have no more to do but to look attentively into our own Minds, having as was said above, laid aside all Prejudices and whatever may give a false tincture to our Light, there we shall find a Clear and Lively Representation of what we seek for, unsophisticated with the Dross of false Definitions and unintelligible Expressions. But we must not imagine that a transient view will serve the turn, or that our Eye will be Enlightened if it be not fix’d. For tho’ Truth be exceeding bright, yet since our Prejudices and Passions have darkned our Eye-sight, it requires no little Pains and Application of Mind to find her out, the neglect of which Application is the Reason that we have so little Truth, and that the little we have is almost lost in that Rubbish of Error which is mingled with it. And since Truth is so near at hand, since we are not oblig’d to tumble over many Authors, to hunt after every celebrated Genius, but may have it for enquiring after in our own Breasts, are we not inexcusable if we don’t obtain it? Are we not unworthy of Compassion if we suffer our Understandings to be over-run with Error? Indeed it seems to me most Reasonable and most agreeable to the Wisdom and Equity of the Divine Operations, that every one shou’d have a Teacher in their own Bosoms, who will if they seriously apply themselves to him, immediately Enlighten them so far as that is Necessary, and direct them to such Means as are sufficient for their Instruction both in Humane and Divine Truths; for as to the latter, Reason if it be Right and Solid, will not pretend to be our sole Instructor, but will send us to Divine Revelation when it may be had.
GOD does nothing in vain, he gives no Power or Faculty which he has not allotted to some proportionate use, if therefore he has given to Mankind a Rational Mind, every individual Understanding ought to be employ’d in somewhat worthy of it. The Meanest Person shou’d Think as _Justly_, tho’ not as _Capaciously_, as the greatest Philosopher. And if the Understanding be made for the Contemplation of Truth, and I know not what else it can be made for, either there are many Understandings who are never able to attain what they were design’d and fitted for, which is contrary to the Supposition that GOD made nothing in Vain, or else the very meanest must be put in a way of attaining it: Now how can this be if all that which goes to the composition of a Knowing Man in th’account of the World, be necessary to make one so? All have not leisure to Learn Languages and pore on Books, nor Opportunity to Converse with the Learned; but all may _Think_, may use their own Faculties rightly, and consult the Master who is within them.
By Ideas we sometimes understand in general all that which is the immediate Object of the Mind, whatever it Perceives; and in this large Sense it may take in all Thought, all that we are any ways capable of Discerning: So when we say we have no Idea of a thing, ’tis as much as to say we know nothing of the matter. Again, it is more strictly taken for that which represents to the Mind some Object distinct from it, whether Clearly or Confusedly; when this is its import, our Knowledge is said to be as Clear as our Ideas are. For that Idea which represents a thing so Clearly, that by an Attent and Simple View we may discern its Properties and Modifications, at least so far as they can be Known, is never false; all our Certainty and Evidence depends on it, if we Know not Truly what is thus represented to our Minds we know nothing. Thus the Idea of Equality between 2 and 2 is so evident that it is impossible to doubt of it, no Arguments could convince us of the Contrary, nor be able to persuade us that the same may be found between 2 and 3.
And as such an Idea as this is never False, so neither can any Idea be said to be so, if by False we mean that which has no Existence; our Idea certainly Exists, tho’ there be not any thing in Nature Correspondent to it. For tho’ there be no such thing as a Golden Mountain, yet when I think of one, ’tis certain I have an Idea of it.
But our Ideas are then said to be False, or rather Wrong, when they have no Conformity to the Real Nature of the Thing whose Name they bear. So that properly Speaking it is not the Idea but the judgment that is False; we err in supposing that our Idea is answerable to something without us when it is not. In simple Perceptions we are not often deceiv’d, but we frequently mistake in Compounding them, by Uniting several things which have no Agreement, and Separating others which are Essentially United. Indeed it may happen that our Perceptions are faulty sometimes, thro the Indisposition of the Organs or Faculties, thus a Man who has the _Jaundice_ sees every thing ting’d with Yellow, yet even here the Error is not in the Simple Idea but in the Compos’d one, for we do not mistake when we say the Object appears Yellow to our Sight, tho’ we do, when we affirm that it does, or ought to do so to others. So again, when the Mind does not sufficiently Attend to her Ideas nor Examine them on all sides, ’tis very likely she will Think amiss, but this also is a false Judgment, that which is amiss in the Perception being rather the Inadequateness than the Falshood. Thus in many Cases we enquire no farther than whether an Action be not Directly Forbidden, and if we do not find it Absolutely Unlawful, we think that sufficient to Authorize the Practise of it, not considering it as we ought to do, Cloathed with the Circumstances of Scandal, Temptation, _&c._ which place it in the same Classes with things unlawful, at least make it so to us.
Rational Creatures shou’d endeavour to have right Ideas of every thing that comes under their Cognizance, but yet our Ideas of Morality, our thoughts about Religion are those which we shou’d with greatest speed and diligence rectifie, because they are of most importance, the Life to come, as well as all the Occurrences of This, depending on them. We shou’d search for Truth in our most abstracted Speculations, but it concerns us nearly to follow her close in what relates to the Conduct of our Lives. For the main thing we are to drive at in all our Studies, and that which is the greatest Improvement of our Understandings is the Art of Prudence, the being all of a Piece, managing all our Words and Actions as it becomes Wise Persons and Good Christians.
Yet in this we are commonly most faulty; for besides the deceits of our Passions, our Ideas of Particular Vertues and Vices, Goods and Evils, being an assemblage of divers simple Perceptions, and including several Judgments are therefore liable to mistake, and much more so considering how we commonly come by them. We hear the Word that Stands for such a Thing, suppose Honor, and then instead of enquiring what it is at the Fountain-head the Oracles of GOD, and our own, or the Impartial Reason of the Wisest and the Best, Custom and the Observations we make on the Practice of such as Pretend to it forms our Idea, which is seldom a Right one, the Opinions and Practices of the World being very fallacious, and many times quite opposite to the Dictates of Reason wou’d we but give ear to them. For what a strange distorted Idea of Honor must they needs have, who can think it Honourable to break a Vow that ought to be Kept, and Dishonourable to get loose from an Engagement that ought to be Broken? Who cannot endure to be tax’d with a Lye, and yet never think fit to keep their Word? What do they think of Greatness who support their Pomp at the Expence of the Groans and Tears of many Injur’d Families? What is their Idea of Heaven, who profess to Believe such a thing, and yet never endeavour to Qualifie themselves for the Enjoyment of it? Have they any Idea at all of these things when they speak of ’em? Or, if they have, is it not a very false one?
Now that we may avoid mistake the better, and because we usually join Words to our Ideas even when we only Meditate, we shou’d free them from all Equivocation, not make use of any Word, which has not a Distinct Idea annex’d to it, and where Custom has join’d many Ideas to one Word, carefully separate and distinguish them. For if our Words are Equivocal, how can we by Pronouncing such and such, excite the same Idea in another that is in our own Mind, which is the End of Speech, and consequently how can we be Understood? And if sometimes we annex one Idea to a Word, and sometimes another, we may for ever wrangle with those who perhaps wou’d be found to agree with us if we Understood each other, but can neither Convince them, nor clear up the Matter to our own Mind. For Instance: Shou’d I dispute Whether Evil were to be Chosen? Without defining what I mean by Evil, which is a Word customarily apply’d to things of different Natures, and shou’d conclude in the Affirmative, meaning at the same time the Evil of Pain, or any Corporal Loss or Punishment, I were not mistaken, tho’ another Person who annexes no other Idea but that of Sin to the word Evil, might Justly contradict me and say that I was. Or if in the Process of my Discourse, I shou’d without giving notice of it, substitute the Idea of Sin instead of that of Pain, when I mention Evil, I shou’d argue falsly. For it is a Maxim that we may Chuse a less Evil to avoid a greater, if both of them be Corporal Evils, or if one of them be so, and we chuse it to avoid a Sin, between which and the Evil of Pain there is no Comparison: But if the two Evils propos’d to our Choice be both of them Sinful, that Principle will not hold, we must Chuse neither, whatever comes on’t, Sin being Eligible no manner of way.
Thus many times our Ideas are thought to be false when the fault is really in our Language, we make use of Words without joyning any, or only loose and indeterminate Ideas to them, Prating like Parrots who can Modify Sounds, and Pronounce Syllables, and sometimes martial them as a Man wou’d, tho without the use of Reason or understanding any thing by them. So that after a long Discourse and many fine Words, our Hearer may justly ask us what we have been saying? And what it is we wou’d be at? And so a great part, of the Good Breeding of the World, many Elegant Complements pass for nothing, they have no meaning, or if they have, ’tis quite contrary to what the Words in other Cases signifie.
From the Companion of two or more Ideas clearly Conceived arises a Judgment, which we may lay down for a Principle, and as we have occasion Argue from. Always observing that those Judgments which we take for Axioms or Principles, be such as carry the highest Evidence and Conviction, such as every one who will but in the least Attend may Clearly see, and be fully convinced of, and which need not another Idea for their Demonstration. Thus from the Agreement which we plainly perceive between the Ideas of GOD and of Goodness singly consider’d, we discern that they may be joyn’d together so as to form this Proposition, _That GOD is Good_: And from the evident disparity that is between GOD and Injustice, we learn to affirm this other, _That he is not Unjust_. And so long as we Judge of Nothing but what we see Clearly, we can’t be mistaken in our Judgments, we may indeed in those Reasonings and Deductions we draw from them, if we are Ignorant of the Laws of Argumentation, or Negligent in the Observation of them.
The First and Principal thing therefore to be observed in all the Operations of the Mind is, That we determine nothing about those things of which we have not a Clear Idea, and as Distinct as the Nature of the Subject will permit, for we cannot properly be said to Know any thing which does not Clearly and Evidently appear to us. Whatever we see Distinctly we likewise see Clearly, Distinction always including Clearness, tho this does not necessarily include that, there being many Objects Clear to the view of the Mind, which yet can’t be said to be Distinct.
[Sidenote: _Les Princip. de la Philos. de M. Des Cartes._ Pt. I. §. 45.]
That (to use the Words of a Celebrated Author) may be said to be “Clear which is Present and Manifest to an attentive Mind; so as we say we see Objects Clearly, when being present to our Eyes they sufficiently Act on ’em, and our Eyes are dispos’d to regard ’em. And that Distinct, which is so Clear, Particular, and Different from all other things, that it contains not any thing in it self which appears not manifestly to him who considers it as he ought.” Thus we may have a Clear, but not a Distinct and Perfect Idea of GOD and of our own Souls; their Existence and some of their Properties and Attributes may be Certainly and Indubitably Known, but we can’t Know the Nature of our Souls Distinctly, for Reasons too long to be mentioned here, and less that of GOD, because he is Infinite. Now where our Knowlege is Distinct, we may boldly deny of a subject, all that which after a careful Examination we find not in it: But where our Knowlege is only Clear, and not Distinct, tho’ we may safely Affirm what we see, yet we can’t without a hardy Presumption Deny of it what we see not. And were it not very common to find People both Talking and Writing of things of which they have no Notion, no Clear Idea; nay and determining Dogmatically concerning the intire Nature of those of which they cannot possibly have an Adequate and Distinct one, it might seem impertinent to desire them to speak no farther than they Apprehend. They will tell you Peremptorily of Contradictions and Absurdities in such matters as they themselves must allow they cannot Comprehend, tho others as Sharp sighted as themselves can see no such thing as they complain of.
As Judgments are form’d by the Comparing of Ideas, so Reasoning or Discourse arises from the Companion or Combination of several Judgments. Nature teaches us when we can’t find out what Relation one Idea bears to another by a Simple view or bare Comparison, to seek for a Common Measure or third Idea, which Relating to the other two, we may by Comparing it with each of ’em, discern wherein they agree or differ.
Our Invention discovers it self in proposing readily apt Ideas for this Middle Term, our Judgment in making Choice of such as are Clearest and most to our purpose, and the excellency of our Reasoning consists in our Skill and Dexterity in Applying them.
Invention indeed is the hardest part, when Proofs are found it is not very difficult to manage them. And to know precisely wherein their Nature consists, may help us somewhat in our enquiries after ’em. An Intermediate Idea then which can make out an Agreement between other Ideas, must be Equivalent to, and yet Distinct from those we compare by it. Where Ideas agree it will not be hard to find such an Equivalent, and if after diligent search we cannot meet with any, ’tis a pretty sure Sign that they do not agree. It is not necessary indeed that our Middle Idea be Equivalent in all respects, ’tis enough if it be in such as make the Comparison: And when it is so to one of the Compar’d Ideas but not to the other, that’s a Proof that they do not agree amongst themselves.
All the Commerce and Intercourse of the World is manag’d by Equivalents, Conversation as well as Traffick. Why do we Trust our Friends but because their Truth and Honesty appears to us Equivalent to the Confidence we repose in ’em? Why do we perform Good Offices to others, but because there’s a proportion between them and the Merit of the Person, or our own Circumstances? And as the way to know the Worth of things is to Compare them one with another, so in like manner we come to the Knowlege of the Truth of ’em by an Equal Ballancing.
But you will say, Tho I may learn the value of a _Spanish_ Coin by Weighing, or Comparing it with some other Money whose Standard I know, and so discern what proportion it bears to those Goods I wou’d exchange; yet what Scales shall I find to weigh Ideas? What Hand so even as to poize them Justly? Or if that might be done, yet where shall I meet with an Equivalent Idea when I have occasion to use one?
In answer to this Demand I consider, that as Light is always visible to us if we have an Organ to receive it, if we turn our Eyes towards it, and that nothing interpose between it and us; so is Truth, we are surrounded with it, and GOD has given us Faculties to receive it. If it be ask’d, Why then do we so seldom find it? The Reason is, because instead of making right use of our Faculties we employ them in keeping it out; we either shut our Eyes, or if we vouchsafe to open them, we are sure to view it thro such unsuitable Mediums as fail not to misrepresent it to us. As for those few Noble Spirits, who open the Windows of their Souls to let in Truth, and take the Films of Interest, Passion and Prejudice from before their Eyes, they will certainly be Enlighten’d, and cannot miss of obtaining as much Truth as they are capable of Receiving. For, to go on with the Comparison, as we can See no farther than our own Horizon, tho the Light shine never so bright around us; and as we cannot discern every Object even within that Compass Clearly, nor Any Distinctly but what we particularly apply our selves to; So neither are our Capacities large enough to take in _All_ Truth, as has been often said, nor are we capable of attaining _Any_, without Attention and diligent Examination. But if we carefully Consider those Ideas we already have and Attend to those Truths we are acquainted with, we cannot want Mediums to discover more, if our Enquiries be after that which is within our Reach. He who is the Fountain of Truth is also a GOD of Order, and has so regularly connex’d one Truth with another, that the discovery of one is a step towards a further Progress; so that if we diligently Examine those Truths which, we Know, they will clear the way to what we search after: For it seldom happens but that the Question it self directs us to some Idea that will serve for the Explanation or Proof of it.
There is no Object, no Accident of Life but affords us matter of Instruction. GOD has so dispos’d all the Works of his Hands, all the Actings of his Providence, that every one of ’em ministers to our Improvement, if we will but Observe and Apply them. Indeed this Living _Ex Tempore_ which most of us are guilty of, our making no Reflections, our Gay and Volatile Humour which transports us in an Instant from one thing to another, e’re we have with the Industrious Bee suck’d those Sweets it wou’d afford us, frequently renders his gracious Bounty ineffectual. For as the Diligent-hand maketh Rich, whil’st the Slothful and Prodigal come to nothing, so the Use of our Powers improves and Encreases them, and the most Observing and Considerate is the Wisest Person: For she lays up in her Mind as in a Store-house, ready to produce on all Occasions, a Clear and Simple Idea of every Object that has at any time presented it self. And perhaps the difference between one Womans Reason and anothers may consist only in this, that the one has amass’d a greater number of such Ideas than the other, and dispos’d them more Orderly in her Understanding, so that they are at hand, ready to be apply’d to those Complex Ideas whose Agreement or Disagreement cannot be found out but by the means of some of ’em.
But because Examples are more familiar than Precepts, as condescending to shew us the very manner of Practising them, I shall endeavour to make the matter in Hand as plain as I can by subjoining Instances to the following Rules, which Rules as I have not taken wholly on Trust from others, so neither do I pretend to be the Inventer of ’em.
We have heard already that a Medium is necessary when we can’t discern the Relation that is between two or more Ideas by Intuition or a simple View. Could this alone procure us what we seek after, the addition of other Ideas wou’d be needless, since to make a shew of Wit by tedious Arguings and unnecessary Flourishes, does only Perplex and Incumber the Matter, Intuition being the Simplest, and on that account the best way of Knowing.
_Rule_ I. And therefore we shou’d in the first place, _Acquaint our selves throughly with the State of the Question, have a Distinct Notion of our Subject whatever it be, and of the Terms we make use of, knowing precisely what it is we drive at_: that so we may in the second.
_Rule_ II. _Cut off all needless Ideas and whatever has not a necessary Connexion to the matter under Consideration_, which serve only to fill up the Capacity of the Mind, and to Divide and Distract the Attention. From the neglect of this comes those causless Digressions, tedious Parentheses and Impertinent Remarques which we meet with in some Authors. For, as when our Sight is diffus’d and extended to many Objects at once we see none of them Distinctly; so when the Mind grasps at every Idea that presents it self, or rambles after such as relate not to its Present Business, it loses its hold and retains a very feeble Apprehension of that which it shou’d Attend. Some have added another Rule (_viz._) _That we Reason only on those things of which we have Clear Ideas_; but I take it to be a Consequence of the first, and therefore do not make it a distinct one: For we can by no means Understand our Subject, or be well acquainted with the State of the Question, unless we have a Clear Idea of all its Terms.
_Rule_ III. Our Business being stated, the next Rule is _To conduct our Thoughts by Order, beginning with the most Simple and Easie Objects, And ascending as by Degrees to the Knowlege of the more Compos’d_. I need not tell you, that Order makes every thing, Easie, Strong and Beautiful, and that the Superstructure is neither like to Last or Please unless the Foundation be duly laid, for this is obvious to the most Superficial Reader. Nor are they likely to solve the Difficult, who have neglected or slightly pass’d over the Easie Questions. Our Knowledge is gradual, and by passing Regularly thro Plain things, we arrive in due time at the more Abstruse.
_Rule_ IV. In this Method we are to practise the Fourth Rule which is, _Not to leave any part of our Subject unexamin’d_, it being as necessary to Consider All that can let in Light, as to shut out what’s Foreign to it. We may stop short of Truth as well as over-run it; and tho we look never so attentively on our proper Object, if we view but half of it, we may be as much mistaken, as if we extended our Sight beyond it. Some Objects agree very well when observ’d on one side, which upon turning the other shew a great disparity. Thus the Right Angle of a Triangle may be like to one part of a Square, but compare the Whole, and you’l find ’em very different Figures. And a Moral Action may in some Circumstance be not only Fit but Necessary, which in others, where Time, Place, and the like have made an alteration, wou’d be most Improper; so that if we venture to Act on the former Judgment, we may easily do amiss, if we wou’d Act as we ought, we must view its New Face, and see with what Aspect that looks on us.
To this Rule belongs that of _Dividing the Subject of our Meditations into as many Parts, as we can, and as shall be requisite to Understand it perfectly_. This is indeed most necessary in difficult Questions, which will scarce be unravell’d but in this manner by Pieces: Ever taking care to make Exact Reviews, and to Sum up our Evidence justly e’re we pass Sentence and fix our Judgment.
_Rule_ V. To which purpose we must _Always keep our Subject Directly in our Eye, and Closely pursue it thro all our Progress_; there being no better Sign of a good Understanding than Thinking Closely and Pertinently, and Reasoning dependently, so as to make the former part of our Discourse a support to the Latter, and _This_ an Illustration of _That_, carrying Light and Evidence in ev’ry step we take. The neglect of this Rule is the Cause why our Discoveries of Truth are seldom Exact, that so much is often said to so little purpose; and many Intelligent and Industrious Readers when they have Read over a Book are very little wiser than when they began it. And that the two last Rules may be the better observ’d, ’twill be fit very often to look over our Process so far as we have gone, that so by rendring our Subject Familiar, we may the sooner arrive to an Exact Knowlege of it.
_Rule_ VI. All which being done we are in a fair way towards keeping the last Rule, which is, _To judge no further than we Perceive, and not to take any thing for Truth which we do not evidently Know to be so_. Indeed in some Cases we are forc’d to content our selves with Probability, but ’twere well if we did so only where ’tis plainly Necessary. That is, when the Subject of our Meditation is such as we cannot possibly have a Certain Knowlege of, because we are not furnish’d with Proofs which have a Constant and Immutable Connexion with the Ideas we apply them to, or because we can’t perceive it, which is our Case in such Exigencies as oblige us to Act presently, on a cursory view of the Arguments propos’d to us, when we want time to trace them to the bottom, and to make use of such means as wou’d discover Truth.
I cannot think we are often driven to such straits in any considerable Affair, tho I believe that very many Subjects may be propos’d to us, concerning which we cannot readily pass our Judgment, either because we never consider’d them before, or because we are wanting in some Means that lead to the Knowlege, of ’em. In which Case Reason wills that we suspend our Judgment till we can be better Inform’d; nor wou’d it have us remit our Search after Certainty, even in those very Cases in which we may sometimes be forc’d to Act only on Probable Grounds. For Reason can’t rest satisfy’d with Probabilities where Evidence is possible, our Passions and Interest may, but _That_ does not incline us to leave off Enquiring lest we happen to meet somewhat contrary to our Desires.
No, Reason requires us to continue our Enquiries with all the Industry we can, till they’ve put us in Possession of Truth, and when we have found, enjoyns us to follow her, how opposite soever she may cause our Latter Actions to be to our Former. But by this we may learn (and so we may by every thing that such weak and fallible Creatures as we are, perform) to think Candidly of those whose Opinions and Actions differ from our own. Because we do not know the necessity of their Affairs, nor in what ill Circumstances they are plac’d in respect of Truth.
And now to Apply what has been said; The State of the Question being Distinctly known, and certain Ideas fixt to the Terms we make use of, we shall find sometimes that the Difference which was suppos’d to be between the Things themselves, is only in words, in the divers ways we make use of to express the same Idea.
For if upon looking into our selves we discern, that these different Terms have but one and the same Idea, when we have corrected our Expressions the Controversie is at an End, and we need enquire no further. Thus, If we are ask’d _Whether GOD is Infinitely Perfect_?
There needs no Intermediate Idea to compare the Idea of GOD with that of Infinite Perfection, since we may discern them on the very first view to be one and the same Idea differently express’d, which to go about to explain or prove were only to cumber with needless words, and to make what is Clear, Obscure. For we Injure a Cause instead of Defending it, by attempting an Explanation or Proof of things so Clear, that as they do not need, so perhaps they are not Capable of any.
But if it be made a Question _Whether there is a GOD, or a Being Infinitely Perfect_? We are then to Examin the Agreement between our Idea of GOD and that of Existence. Now this may be discern’d by Intuition, for upon a View of our Ideas we find that Existence is a Perfection, and the Foundation of all other Perfections, since that which has no Being cannot be suppos’d to have any Perfection. And tho the Idea of Existence is not Adequate to that of Perfection, yet the Idea of Perfection Includes that of Existence, and if _That_ Idea were divided into parts, one part of it wou’d exactly agree with _This_. So that if we will allow that _Any_ Being is Infinite in All Perfections, we cannot deny that that Being Exists; Existence it self being one Perfection, and such an one as all the rest are built upon.
If unreasonable Men will farther demand, _Why is it necessary that All Perfection shou’d be Centred in One Being, is’t not enough that it be parcel’d out amongst many? And tho it be true that that Being who has all Perfection must needs Exist, yet where’s the Necessity of an All-Perfect Being?_ We must then look about for Proofs and Intermediate Ideas, and the Objection it self will furnish us with one. For those _Many_ whose Particular Ideas it wou’d have joyn’d together to make a Compound one of All-Perfection, are no other than Creatures, as will appear if we consider our Idea of Particular Being and of Creature, which are so far from having any thing to distinguish ’em, that in all Points they resemble each other. Now this Idea naturally suggests to us that of Creation, or a Power of giving Being to that which before the exerting of that Power had none, which Idea if we use it as a Medium, will serve to discover to us the necessity of an All-Perfect Being.
For in the first place, what ever has any Perfection or Excellency (for that’s all we mean by Perfection here) must either have it of it self, or derive it from some other Being. Now Creatures cannot have their Perfections from themselves because they have not their Being, for to suppose that they Made themselves is an Absurdity too ridiculous to be seriously refuted, ’tis to suppose them to Be and not to Be at the same time, and that when they were Nothing, they were able to do the greatest Matter. Nor can they derive either Being or Perfection from any other Creature. For tho some Particular Beings may seem to be the Cause of the Perfections of others, as the Watch-maker may be said to be the Cause of the Regular Motions of the Watch, yet trace it a little farther, and you’l find this very Cause shall need another, and so without End, till you come to the Foundation-head, to that All-Perfect Being, who is the last resort of our Thoughts, and in whom they Naturally and Necessarily rest and terminate. If to this it be Objected that we as good as affirm that this All-Perfect Being is his own Maker, by saying he is Self-Existent, and so we fall into the same Absurdity which we imputed to that Opinion which supposes that Creatures were their own Maker. The reply is easie, That we do not say he Made himself, we only affirm that his Nature is such, that tho we can’t sufficiently Explain because we can’t comprehend it, yet thus much we can discern, that if he did not Exist of himself no other Being could ever have Existed. So that either All must be swallow’d up in an Infinite Nothing, if Nothing can properly have that Epithet, and we must suppose, that neither we our selves, nor any of those Creatures about us ever had, or ever can have a Being, which is too ridiculous to imagine, or else we must needs have recourse to a Self-Existing Being, who is the Maker and Lord of all things. And since Self Existence must of necessity be plac’d somewhere, is it not much more Natural and Reasonable to place it in Infinite Perfection, than amongst poor, frail Creatures, whose Origin we may trace, and whose End we see daily hastning?
To Sum up all: Since there are Innumerable Beings in the World, which have each of them their several Excellencies or Perfections; Since these can no more derive their Perfections than their Being from themselves or from any other Creature; Since a Self-Existing Being is the result of our Thoughts; the First and only True Cause, without whom it is impossible that any thing should ever have Existed; since Creatures with their Being receive all that depends on it from him their Maker; Since none can give what he has not, and therefore he who Communicates an innumerable variety of Perfections to his Creatures, even all that they enjoy, must needs contain in himself all those Beauties and Perfections he is pleas’d to Communicate to Inferior Beings; nothing can be more Plain and Evident than that there is a GOD, and that the Existence of an All-Perfect Being is Absolutely necessary.
Perhaps these Arguments are not in Form, I do not oblige my Self to follow servilely the Rules of Art, nor know I what better Judges will think of ’em, but they seem to me to be Clear, Rational and Concluding, which is all I aim at. And I hope the Reader will receive from hence more light into the way of Arguing, than she cou’d have gain’d had I spent as many Pages in prescribing Rules and giving trifling Examples, which when they are known, merit only to be forgot again. But if some are better pleas’d with the usual way of Syllogism, and think an Argument cannot be rightly managed without one, for their Satisfaction we will add another Instance.
Suppose the Question were put _Whether a Rich Man is Happy_? By a Rich Man understanding one who possesses the Wealth and Good things of this World, and by Happy the Enjoyment of the Proper Good of Man. We compare the two Terms Riches and Happiness together, to discern if they be so much one and the same, that what is affirm’d of the one may be laid of the other; but we find they are not. For if Riches and Happiness were terms Convertible, then all who are Happy must be Rich, and all who are Rich must be Happy, to affirm the last of which is to beg the Question, and the contrary appears by the following Argument, which makes use of _Satisfaction with ones own Condition_ for the middle Idea or Common Measure.
He who is Happy is satisfied with his Condition and free from Anxious Cares and Solicitude (for these proceeding from the want of Good, he who enjoys his proper Good cannot be subject to them.) But Riches do not free us from Anxieties and Solicitude, they many times encrease them, Therefore to be Rich and to be Happy are not one and the same thing.
Again, If there are some who are Happy and yet not Rich, then Riches and Happiness are two distinct things. But a Good Poor Man is Happy (in the Enjoyment of GOD who is better to him than Thousands of Gold and Silver,) therefore Riches and Happiness are to be distinguish’d.
We may further consider, that if the Enjoyment of Riches can make a Man Happy according to our Notion of Happiness, they must be his Proper Good. Now if we compare the Idea of Riches with that which we have of Man, we shall find in the former nothing but what’s Material, External and Adventitious, but our Idea of the latter represents to us somewhat that Thinks, and so is of an Immaterial and more noble Nature, a Nature altogether different from the former, and much more excellent and Superior to it; and by Consequence the less Noble cannot be the Good of the more, nor a Body or an Extended Substance, the Proper Good of the Mind, a Spiritual or Thinking Substance. So that upon the whole matter we find, that we cannot affirm a Man is Happy because he is Rich, neither can we deny it; Riches consider’d absolutely in themselves, neither make a Man Happy nor hinder him from being so. They Contribute