held in cisalpine Gaul — that is, in the country which extended from the Kubicon, a small river in Eo- magna, to the Alps. But, in order to render the city of Eome secure from these troops, the celebrated senatus consultum was passed, the inscription of which is still to be seen on the road leading from Eimini to Cesena, and by which, whoever might pass the Eubicon with an army, a legion, or a cohort, was devoted to the infernal gods, and declared to be sac- rilegious and a parricide.
To a government so important as that of cisal- pine Gaul, and which held the city in check, was joined one which was more considerable yet. This was transalpine Gaul, comprehending the countries of the south of France, and offering Caesar an op- portunity to carry on war during many years with whatever peoples he would. The result was, that his soldiers grew old with himself, and that he con- quered them no less than the barbarians. If CoBsar had not had the government of transalpine Gaul, he would neither have corrupted his soldiers, nor caused his name to be respected by so many victories. If he had not had the government of cisalpine Gaul, Pompey would have been able to arrest his passage of the Alps; whereas, from the very beginning of the war, the latter was compelled to abandon Italy — a circumstance which ruined the reputation of his party; and, in civil wars, reputation is power itself.
The same consternation which Hannibal created CHAP. II.] OF THE ROMANS. 217 in Eome by his victory at Cannae, Caesar created by crossing the Rubicon. Pompey was dismayed; and, in the first moments of the war, he saw no course to take except that which remains in connection with desperate affairs. He could only succumb and fly. He retreated from the capital, leaving the pub- lic treasure behiad him; he could nowhere retard the career of the conqueror; he abandoned a part of his troops, all Italy, and passed beyond the sea.
Much has been said respecting the fortune of Cae- sar; but that extraordinary man possessed so many great qualities in perfection — although he had many vices also — that it is difficult to conceive that he would not have been conqueror, no matter what army he had commanded, or that he would not have governed, no matter in what republic he had been born.
After having defeated the lieutenants of Pompey in Spain, Caesar proceeded to Greece in search of the chief himself. Pompey, who held the shore of the sea, and commanded superior forces, was on the verge of seeing the army of Caesar perish from want and famine; but, as he possessed in a supreme de- gree the weakness of desiring to be approved, he could not refrain from lending an ear to the vain discourses of his followers, who incessantly rallied or accused him." He wishes, said one, to perpetuate his command, and, like Agamemnon, to be king of '* See Plutarch, Life of Pompey. 10 218 GEANDEUE AlfD DECADENCE [montesquieu.
kings. I warn you, said another, tliat we shall eat no more Tusculan figs this year. Some particular successes which he achieved turned the heads of the senatorial troop that attended him; and thus, in order not to be blamed, he did a thing which pos- terity will always censure: he sacrificed all his ad- vantages in order to proceed, with raw troops, to engage in battle with an army which had so often conquered." " When, after the battle of PharsaHa, the remains of Pompey's forces had withdrawn into Africa, Scipio, who commanded them, would not follow the advice of Cato — which was to protract the war into a long one. Inflated by some advantages, he risked all and lost all; and, when the party was re-established by Brutus and Cassius, the same precipitation ruined the republic a third time.
It is to be observed that during the civil wars, which lasted for so long a time, the power of Eome constantly increased abroad. Under Marius, SyUa, Pompey, Caesar, Anthony, and Augustus, Eome con- tinually grew more terrible, and completed the over- throw of all the kings who yet remained.
There is no state which so dangerously menaces others with conquest as one which is experiencing the horrors of civil war. AH orders of men — the noble, " This is well explained in Appian, The Civil War, Book IV, oh. cviii, etc. — The army of Octavius and Anthony would have perished of famine if battle had not been given, " See my Note at the end of this chapter. — Tuanslatok.
CHAP. XI,] OF THE ROMANS. 219 the burgher, the artisan, the laborer — become soldiers; and, -when the contending forces ai-e reunited by peace, such a state possesses great advantages over others, whose populations consist mostly of citizens only. In addition to this, great men are often formed during civil wars; for, in the midst of confusion, great men come to light; each determines for himself his own place and his own rank, whilst at other times the places of men are determined for them, and often with no regard to their capabihties. And, to pass from the example of the Romans to others more re- cent, the French have never been so formidable abroad as after the quan-els of the houses of Bur- gundy and Orleans, after the troubles of the League, and after the civil wars which occurred during the minorities of Louis XIII and Louis XIV. England has never been so much respected as under Cromwell after the wars of the Long Parliament. The Germans did not acquire superiority over the Turks until after the civil wars of Germany. The Spaniards under PhiHp V, immediately after the civil wai's of the Suc- cession, displayed a power in Sicily which astonished Europe; and at the present day Persia, rising afresh from the ashes of civil war, himiiliates the Turks.
At length the Eoman republic was subverted. There is no necessity that we should accuse the am- bition of a few individuals, but there is a necessity that we should accuse man — always the more greedy for the acquisition of power in proportion as the 220 GRANDEUK AND DECADENCE [montebquieit.
amount wliicli lie already possesses is great. He de- sires all for no other reason than that he already pos- sesses much.'
If Csesar and Pompey had thought as Cato, others would have thought as Csesar and Pompey; and the republic, ready to perish, would have been drawn to the precipice by another hand.
Csesar pardoned everybody; but it appears to me that the moderation which a man shows after he has first usurped all does not merit great praise.
"Whatever may have been said of the activity of Csesar after the battle of Pharsalia, Cicero justly ac- cuses him of having been slow. The latter tells Cas- sius that they had never believed that the party of Pompey would have thus revived in Spain and Af- rica; and that, if they could have foreseen that Csesar would amuse himself as he did in his war at Alexan- dria, they would not have made their peace with him, but would have withdrawn with Scipio and Cato into Africa." Thus, by a foolish amour, Csesar encum- bered himself with four wars, and, in not anticipating the last two, he again put in question that which had. been decided at Pharsalia.
At first, Csesar governed under the titles of the Poman magistracies; for men are not much touched except by names; and, as the peoples of Asia ab- horred those of consul and proconsul, the peoples of Europe detested that of king; so that, at this time, " Familiar Letters, Book XV.
CHAP. XI.] OF THE ROMANS. 221 these names constituted the happiness or the despair of the earth. Caesar attempted to have a diadem placed upon his head, but, seeing that the acclama- tions of the people ceased, he rejected it. He made yet other attempts;" but I cannot comprehend that he believed that, since the Komans endured him as tyrant, they therefore loved a tyranny, or that they really thought they had done what in fact they had done.
On one occasion, while the senate conferred cer- tain honors upon him, he neglected to rise from his seat; and then the gravest members of this body completely lost their patience.
Men are never more offended than when their ceremonies and usages are disregarded. Seek to sub- due them; this is sometimes a proof of the esteem which you have for them. Shock their customs; this is always taken as an indication of contempt.
At all times an enemy of the senate, Caesar could not conceal the contempt he had conceived for that body, which — since it possessed power no longer — was become almost ridiculous. For this reason, even his clemency was insulting. He was regarded, not as pardoning, but as disdaining to punish.
He carried his contempt for the senate so far that he himself made senatorial decrees, and subscribed to them the names of the first senators that came '8 He set aside the tribunes of the people.
222 GRANDEUE AND DECADENCE [MONTESQDiEtr.
into his mind. "I learn sometimes," says Cicero,'" "that a senatus-consultvm,, passed upon my recom- mendation, has already been carried into Syria and Armenia before I have become aware of its exist- ence; and many princes have written me letters of thanks for having advised that the title of king should be given them, whom not only I did not know to be kings, but I did not so much as know that they were in the world."
In the letters of some great men of this time," which have been placed under the name of Cicero for the reason that most of them were written by him, we may see to what a condition of humiha- tion and despair the first men of the republic were reduced by that sudden revolution which deprived them of their honors, and even of their occupations; when — inasmuch as the senate was shorn of its powers — they could no longer hope for that credit which they had heretofore enjoyed throughout the earth, except in the cabinet of one man. This state of things is much better realized from these letters than from the accounts of historians. They are a masterpiece of the naivete of meti united by a common calamity, and of an age when a meri- tricious politeness had not diffused falsehood every- where. "We do not see in these letters, as in most of our modem correspondence, people who desire to " Familiar Letters, Book IX.
^^ See the Letters of Oieero and of Servius Sulpitius.
CHAP. XI.] OF THE ROMANS. 223 deceive; but we feel that we are iu the presence of Tinhappy friends, who seek to communicate all to each other.
It was very difficult for Caesar to defend his life. Most of the conspirators were men who either be- longed to his own party, or who had been loaded with benefits by him;" and that this should have been so was very natural. The conspirators had realized great advantages from Caesar's success; but the more their fortunes improved the more they began to participate in the common calamity;" for, to a man who has nothing, it imports little enough, in certain respects, under what government he lives.
In addition to this, there was a certain law of nations — a certain opinion established in all the re- publics of Greece and Italy— according to which the assassin of any one who had usurped sovereign power was regarded as a virtuous man. Especially at Eome, after the erpulsion of the kings, this law was defi- nite, and its execution approved. The republic armed the hand of each citizen, constituted him a magistrate for the moment, and acknowledged him as her defender. / Brutus dared even to say to his friends that, if it had been his own father, returned to the earth, he '1 Deeimus Brutus, Caius Casea, Treboniu3, TuUius Cimber, Minutius Basilius, were friends of Caesar. (Appian, De Bdlo Civili, lib. ii, ch. cxiii.)
" I do not speak of the satellites of a tyrant, who would share his ruin, but of the companions of a tyrant, under a free government.
224 GKANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu.
would have killed him aU the same; " and although, in consequence of the continuance of the tyranny, this spirit of liberty was gradually lost, yet, at the begin- ning of the reign of Augustus, conspiracies were con- stantly reviving.
This idea of assassinating tyrants arose from a dominant love of country which, passing beyond the ordinary rules prescribed for the judgment of crimes and virtues, and listening to the voice of patriotism only, saw neither citizen, nor friend, nor benefactor, nor father. Virtue seemed to forget herself in order to surpass herself; and the act which could not at first sight be approved, for the reason that it was atrocious, she caused to be admired as divine."
In fact, was not the crime of Caasar — who Hved under a free government — of such a nature that it could not be punished otherwise than by assassi- nation? And, to ask why he was not pursued by open force, or by the laws — would not that have been the same thing as to have appealed to his own crimes for redress?
^' Letter of Brutus, in the collection of those of Cicero. ^ Compare the remarks upon tyrannicide, which may be found at the close of my Note at the end of this chapter. — Translator.
BAKEK.} OF THE KOMANS. 225 l^OTE BY THE TEAISTSLATOE.
The vast relative importance wliicli, in tlie gen- eral scheme of Roman history, attaches to the clos- ing age of the republic, will justify some further reference to the three prominent actors whom Mon- tesquieu places in the foreground of this eventful epoch. The proscriptions of Sylla, the military genius and character of Pompey, and the role which Ceesar performed in the usurpation of supreme power, will therefore constitute the subjects of some additional remarks; to which may be fitly added some further notice of the ancient doctrine of tyrannicide, in the application of which the great usurper perished — thus f ulfiUing the law of tragic interest by mingling his own blood with the fall of the republic.
1. The proscrijpUon was a novelty in the Koman system, taking its rise from the general fury of the civil wars, exalted to a yet greater degree of inten- sity in the special frenzy of Sylla. It was a fright- ful instrument of injustice and tyranny; and its in- troduction clearly indicated that the republican spirit — ^which had heretofore upheld the institutions of 226 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakeb.
Eome — had experienced a fatal collapse. The fol- lowing extract from the accurate and learned work of Dr. Adam will give some idea of what this nov- elty was, and how it was operated by its inventor: "Sylla first introduced the method of proscrip- tion. Upon his return into the city, after having conquered the pai-ty of Marius, he wrote down the names of those whom he doomed to die, and ordered them to be fixed up on tables in the public places of the city, with the promise of a certain reward for the head of each person so proscribed. ISTew lists were repeatedly exposed as new victims occurred to his memory, or were suggested to him. The first list contained the names of forty senators and 1,600 equites. Incredible numbers were massacred, not only at Eome, but through all Italy. Whoever har- bored or assisted a proscribed person was put to death. The goods of the proscribed were confiscated, and their children declared incapable of honors. The lands and fortunes of the slain were divided among the friends of Sylla, who were allowed to enjoy pre- ferments before the legal time." " The proscription, therefore, was wholesale mur- der and robbery, perpetrated by the successful upon the defeated faction; and, in forming a just idea of the ruin of the republic, which speedily followed, it is worthy of special remark that this violent and bloody practice originated with the aristocratic, and NOTE.] OF THE EOMANS. 227 not with the popular faction. Sylla was the leader of the former, Marius of the latter; and, whilst Marius was in the ascendant — however extensive may- have been his massacres and assassinations — he organ-_ ized no machinery for systematic destruction, he re- sorted to no such cold-blooded and awful instrument of tyranny as the proscription.
Mr. Maine — one of that small number of writers in the English language who have carried the spirit of philosophy and general reason into the literature of law — thinks the proscription may be traced to the want of power in the Homan criminal tribunals, or Qusestiones Perpetuse, to inihct the penalty of death. " The incompetence of the Eoman tribunals to pass sentence of death," he says, "led distinctly and di- rectly to those frightful revolutionary intervals, known as the proscriptions, during which all law was formally suspended simply because party violence could find no other avenue to the vengeance for which it was thirsting."' I suspect that the cause here assigned is not equal to the effect claimed for it. It may be admitted, indeed, that such want of power in the criminal courts existing in the time of Marius and Sylla had some tendency to increase ir- regular violence in a society filled with vicious per- sons; but it- appears to me, nevertheless, that the main cause of the proscriptions is to be sought, not in any defect in the criminal law, but in that grow-' 228 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakeb.
ing revolutionary spirit whicli had at length brought the two factions to a trial of armed force, and which, proceeding as this disorderly spirit did from gen- eral causes, would have conducted the state to the same issue, no matter how efficient the provisions of the criminal law might have been. Doubtless proper laws have a tendency to anticipate and ward off revo- lution; and in some instances they will actually do so. But, where the temper of a people has ceased to be compatible with their existing form of govern- ment, the disorderly forces of society are too large for legal restraint; and this seems to have been the case with the Eomans at the time of which we speak. Laws punishing particular crimes with death would hardly have stayed the hand of a man lite SyUa, whose passion and whose principle it appears to have been, to strike off the heads of the enemies of his faction, whether guilty of any such crimes or not.
Condemning, killing, and confiscating by way of proscription, which admitted no charge legally pre- ferred, no notice to answer, no trial and no proof of guilt or innocence, but simply inscribed the victim's name upon a tablet, and armed against him a troop of assassins, each vying with the rest for the price set upon his head, must clearly take its place as one of the basest and most criminal contrivances that was ever resorted to by power; and, when we remember that all Italy was thus stained with the blood of the Marian faction — which in its turn had been guilty KOTE.] OF THE EOMANS. 229 of atrocities only second in extent and quality — we may have some idea of the causes which were already hurrying the republic to ruin, when Sylla and Marius were succeeded, and, so far as party position was con- cerned, represented, by Pompey and Caesar.
2. The great and successful part which Pompey for BO long a time acted in connection with the des- tiny of Home, followed as it finally was by an over- throw in which he perished with the republic, gives rise to an interesting question respecting the real char- acter of his military genius.
Whatever excuse there may or may not have been for his neglect to anticipate Caesar, by placing Borne and the adjacent parts of Italy in a state of defense, it appears certain at all events — after the storm had burst upon the unguarded capital — that he manifested great and prompt ability in assembling the land and naval forces of the republic in Greece and upon the neighboring seas. And, fully aware how su- perior were the veteran legionaries of Cffisar to his own new levies, his plan appears to have been to compen- sate the inferiority of his material by protracting the war and awaiting the effect of discipline, by carefully avoiding a decisive engagement, by availing himseK of his greatly superior numbers on land for secure defense in strong positions, and of his overwhelming ascendency on sea to supply his own forces and to cut off the supplies of his enemy. This plan seems to have been consummately well conceived in the circum- 230 GEANDEUK AND DECADENCE [baker.
stances in whicli he was placed after his abandonment of Italy; and, had it been rigorously adhered to, it ap- pears probable that Cjesar would have been beaten in the end. So long as Pompey was faithful to his own theory of the contest, the scale inclined in his favor. Cassar — conscious that the military requirements of his situation were the reverse of those of his antaaro- nist — knowing that his weak side consisted in delay, and his strong one in early and decisive action — made repeated and almost desperate attempts to draw Pom- pey into a general engagement. For many months all such attempts were skilfully foiled by his adver- sary; and, up to the time of Caesar's withdrawal from Dyrrachium, it must be confessed that Pompey had played the master hand. At this crisis the affairs of Caesar, whether in Greece, on sea, or in Italy, bore the hue of a waning cause; and public opinion rather strongly expected his overthrow.
It is mainly at this point that the question arises upon Pompey as a general. In departing from the plan which he had hitherto pursued, in following his enemy into the open field with troops of greatly in- ferior quality, and staking all on a single battle, and that, too, at a time when delay alone was visibly work- ing the ruin of Caesar, was Pompey impelled by his own judgment as a soldier? If so, his genius would clearly have to be held defective; but he does not ap- pear to have been thus determined. Was he biased by the augurs and the haruspices, whose divinations- NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 231 really a reflex of the public expectation — converged strongly in his favor? If so, his genius was impaired by an unworthy superstition; and it may be that he was in some degree touched by this influence. Was he virtually coerced by a demoralization in his com- mand which was equally as dangerous as the peril of a decisive battle? If so, he may be classed among those great but unfortimate men who have been over- borne by circumstances too strong for any human will to control; and there was much in the composition of his command and in the character of his retainers to indicate that something of this sort may have been present. But, finally, was he, as Montesquieu sup- poses, determined by the mere impatience, raillery, and importunity of the great personages who had as- sembled in his camp? If so, his vanity was superior to his genius — a truly fatal defect ia a general on a trying occasion. But the real state of the case, as it presents itself for judgment at this distance of time, seems rather to be that Pompey may have been influ- enced by the last three causes combined; and, as it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine in what degree by each, it appears to be equally difficult to say with precision to what extent his military con- duct was culpable or excusable.
Dr. Middleton presents much the same view as that of Montesquieu, but in terms somewhat more favorable to Pompey. " But, after all," says this able writer, " it must be owned that Pompey had a very 232 GEANDEUK AND DECADENCE [bakee.
difficult part to act, and much less liberty of execut- ing what he himself approved than in all the other wars in which he had been engaged. In his wars against foreign enemies his power was absolute, and aU his motions depended on his own will; but in this, besides several kings and princes of the East who attended him in person, he had with him in his camp almost all the chief magistrates and senators of Eome, men of equal dignity with himself, who had commanded armies, and obtained triumphs, and ex- pected a share in all his councils; and that, in their common danger, no step should be taken but by their common advice: and, as they were under no engage- ment to his cause but what was voluntary, so they were necessarily to be humored, lest through disgust they should desert it. l^ow, these were all uneasy in their present situation, and longed to be at home in the enjoyment of their estates and honors; and, hav- ing a confidence of victory from the number of their troops and the reputation of their leader, were per- petually teasing Pompey to the resolution of a battle, charging him with a design to protract the war for the sake of perpetuating his authority; and caUing him another Agamemnon, who was proud of holding so many kings and generals under his command; till, being unable to withstand their reproaches any longer, he was driven by a kind of shame, and against his judgment, to the experiment of a decisive action."'
' Life of Cicero, London, 1839, p. 188.
SOTE.] or THE ROMANS. 233 After resolving to risk an open and general battle with such troops as he commanded, it was no dis- credit to Pompey's capacity that he was overthrown. Osesar himself indicated the quality of his rival's forces by the characteristic remark, just before leaving Italy for Spain, that " he was going against an army without a general, and that he should thence return against a general without an army." * The question of capacity on the part of Pompey arises solely upon his resolution to fight a decisive battle under the cir- cumstances, and it is curious to reflect that, but for the seemingly fortuitous circumstances which appear to have diverted him from the masterly plan of oper- ations which he had formed, and for a considerable time adhered to, it is clearly within the scope of rea- sonable probabihty that he, and not Osesar, would have acquired the repute of being the first military man of Kome. It is obvious, at all events, that the easy and vulgar method of judging by the event has too much obscured the just fame of Pompey. This able man had nearly, doubled both the domain and the revenues of the republic, and the triumphs with which he had been honored had commemorated his achievements in Europe, Asia, and Africa. The con-