The Guide of the Perplexed

la. I.e., divine knowledge.

1. Or: one. 2. Ps. 75:11-13.

3. The whole phrase reads: Surely Thou settest them in slippery places.

4. Ps. 73:16-19.

^ jS The Guide of the Perplexed III ■ 19 [ 40a Malachi, who says: Your words have been all too strong against Me, saith the Lord, and so on. Ye have said, It is vain to serve God; and what profit is it that we have kept His charge, and that we have walked mournfully because of the Lord of hosts? And now we call the wicked happy, and so on. Then they that feared the Lord spoke, and so on. Then shall ye again discern, and so on.5 David too has made clear that that opinion6 was well known in his time and has made clear its necessary consequences, namely, the wronging and unjust treatment of men by one another. And he began to argue with a view to destroying that opinion and to making it known that He, may He be exalted, knows all this. | He says: They slay the widow and the stranger, and murder the fatherless. And they say: The Lord will not see, neither will the God of Jacob give heed. Consider ye brutish among the people-, and ye fools, when will ye be wise? He that planted the ear, shall He not hear? He that formed the eye, shall He not see?1 I shall now explain to you the meaning of this argument after I have mentioned to you the way in which those who are overhasty in their interpretations of the prophets’ discourse, misunderstand this discourse. Several years ago some distinguished individuals of our religious community, who were physicians, told me that they wondered at this dictum of David. They said: According to his way of reasoning, it would follow necessarily that the Creator of the mouth eats and the Creator of the lung shouts and the same would hold for all the other members. Reflect now, you who study this Treatise of mine, how far they were from a correct understanding of this argument, and hear its true meaning: In the case of everyone who makes any instrument, it is clear that unless he had a conception of the work to be done with that instrument, he would be unable to make it. For in¬ stance, unless a smith had a conception and an understanding of the meaning of sewing, he would not make a needle in that form which alone permits performing the act of sewing. The same applies to the other instruments. When, therefore, some of the philosophers thought that God does not appre¬ hend these individual things because they are apprehended by the senses, whereas He, may He be exalted, does not apprehend with a sense but through an intellectual apprehension, he8 argued against them by starting from the existence of the senses, saying: If the meaning of the apprehension of the sense of sight is hidden from Him and He does not know it, how did 5. Mai. 3: 13-18.

6. I.e., the opinion that God has no knowledge of what happens in relation to human individuals.

7. Ps. 94:6-9.

8. I.e., David.

He bring into existence this instrument, which is disposed for visual appre¬ hension? Do you hold that it could have happened by chance that a cer¬ tain clear humor should be produced, and outside it another similar humor, and again outside it a certain membrane | in which a hole happened to be bored, and in front of that hole a clear and hard membrane? To sum up: Can someone endowed with intelligence conceive that the humors, mem¬ branes, and nerves of the eye — which, as is known, are so well arranged and all of which have as their purpose the final end of this act of seeing — have come about fortuitously? Certainly not. But as every physician and every philosopher has set forth, this is brought about of necessity through a purpose of nature. Nowr according to the general consensus of philosophers, nature is not endowed with intellect and the capacity for governance. Rather does this craftsmanlike governance proceed, according to the opinion of the philosophers, from an intellectual principle; and, according to us, it is the act of an intelligent being who impressed all the faculties in question into all the things in which a natural faculty exists. If, however, that intel¬ lect does not apprehend or know the matter in question, how — according to that opinion — can he have brought into existence, or how can there have proceeded from him, a nature tending toward a purpose of which he has no knowledge? Accordingly it is with truth that he 9 called them brutish and fools. Thereupon he begins to make clear that this is a deficiency in our apprehension; that God, may He be honored and magnified, who has given us the intellect with which we apprehend — and because of our incapacity to apprehend His true reality, may He be exalted, there arise in us these great doubts — knows, may He be exalted, this our deficiency; and that no atten¬ tion should be directed to the rash reflections necessarily proceeding from this our inadequate thought.10 He11 says: He that teacheth man knowledge,• the Lord knoweth the thoughts of man, that they are vanity H The whole of my aim in this chapter was to make it clear that this speculation is very ancient; I refer to the notion that God lacks apprehen¬ sion, which has occurred to the ignorant in view of the fact that the circum¬ stances of the human individuals, which by their nature are contingent, are not well ordered. Thus it says: And the Children of Israel did impute things that were not \ right unto the Lord.15 And it is said in the Midrash: What did 9. I.e., David.

10. According to certain manuscripts and Alharizi’s Hebrew translation, the last part of this sentence could be rendered: and that their inadequate thought pays no attention to the rash reflections it has of necessity brought about.

j8o The Guide of the Perplexed III • 20 [ 4 ib they say? They said: This column neither sees nor hears nor speaks. 1 4 They 1 5 wished to refer by this to their16 imagining that God does not apprehend these circumstances and that no command or prohibition from Him reaches the prophets. The cause of all this and, according to them, the proof of it, are to be found in the fact that the circumstances of the human individuals do not take a course that is in accordance with what, as every one of us con¬ siders, ought to happen. Accordingly when they saw that things were not as they wished, they said: The Lord seeth us not.17 Zephaniah says concerning these: [ Those] that say in their heart: The Lord wdl not do good, neither will He do evil.18 As for what should be said concerning His knowledge, may He be exalted, of all things, I shall inform you of my opinion concerning this after I have made known to you the matters about which there is general con¬ sensus and that no one endowed with intellect can contradict in any point.

CHAPTER 20 CHAPTER 20 A matter concerning which there is a general consensus is that it is not true that new knowledge should come to Him, may He be exalted, so that He would know now what He did not know before. And it is not true, even according to the opinion of those who believe in the attributes,1 that He should have many and numerous insights. After this has been demon¬ strated, we, the community of those who adhere to a Law, say that He knows with one single knowledge the many and numerous things. For as far as He, may He be exalted, is concerned, insights do not differ because of the difference of the things known, as is the case in respect to us. Similarly we say that He has known all the things that are produced anew before they have come about and that He has known them perpetually. | For this rea¬ son no new knowledge comes to Him in any way. For, seeing that He knows that a certain man is now nonexistent, but will exist at a certain time, will go on existing for such and such a duration, and will then again become nonexistent, there will be for Him no additional knowledge when that individual comes into existence as He had known beforehand. Nothing was 14. The Midrash is unknown. 15. The authors of the Midrash.

16. The Children of Israel are meant. 17. Ezek. 8:12. 18. Zeph. 1:12.

1. I.e., the divine attributes.

42 a ] The Guide of the Perplexed III 20 481 produced thereby2 that was unknown to Him. On the contrary, something was produced of which it had been perpetually known that it would be pro¬ duced in the way it came into existence. Thus it follows necessarily from this belief that knowledge may have as its object nonexistent things and may embrace the infinite. And this is indeed our belief. For we say that it is not impossible that His knowledge should have as its object the nonexistent things about whose being brought into existence He knew beforehand and that He is able to bring into existence. On the other hand, that which is never brought into existence is, with reference to His knowledge, an abso¬ lutely nonexistent thing,3 which is not an object for His knowledge, as that which is nonexistent for us is not an object for our knowledge.

As for knowledge of the infinite, there is a difficulty about it. Some of the people of speculation came to profess the opinion that knowledge4 has for its object the species, but, in a certain sense, extends to all the individuals of the species. This is the opinion of all those who adhere to a Law in view of what is required by the necessities of speculation. The philosophers, however, affirm decidedly that His knowledge may not have for its object a non¬ existent thing and that no knowledge may embrace that infinite; conse¬ quently, as no new knowledge may come to Him, it is impossible that He should know anything of the things that are produced anew. Accordingly He only knows the permanent immutable thing. Another doubt, however, arose in some5 of them, and they said: Even if He should know only the permanent things, He would have many insights. For if the things known become many, the insights regarding them become many. For to everything known there is a knowledge that is special for it. Consequently | He only knows His own essence.6 What I myself say is that all these difficulties to which all of them are subject have as their cause the fact that they established a relation between our knowledge and His, may He be exalted; for every sect considers the things that are impossible for our knowledge and consequently thinks that this also holds necessarily with regard to His knowledge or else that the thing is obscure for it. The philosophers ought to be blamed more strongly than anyone else with regard to this question. For they were those who have demonstrated that there is no multiplicity in His essence,7 may He be exalted, and that He has no attribute beyond His essence; but that, on the contrary, His knowledge is His essence, and His essence His knowledge. As 2. Through that individual’s coming into existence. 5. Or: absolute nonexistence.

4. I.e., divine knowledge. 5. Or: one. 6. Or: self. 7. Or: self.

482 The Guide of the Perplexed III ■ 20 [ 42 b we have explained, they were those who have demonstrated that our intellects are incapable of apprehending the true reality of His essence as it really is. How then can they think that they can apprehend His knowl¬ edge, seeing that His knowledge is not a thing that is outside of His essence? For the selfsame incapacity that prevents our intellects from appre¬ hending His essence also prevents them from apprehending His knowledge of things as they are. For this knowledge is not of the same species as ours so that we can draw an analogy with regard to it, but a totally different thing. And just as there is a necessarily existent essence from which — according to their opinion — every existent derives of necessity, or that — according to our opinion — produces all the things that are other than itself after they have been nonexistent — so do we say that this essence apprehends all that is other than itself; that in all the things that exist,8 nothing whatever is hidden from it; and that between our knowledge and His knowledge there is noth¬ ing in common, as there is nothing in common between our essence and His essence. With regard to this point, only the equivocality of the term “knowledge” occasions the error; for there is a community only in the terms, whereas in the true reality of the things there is a difference. It is from this that incongruities follow necessarily, as we imagine that things that obliga¬ torily pertain to our knowledge pertain also to His knowledge.

One of the things that have become clear to me by the texts of the Torah is that His knowledge, may He be exalted, that a certain possible9 thing | will come into existence, does not in any way make that possible thing quit the nature of the possible. On the contrary, the nature of the possible remains with it; and knowledge concerning what possible things will be produced,10 does not entail one of the two possibilities becoming necessary. This is also one of the fundamental principles of the Law of Moses, a principle concerning which there is neither doubt nor a contestation. If this were not so, it would not have said: Then thou shalt make a parapet for thy roof, 1 1 and likewise: Lest he die in the battle, and another man take her} 2 Similarly the whole of religious legislation, the commandments, and the prohibitions, goes back to this principle: namely, that His knowledge con¬ cerning what will happen does not make this possible thing quit its nature. However, this constitutes a great difficulty for the apprehension of our inadequate intellects.

Consider in how many ways His knowledge differs from ours, according to the opinion of all those who adhere to a Law. In the first place, His 8. Or: that He (or: it) has brought into existence. 9. I.e., contingent.

10. Or: what will be produced from the possible. 11. Dent. 22:8. 12. Dcut. 20:7.

43 a ] The Guide of the Perplexed III ■ 20 4gj knowledge, while being one, corresponds to many known things belonging to various species. In the second place, it may have as its object something that does not exist. In the third place, it may have as its object something that is infinite. In the fourth place, His knowledge undergoes no changes in its apprehension of things produced in time. And yet it might seem that the knowledge that a thing will exist is not identical with the knowledge that it already exists $ for there is in the latter case a certain surplus, namely, the fact that what had been in potentia became actual. In the fifth place, it is in accordance with the opinion of our Law’ that God’s knowiedge, may He be exalted, does not bring about the actualization of one of the two possibilities even though He, may He be exalted, knows perfectly how one of them will come about. Accordingly, w’ould that I knew in w’hat wray, according to the opinion of those wrho believe that knowledge is a superadded attribute,13 our knowledge resembles His and w’hether there is here something other than a mere community in the terms. According to our opinion — that is, the opinion of people who say that His knowledge is not something superadded to His essence — it is truly necessary that His knowledge should differ from ours | in substance, just as the substance of the heavens differs from the substance of the earth. The prophets have explicitly stated this, saying: For My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways My ways, saith the Lord. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are My ways higher than your ways, and My thoughts than your thoughts}* To sum up the notion that I have stated in rdsumd: Just as we do not apprehend the true reality of His essence, but know withal that His exist¬ ence is the most perfect of existences and not commingled in any way with any deficiency or change or being acted upon, so although we do not know the true reality of His knowledge because it is His essence, we do know that He does not apprehend at certain times while being ignorant at others. I mean to say that no new knowledge comes to Him in any way 5 that His knowledge is neither multiple nor finite; that nothing among all the beings is hidden from Him 5 and that His knowledge of them does not abolish their natures, for the possible remains as it was with the nature of possibility. All the con¬ tradictions that may appear in the union of these assertions are due to their being considered in relation to our knowledge, which has only its name in common with His knowledge. Similarly the word “purpose” is used equivocally when applied to what is purposed by us and to what is said to be His purpose, may He be exalted. Similarly the word “providence” is used 13. I.e., an attribute superadded to God’s essence. 14. Isa. 53:8-9.

equivocally when applied to what we are provident about and to that of which it is said that He, may He be exalted, is provident with regard to it. It is accordingly true that the meaning of knowledge, the meaning of pur¬ pose, and the meaning of providence, when ascribed to us, are different from the meanings of these terms when ascribed to Him. When, therefore, the two providences or knowledges or purposes are taken to have one and the same meaning, the above-mentioned difficulties and doubts arise. When, on the other hand, it is known that everything that is ascribed to us is different from everything ascribed to Him, truth becomes manifest. The differences between the things ascribed | to Him and those ascribed to us have been explicitly stated, as have been mentioned above, in its dictum: Neither are your ways My ways.

CHAPTER 21 A great disparity subsists between the knowledge an artificer has of the thing he has made and the knowledge someone else has of the artifact in question. For if the artifact was made in a way conforming to the knowl¬ edge of its artificer, the artificer only made it through following his own knowledge. With regard to the other one who looks at that artifact, com¬ prehending it with his knowledge, his knowledge follows the artifact. Thus, for instance, the artificer who made this box in which weights are moved by the flow of water so as to indicate the hours of the day or the night that have passed, apprehends and knows all the quantity of water that must flow in it, the changes in the position of the flow, all the threads that are drawn, and all the balls that come down. And he knows these motions not because he looks at the motions that take place now. The converse is true, for the motions that take place now only come about because they conform to his knowledge. However, this does not hold in the case of someone who looks at this instrument. For whenever the onlooker sees a movement, he obtains new knowledge. And by not ceasing to look on and gradually to obtain in¬ crease of new knowledge, he acquires in this way a knowledge of the whole of the instrument. However, if you suppose that the motions of this instru¬ ment are infinite, the onlooker could never contain them in his knowledge. In addition, the onlooker is incapable of knowing any | of these motions before they take place, for he only knows whatever he knows on the basis of 44^] The Guide of the Perplexed ill • 21 483 what takes place. Such is the case with regard to that which exists1 taken as a whole in its relation to our knowledge and His knowledge, may He be exalted. For we know all that we know only through looking at the beings; therefore our knowledge does not grasp the future or the infinite. Our in¬ sights are renewed and multiplied according to the things from which we acquire the knowledge of them. He, may He be exalted, is not like that. I mean that His knowledge of things is not derived from them, so that there is multiplicity and renewal of knowledge. On the contrary, the things in question follow upon His knowledge, which preceded and established them as they are: either as the existence of what is separate from matter; or as the existence of a permanent individual endowed with matter; or as the existence of what is endowed with matter and has changing individuals, but follows on an incorruptible and immutable order. Hence, with regard to Him, may He be exalted, there is no multiplicity of insights and renewal and change of knowledge. For through knowing the true reality of His own immutable essence, He also knows the totality of what necessarily derives from all His acts. For us to desire to have an intellectual cognition of the way this comes about is as if wre desired that we be He and our appre¬ hension be His apprehension. He who studies true reality equitably ought accordingly to believe that nothing is hidden in any way from Him, may He be exalted, but that, on the contrary, everything is revealed to His knowledge, w'hich is His essence, and that it is impossible for us to know in any way this kind of apprehension. If we knew how it comes about, wre would have an intellect in virtue of which an apprehension of this kind might be had. This, however, is a thing that in what exists2 belongs only to Him, may He be exalted, and it is His essence. Understand this then. For I say that this is something most extraordinary and a true opinion; if it is carefully studied, no mistake or distortion wall be found in it, nor wall | in¬ congruities be attached to it; and no deficiency is ascribed through it to God. No demonstration at all can be obtained with regard to these great and sublime notions, either for our opinion — that of the community of those who adhere to a Law — or for the opinion of the philosophers, even if one con¬ siders all the differences among the latter with regard to this question. And with regard to all problems with reference to which there is no demon¬ stration, the method used by us with regard to this question — I mean the question of the deity’s knowdedge of what is other than He — ought to be followred. Understand this.

1. Literally: existence.

2. Literally: existence.

CHAPTER 22 The story of Job, which is extraordinary and marvellous, belongs to the kind of things we are discussing now. I mean to say that it is a parable intended to set forth the opinions of people concerning providence. You know the explicit statement of some of [the Sages]: Job has not existed and was not created, but was a parable J Those, on the other hand, who believe that he has existed and was created and that the story has happened, do not know at what time and in what place he lived. For some of the Sages say that he lived in the days of the Patriarchs, whereas others say that he lived in the days of Moses; again others say that he lived in the days of David; again others say that he was one of those who came back from Babylon. This confirms the opinions of those who say that he has not existed and was not created. To sum up: whether he has existed or not, with regard to cases2 like his, which always exist, all reflecting people become perplexed; and in con¬ sequence such things as I have already mentioned to you are said about God’s knowledge and His providence. I refer to the assertion that a right¬ eous and perfect man, who was just in his actions and is most careful to avoid sins, was stricken — without his having committed a sin entailing this — by great and consecutive calamities with respect to | his fortune, his children, and his body. Now according to both opinions, the one that considers that he has existed and the one that considers that he has not, the prologue — I mean the discourse of Satan, that of God addressed to Satan, and the giving- over [of Job to Satan] — is indubitably, in the view of everyone endowed with intellect, a parable. However, it is not a parable like all others, but one to which extraordinary notions and things that are the mystery of the universe 3 are attached. Through it great enigmas are solved, and truths than which none is higher become clear. I shall mention to you what it is possible to mention, and I shall mention to you the words of the Sages that have drawn my attention to everything that I understand in this great parable.

The first thing that you will consider is its dictum, There was a man in the land of Us,* in which figures the equivocal word Us. It is the name of an individual: Us his first-born;5 and also the imperative of a verb meaning to reflect and meditate: Usu cesah [take counsel together ].6 It is as if [Scripture] 2. Or, according to certain manuscripts: stories like his.

3. The expression quoted occurs in B.T., Hagigah, 13a, but refers there to Ezekiel’s vision.

45^] The Guide of the Perplexed III • 22 ^Sj