The education of Mithridates was Grecian, and he appears to have excelled all the monarchs of his time in mental culture. According to the description given of him by Appian, he was endowed with a magnificent physique. He was great in size, powerful, and active; he drove eight pair of horses before his car; and he was able to ride^by means of a relay of horses — one ' See Appian, De Bella Miihridatico, ch. 109.
IQ2 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakeb.
thousand stadia in a day^ — a distance equal to about one hundred and fifteen English miles. He evidently belonged to the Nimrod rather than to the Sardana- palus type of Asiatic despots.
For the rest, Mithridates seems to have united Tillanous criminality with his great ability. Appian accuses him of having murdered his mother, his brother, three sons, and as many daughters; " and he is, moreover, doubtfully accused of having ordered that general massacre of Koman citizens in Asia, the victims of which are variously stated at 80,000 or 150,000 persons. In presence of such deeds — whether certain or doubtful — ^history is constrained to acquiesce in his overthrow — despite his eminent genius and his heroic resistance of Home.
After the prostration of the power of Mithridates, the door to Asia was flung wide open to the Eomans; and the greatly increased spoils thence transported to Eome hastened the corruption in which the republic was so soon to perish.
* Ibid., ch. 112.
' E>-af autem o-udelis in omnes et sanguinarius; mairis fraimqw interfector, et trium filiorum acfiliarum totidem. (Ibid.)
MONTESQUIEU.] OF THE KOMANS. 163 CHAPTEJl YIII.
OF THE DIT1SI0N8 "WHICH CONSTANTLY EXISTED IN THE CITY OF EOME.
Dheing the time that Eome was conquering the world, a hidden war was going on inside her own walls. The fires which burned within her bosom, like those of volcanoes, burst forth whenever any exciting cause presented itself to increase their ac- tivity.'
' Machiavelli attributes Koman liberty to the incessant struggle here referred to between the upper and the lower classes. He says "two diverse humors " exist in all cities, which derive their origin from the fact " that the people desire to be neither commanded nor oppressed by the great, whilst the great desire to command and oppress the people "; and, speaking of the Romans in particular, he adds: " Those who con- demn the tumults between the Nobles and the Plebs appear to me to blame the very things which were the first cause of the maintenance of Koman liberty, and to looli more to the uproar and the outcries which attended these tumults than to the good effects which they produced, and not to consider how it is that there are in every republic two diverse humors — that of the people and that of the great — ^from the disagree- ment of which proceed all the laws which are made in favor of liberty, as we may readily see was the case in Kome; for, from the time of the Tarquins to the time of the Gracchi, which was more than three hundred years, the tumults of Rome rarely led to exile, and very rarely to the shedding of blood. Neither can these tumults be regarded as mis- chievous, nor a republic as divided, which, by reason of its dissensions ^Qj. GRANDETJK AND DECADENCE [montesqtjief.
After tlie expxilsion of the kings, the govera- ment became an aristocracy. The patrician famihes alone obtained all the magistracies, all the dignities," and consequently aU the civil and military honors of the state.'
Desii'ing to prevent the return of the kings, the patricians sought to strengthen the revolutionary movement which had taken place in the popular mind. But, in accomplishing this purpose, they did more than they intended; for, while imparting to the people a hatred for kings, they imparted to them an immoderate desire for liberty; and, inasmuch as the entire authority of the kings had passed into the hands of the consuls, the people felt that they had not obtained that liberty, the love of which the pa- tricians had so much encouraged. They sought, there- fore, to lessen the power of the consulate, to ob- tain plebeian magistrates, and to share the curule offices with the patricians.
The latter were forced to concede aU that the during so long a period of time, sent into exile not more than eight or ten of its citizens, put Tery few of them to death, nor even imposed a pecuniary fine upon many." (Discorsi, Jib. i, cap. ir.)
The " two diverse humors " of Maohiavelli presents an idea which goes deep and extends far. Everywhere liberty has been the result of sharp self-assertion on the part of the people; and everywhere, when this has been wanting, " the great " have absorbed the powers of the state.— Translator.
' The patricians had even in some sort a sacred character; they only could take the auspices. See in Livy, Boot VI, chs. xl, xli, the harangue of Appius Claudius.
^ For example, they only could have the honors of a triumph, since they only could be consuls and command armies.
CHAP. Till.] OF THE ROMANS. 165 people demanded; for, in a city in which poverty was public virtue, and in which wealth — that stupid means to power — was despised, birth and dignities could give no great advantage. It was necessary, therefore, that the power of the state should return to the greatest number, and that the aristocratic should be gradually changed into a popular form of government.
Those who obey a king are less tormented by jealousy and envy than the citizens of a country governed by an hereditary aristocracy. A monarch is so distant from his subjects that he is seldom seen, and he is so far above them that they cannot im- agine any likeness between him and themselves which is ' capable of being a source of offense to them; but the nobles who govern a country are under the eyes of everybody; and they are not so elevated but that odious comparisons are continually made. Accordingly, it has been the experience of all past ages, as it is of the present, that the people detest aristocrats. Republics, in which birth con- fers no part in the government, are in this respect the most happy; for the people feel less envy of an authority which they themselves bestow upon whom they will, and which they can resume at their pleasure.
The people of Rome, being dissatisfied with the patricians, withdrew to the Mons Sacer.* Deputies ' A ridge of hillg, lying about three miles outside the city, beyond the little river Anio, and called sacred mount, not at the time, but from the 1QQ GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesotieu.
were sent by the other party, who succeeded in ap- peasing them; and, since they all promised mutual assistance to each other in case the patricians should not observe their pledges ' — a means of defense which would have led to seditions at every instant, thus disturbing all the functions of the state — - it was thought best to create a magistracy whose duty it should be to prevent injustice from being done to the plebeians." But, by an eternal infirmity of human nature, the plebeians, who had obtained Tribunes for defense, employed them for attack.' Little by little they wrested from the patricians a share in all their prerogatives — a course of proced- ure which gave rise to contiaual dissensions in the state. In these contests the people were sustained, or rather animated, by their tribunes, whilst the patricians were defended by the senate — which body, being composed almost wholly of patricians, was governed more by the ancient maxims, and influ- enced by a fear that the populace would elevate some tribune to the tyranny.
On their part, the people resorted to their own circumstance that it was subsequently dedicated to Jupiter. (Livy, Book 11, ch. 32; Ferguson's Horn. Rep., ch. ii; Anthon's Clas. Die., art. Mons Sacet:) — Translator. ' ' Zonaras, i, ii.
* This was the origin of the Tribunes of the people.
'' So far from being an infirmity, the property of human nature here referred to is, at bottom, one of its noblest endowments j it is that prop- erty which aspires to an equality of rights among men, and which im- parts to the world's civilization a slow, interrupted, but ever-recurring movement in the direction of Democracy. — Tuanslatob.
CHAP, vm.] OF THE ROMANS. 167 proper force, and made use of tlieir superiority in the BufErage; they refused to go to war, and threat- ened to withdraw; they availed themselves of the partiality of their laws,' and passed judgments of con- demnation against those who resisted their demands too strenuously. The senate, on the other hand, de- fended itself by its wisdom, its justice, and the love of country which it inspired; by the benefactions which it dispensed, and the wise application which it made of the public funds; by the respect which the people had for the glory of the principal families and the virtues of great personages;" by the influ- ence of religion, the prestige of ancient institutions, and the suppression of days of public assemblage under pretext that the auspices had not been favor- able; by the hold which it had upon its clients, by the opposition of one tribune to another, and by the creation of a dictator;" by the diverting influence of ' That is, of the plebiscites, originally a sort of " by-laws," made by, and applicable to, the pleba alone, but afterwards so extended in their operation as to affect the other orders of the state. (See Cooper's Jus- tinian, Phila., 1812, p. x; and Ferguson's Bom. Mep., ch. ii.) — ^Trans- lator.
' The people, who loved glory, and who were composed of men who had passed their lives in war, could not refuse their suffrages to a great man under whom they had fought. They obtained the right to elect plebeians, and they elected patricians. Whilst providing that there should always be one plebeian consul, they were obliged to tie their own bands; for the plebeian families also, who were once placed in office, were continually elected thereto afterwards; and, when the people ele- vated.some man of little worth, as Varro or Marius, it was a species of victory which they achieved over themselves.
" As a means of defending themselves, the patricians resorted to the expedient of creating a dictator. This succeeded admirably; but the 158 GKANDEUK AND DECADENCE [montesquiep.
a new war, or the quieting effect of calamities whidi reunite all interests; by a paternal condescension in according to the people a part of their demands in order to induce them to abandon others; and, finally, by the constant maxim of preferring the preservation of the Kepublic to the prerogatives of any order or of any magistracy whatever.
In the course of time, when the plebeians had so far humbled the patricians that the distinction be- tween the two had become a vain thing," and when patricians and plebs were indiSerently elevated to the honors of office, new disputes arose among the common people. They were agitated on the one hand by the tribunes, and on the other by the prin- cipal patrician and plebeian families, who were now called nobles, and who were supported by the senate — which body was composed of them. But, inas- much as the ancient maiiners_Jaad_disappeared, as private individuals possessed immense fortunes, and as it is impossible that wealth should not give power, the nobles resisted with more force than the patri- cians had done; and this was the cause of the death of the Gracchi, and of many others who acted upon their principles.'"
plebeians — having obtained the right to be elected to the consulate- could also be chosen as dictators; and this disconcerted the patricians. See in Livy, Book VIII, how Publius Pliilo humbled them during his dictatorship. He made three laws which were very prejudicial to them.
" The patricians only retained some sacerdotal offices, and the right of creating the magistrate, who was called Irderrex.
'^ As Saturninus and Glaucias.
CHAP. VIII.] OF THE ROMANS. 169 It is necessary that I should here say something of a magistracy which contributed much to maintain the government of Eome. It was that of the cen- sors. These magistrates were charged with the duty of taking the census of the people; and, in addition, to this, inasmuch as the strength of the republic con-, sisted in discipline, in austerity of manners, and in the constant observance of certain customs, they cor- rected such abuses as the law had not foreseen, or those which the ordinary magistrate could not pun- ish." There are bad examples which are worse than crimes; and more states have perished by reason of a departure from wholesome manners than from a violation of the laws. At Home, domestic and pub- lie disorders — everything that threatened to introduce dangerous novelties, or to change the heart or the spirit of the citizen — and, if I may so say, whatever tended to prevent the perpetuation of relapses from the ancient manners — belonged to the jurisdiction of the censors. They could drive from the senate whom they would; they could take from an eques- trian the horse which was kept for him at the public expense; they could place a citizen in. another tribe, and even among those who paid the expenses of the city without having any share in its privileges."
" We may observe how the censors degraded those who, after the battle of Cannae, advised the abandonment of Italy — those who surren- dered to Hannibal — and those who, by a disingenuous interpretation, had broken the parol which they had given him.
" This was called cerarium aliquem facere aut in cwrimm tabulaa 8 170 GRANDEUE AND DECADENCE [MONiESQiimT.
M. Livy even took notice of the masses of tlie peo- ple themselves; and, out of thirty-five tribes, he placed thirty-foTir in the rank of those who had no share in the privileges of the city." "For," said he, "after having condemned me, yon have made me consul and censor: it must be, therefore, that you have once betrayed your trust, by inflicting a punishment upon me, or that you have twice be- trayed it, in first creating me consul and then cen- sor." M. Duronius, a tribime of the people, was driven from the senate by the censors, for the reason that daring his magistracy he had abrogated the law which limited the expenses of banquets."
The censorship was a very wise institution. These officers could not, however, deprive any one of a mag- istracy, for that would have interrupted the.exercise of the public power;" but they struck down order and rank, and deprived the citizen, so to speak, of his personal nobility.
Servius Tullius had made that famous division by Centuries, which Livy " and Dionysius of Halicarnas- sus " have so weU explained. He had distributed one hundred and ninety-three centuries into six classes, and placed all the common people in the last, century, which alone formed the sixth class. We see that this refen-e. The citizen wag removed from his century, and had no longer the right of suffrage. " Livy, Book XXIX, ch. 37.
" Valerius Maximus, Book II, ch. 9.
" The dignity of Senator was not a magistracy.
'8 Book I, ch. 43. " Book IV, art. 16 d seq.
CHAP, vni.] OP THE ROMANS. 171 arrangement excluded the masses of the people from the sufirage— not in point of law, hut as a matter of fact."
In the course of time it was provided that, except in some particular cases, the exercise of the right of suffrage should follow the division hy Tribes. There were thirty-five tribes, four in the city and thirty-one in the country, each of which, voting as a tribe, cast one vote. The principal citizens, who were all labor- ers, entered naturally into the country tribes, whilst those of the city received the meaner sort of the peo- ple," who, being confined to the town, exercised very little influence upon affairs. This arrangement was regarded as the salvation of the repubUc; and, when Fabius replaced in the four tribes of the city those inferior people whom Appius Claudius had distributed through all, he thereby acquired the surname of Maxi- mus."
Every five years the censors examined into the actual condition of the republic, and so distributed the people in their different tribes that the tribunes and ambitious aspirants could not render themselves masters of the baUot, and that the people themselves could not make an abusive use of their own power."
'" See my Note at the end of this chapter. — ^Tbanslatob.
'' Called turba foremis.
»» See Livy, Book IX, eh. 46.
'^ [The functiona of the censors were not limited to this examination and moral distribution of the individuals who composed the republic. They also took the census of the people; and, " by this means," says 172 GRANDEUE AND DECADENCE [montesquieit.
The government of Eome was admirable in this — that from its origin its constitution was such — whether from the spirit of the people, the influence of the senate, or the authority of certain magistrates — that all abuses could be corrected..^ j Carthage perished, for the reason that, when it became necessary to retrench abuses, she could not even tolerate the hand of her own Hannibal. Athens fell, for the reason that her errors appeared to her so sweet that she did not desire to remedy them. And, among us, the republics of Italy, which boast of the perpetuity of their governments, should only boast of the perpetuity of their abuses; and, accord- Bossuet, " Eome knew what number of citizens she had who wore capa- ble of bearing arms, and what she could rely upon from the youth who were coming of age every day. Thus, she so managed her forces against an enemy who came from the shores of Africa that time alone should destroy him, placed as he was in a foreign country, in which succors were so slow to arrive, and where even his victories, which cost him so much blood, were fatal to him. Therefore it was, that whatever disasters might happen, the senate, always advised of the number of good soldiers yet remaining, had only to temporize, and never suffered itself to be cast down. When, by the defeat at Cannae, and by the revolts which followed, it saw the forces of the Republic so far diminished that it could hardly have defended itself if the enemy had pushed immediately on, it yet sustained itself by its courage, and, without being disturbed by the public calamities, it addressed its attention to the means of victory. As soon as it was seen that Hannibal, instead of pressing his advantage, only thought for a time of enjoying it, the senate became reassured, and clearly saw that an enemy who could neglect to pursue his fortune, and who was capable of being dazzled by his great successes, was never born to conquer the Romans. From that moment Eome continually achieved greater enterprises; and Hannibal, supremely able and courageous, and completely victorious as he was, could not maintain himself against her." Disc, sur PHist. miiv., troisifeme partie, ch. vi.]
CHAP. Till.] OF THE ROMANS. 173 ingly, they enjoy no more liberty than was found at Eome during the time of the Decemvirs."
The government of England is wiser; for it con- tains a body which continually inspects it, and which as continually inspects itself." The errors of this government are such that they are never of long duration, and — in consequence of that spirit of vigi- lance which they awaken in the mind of the nation — they are often useful.
In a word, a free government — that is to say, one which is constantly agitated — can never maintain itself if it is not, by its own laws, capable of cor- rection.
'* Nor have they oven more power.
'^ The parliament — especially the House of Commons. — Translator.
174 GEANDEUE AND DECADENCE [bakeb.
NOTE BY THE TEANSLATOK.
In the preceding chapter Montesquieu presents, among other things, a very general idea of the rela- tions and comparative political rights of the different classes of Koman citizens. This idea will become at the same time more distinct and more comprehensive if, on the one hand, we look a little closer than he has done into the distribution which was made by classes, centuries, and tribes, and, on the other, take a somewhat more extensive and definite view than he has presented of the Roman constitution in its rela- tion to liberty.
1. As to the division by classes and centuries — commonly referred to Serving TiiUius^we are at once admitted to the spirit of the Koman people by the circumstance that this was simply a division of the army, foot and horse. Accordingly, when called upon to meet in their quality of classes and centu- ries, the people were summoned, Uke an army, by the martial blast of the horn; they assembled in the Campus Martins, a field lying outside the city walls, and dedicated to the god of war; and, in their NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 175 aggregate capacity, they were called "Exercitus TJr- banus," or "the Army of the City."
According to the account of Livy, there were five classes of infantry, and a sixth which was composed of citizens who were excluded from the military ser- vice. This classification was based upon property. An estate of not less than one hundred thousand Koman asses — a sum equal in value to $970 — admitted the owner to a place in the first class; seventy-five thou- sand asses was the qualification for the second class; fifty thousand for the third; twenty -five thousand for the fourth; eleven thousand for the fifth; and all whose estates were of less value than this last sum were placed in the sixth class. Of these classes, the first was divided into eighty centuries; the second, third, and fourth, into twenty each; the fifth into thirty; and the whole of the sixth made one century only. Five additional centuries were incorporated into the infantry service, apparently without respect to property qualification, but with regard to their special art — two of mechanics and three of trumpeters and horn-blowers — ^the former being attached to the centuries of the first class, the latter to those of the fifth. Thus, of the footmen — including the non- military century, which embraced the whole of the sixth class — ^there were one hundred and seventy-six centuries.
The knights, or horsemen, constituted a body to themselves, and were composed of two social elements 176 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baMIB.
blended together — the patricians and the richeiSt of the commons. They were divided into eighteen cen- turies— thus making the entire number of centuries one hundred and ninety-four.
When a vote was to be taken, the centuries of horsemen — as being of the highest rank and dignity — took the lead, and cast their eighteen votes. Next came the centuries composing the first or wealth- iest class of footmen, with their eighty votes; then the centuries of the second class of footmen, and so on down the scale. But, if the horsemen and the first class of footmen agreed, as they very generally did, the voting was carried no further — since the sum of the votes of these two bodies constituted a clear majority of the whole; and in practice the canvass was rarely carried as far as the last or lowest class.
It is obvious that this distribution of power con- stituted an aristocracy of rank and wealth, and that the political rights of a great majority of the citizens were rather theoretical than real.
The custom of voting by tribes, which afterward became common, was considerably more democratic; but even here the habit of placing greatly unequal numbers of voters in different tribes of equal elec- toral weight removed the constitution of Eome — even in respect to her citizens only, and in total disregard of her slaves and provincial subjects — very far from the standard of a pure democracy.
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 177 2. In taking, however, a still more general view of the Koman constitution in its relation to liberty, it is necessary that we should regard, not alone those who bore the character of citizens, but also the two other great classes of people just alluded to — the pro- vincials and the slaves; and, in thus extending our view, it is not too much to say that, during the whole course of the republic, the masses of mankind who were governed, controlled, or disposed of by Roman laws or Eoman mandates, possessed very little political power indeed in proportion to their numbers. And, to speak in terms of complete generality, we may add that the domination of Rome in this respect was but one instance upon a grand scale of what, within more circumscribed limits, was equally true of all the repub- lics of antiquity. The government of Carthage, for example, was an aristocracy of wealth, mainly con- trolled by a few great families. The men who voted at Athens were but a handful compared with the number of those whom they governed or owned. The republic of Argos, which, from the nature of its or- ganization, and from its reputed seniority in the family of Greek states, may be taken as a typical form to which all the rest of the group approximated, con-