§. II. Disengage our selves from all our former Prejudices, from our Opinion of Names, Authorities, Customs and the like, not give credit to any thing any longer because we have once believ’d it, but because it carries clear and uncontested Evidence along with it. I shou’d think there needed no more to persuade us to this, than a consideration of the mischiefs these Prejudices do us. These are the grand hindrance in our search after Truth; these dispose us for the reception of Error, and when we have imbib’d confirm us in it; Contract our Souls and shorten our views, hinder the free range of our Thoughts and confine them only to that particular track which these have taken; and in a word, erect a Tyranny over our free born Souls, whilst they suffer nothing to pass for True that has not been stampt at their own Mint. But this is not all their mischief, they are really the root of Scepticism; for when we have taken up an Opinion on weak Grounds and stifly adher’d to it, coming afterwards by some chance or other to be convinc’d of its falseness, the same disposition which induc’d us to receive the Premises without Reason, now inclines us to draw as false a Conclusion from them; and because we seem’d once well assur’d of what now appears to have nothing in’t to make us so, therefore we fancy there’s nothing certain, that all our Notions are but Probabilities, which stand or fall according to the Ingenuity of their Managers, and so from an unreasonable Obstinacy we pass on to as unreasonable a Levity; so smooth is the transition from believing too easily and too much, to the belief of just nothing at all.
But pray where’s the force of this Argument, "This is true because such a Person or such a Number of Men have said it. Or, which commonly weighs more, because I my self, the dear Idol of my own Heart have sometimes embrac’d and perhaps very zealously maintain’d it?" Were we to Poll for Truth, or were our own particular Opinions th’Infallible Standard of it, there were reason to subscribe to the Sentiments of the _Many_, or to be tenacious of our _Own_. But since Truth tho she is bright and ready to reveal her self to all sincere Inquirers, is not often found by the generality of those who pretend to seek after her, Interest, Applause, or some other little sordid Passion, being really the Mistress they court, whilst she (like Religion in another Case) is made use of for a Stale to carry on the Design the better; since we’re commonly too much under the power of Inordinate Affections to have our Understandings always clear and our Judgments certain, are too rash, too precipitate not to need the assistance of a calmer thought, a more serious review; Reason wills that we shou’d think again, and not form our Conclusions or fix our foot till we can honestly say, that we have without Prejudice or Prepossession view’d the matter in Debate on all sides, seen it in every light, have no bias to encline us either way, but are only determin’d by Truth it self, shining brightly in our eyes, and not permitting us to resist the force and Evidence it carries.
This I’me sure is what Rational Creatures ought to do, what’s then the Reason that they do’t not?
Laziness and Idleness in the first place; Thinking is a pain to those who have disus’d it, they will not be at the trouble of carrying on a thought, of pursuing a Meditation till it leads them into the confines of Truth, much less till it puts ’em in possession of her. ’Tis an easier way to follow on in a beaten road, than to launch out into the main Ocean, tho it be in order to the making of new Discoveries; they therefore who would be thought knowing without taking too much pains to be so, suppose ’tis enough to go on in their Fore-fathers steps, to say as they say, and hope they shall get as much Reputation by it as those who have gone before.
Again Self-love, an excellent Principle when true, but the worst and most mischievous when mistaken, disposes us to be retentive of our Prejudices and Errors, especially when it is joyn’d as most commonly it is with Pride and Conceitedness. The Condition of our present State (as was said before) in which we feel the force of our Passions e’re we discern the strength of our Reason, necessitates us to take up with such Principles and Reasonings to direct and determine these Passions as we happen to meet with, tho probably they are far from being just ones, and are such as Education or Accident not right Reason disposes us to; and being inur’d and habituated to these, we at last take them for our own, for parts of our dear beloved selves, and are as unwilling to be divorced from them as we wou’d be to part with a Hand or an Eye or any the most useful Member. Whoever talks contrary to these receiv’d Notions seems to banter us, to persuade us out of our very Senses, and does that which our Pride cannot bear, he supposes we’ve been all along deceiv’d and must begin anew: We therefore instead of depositing our old Errors, fish about for Arguments to defend ’em, and do not raise Hypotheses on the Discoveries we have made of Truth, but search for Probabilities to maintain our Hypotheses. And what’s the result of all this? Having set out in a wrong way we’re resolv’d to persist in it, we grope in the dark and quarrel with those who wou’d lead us out of it!
But is there no Remedy for this disorder, since we hope that All are not irrecoverably lost, tho too many are so invellop’d in Prejudice that there’s little probability of disengaging them? Why really the best that I can think of at present is, to Resolve to be Industrious, and to think no Pains too much to purchase Truth; to consider that our Fore-fathers were Men of like Passions with us, and are therefore not to be Credited on the score of Authority but of Reason; to remember likewise our own Infirmity, the shortness of our Views, and the bias which our Passions and secular Interests give us; generously to disengage our selves from the deceptions of sense, from all sinister and little Designs, and honestly to search after Truth for no other End but the Glory of GOD, by the accomplishing of our Own and our Neighbours Minds, and when we have humbly implor’d, as now we may very well hope for the Divine Assistance, that the Father of Lights will shine upon us, and that He who is _the Way, the Truth and the Life_ will lead us into all Truth; why then we shou’d do well to take notice, That it is of no great consequence to us what our old Opinions are any farther than as we persist in ’em; that there’s no necessity that they shou’d be true, but ’tis highly necessary we shou’d fix on what is so; therefore these also must be made to pass the Scrutiny, and be cashier’d if they stand not the Test of a severe Examination and sound Reason.
’Tis a great mistake to fancy it a reproach to change our Sentiments, the infamy lies on their side who wilfully and unreasonably adhere to ’em. Not but that it is mean and shameful to be ever on the tip-toe, and indeed to change in any Case where pure and disinteress’d Reason does not oblige us to it. To be once willing to alter our sentiments if there be just occasion for’t, wou’d for ever after secure us from Changing, to which the Precipitate and Obstinate are most liable; whereas such as suspend their Judgments till after a sufficient Examination and Weighing of all things they see cause to fix them, do seldom Change, because they can hardly meet with any Reason to do so; and indeed whatever may be the Character of a Wit, Stay’dness and Deliberation is that of a Wise Person.
But as there is an extream on one hand in being too resolutely bent on our Old Opinions, so is there on the other in inordinately thirsting after Novelty. An Opinion is neither better nor worse for being Old or New, the Truth of it is the only thing considerable; tho properly speaking all Truth is Antient, as being from Eternity in the Divine Ideas, ’tis only New in respect of our Discoveries. If we go about to assign a Reason for this insatiable desire of Novelty, I know not how to find a better than our Credulity and easy assent to things inevident. Truth being the proper Object of the Understanding it does naturally search after it, and tho this search will never wholly cease, because our Understandings are more capacious than our Discoveries, and the view of one Truth is but a Preparative to look farther; yet had we clear and certain Evidence for our Conclusions, tho that wou’d not end our Inquiries, it wou’d however satisfie us, so far at least as they had gone. Whereas on the contrary your hunters after Novelty are commonly never satisfied, they pull down to day what they had built up yesterday, and Why? But because they concluded too soon? and their Novel Hypothesis is founded on Fancy or Passion, or any thing rather than Right Reason.
But when I speak of the little deference that is to be given to Names, Authorities, and receiv’d Opinions, I extend it no farther than to matters purely Philosophical to mere Humane Truths, and do not design any Prejudice to the Authority of the Church which is of different consideration. For tho it be necessary even in this Case, to deposite whatever may look like a Prejudice, arising from that particular way of Worship, whereby that Communion in which we’ve been Educated is distinguish’d from all other Christians, yet as to the Substantials of Faith and Practice, tho every one be allow’d to Examine, for they will bear the Test, yet it is not fit that he shou’d draw Conclusions, contrary to what has been already determin’d by the Catholick Church, or even by that particular Church of which he is a Member, unless where it does plainly and evidently contradict that sense of Holy Scripture which has been receiv’d by the Church Universal. Nor is this a giving up our selves to Authority barely as such, ’tis only a modest deference to Truth. Philosophical Truths are not open to every Inquirer, an elevated Genius and great application of Mind is requir’d to find them out, nor are they of that importance but that Men may give Scope to their Thoughts, and very often think, tho indeed unreasonably, that they’re oblig’d in point of Honour to defend their own Hypotheses.
But the Articles of our Faith and the great Principles of Christian Morality are of another Nature, GOD _wou’d have all Men to be sav’d and to come to the Knowlege of_ these _Truths_, tho he did not design ’em all for Philosophers, and therefore they carry a Proof and Evidence suited to the very Vulgar, which he who runs may read, which every one ought to acquiesce in, tho according to their leisure and capacity ’tis fit they inquire why. And being a matter of the highest concern such as our Eternal Happiness or Misery depends on, it may reasonably be suppos’d (tho to the shame of our Folly we sometimes find the contrary) that Men won’t play fast and loose in a Business of so vast importance, but that all Christians have as they are oblig’d seriously and fully consider’d it, and especially those who are more peculiarly set apart by the Divine Appointment for the study of Sacred Truths. So that to acquiesce in the Authority of the Church, so far as it is here pleaded for is no more than this, The calling in to our assistance the Judgment and Advice of those whom GOD hath set over us, and consequently whom he assists in a more especial manner, to discharge that Function to which he has call’d them; and, in such disputable points as we’re not able to determine for our selves, a quiet submission to the Voice of our Guides, whom Modesty will incline us to think have greater Abilities and Assistances, as well as more Time and Opportunity to find out the Truth than we.
As Prejudice fetters the Understanding so does Custom manacle the Will, which scarce knows how to divert from a Track which the generality around it take, and to which it has it self been habituated. It wou’d be too large a digression, to examin throughly a Subject so fit to be consider’d, being it is the root of very much Evil, the last refuge of Vice where it fortifies it self when driven from all other retreats.
We shall therefore forbear to enquire from what mistakes it draws its force, what Considerations are proper to disarm it of its power, and what else might be of use to deliver us from its Slavery, and only remark; That tho great deference is to be paid to the Ways and Usages of the Wise and Good, yet considering that these are the least number of Mankind, ’tis the Croud who will make the Mode, and consequently it will be as absurd as they are: Therefore Custom cannot Authorise a Practice if Reason Condemns it, the following a Multitude is no excuse for the doing of Evil. None but the Weak and Inconsiderable swim down with the Torrent, brave Spirits delight to stem the Tide, they know no Conquest so Glorious, because none so difficult, as that which is obtain’d over foolish and ill-grounded Maxims and sinful Customs; What wou’d they not do to restore Mankind to their Lawful Liberty, and to pull down this worst of Tyrannies, because it enslaves the very Souls of Men?
§ III. But a Generous Resolution and Courageous Industry are not only necessary to enable us to throw off Sloth and to Conquer the Prejudices of Education, Authority and Custom, the same Resolution and Courage which help’d us to this Victory, must secure and continue to us the Fruits of it. We shall have need of Patience and constant Perseverance thro the whole course of our Lives if we mean to prosecute the noble Design we have begun; we must not think the Business is over when we have smooth’d the entrance; there will still be Difficulties, tho no insuperable ones, but such as will wear off by degrees, the greatest uneasiness being in the first effort. And tho our Progress shou’d not happen to be answerable to our Desires, there’s no reason to be discourag’d, we shou’d rather be animated by such noble Desires to greater Industry. Where’s the Glory of an easy Victory? ’Tis Labour and Cost that inhanses the value of every thing. And to the end we may not be discourag’d, ’tis fit that we arm our selves against all Accidents by considering them before hand. We have the Malice and Industry of many Cunning and Powerful Adversaries, as well as our own indocility to contend with. The grand Enemy of Mankind is very unwilling that they shou’d arrive at that State of Innocence and Perfection from which he fell, and of all the Artifices he makes use of to hinder it, scarce any’s more effectual than the mischief he excites us to do one another. What are they employ’d in but his Service who will neither do any thing that’s excellent themselves, nor if they could hinder, suffer it to be done by others? Who employ all their little Wit and Pains in Scoffing at such who they say in derision wou’d be wiser then their Neighbours? We must be content to suffer a scornful fleer, a parcel of hard Names and a little ridiculing, if we’re Resolv’d to do such things as do not deserve ’em. Dogs will bark at the Moon, and perhaps for no other reason but because she is out of their reach, elevated above them. But the Author of our Nature to whom all the Inconveniencies we are liable to in this Earthly Pilgrimage are fully known, has endow’d us with Principles sufficient to carry us safely thro them all, if we will but observe and make use of ’em. One of these is _Generosity_, which (so long as we keep it from degenerating into Pride) is of admirable advantage to us in this matter. It was not fit that Creatures capable of and made for Society, shou’d be wholly Independent, or Indifferent to each others Esteem and Commendation; nor was it convenient considering how seldom these are justly distributed, that they shou’d too much regard and depend on them. It was requisite therefore that a desire of our Neighbours Good Opinion shou’d be implanted in our Natures to the end we might be excited to do such things as deserve it, and yet withall a Generous neglect of it, if they unjustly withheld it where it was due. There’s so little reason that we shou’d be discourag’d from what is truly excellent and becoming on account of being Scoft and Laugh’d at for it, that on the contrary this is a new accession to our Glory, we never shine so Illustriously as when we break thro these little Clouds and Oppositions which impotently attempted to obscure our Rays. To be Reproach’d for Weldoing is a higher Encomium, than the loftiest Praises when we do not deserve them: So that let the World think as it list, whilst we are in the pursuit of true Wisdom, our Reputation is secur’d, our Crown is furbishing and tho it do not shine out in this Envious and Ill-natur’d World, it will however, which is infinitely more desirable appear in all its Lustre and Splendor in a better.
And as we disregard the Censures of ill People, so are we patiently to bear with our own backwardness and indocility. There goes a good deal of Time and Pains, of Thought and Watchfulness to the rooting out of Ill-habits, to the fortifying our Minds against foolish Customs, and to the making that easie and pleasant which us’d to be irksom to us.
But we ought not to be disheartn’d, since ’tis necessary to be done, and we cannot reasonably say ’tis Impossible, till we’ve attempted and fail’d in’t. But then let’s attempt it in the most prudent Method, use the properest Means, allow sufficient Time for their Operation and to make the essay: Let’s not set about it by fits, or in one or two good Moods, nor expect it will be done on a sudden, but by degrees and in a proper season, making it our main Design and Business, and then I dare confidently affirm the success will answer the Pains we have spent about it.
§. IV. But one thing more, and then I shall go on as well as I can, to lay down what seems to me the best Method for Improvement. Whoever wou’d Act to purpose must propose some End to themselves, and keep it still in their Eye thro’out their whole progress. Life without this is a disproportionate unseemly thing, a confused huddle of broken, contradictory Actions, such as afford us nothing but the being asham’d of ’em. But do we need to be taught our End? One wou’d rather think there were no occasion to mention it, did not Experience daily convince us how many there are who neglect it. What End can Creatures have but their Creators Glory? And did they truly understand their own Happiness ’tis certain they wou’d have no other, since this is the only way of procuring their own Felicity. But it is not enough to have barely an implicit and languid desire of it, ’twere much better to hold it ever in view, and that all our Actions had in their proportion a warm and immediate tendency thither. This wou’d stamp the impression of Holiness upon the most indifferent Action, and without this what is Materially and to all outward appearance very good, is really and truly no better than a specious folly. We are not made for our selves, nor was it ever design’d we shou’d be ador’d and idoliz’d by one another. Our Faculties were given us for Use not Ostentation, not to make a noise in the World, but to be serviceable in it, to declare the Wisdom, Power and Goodness, of that All-Perfect Being from whom we derive _All_ our Excellencies, and in whose Service they ought _Wholly_ to be employ’d.
Did our Knowlege serve no other purpose than the exalting us in our own Opinion, or in that of our Fellow Creatures, the furnishing us with Materials for a quaint Discourse, an agreeable Conversation, ’twere scarce worth while to be at the trouble of attaining it. But when it enlarges the Capacity of our Minds, gives us nobler Ideas of the Majesty, the Grandeur and Glorious Attributes of our adorable Creator, Regulates our Wills and makes us more capable of Imitating and Enjoying him, ’tis then a truly sublime thing, a worthy Object of our Industry: And she who does not make this the End of her Study, spends her Time and Pains to no purpose or to an ill one.
We have no better way of finding out the true End of any thing, than by observing to what Use it is most adapted. Now the Art of _Well-Living_, the Study of the Divine Will and Law, that so we may be Conformable to it in all things, is what we’re peculiarly fitted for and destin’d to, what ever has not such a Tendency, either Directly or at least Remotely, is besides the purpose. Rational Studies therefore next to GOD’s Word bid fairest for our Choice, because they best answer the Design above mention’d. Truths merely Speculative and which have no influence upon Practice, which neither contribute to the good of Soul or Body, are but idle Amusements, an impertinent and criminal wast of Time. To be able to speak many Languages, to give an Historical Account of all Ages Opinions and Authors, to make a florid Harangue, or defend right or wrong the Argument I’ve undertaken, may give me higher thoughts of my Self but not of GOD, this is the _Knowlege that pufeth up_, in the Words of the Apostle, and seldom leads us to that _Charity which Edifieth_.
And as the Understanding so the Will must be duly directed to its End and Object. Morality is so consonant to the Nature of Man, so adapted to his Happiness, that had not his Understanding been darkn’d by the Fall, and his whole Frame disorder’d and weakened, he wou’d Naturally have practis’d it. And according as he recovers himself, and casts off those Clouds which Eclipse his Reason, so proportionably are his Actions more agreeable to Moral Precepts, and tho we suppose him ignorant of any higher end, he will however do such things as they enjoyn him, to th’intent he may be easy, obtain a good Reputation, and enjoy himself and this World the better. Now were we sure that Reason wou’d always maintain its ground against Passion and Appetite, such an one might be allow’d to be a good Neighbour, a Just Ruler, a plausible Friend or the like, and wou’d well enough discharge the Relative Duties of Society, and do nothing misbecoming the dignity of Human Nature.
But considering how weak our Reason is, how unable to maintain its Authority and oppose the incursions of sense, without the assistance of an inward and Spiritual Sensation to strengthen it, ’tis highly necessary that we use due endeavours to procure a lively relish of our true Good, a Sentiment that will not only Ballance, but if attended to and improv’d, very much out-weigh the Pleasures of our Animal Nature.
Now this is no otherwise to be obtain’d than by directing the Will in an elicit Act to GOD as its only Good, so that the sole End of all its movements, may be to draw near, to acquiesce in and be united to him.
For as all Natural Motions are easie and pleasant, so this being the only Natural Motion of the Will must needs be unspeakably delightful to it. Besides that peculiar delectation, which this Fountain of Joy bestows as a Donative, on all who thus sincerly address themselves to him. So that it is not enough to be Morally Good because ’tis most Reputable and Easie, and most for our Pleasure and Interest in the present World, as this will never secure our Duty, so is it too low an End for a Creature Capable of Immortality to propose, nothing less than an intire devoting of our selves to the End for which we were made, the Service and Enjoyment of the most amiable and only Good, can keep us Constantly and Uniformly in our Duty, or is a Design that’s worthy of us.
CHAP. III.
_Concerning the Improvement of the Understanding._ I. _Of the Capacity of the Humane Mind in General._ II. _Of Particular Capacities._ III. _The most common Infirmities incident to the Understanding and their Cure._ IV. _A Natural Logic, And_ V. _Rhetoric propos’d._ VI. _The Application and Use of our Knowlege._ The perfection of the Understanding consisting in the Clearness and Largness of its view, it improves proportionably as its Ideas become Clearer and more Extensive. But this is not so to be understood as if all sorts of Notices contributed to our Improvement, there are some things which make us no wiser when we know ’em, others which ’tis best to be ignorant of. But that Understanding seems to me the most exalted, which has the Clearest and most Extensive view of such Truths as are suitable to its Capacity, and Necessary or Convenient to be Known in this Present State. For being that we are but Creatures, our Understanding in its greatest Perfection has only a limited excellency.
It has indeed a vast extent, and it were not amiss if we tarried a little in the Contemplation of its Powers and Capacities, provided that the Prospect did not make us giddy, that we remember from whom we have receiv’d them, and ballance those lofty Thoughts which a view of our Intellectuals may occasion, with the depressing ones which the irregularity of our Morals will suggest, and that we learn from this inspection, how indecorous it is to busy this bright side of us in mean things, seeing it is capable of such noble ones.
Human Nature is indeed a wonderful Composure admirable in its outward structure, but much more excellent in the Beauties of its Inward, and she who considers in whose Image her Soul was Created, and whose Blood was shed to Redeem it, cannot prize it too much, nor forget to pay it her utmost regard. There’s nothing in this Material World to be compar’d to’t, all the gay things we dote on, and for which we many times expose our Souls to ruin, are of no consideration in respect of it. They are not the good of the Soul, its happiness depends not on ’em, but they often deceive and withdraw it from its true Good. It was made for the Contemplation and Enjoyment of its GOD, and all Souls are capable of this tho in a different degree and by measures somewhat different, as we hope will appear from that which follows.
§. I. Truth in general is the Object of the Understanding, but all Truths are not equally Evident, because of the Limitation of the Humane Mind, which tho’ it can gradually take in many Truths, yet cannot any more than our sight attend to many things at once: And likewise, because GOD has not thought fit to communicate such Ideas to us, as are necessary to the disquisition of some particular Truths. For knowing nothing without us but by the Idea we have of it, and Judging only according to the Relation we find between two or more Ideas, when we cannot discover the Truth we search after by Intuition or the immediate companion of two Ideas, ’tis necessary that we shou’d have a third by which to compare them. But if this middle Idea be wanting, though we have sufficient Evidence of those two which we wou’d compare, because we have a Clear and Distinct Conception of them, yet we are Ignorant of those Truths which wou’d arise from their Comparison, because we want a third by which to compare them.
To give an instance of this in a point of great consequence, and of late very much controverted tho to little purpose, because we take a wrong method, and wou’d make that the Object of Science which is properly the Object of Faith, the Doctrin of the Trinity. Revelation which is but an exaltation and improvement of Reason has told us, That the Father is GOD, the Son is GOD, and the Holy Ghost is GOD, and our Idea of the Godhead of any one of these Persons, is as clear as our Idea of any of the other. Both Reason and Revelation assure us that GOD is One Simple Essence, Undivided, and Infinite in all Perfection, this is the Natural Idea which we have of GOD. How then can the Father be GOD, the Son GOD, and the Holy Ghost GOD, when yet there is but One GOD? That these two Propositions are true we are certain, both because GOD who cannot lie has Reveal’d ’em, and because we have as clear an Idea of ’em as it is possible a Finite Mind shou’d have of an Infinite Nature. But we cannot find out how this should be, by the bare Comparison of these two Ideas without the help of a third by which to compare them. This GOD has not thought fit to impart to us, the Prospect it wou’d have given us wou’d have been too dazling, too bright for Mortality to bear, and we ought to acquiesce in the Divine Will. So then, we are well assur’d that these two Propositions are true, _There is but one GOD_; And, _There are three Persons in the Godhead_: but we know not the _Manner_ how these things are. Nor can our acquiescence be thought Unreasonable, nor the Doctrin we subscribe to be run down as absurd and contradictory by every little warm Disputer and Pretender to Reason, whose Life is perhaps a continual contradiction to it, and he knows little of it besides the Name. For we ought not to think it strange that GOD has folded up his own Nature, not in Darkness, but in an adorable and inaccessible Light, since his Wisdom sees it fit to keep us ignorant of our own. We know and feel the Union between our Soul and Body, but who amongst us sees so clearly, as to find out with Certitude and Exactness, the secret ties which unite two such different Substances, or how they are able to act upon each other? We are conscious of our own Liberty, who ever denies it denies that he is capable of Rewards and Punishments, degrades his Nature and makes himself but a more curious piece of Mechanism; and none but Atheists will call in question the Providence of GOD, or deny that he Governs _All_, even the most Free of all his Creatures. But who can reconcile me these? Or adjust the limits between GOD’s Prescience and Mans Free-will? Our Understandings are sufficiently illuminated to lead us to the Fountain of Life and Light, we do or may know enough to fill our Souls with the noblest Conceptions, the humblest Adoration, and the intirest Love of the Author of our Being, and what can we desire farther? If we make so ill a Use of that Knowledge which we have, as to be so far puffed up with it, as to turn it against him who gave it, how dangerous would it be for us to have more Knowledge, in a State in which we have so little Humility! But if vain Man will pretend to Wisdom, let him first learn to know the length of his own line.
Tho the Human Intellect has a large extent, yet being limited as we have already said, this Limitation is the Cause of those different Modes of Thinking, which for distinction sake we call Faith, Science and Opinion. For in this present and imperfect State in which we know not any thing by Intuition, or immediate except a few first Principles which we call Self-evident, the most of our Knowlege is acquir’d by Reasoning and Deduction: And these three Modes of Understanding, Faith, Science and Opinion are no otherwise distinguish’d, than by the different degrees of Clearness and Evidence in the Premises from whence the Conclusion is drawn.
Knowlege in a proper and restricted Sense and as appropriated to Science, signifies that clear Perception which is follow’d by a firm assent to Conclusions rightly drawn from Premises of which we have clear and distinct Ideas. Which Premises or Principles must be so clear and Evident, that supposing us reasonable Creatures, and free from Prejudices and Passions, (which for the time they predominate as good as deprive us of our Reason) we cannot withhold our assent from them without manifest violence to our Reason.
But if the Nature of the thing be such as that it admits of no undoubted Premises to argue from, or at least we don’t at present know of any, or that the Conclusion does not so necessarily follow as to give a perfect satisfaction to the Mind and to free it from all hesitation, that which we think of it is then call’d Opinion.
Again, If the Medium we make use of to prove the Proposition be Authority, the Conclusion which we draw from it is said to be Believ’d; This is what we call Faith, and when the Authority is GOD’s a Divine Faith.
Moral Certainty is a Species of Knowlege whose Proofs are of a compounded Nature, in part resembling those which belong to Science, and partly those of Faith. We do not make the whole Process our selves, but depend on another for the _immediate_ Proof, but we our selves deduce the _Mediate_ from Circumstances and Principles as Certain and almost as Evident as those of Science, and which lead us to the immediate Proofs and make it unreasonable to doubt of ’em.
Indeed we not seldom deceive our selves in this matter, by inclining alternately to both extremes. Sometimes we reject Truths which are Morally Certain as Conjectural and Probable only, because they have not a Physical and Mathematical Certainty, which they are incapable of. At another time we embrace the slightest Conjectures and any thing that looks with Probability, as moral Certainties and real Verities, if Fancy, Passion or Interest recommend them; so ready are we to be determin’d by these rather than by solid Reason.
In this enumeration of the several ways of Knowing. I have not reckon’d the Senses, in regard that we’re more properly said to be _Conscious_ of than to _Know_ such things as we perceive by Sensation.
And also because that Light which we suppose to be let into our Ideas by our Senses is indeed very dim and fallacious, and not to be relied on till it has past the Test of Reason; neither do I think there’s any Mode of Knowlege which mayn’t be reduc’d to those already mentioned.
Now tho there’s a great difference between Opinion and Science, true Science being immutable but Opinion variable and uncertain, yet there is not such a difference between Faith and Science as is usually suppos’d. The difference consists not in the Certainty but in the way of Proof; the Objects of Faith are as Rationally and as Firmly Prov’d as the Objects of Science, tho by another way. As Science Demonstrates things that are _Seen_, so Faith is the Evidence of such as are _Not Seen_. And he who rejects the Evidence of Faith in such things as belong to its Cognizance, is as unreasonable as he who denies Propositions in Geometry that are prov’d with Mathematical exactness.
There’s nothing true which is not in it self demonstrable, or which we should not pronounce to be true had we a Clear and Intuitive View of it. But as was said above we see very few things by Intuition, neither are we furnish’d with Mediums to make the Process our selves in Demonstrating all Truths, and therefore there are some Truths which we must either be totally ignorant of, or else receive them on the Testimony of another Person, to whose Understanding they are clear and manifest tho not to ours. And if this Person be one who can neither be Deceiv’d nor Deceive, we’re as certain of those Conclusions which we prove by his Authority, as we’re of those we demonstrate by our own Reason; nay more Certain, by how much his Reason is more Comprehensive and Infallible than our own.
Science is the following the Process our Selves upon Clear and Evident Principles; Faith is a Dependance on the Credit of another, in such matters as are out of our View. And when we have very good Reason to submit to the Testimony of the Person we Believe, Faith is as Firm, and those Truths it discovers to us as truly Intelligible, and as strongly Prov’d in their kind as Science.
In a word, as every Sense so every Capacity of the Understanding has its proper Object. The Objects of Science are things within our View, of which we may have Clear and Distinct Ideas, and nothing shou’d be