3. The statements of Montesquieu respecting the equal division of lands among the early Komans and other ancient peoples — ^the massing of the lands '^ See Compendium of (lie Ninth Census of the United Slates, p. 20; Message and Documents, War Department, ISIS-H, Part I, p. 25; and Chambers' Ihtc., art. Navies, NOTE.] OF THE EOMANS. 71 at a later period in the hands of a few — and the closing reference to the agrarian law which agitated Eome at the time of the Gracchi — are scarcely suf- ficient to give an adequate general idea of the Ko- man land system as now understood.
It appears to be true that, by the original organi- zation of the Koman state, an equal division of land among the citizens was provided for; and indeed such equal allotment of land may be regarded as a funda- mental principle of organization among the ancient republics generally. " It seems to have been a notion generally entertained in the ancient world," says Dr. Arnold, " that every citizen of a country should be a landholder, and that the territory of a state, so far as it was not left unenclosed or reserved for public purposes, should be divided in equal portions amongst the cit- izens." ' In order to avoid misapprehension, however, it must be kept in view that these early communities abounded in slaves and subjugated classes, and that those who answered to the character of citizens con- stituted but a minor part of the entire population of the state.
The shares thus set apart to Homan citizens were small, not exceeding it would seem seven jugera, or about fonr and one third English acres.* Besides the lands so allotted to the citizens, there was an unallotted public domain, kept in reserve, and belonging, like our public lands, to the state.
72 GRAKDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker.
Now, it was not only by absorbing these small private estates, as Montesquieu appears to suppose, but also by occupying and claiming a large part of the public lands, that the ricb class of citizens came to be sucb disproportionate landholders; and the Agrarian Laws, which among other things were de- signed to remedy this mischief, seem to have been intended to apply exclusively to the last species of lands. Formerly, these laws were regarded, even among the best scholars, as having in view the con- fiscation of lands to which the rich were entitled in their own private right; and the result of this mis- conception has been, that the term "agrarian" has become intimately associated with the arbitrary seizure of the property of the more wealthy for the benefit of the poorer class of citizens. It may be indeed that agrarian laws were proposed, which looked to the confiscation of private estates in lands, although I find no direct and conclusive evidence that such was the case. From the context of Cicero in Book II chapter 21 of his Offices, it may be inferred that the law brought forward, but afterwards abandoned, by the tribune Philippus, was of this character. But it now appears certain at all events that the actual agrarian laws of Eoman history were intended to have no other application than to lands which were in fact owned by the state.
For the correction of the former misconception as to the real nature of this class of laws we are main- NOTE.] OF THE EOMANS. Y3 ly indebted to Niebuhr. " If," eays Dr. Arnold, " amongst Mebnhr's countless services to Koman his- tory, any single one may claim our gratitude beyond the rest, it is his explanation of the true nature and character of the agrarian laws." ' In the most general sense, the agrarian laws of the Romans were simply their pvMic land laws. From the time of the earliest kings, it was their constant policy to appropriate some part of the lands of the defeated enemy; and sometimes the state acquired lands by purchase. These lands, whether acquired in the one way or the other, became the exclusive property of the state, and were from time to time allotted among citizens — who were removed to and colonized upon them.
For the most part this system of gratuitous dis- tribution of the public lands worked harmoniously; but there was one point upon which angry contro- versies and even violent collisions in the bosom of the state arose. It was. the custom of the govern- ment to allow individuals to enter upon and occupy unallotted public lands, paying to the state a certain moderate rent therefor. Under this usage a great portion of the public lands came to be occupied by the rich class of citizens; and even the payment of the reserved rent came to be much neglected. By the agrarian law of Licinius Stolo — passed about 369 years before Christ — which was the model for all ^ Idem, p. 59. 4 74 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker.
subsequent legislation of tlie kind, and wliicli is now- understood to have related solely to public lands- no individual was allowed to occupy more than 500 jugera, or about 311i English acres of such land; and any excess above this amount was to be allotted among the poorer class of citizens at the rate of 1 jugera to each.
In the legal aspect of the case, such occupants of the public lands were tenants at will of the state, and acquired no title whatever, as against the latter, to the lands which they were thus permitted to pos- sess and to use. But, as Dr. Arnold remarks, "al- though the land was undoubtedly the property of the state, and although the occupiers of it were in relation to the state mere tenants at will, yet it is in human nature that a long undisturbed possession should give a feeling of ownership, the znore so as, while the state's claim lay dormant, the possessor was in fact the proprietor; and the land would thus be repeatedly passing by regular sale from one occupier to another." ° It hence resulted that the passage of the Licinian law was resisted with great bitterness by the patricians and the richer class of citizens.
After having in a great measure corrected the evil which it was intended to remedy, this law of Licinius finally fell into disuse; and many of the wealthier citizens, in total disregard of the limitation imposed by the law, occupied immense tracts of " Idem, p. 60.
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 75 public land in addition to their private estates, wliilst many of tlie poorer citizens were without lands.
In this state of things, and to remedy this enor- mous abuse, Tiberius Gracchus — b. c. 132 — caused the Licinian law to be revived in a modified form. In its new form, the law, while retaining the old limitation of 500 jugera of public land to each occu- pant, allowed 250 jugera in addition to be occupied for each son of the family; and, whilst providing that in all cases any excess should be resumed by the state for allotment among the poorer class of citizens, it also provided that payment should be made for the improvements which had been put upon the lands thus resumed.
Such, in substance, appear to have been the main features of the agrarian laws. The disturbance which followed the enactment of the law of Tiberius Gracchus, and- in which that great statesman per- ished, was not so much a sedition of the people as a sedition of the patricians — in their spirit of hostility to a just and wholesome law.'
' Livy, Book TI, chs. 35-42; Arnold's Hist, of Rome, chs. ix and xxvi; Niebuhr's Rom. Geschichte, Berlin, 1853, pp. 22-lr-240; Chambers' Enc, art. Agrarian Law; Anthon'a Clas. Die, articles Agrarice Leges and Lieinius.
76 GRAKDEUE AND DECADENCE [MONiESQCiEti.
CHAPTEE IV.
THE GAULS. PYEEHtTS. COMPAEISON OF CAETHAGE AND EOME. WAE WITH HANNIBAl.
The Komans liad many wars with the Gauls. The same love of glory, the same contempt of death, the same obstinate resolre to conquer, characterized the two. nations; but their arms were different. The buckler of the Gauls was small, and their sword bad. They were handled, therefore, by the Eomans much as the Mexicans have been in these later ages by the Spaniards. It is surprising that these peoples, whom the Romans encountered at nearly all places and times, should have suffered themselves to be de- stroyed, one after another, without ever knowing, inquiring into, or remedying the cause of their disasters.'
Pyrrhus made war upon the Eomans at a time when they were in a condition to resist him, and to gain instruction by means of his victories. He taught them to entrench themselves, and how to select and arrange a camp. He accustomed them to ' See my Note at the end of this chapter. — Translator.
CHAP. IT.] OF THE ROMANS. 77 elephants, and prepared them for wars upon a grander scale.'
The greatness of Pyrrhus consisted solely in his personal qualities." Plutarch tells us that he was obliged to make war upon Macedon, for the reason that he was unable to support his army of eight thou- sand foot and five hundred cavalry.* This prince, master of a little state of which we hear nothing said after his time, was an adventurer, continually engaged in enterprises, for the reason that he could subsist in no other manner.
The Tarentines, his allies, had degenerated very much from the institutions of the Lacedaemonians, their ancestors.' He would have been able to accom- plish great things with the aid of the Samnites, but for the fact that the Eomans had nearly destroyed this nation.
Carthage, become rich sooner than Pome, was also sooner corrupted. Thus, whilst at Pome the public ' [The war with Pyrrhus expanded the minds of the Eomans. Deal- ing with an enemy of so much experience, they became more ingenious and more enlightened than they were before. They found the means of protecting themselves against the elephants, which in the first battle had thrown their legions into disorder. They avoided the plains, and Bought places which were advantageous against a cavalry which they had mis- takenly despised. They learned afterwards to form their camp upon the model of that of Pyrrhus — ^having admired the order and the distribution of his troops, whilst among themselves all was confusion. (Saint-Etee- MOKD, inflexions sur les divers gSnies du peuple romain dans les different tempts de la ripablique, ch. vi.)]
' See a fragment of Book I of Dion, in the Excerpt of Virtues and Vices.
* lAfe of Pyrrhus. ' Justin, lib. xx, ch. 1.
78 GKANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu.
employments were only obtained by virtue, and yielded no profit except honor and a preference of toil, all tbat society could bestow upon the citizen was sold at Carthage, and every service performed for the public was paid for by the state.
A Idngdom is not brought nearer to ruin by the tyranny of the sovereign than is a republic by indifference to the common welfare. The advantage of a free state is that the revenues are better ad- ministered; and, when they are even worse admin- istered, the advantage of. a free state yet is, that there are no favorites. But, when this is not the case, and when, instead of the friends and relations of a prince, it becomes necessary to provide for- tunes for all those who have part in the adminis- tration of the government — all is lost." The evasion of the laws in a republic thus corrupted is more dangerous than their violation by a monarch — ^who, being the first citizen of his state, has the greatest interest in its preservation.
At Home, ancient manners and a certain habit of poverty rendered fortunes nearly equal; but at Car- thage, individuals possessed the wealth of kings.
Of the two factions which reigned at Carthage, the " These words of Montesquieu should arrest the attention of Ameri- cans. The two evils which ho points out, indifference to the public welfare, and the conversion of the public service into a means for the accumula- tion of private fortunes, are alike destructive of the spirit, if not of the form, of a republican government; and the first of these evils is sure to be followed by the other.— Translator.
CHAP. IV.] OF THE ROMANS. 79 one constantly desired peace, the other, war; so that it was impossible to enjoy the one or to prosecute the other with effect.
"Whilst at Eome, war immediately reunited all in- terests, it separated them the more at Carthage.'
In states governed by a monarch dissensions are easily appeased, for the sovereign holds in his hands a coercive authority which enables him to impose checks upon the two parties; but in a republic such dissensions are more lasting, for the malady ordina- rily attacks the very power which should be able to cure it.
At Eome, governed by laws, the people suffered the senate to take the direction of affairs; at Carthage, governed by abuses, the people desired to do every- thing themselves.
Carthage, which made war with her opulence against Eoman poverty, was, even in this respect, at a disadvantage. Gold and silver may be consumed; but virtue, constancy, force, and poverty, are inex- haustible.
The Eomans were ambitious from pride, the Car- thaginians from avarice; those would command, these would acquire. The latter, constantly calculating re- ' The presence of Hannibal caused all divisions to cease among the Romans; but the presence of Scipio embittered those which already ex- isted among the Carthaginians; it took away from the government of the latter all the force which it had left; the generals, the senate, the nobles, became more suspected by the people, and the people became more furious. See Appian's account of the war of the first Scipio.
80 6KANDEUB AND DECADENCE [montesquieu.
ceipts and expenses, always made war without lov- ing it.
The loss of battles, the diminution of her people, the ruin of her commerce, the exhaustion of her pub- He treasury, and the revolt of the neighboring nations,. were sufficient to induce Carthage to accept the hard- est conditions of peace. But Kome was not guided by the sentiment of benefits and calamities. She was solely determined by the sense of her own glory; and, as she did not imagine that she could exist if she did not command, there was no hope and no fear which could induce her to mate a peace which she did not impose.
There is nothing so powerful as a repubKc in which the laws are observed, not from fear, not from reason, but from passion — as was the case with the Romans and the Lacedaemonians; for then there is joined to the wisdom of a good government all the force which is proper to a faction.
The Carthaginians availed themselves of foreign troops; the Komans employed their own.° As the latter always regarded the conquered as instruments of future triumphs, they made soldiers of all the peoples whom they subdued; and, the greater the difficulty they might have in vanquishing them, the more they regarded them as proper to be incorporated into their * [Cartilage being founded upon commerce and Rome upon arms, the first employed foreigners for its wars and citizens for its traffic; the other made citizens of all nations, and soldiers of its citizens. (Saint-Evre- mond.)]
CHAP. IT.] OF THE ROMAKS. 81 republic. Thus we see the Samnites — who were only subjugated after twenty-four triumphs "-—become aux- iliaries of their conquerors; and, some time before the second Punic war, the Romans drew from them and from their allies — ^that is to say, from a country not much larger than the states of the Pope and of Na- ples— seven hundred thousand infantry and seventy thousand cavalry, to oppose the Gauls." " At the height of the second Punic war Rome had constantly on foot from twenty-two to twenty- four legions; and yet it appears from Livy that the census did not then exceed about one hundred and thirty-seven thousand citizens.
Carthage employed greater forces for attack. Home for defense. The latter, as we have seen, armed a pro- digious number of men against the Gauls and against Hannibal, who attacked her; but she sent out no more than two legions against the greatest kings — a policy which perpetuated her forces.
The establishment of Carthage in her territory ' Flobus, lib. 1, ch. xvi.
'" See Polvbiug. The Summary of Florua says they levied three hundred thousand men in the city and among the Latins.
" The large number stated in the text must not be understood as applying to forces actually brought into the field, but as referring to the total aggregate of men capable of military duty among the Romans and all their allies at the time of the Gallic invasion alluded to — which was 225 years before Christ, and seven years before the beginning of the second Punic war. This aggregate is said to have been as high as YSO,- 000 men; but the number actually put into service against the Gauls does not appear to have been more than about 171,000— whilst the at- tacking force of the Gauls seems not to have exceeded Y0,000. (See Arnold's Hist, of Rome, N. T., ISSY, pp. 464-465.)— Translator.
82 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesotiep.
was less solid than that of Eome in hers. The lat- ter was surrounded by thirty colonies, which served her as so many ramparts." Prior to the battle of Cannae no ally had abandoned her. The reason was, that the Samnites and the other peoples of Italy were accustomed to her domination.
Most of the cities of Africa, being but little for- tified, surrendered at once upon the approach of an enemy. Thus, all who disembarked upon the coast of Africa — Agathocles, Kegulus, Scipio — immediately reduced Carthage to despair.
The ills which befell the Carthaginians through- out the war which the first Scipio made upon them can hardly be attributed to any other cause than a bad government. Their city and even their armies were famished, whilst the Eomans were supplied with an abundance of all things."
Among the Carthaginians, the armies which had been beaten became more insolent. Sometimes they crucified their generals, and punished them for their own cowardice. Among the Komans, the consul deci- mated the troops who had fled, and again led them against the enemy.
The government of the Carthaginians was very " LivT, lib. xxvii, chs. ix and x. [These colonies, established on all sides of the empire, produced two admirable effects. The first was, that they relieved the city of a great number of citizens, mostly poor. The other was, that they guarded the principal posts, and gradually accus- tomed foreign nations to Roman manners. (Bossuet, Disc, sur PHiel. Univ., troisiferae partie, eh. vi.)]
" See Appian, lib. Libi/ke, oh. xxv.
CHAP. IV.] OF THE ROMANS. 83 severe." They had oppressed the peoples of Spain so cruelly that when the Eomans arrived there they were regarded as liberators; and, if we consider the immense sums which Spain cost them in carrying on a war in which they succumbed at last, we shall plainly see that injustice is bad policy, and that it does not even accomplish its own ends.
The commerce of Carthage had been much dimin- ished by the founding of Alexandria. During primitive times, superstition had in some sort ban- ished foreigners from Egypt; and when the Persians had conquered that country, their only policy was to weaken their new subjects; but, under the Greek kings, Egypt carried on nearly all the commerce of the world, and that of Carthage began to decline.
Nations established upon commerce may exist for a long time in a state of mediocrity; but their grandeur is of short duration. They rise little by little, and without attracting notice; for they do no particular act which serves to arrest attention and to signalize their power. But, when they have grown to such an extent that none can fail to observe them, all seek to deprive such a nation of an advantage which it has only obtained, so to speak, by surprise."
" See what Polybiua says of their exactions, especially in the frag- ment of Book IX, Excerpt of Virtues and Vices.
'° The idea here presented, that great commercial states are less secure than others, can scarcely be accepted as a fundamental principle, although doubtless true in its application to the states of antiquity — at a period in the world's history when the war spirit was much more domi- nant, when physical force was more unqualiiiedly accepted by nations as g4 GEANDEUE AND DECADENCE [montesquief.
The Carthaginian cavalry was superior to the Eoman in two respects. In the first place, the JSTu- midian and Spanish horses were better than those of Italy; and in the next place the Eoman cavalry was badly armed; for, as we learn from Polybius," it was not until the wars which they made against the Greeks, that the Eomans changed their style in this regard. In the first Punic war Eegulus was beaten from the moment that the Carthaginians selected plains for battle, in order to favor the operations of their cavalry; and in the second, Hannibal owed his principal victories to his Numidian horsemen."
Having conquered Spain, and formed an alliance with Masinissa, Scipio deprived the Carthaginians of this advantage. It was Numidian cavalry that gained the battle of Zama and ended the war.
The Carthaginians had more experience on sea than the Eomans, and better understood the manage- ment of ships; but it appears to me that this ad- vantage was not so great at that time as it would be at the present day.
ISTot haAdng the mariner's compass, the ancients were Httle able to navigate except along the shores a standard of right, and when wealth had not yet learned to draw to itself that measure of defensive force which it so well knows how to organize and employ in modern times. In the circumstances of the modem world, Great Britain is a standing illustration of the security of a first class commercial state. — Tkanslator.
'* Lib. Ti, ch. xxT.
" Some entire corps of Numidians passed over to the side of the Eomans, who from that time began to experience a sense of relief.
CHAP. IV.] OF THE ROMANS. 85 of seas; tliey only used vessels provided with oars — small and flat; nearly aU road-steads served them as ports; the knowledge of pilots was very limited, and their manoeuvering a very small affair. Hence it was that Aristotle said it was useless to have a corps of mariners, and that laborers would suffice for that.'* Art was so imperfect, that not much more was accomplished with a thousand oars than is now with a hundred." Large vessels were dis- advantageous; for, being difficult to put in motion by the crew, they were unable to execute the nec- essary evolutions. Of this, Anthony made a disas- trous experiment at Actium."" His ships were unable to move, whilst those of Augustus, being lighter, at- tacked them on aU sides. As the ancient vessels were propelLed by oars, the lighter could easily break the oars of the larger ones, which were thus re- duced to the condition of immovable machines, like our present ships when dismasted.
Since the discovery of the mariner's compass all this has been changed. We have abandoned the use of oars;" we construct large vessels, and shun the shores of the sea. The machinery of navigation has '* Politics, Book VII, ch. vi.
" See what Perrault says respecting the oars of the ancients. Essai de physique, tit. 3, Micanique des animaux.
2" The same thing happened at the battle of Salamis. (PLtriAKCH, £i/e of Themistodes.) History is full of similar facts.
" From which we may judge how imperfect was the marine of the ancients — since we hare abandoned a practice in which we were so supe- rior to them.
S6 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [moktesqdiec.
become more composite, and its applications more multiplied.
The discovery of gunpowder has led to a conse- quence which would not have been suspected. It is that the force of navies consists more than ever in art; for, in order to resist the violence of cannon, and not to be exposed to a superior fire, large vessels are neces- sary; but the power of art should be proportioned to the magnitude of the machine.
The small vessels of the ancients grappled with each other suddenly, and the soldiers of the two sides joined in conflict. An entire land army was placed on a fleet. In the naval battle which Eegulus and his colleague gained, we see a hundred and thirty thousand Komans engage with a hundred and fifty thousand Carthaginians. At that time soldiers were accounted for much and men of art for little; at present, soldiers are accounted for little, and men of art for much.
This difference is made manifest by the victory which was achieved by the consul Duillius. The Eo- mans were without knowledge of navigation; a Car- thaginian galley grounded upon their coasts; they used this as a model for the building of others; in three months time their fleet was constructed and equipped and their seamen ready; they put to sea, found the Carthaginian navy, and beat it.
At present, a whole lifetime is scarcely sufficient to enable a sovereign to form a fleet capable of appear- CHAP. IT.] OF THE ROMANS. 87 ing before a power whicli has already the empire of the sea. It is perhaps the sole thing which money alone cannot do; and if in our time a great mon- arch succeeded at once in accomplishing such a task," experience has caused others to see that his example is more to be admired than followed."
The second Punic war is so famous that all the world is acquainted with it. When we consider well the crowd of obstacles which confronted Hannibal, and which that extraordinary man surmounted, we have before us the finest spectacle that antiquity pre- sents.
Eome was a prodigy of constancy. After the bat- tle of Ticinus, of Trebia, of Trasymenus — after that of Cannas, which was more disastrous yet, and when she was abandoned by nearly all the peoples of Italy, she did' not ask for peace. The reason was that the senate never departed from the ancient maxims. It dealt with Hannibal as it had previously dealt with Pyrrhus — with whom it had refused to enter into any accommodation whilst he remained in Italy. And I find in Dionysius of Halicamassus,'' that at the time of the negotiation with Ooriolanus, the senate declared that it would not violate its ancient customs; that the Koman people would not make peace so long as the enemy remained upon their soil; but that, if the Yol- scians withdrew, all would be accorded which might be just.
'' Spain and MuscoTy. «' Louis XrV. '* Roman Antiquities, Book VIII.
88 GEANDEUE AND DECADENCE [montesquied.
Kome was saved by the force of her institutions. After the battle of Cannse, not even the women were permitted to shed tears. The senate refused to ran- som the prisoners, and sent the miserable remains of the army to continue the war in Sicily — without rec- ompense and without military honor — ^until Hannibal should be driven from Italy."""
On the other hand, the consul Terrentius Yarro had fled shamefully to Venusia. This man, who was of the lowest birth, had only been elevated to the consulate in order to mortify the nobles. But the ^* [After the battle of Cannse, when any other state would have sue- cumbed to its bad fortune, there was not a movement of weakness among the Eoman people, nor a thought which was not devoted to the good of the republic. All orders, all ranks, all conditions exhausted themselves voluntarily. Honor consisted in retaining less, shame in reserving more. (Saint-E vremond. )] *' Inflexible as the Roman character may have been, it was yet not so completely devoid of sensibility and weakness as seems to be implied in the text and in the passage from Saint-Evremond. The scenes of dis- tress which took place in Rome immediately after the rout on the Allia, and after the defeats of Trasymenus and Cannas, rank with the most un- bounded displays of human feeling that are to be found in history. On the first occasion, " the entire city " was " filled with wailings "; on the second, instances are given of women who fell dead from joy on meeting sons whom they believed to have been slain in the battle; on the third, the city was seized with panic, the first hurried sitting of the senate took place " while the loud lamentations of the women were resounding," and Livy declares that the scene was indescribable. Montesquieu's remark that " not even the women were permitted to shod tears " after this last defeat, conveys an exaggerated idea of Roman stolidity. The fact waSj that for prudential reasons, public and private, the senate passed a de- cree, not forbidding the shedding of tears, but limiting the time of mourn- ing to thirty days. (See Livy, Book V, chs. 39-40, Spillan's trans.; and