We might assign many causes for that custom of suicide which was so common among the Romans: ' Octavius wa3 heir of Csssar, and his son by adoption.
'" So insensate was their cruelty that they ordered, under penalty of death, that everybody should rejoice in the proscriptions. See Dion.
" I suppose reference is here made to the battles of Pharsalia, Phil- Ippi, and Actium. In the first, b. c. 48, Ceesar triumphed over Pompey; in the second, b. c. 42, Octavius and Anthony defeated Brutus and Cas- sius; in the third, b. c. 31, Octavius consolidated his power by the over- throw of Anthony. All three of these battles took place within the con- fines of Greece or upon its neighboring waters — in which fact we may detect a certain poetical propriety. Csesar expired at the base of Pom- pey'a statue; the ambitious and corrupt republic gave to itself its final and mortal stabs upon the soil and under the eye of vanquished Greece. — Teanslatok.
252 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu.
the progress of the stoical philosophy, which en- couraged self-destruction; the institution of the tri- umph, and that of slavery, which caused many great men to believe that they ought not to survive a defeat; the privilege which the accused had of killing them- selves, instead of submitting to a judgment by which their memory would be tarnished and their property confiscated;'" a certain point of honor, more reason- able, perhaps, than that which prompts us at the present day to slay our friend for a jest or a word; and, finally, the great commodity for heroism which suicide supplied — each one finishing the part which he played in the world at the place which he chose for himself."
We might add to the foregoing the great facihty with which self-destruction is executed. The soul, wholly occupied with the act which it is going to commit, with the motives which determine it, with the perils which it is about to escape, does not, prop- erly speaking, see death; for passion causes us to feel, but never to see.
Self-love — the love of our own preservation — transforms itself in so many ways, and acts from principles so opposite, that it prompts us to sacrifice our being for the love of our being; and such is the '^ Eorum qui de se slatuehant humahantur corpora, manebanl testa- menta, pretium festinandi. Tacitus, Annales, lib. vi, ch. xxix.
" If Charles I and James 11 had lived under the influence of a re- ligion which permitted them to kill themselves, the one would not have had to endure such a death, nor the other such a life.
CHAP. XII.] OF THE ROMANS. 253 store wWcli we place upon ourselves, that, by virtue of a natural and obscure instinct, whicli causes us to love ourselves more tlian our own life, we consent to cease to live."
" [In some modern editions tliis chapter ends with the following paragraph: " It is certain that men haye become less free, less courageous, less impelled to great enterprises, than they were at a time when, by virtue of that power which they held over themselves, they were able, at any instant, to escape from every other power."
But, this passage not being found in any of the editions published during the life of Montesquieu, we have thought it right to remit it to the foot of the page. (P.)]
254 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker.
NOTE BY THE TEAJSTSLATOR.
In the foregoing remarks upon suicide, as in those respecting tyrannicide, at the close of Chapter XI, we see that Montesquieu was considerably influenced by the ancient spirit.
The thought which needs to be placed in the foreground in connection with suicide is that, where it does not proceed from insanity, it very generally results from a want of courage to meet, and of forti- tude to endure, the ills of life. Involving thus a retreat in the face of the enemy — that is, a retreat in the face of the evils with which life is environed — suicide is wanting in the two fundamental ele- ments of true heroism — aggressive courage and pas- sive endurance. It is the office of the first of these to impel the soul to brave, positive action; of the •second, to sustain it in those circumstances of misfor- tune in which the active powers are no longer of any avail. It is clear that the quality of a man is most tried when he is reduced to the latter condition; from which we see that the highest type of heroism consists more in the power to endure than to do.
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 255 The choice of suicide, however, even in such cir- cumstances, is still a confession that the soul is too weak, too unheroic, to sustain the burden which has been cast upon it.
The vague impression, in which Montesquieu ap- pears to share, that suicide was relatively more comjnon in ancient than it is in modern times, is probably erroneous. This impression seems to be founded upon the consideration that among the an- cients self-destruction was commended by philosophy, permitted by religion, and approved by the law; whilst in our modern societies it is forbidden by the first two, and discouraged as much as may be by the third. But it would appear that there are social causes at work in modern times which act more powerfully in the production of suicide, than law, re- ligion and philosophy are able to do in restraint of it. There are, of course* no ancient statistics upon the subject, by means of which a direct comparison may be made with modem results; but such modern statistics as we have give rise to a suspicion that suicide has increased in our existing societies with the increase of social development.' Should this sus- picion come to be verified for the future, suicide will take its place as an obstinate retii/rning cur- rent in the vast direct movement of the stream of civilization.
' See Quetelet's Physique Sodale, Bruxelles and Paris, 1869, torn, ii, pp. 232-236.
256 GEANDEUE AND DECADENCE [baker.
One feels a sad interest in considering side by side two of the laws which Quetelet has generalized from a wide range of facts — the laws which express the tendency to crime and the tendency to suicide in the life of the arerage individual: " The penchant to cri/me increases very rapidly towards the adult age; it attains its maxi/mum, a/nd then decreases slowly to the end of life...The penchant to suicide, already developed in infancy, increases sensibly towards the adult age, amd goes on continually increasing to the most advanced old age — regard ieing had to the numbers of the population." ' Thus it appears, if Quetelet is right, that whilst the tendency to crime diminishes with the burden of years, the tendency to throw off life increases.
The sphere of the activities, and, consequently, the sphere of the mental excitations, of our modem socie- ties, are evidently much more extensive, complex, and intense than were the like in the societies of ancient times; a difiEerence which probably stands connected, not only with an increased tendency to suicide, but with an increased tendency to insanity as well. But, inasmuch as all normal activity and mental excita- tion tend to promote physical and cerebral health and energy, we must suppose that the fault lies in that abnormal, and eminently irrational, element of rush and stress which has place in our present societies — above all, in that of the United States. The physi- " FJiysiquc Sociale, torn, ii, pp. 366, SGY.
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 257 cal, intellectual, and moral waste, wreckage, and bad work, thence resulting, are enormous. If we moved at a more seK-contained pace, we should make much better speed in respect to every rational human in- terest, and have much less insanity and suicide.
The active forces in our modem societies — and eminently so in the United States — are for the time being considerably larger than the wisdom which con- trols them; and one of the chief problems which is set before our time — especially before Americans — is to put these two factors in better proportion and accord with each other.
258 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu.
CHAPTEE XIII.
AUGUSTirS.
Sextus Pompet held Sicily and Sardinia. He was master of the sea, and had with him an im- mense number of fugitives and proscribed citizens who fought for their last hopes. Octavius prosecuted two very laborious wars against him, and, after many bad successes,.finally vanquished him by means of the ability of Agrippa.
The conspirators had nearly all ended their lives unhappily.' It was very natural that men who were at the head of a party which was so often beaten, and that, too, in civil wars in which no quarter was given, should perish by violence. From this circum- stance, however, was drawn the conclusion of a divine vengeance, which pursued the murderers of Caesar, and proscribed their cause.
Octavius gained the soldiers of Lepidus, and de- spoiled him of the powers of the triumvirate. He ' In our times, nearly all those wto condemned CHarlea I came to a tragic end. The reason was, that it is scarcely possible to do such things without raising up mortal enemies on all sides, and, consequently, •without incurring an infinity of dangers.
CHAP. XIII.] OF THE ROMANS. 259 even envied him the consolation of leading an ob- scure life, and forced him to assume an humble appearance in the assemblies of the people. We feel quite content in witnessing the humiliation of this man. He was the most wicked citizen of the republic, always first to commence disturbances, and incessantly forming mischievous projects in which he was obliged to associate abler men than himself. A modem author," who has been pleased to write his eulogy, cites Anthony, who, in one of his let- ters, gives Lepidus the name of an honest man; but an honest man for Anthony should not be much so for others.
I believe that Octavius is the only one of all the Roman commanders who succeeded in gaining the affection of his soldiers while giving them in- cessant proofs of natural cowardice. At this time, however, the soldiers placed a higher estimate upon the liberality than upon the courage of their gen- eral. Perhaps it was even fortunate for Octavius that he did not possess that valor which is capable of giving empire; and it may be — inasmuch as he was less feared — that he was borne to it by this veiy defect in his character. It is not impossible that the qualities which dishonored him most served him best. If he had at once shown a great soul, all men would have been apprehensive of him. If he had possessed a bold spirit, he would not have 2g0 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquku.
given Anthony time to ruin himself by his extrava- gances.
Whilst preparing for war against Octavius, An- thony bound himself by an oath to his soldiers, that within two months after he should achieve victory he would re-establish the republic; from which it is easy to see that the soldiers themselves were jealous of the liberty of their country, although they were constantly destroying it — there being nothing so blind as an army.
The battle of Actium took place; Cleopatra fled, and drew Anthony with her. It is certain that in the end she betrayed him.' It may be that, influ- enced by that inconceivable spirit of coquetry which belongs to women, she had formed the design of bringing yet a third master of the world to her feet.
A woman for whom Anthony had sacrificed the world betrayed him; the numerous captains and kings whom he had either aggrandized or set np deserted him; but, as if generosity were allied to servitude, a troop of gladiators stood by him with heroic fidehty. Cover a man with benefits, and you at once inspire him with the idea of looking about for the means of preserving them; they are new interests which you have given him to defend.
That which is surprising in these wars is the fact that one battle nearly always decided the affair, and that defeats were not repaired.
' See Dion, Book LI.
CHAP. XIII.] OF THE ROMANS. 261 Properly speaking, the Koman soldiers were not actuated by the spirit of party. They did not fight for a certain thing, but for a certain person. They knew only their chief, who engaged them by im- mense expectations. But once beaten, the chief being no longer in a condition to fulfill his promises, they passed over to another side. The provinces en- tered into the quarrel with no more sincerity; for it imported very little to them whether the senate or the people had the upper hand. Thus it was that, as soon as one of the chiefs was beaten, they gave them- selves to the other; ' for it was necessary that each city should take care to justify itself before the conqueror, who, having vast promises to keep with his soldiers, would sacrifice to them the most culpable communities.
"We have had two sorts of civil wars in France. Those which had religion for a pretext were long ones; for the motive from which they sprung con- tinued to exist after a victory was gained. The other class of our civil wars had, properly speaking, no mo- tive, but were excited by the folly or the ambition of some great persons; and these were speedily ter- minated.
Augustus — for this is the name which flattery gave to Octavius — established order; that is to say, lasting servitude;' for, when the sovereign power '' No garrisons had been stationed in the cities for the purpose of holding them; the Komans had needed no other means than armies and colonies for the security of their empire.
' [Most ambitious men who elevate themselves take new titles in 262 GEAiJDEUE AND DECADENCE [montesquieu.
comes to be usurped in a free state, whatever tends to establish the unlimited authority of the usurper takes the name of order, whilst, on the other hand, what- ever tends to maintain the honest liberty of his sub- jects is called disorder, dissension, bad government. All those who had heretofore cherished ambitious projects had labored to throw the republic into a species of anarchy. Pompey, Crassus, and Csesar suc- ceeded marvelously in this. They established an im- punity for every variety of public crimes. All that might have a tendency to arrest the corruption of manners, all that might aid in maintaining an effi- cient police, they abolished; and, as good legislators seek to render their fellow-citizens better, these la- bored to make them worse. They, therefore, intro- duced the custom of corrupting the people with money; and when an accusation for the offence was preferred, they corrupted the- judges also. They caused the elections to be disturbed by all sorts of violence; and when the offenders were brought to justice, they furthermore intimidated the courts." Even the authority of the people was annihilated. Witness the proceeding of Gabinius, who, after hav- ing employed his army — in disregard of the will of order to authorize new power. Rut Augustus desired to conceal new power under known names and ordinary dignities. He had himself called emperor, in order to preserve his authority over the legions; he had himself created tribune, as a means of controlling the people; and prince of (he senate, in order to govern that body. (Saint-Eteemond.)] « This is very apparent in the LMeis of Cicero to Atticus.
CHAP, xiii.] OF THE ROMANS. 263 the people — for the purpose of re-establishing Ptol- emy, coolly returned and demanded the honors of a triumph.'
The first men of the republic had sought to dis- gust the people with their own power, and to render themselves necessary by aggravating the inconveni- ences of republican government. But when Augus- tus was once master, policy induced him to labor for the re-establishment of order, to the end that the conveniences of a despotic government might be felt.
So long as Augustus was yet contending for as- cendency in the field, he feared revolts among the soldiers, and not conspiracies among the citizens. It was for this reason that he temporized with the for- mer and was so cruel to the latter. When, however, peace was established, he feared conspiracies; and having the destiny of Caesar constantly before his eyes, he was studious to abstain from his conduct in order to avoid his fate. This is the key to the whole life of Augustus. He attended the sittings of the senate with a cuirass under his robe; he refused the name of dictator; and, whereas C^sar had insolently said that the republic was nothing, and that his word was law, Augustus spoke incessantly of the dignity of the senate, and of the respect which he had for the republic. He was careful, therefore, to establish a government which would be in the greatest pos- ' Csesar made war upon the Gauls, and Crassus upon the Parthians, without any deliberation of the senate or decree of the people. See Dion.
264 GEANDEUE AND DECADENCE [montesquieu.
sible degree acceptable to others without interfering with his own interests; and the result was that, while the government which he organized was an aristoc- racy in its relation to civil affairs, it was a monarchy in its relation to the military power. This ambiguous government, not being upheld by its own proper force, could only stand during the pleasure of the monarch; and it was, consequently, completely mo- narchical at bottom.
The question has been raised, whether or not Au- gustus did in reality cherish a design of abdicating the empire. But who does not see that, if he had so desired, it was impossible that he should not have succeeded in executiag his purpose? The circum- stance that he asked every ten years to be relieved from the weight Of government, and yet always con- tinued to carry the burden, makes it manifest that he was only acting. It was a piece of small finesse, in order to have given to him anew, that which he did not believe he had sufficiently acquired. I am determined in this judgment by the entire life of Augustus; and although men are capable of being extremely capricious, yet it rarely happens that a man renounces in a moment an object upon which he has reflected during his whole life. All the acts, all the regulations of Augustus, tended visibly to the establishment of a monarchy. SyUa voluntarily laid down the dictatorship; but in the entire life of this man — even in the midst of his excesses — we see a re- CBAP. XIII.] OF THE ROMANS. 265 publican spirit. All his measures, although tyran- nically executed, tended constantly to a certain form of republic. Sylla was an intensely passionate man; and he carried the Romans to liberty with violence. Augustus was a cunning tyrant;* and he conducted them gently to servitude. Whilst under Sylla the republic regained its powers, all the world raised the cry of tyranny; whilst under Augustus tyranny for- tified itself, men only spoke of liberty.
The custom of triumphs, which had contributed so much to the grandeur of Rome, was lost under Augustus; or, rather, this honor became a privilege of sovereignty.' For the most part, the course which affairs took under the emperors had its origin in the regimen of the republic; '° and it is necessary to con- sider the one in connection with the other. He alone had the right to demand a triumph under whose auspices the war had been conducted; " but it was always conducted under the auspices of the * I here employ this word in tlie sense of the Greelcs and Eomans, who gave the name of tyrant to all who had overthrown a democratic government.
' Only the triumphal ornaments were thenceforth given to generals. (Dion, in Aug.)
'" The Eomans having changed their government without having been invaded, the same customs continued after the change; and even the form of the government remained nearly the same.
" Dion, in Aug., Book LIT, says that Agrippa, influenced by modesty, neglected to render to the senate an account of his expedition against the nations of the Bosporus, and even refused a triumph — and that after him no person of his rank triumphed; but this was- a favor which Augustus desired to confer upon Agrippa, and which Anthony did not confer upon Ventidius the first time the latter vanquished the Parthians. 12 2gg GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquied.
chief, and consequently — after the fall of the re- public—under those of the emperor, who was the head of all the armies of the empire.
As, during the time of the republic the govern- ing principle had been to carry on incessant war, under the emperors the cultivation of peace was a leading maxim of state. With armies which might set too high a price upon their services, victories were only regarded as subjects of disquietude. Those who held commands feared to undertake too great achievements. It was necessary so to moderate their own glory that it might awaken the attention with- out arousing the jealousy of the prince, and not to appear before him with an eclat which his eyes could not endure.
Augustus was very cautious in extending the right of Koman citizenship;" he made laws" to pre- vent the emancipation of too many slaves; " he rec- ommended in his testament the future observance of these two maxims, and also that his successors should not seek to extend the empire by new wars.
These three parts of policy were intimately con- nected. From the moment that there should be no more wars there would be no further necessity for new citizens, nor for the emancipation of slaves.
Whilst Rome was engaged in a constant succes- sion of wars, it was necessary that she should con- " Suetonius, in Aug. '^ SnExomus, ibid. See Institutes, lib. i.
" Dion, in Aug.
CHAP, xin.] OF THE ROMANS. 267 tinually replenisii her population. At the commence- ment of her career she appropriated a part of the inhabitants of conquered towns. In process of time, many citizens of the neighboring towns came to Kome for the purpose of participating in the right of suffrage; they established themselves in such great numbers that, upon the remonstrance of allies, the Eomans were often obliged to return them; and, finally, the inhabitants of the provinces arrived in crowds. The laws favored marriages, and even ren- dered them necessary. In the course of her numer- ous wars, Rome acquired a prodigious number of slaves; and when her citizens came to be loaded with wealth, they purchased them everywhere; but, influenced by generosity, avarice, or weakness, they emancipated them in great numbers." Some desired to reward faithful slaves; the motive of others was to obtain, in the name of their emancipated slaves, the grain which the republic distributed to poor citizens; and others yet were influenced by the desire of having their funeral pageants followed by numer- ous trains of attendants bearing garlands of flowers. The people were composed almost wholly of freed- men;'° so that these masters of the world, not only in their beginning, but in the whole course of their history, were for the most part of servile origin. When the common people — consisting as they '^ DioNTS. Hal., lib. iv.
" See Tacitus, Annales, lib. xiii, ch. xxvii, late fumm in corpus, etc.
268 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu.
did all but entirely of freedmen or sons of freedmen — became inconveniently numerous, they were colo- nized; and by this means the fidelity of the prov- inces was guaranteed. There was thus a circulation of the men of all nations. Eome received them as slaves and returned them as Komans.
Under pretext of some riots which took place during the elections, Augustus placed a governor and a garrison in the city. He made the legions per- petual; he stationed them on the frontiers; he es- tablished particular funds for their pay; and he ordered that the veterans should receive their recom- pense in money and not in lands."
Many bad effects had resulted from that distribu- tion of lands which had been made since the time of Sylla. The property of citizens was rendered in- secure. If the soldiers of a cohort were not located in the same place, they became disgusted with their establishment, left their allotments uncultivated, and became dangerous citizens; " whilst, on the other hand, if the lands were distributed by legions, am- bitious men could in a moment find the material for armies against the republic.
Augustus provided fixed establishments for the marine. As before his time the Eomans had no " He provided that the praetorian soldiers should receive five thousand drachms: two thousand after sixteen years of service, and the other three thousand at the expiration of twenty years. (Dion, in Aug.)
" See Tacitus, Annales, lib. xiv, ch. xxvii, in respect to the soldiers who were taken to Tarentum and Antium.
CHAP, xm.] OF THE KOMANS. 269 perpetual bodies of troops for service on land, nei- ther had they any permanent organization for service on the sea. The principal object of the fleets of Augustus was to serve as security for convoys, and to establish communication between the diflTerent parts of the empire; for in other respects the Ro- mans were masters of the whole of the Mediterra- nean; this was the only sea then navigated; and they had no enemy to fear.
Dion has well remarked that after the establish- ment of the empire it was more difficult to write history. All became secret. All dispatches from the provinces were carried into the cabinet of the emperors; and no more was known than what the folly or the hardihood of tyrants did not care to con- ceal, or — what the historians conjectured.
270 GKANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakeb.
NOTE BY THE TRAISTSLATOE.
The establishment of standing military and naval bodies at tbe commencement of tbe empire, and the greatly increased material and mental intereommuni- cation which at the same time ensued throughout the Koman world, are two phenomena of such capital im- portance that I shall here bestow a few remarks upon the reason of the one, and the comparative value of the other.
1. Paradoxical as the statement may at first sight appear, it may be accepted, as a general principle, that the institution of standing armies is the accom- paniment of a diminished military spirit. In the early stages of the ancient societies every able-bodied man was a soldier. The profession of arms, therefore, and consequently the military spirit, was equally dif- fused through the whole society. Such was the nor- mal condition of the Eoman state down to the time of the emperors. "With annual enlistments from the body of the people, with no establishment which an- swers to our idea of a standing army, the military spirit was supreme, and the career of conquest uninter- NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 271