the ability to act of his own accord; it is for this reason that, according to them, the commandments, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments figuring in the Law are well ordered. They hold that all the actions of God are conse¬ quent upon wisdom, that injustice is not permissible for Him, and that He 468 The Guide of the Perplexed III ■ 17 [34a does not punish a man who does good. The Muhazila10 also hold this opinion though, according to them, the ability of man to act of his own accord is not absolute. They also believe that He, may He be exalted, has knowledge of the falling of this particular leaf and of the creeping of this particular ant, and that His providence watches over all the beings. | Incongruities and contradictions follow necessarily also from this opinion. As for the incon¬ gruity, it is as follows. If some human individual is born with an infirmity without having sinned, they say: This is consequent upon His wisdom, and it is better for this individual to be thus than to be sound in body 5 we do not know in what this benefit consists, but this has not happened as a punish¬ ment for him, but as a benefit. And they have a similar answer with regard to the case in which an excellent man perishes, saying that this happens in order that his reward in the other world should become greater. Finally discussion with these reached a point at which they were asked: Why is He just toward man and not just to what is other than man? because of what sin has this particular animal been killed? Wliereupon they assumed the burden of the following disgraceful answer: This is better for it,11 so that God should compensate it in the other world. Even when a flea and a louse are killed, it is necessary that they have a compensation for them from God. They say in the same way that if this mouse, which has not sinned, is devoured by a cat or a hawk, His wisdom has required this with regard to the mouse and that the latter will receive compensation in the other world for what has happened to it.
To my mind no one among the partisans of these three opinions con¬ cerning providence should be blamed, for every one of them was impelled by strong necessity to say what he did. Aristotle followed what is manifest12 in the nature of that which exists. The Ashcariyya tried to avoid having to ascribe to Him, may He be exalted, ignorance with regard to anything, for it is not seemly to say that He knows this particular thing and is ignorant of that other particular thing. Thus the incongruities referred to were neces¬ sarily attached to, and borne by, them. The MuTazil a also tried to avoid having to ascribe to Him, may He be exalted, injustice and wrongdoing. Moreover it was not fitting in their opinion to go against the inborn dispo¬ sition by saying that there is no injustice in inflicting pain on one who has not sinned. Nor was it fitting in their opinion that all the prophets should have been sent and the Law revealed for no | intelligible purpose. Accordingly they too were burdened with incongruities referred to above, 10. On this sect, cf. Translator’s Introduction.
11. I.e., for the animal. 12. ziihir, a word also used to signify “external.”
35a ] The Guide of the Perplexed III • 17 469 and self-contradiction necessarily attached to them. For they believe both that He, may He be exalted, knows everything and that man has the ability to act; and this leads, as the slightest reflection should make clear, to self- contradiction.