If some subjects do not pay enough, the mischief is not so great; their convenience and ease turn always to the public advantage; if some private people pay too much, their ruin redounds to the public detriment. If the government propor- tions its fortune to that of individuals, the ease and conven- ience of the latter will soon make its fortune rise. The whole depends upon a critical moment: shall the state begin with im- poverishing the subjects to enrich itself? Or had it better wait to be enriched by its subjects? Is it more advisable for it to have the former or the latter advantage? Which shall it choose — to begin or to end with opulence?
The duties felt least by the people are those on merchandise, because they are not demanded of them in form. They may be so prudently managed that the people themselves shall d Pollux, book VIII. chap. x. art. 130, ^ Or 60 minae.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 211 hardly know they pay them. For this purpose it is of the ut- most consequence that the person who sells the merchandise should pay the duty. He is very sensible that he does not pay it for himself; and the consumer, who pays it in the main, con- founds it with the price. Some authors have observed that Nero had abolished the duty of the five-and-twentieth part arising from the sale of slaves ',f and yet he had only ordained that it should be paid by the seller instead of the purchaser; this regulation, which left the impost entire, seemed, never- theless, to suppress it.
There are two states in Europe where the imposts are very heavy upon liquors: in one the brewer alone pays the duty, in the other it is levied indiscriminately upon all the consum- ers; in the first nobody feels the rigor of the impost, in the second it is looked upon as a grievance; in the former the sub- ject is sensible only of the liberty he has of not paying, in the latter he feels only the necessity that compels him to pay.
Further, the obliging the consumers to pay requires a per- petual rummaging and searching into their houses. Now noth- ing is more contrary than this to liberty; and those who es- tablish these sorts of duties have not surely been so happy as to hit upon the best method of collecting the revenue.
8. — In what Manner the Deception is preserved In order to make the purchaser confound the price of the commodity with the impost, there must be some proportion between the impost and the value of the commodity: for which reason there ought not to be an excessive duty upon merchan- dise of little value. There are countries in which the duty ex- ceeds seventeen or eighteen times the value of the commodity. In this case the prince removes the disguise: his subjects plainly see they are dealt with in an unreasonable manner, which ren- ders them most exquisitely sensible of their servile condition.
Besides, the prince, to be able to levy a duty so dispropor- tioned to the value of the commodity, must be himself the ven- dor, and the people must not have it in their power to purchase it elsewhere: a practice subject to a thousand inconveniences.
f " Vectigal quintse et vicesimae vena- dere juberetur, in partem pretii emp- Hum mancipiorum remissum specie toribus accrescebat. — Tacit. " Annal." magis, quam vi, quia cum venditor pen- lib. XIII.
212 MONTESQUIEU Smuggling being in this case extremely lucrative, the natural and most reasonable penalty, namely, the confiscation of the merchandise, becomes incapable of putting a stop to it; es- pecially as this very merchandise is intrinsically of inconsider- able value. Recourse must, therefore, be had to extravagant punishments, such as those inflicted for capital crimes.
All proportion then of penalties is at an end. Persons that cannot really be considered as vicious are punished like the most infamous criminals; which of all things in the world is the most contrary to the spirit of a moderate government.
Again, in proportion as people are tempted to cheat the farmer of the revenues, the more the latter is enriched, and the former impoverished. To put a stop to smuggling, the farmer must be invested with extraordinary means of oppressing, and then the country is ruined.
9. — Of a had Kind of Impost We shall here, by the way, take notice of an impost laid in particular countries on the different articles of civil contracts. As these are things subject to very nice disquisitions, a vast deal of knowledge is necessary to make any tolerable defence against the farmer of the revenues, who interprets, in that case, the regulations of the prince, and exercises an arbitrary power over people's fortunes. Experience has demonstrated that a duty on the paper on which the deeds are drawn would be of far greater service.
10. — That the Greatness of Taxes depends on the Nature of the Government Taxes ought to be very light in despotic governments: otherwise who would be at the trouble of tilling the land? Be- sides, how is it possible to pay heavy duties in a government that makes no manner of return to the different contributions of the subject?
The exorbitant power of the prince, and the extreme depres- sion of the people, require that there should not be even a pos- sibility of the least mistake between them. The taxes ought to be so easy to collect, and so clearly settled, as to leave no op- portunity for the collectors to increase or diminish them. A THE SPIRIT OF LAWS portion of the fruits of the earth, a capitation, a duty of so much per cent, on merchandise, are the only taxes suitable to that government.
Merchants in despotic countries ought to have a personal safeguard, to which all due respect should be paid. Without this they would be too weak to dispute with the custom-house officers.
II. — Of Confiscations With respect to confiscations, there is one thing very par- ticular, that, contrary to the general custom, they are more severe in Europe than in Asia. In Europe not only the mer- chandise, but even sometimes the ships and carriages, are con- fiscated; which is never practised in Asia. This is because in Europe the merchant can have recourse to magistrates, who are able to shelter him from oppression; in Asia the magis- trates themselves would be the greatest oppressors. What remedy could a merchant have against a pasha who was deter- mined to confiscate his goods?
The prince, therefore, checks his own power, finding him- self under the necessity of acting with some kind of lenity. In Turkey they raise only a single duty for the importation of goods, and afterwards the whole country is open to the mer- chant. Smuggling is not attended with confiscation or increase of duty. In China g they never look into the baggage of those who are not merchants. Defrauding the customs in the ter- ritory of the Mogul is not punished with confiscation, but with doubling the duty. The princes of Tartary, who reside in towns, impose scarcely any duty at all on the goods that pass through their country./* In Japan, it is true, to cheat the cus- toms is a capital crime; but this is because they have particular reasons for prohibiting all communication with foreigners; hence the fraud i is rather a contravention of the laws made for the security of the government than of those of commerce.
g Father Du Halde, torn. ii. p. 37. nations for that purpose — the Dutch for h " History of the Tartars," part III. the commerce of Europe, and the Chip. 290. nese for that of Asia; they confine the i Being willing to trade with foreign- factors and sailors in a kind of prison, ers without having any communication and lay such a restraint upon them as with them, they have pitched upon two tires their patience.
214 MONTESQUIEU 12. — Relation between the Weight of Taxes and Liberty It is a general rule that taxes may be heavier in proportion to the liberty of the subject, and that there is a necessity for reducing them in proportion to the increase of slavery. This has always been and always will be the case. It is a rule de- rived from nature that never varies. We find it in all parts, — in England, in Holland, and in every state where liberty gradu- ally declines, till we come to Turkey. Switzerland seems to be an exception to this rule, because they pay no taxes; but the particular reason for that exemption is well known, and even confirms what I have advanced. In those barren mountains provisions are so dear, and the country is so populous, that a Swiss pays four times more to nature than a Turk does to the sultan.
A conquering people, such as were formerly the Athenians and the Romans, may rid themselves of all taxes as they reign over vanquished nations. Then, indeed, they do not pay in proportion to their liberty, because in this respect they are no longer a people, but a monarch.
But the general rule still holds good. In moderate govern- ments there is an indemnity for the weight of the taxes, which is liberty. In despotic countries^ there is an equivalent for liberty, which is the lightness of the taxes.
In some monarchies in Europe there are& particular prov- inces which from the very nature of their civil government are in a more flourishing condition than the rest. It is pretended that these provinces are not sufficiently taxed, because through the goodness of their government they are able to be taxed higher; hence the ministers seem constantly to aim at depriv- ing them of this very government whence a diffusive blessing is derived, which redounds even to the prince's advantage.
13. — In zvhat Government Taxes are capable of Increase Taxes may be increased in most republics, because the citi- zen, who thinks he is paying himself, cheerfully submits to a In Russia the taxes are but small; b The pays d'etats, where the states they have been increased since the of the province assemble to deliberate despotic power of the prince is exercised on public affairs, with more moderation. See the " His- tory of the Tartars," part II.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 215 them, and moreover is generally able to bear their weight, from the nature of the government.
In a monarchy taxes may be increased, because the modera- tion of the government is capable of procuring opulence: it is a recompense, as it were, granted to the prince for the respect he shows to the laws. In despotic governments they cannot be increased, because there can be no increase of the extremity of slavery.
14. — That the Nature of the Taxes is in Relation to the Government A capitation is more natural to slavery; a duty on merchan- dise is more natural to liberty, by reason it has not so direct a relation to the person.
It is natural in a despotic government for the prince not to give money to his soldiers, or to those belonging to his court; but to distribute lands amongst them, and of course that there should be very few taxes. But if the prince gives money, the most natural tax he can raise is a capitation, which can never be considerable. For as it is impossible to make different classes of the contributors, because of the abuses that might arise thence, considering the injustice and violence of the gov- ernment, they are under an absolute necessity of regulating themselves by the rate of what even the poorest and most wretched are able to contribute.
The natural tax of moderate governments is the duty laid on merchandise. As this is really paid by the consumer, though advanced by the merchant, it is a loan which the latter has al- ready made to the former. Hence the merchant must be con- sidered on the one side as the general debtor of the state, and on the other as the creditor of every individual. He advances to the state the duty which the consumer will some time or other refund: and he has paid for the consumer the duty which he has advanced for the merchandise. It is, therefore, obvious that in proportion to the moderation of the government, to the prevalence of the spirit of liberty, and to the security of private fortunes, a merchant has it in his power to advance money to the state, and to pay considerable duties for individuals. In England a merchant lends really to the government fifty or sixty pounds sterling for every tun of wine he imports. Where 2i6 MONTESQUIEU is the merchant that would dare do any such thing in a coun- try hke Turkey? And were he so presumptuous, how could he do it with a crazy or shattered fortune?
15. — Abuse of Liberty To these great advantages of liberty it is owing that liberty itself has been abused. Because a moderate government has been productive of admirable effects, this moderation has been laid aside; because great taxes have been raised, they wanted to carry them to excess; and ungrateful to the hand of liberty, of whom they received this present, they addressed themselves to slavery, who never grants the least favor.
Liberty produces excessive taxes; the effect of excessive taxes is slavery; and slavery produces a diminution of tribute.
Most of the edicts of the eastern monarchs are to exempt every year some province of their empire from paying tribute.^ The manifestations of their wills are favors. But in Europe the edicts of princes are disagreeable even before they are seen, because they always make mention of their own wants, but not a word of ours.
From an unpardonable indolence in the ministers of those countries, owing to the nature of the government, and fre- quently to the climate, the people derive this advantage, that they are not incessantly plagued with new demands. The pub- lic expense does not increase, because the ministers do not form new projects: and if some by chance are formed, they are such as are soon executed. The governors of the state do not per- petually torment the people, for they do not perpetually tor- ment themselves. But it is impossible there should be any fixed rule in our finances, since we always know that we shall have something or other to execute, without ever knowing what it is.
It is no longer customary with us to give the appellation of a great minister to a wise dispenser of the public revenues, but to a person of dexterity and cunning, who is clever at finding out what we call the ways and means.
c This is the practice of the emperors annual exemptions, and not perpetual, of China. The author speaks here of — Ed.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 217 16. — Of the Conquests of the Mahommedans It was this excess of taxesc? that occasioned the prodigious facility with which the Mahommedans carried on their con- quests. Instead of a continual series of extortions devised by the subtle avarice of the Greek emperors, the people were sub- jected to a simple tribute which was paid and collected with ease. Thus they were far happier in obeying a barbarous na- tion than a corrupt government, in which they suffered every inconvenience of lost liberty, with all the horror of present slavery.
17. — Of the Augmentation of Troops A new distemper has spread itself over Europe, infecting our princes, and inducing them to keep up an exorbitant num- ber of troops. It has its redoublings, and of necessity becomes contagious. For as soon as one prince augments his forces, the rest, of course, do the same; so that nothing is gained thereby but the public ruin. Each monarch keeps as many armies on foot as if his people were in danger of being exter- minated: and they give the name of peaces to this general effort of all against all. Thus is Europe ruined to such a degree that were private people to be in the same situation as the three most opulent powers of this part of the globe, they would not have necessary subsistence. We are poor with the riches and commerce of the whole world; and soon, by thus augment- ing our troops, we shall be all soldiers, and be reduced to the very same situation as the Tartars.^ Great princes, not satisfied with hiring or buying troops of petty states, make it their business on all sides to pay subsidies for alliances, that is, generally to throw away their money.
The consequence of such a situation is the perpetual aug- mentation of taxes; and the mischief which prevents all future remedy is, that they reckon no more upon their revenues, but in waging war against their whole capital. It is no unusual thing to see governments mortgage their funds even in time d See in history the greatness, the f All that is wanting for this is to oddity, and even the folly of those taxes. improve the new invention of the militia Anastasius invented a tax for breathing, established in most parts of Europe, and " ut quisque pro haustu aeris penderet." carry it to the same excess as they do e True it is that this state of effort is the regular troops, the chief support of the balance, be- cause it checks the great powers.
2i8 MONTESQUIEU of peace, and to employ what they call extraordinary means to ruin themselves — means so extraordinary, indeed, that such are hardly thought of by the most extravagant young spend- thrift.
i8. — Of an Exemption from Taxes The maxim of the great eastern empires, of exempting such provinces as have very much suffered from taxes, ought to be extended to monarchical states. There are some, indeed, where this practice is established; yet the country is more op- pressed than if no such rule took place; because as the prince levies still neither more nor less, the state becomes bound for the whole. In order to ease a village that pays badly, they load another that pays better; the former is not relieved, and the latter is ruined. The people grow desperate between the necessity of paying for fear of exactions, and the danger of pay- ing for fear of new burdens.
A well-regulated government ought to set aside, for the first article of its expense, a determinate sum to answer contingent cases. It is with the public as with individuals, who are ruined when they live up exactly to their income.
With regard to an obligation for the whole amongst the in- habitants of the same village, some pretend g that it is but rea- sonable, because there is a possibility of a fraudulent combina- tion on their side: but was it ever heard that, upon mere sup- position, we are to establish a thing in itself unjust and ruinous to the state?
19. — Which is more suitable to the Prince and to the People, the farming the Revenues, or managing them by Commission The managing of the revenues by commission is like the con- duct of a good father of a family, who collects his own rents himself with economy and order.
By this management of the revenues the prince is at liberty to press or to retard the levy of the taxes, either according to his own wants or to those of his people. By this he saves to the state the immense profits of the farmers, who impoverish it in a thousand ways. By this he prevents the people from K See a treatise on the " Roman Finances," chap. ii. Printed at Paris by Briasson, 1740.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 219 being mortified with the sight of sudden fortunes. By this the public money passes through few hands, goes directly to the treasury, and consequently makes a quicker return to the people. By this the prince avoids an infinite number of bad laws extorted from him by the importunate avarice of the farmers, who pretend to offer a present advantage for regula- tions pernicious to posterity.
As the moneyed man is always the most powerful, the farmer renders himself arbitrary even over the prince himself; he is not the legislator, but he obliges the legislator to give laws.
I acknowledge that it is sometimes of use to farm out a new duty, for there is an art in preventing frauds, which motives of interest suggest to the farmers, but commissioners never think of. Now the manner of levying it being once established by the farmer, it may afterwards be safely intrusted to a commis- sion. In England the management of the Excise and of the Post-office was borrowed from that of the farmers of the rev- enue.
In republics the revenues of the state are generally managed by commission. The contrary practice was a great defect in the Roman government.^ In despotic governments the peo- ple are infinitely happier where this management is established — witness Persia and China.J The unhappiest of all are those where the prince farms out his sea-ports and trading cities. The history of monarchies abounds with mischiefs done by the farmers of the revenue.
Incensed at the oppressive extortions of the pubHcans, Nero formed a magnanimous but impracticable scheme of aboHsh- ing all kinds of imposts. He did not think of managing the revenues by commissioners, but he made four edicts:; that the laws enacted against publicans, which had hitherto been kept secret, should be promulgated; that they should exact no claims for above a year backward; that there should be a pretor established to determine their pretensions without any formality; and that the merchants should pay no duty for their vessels. These were the halcyon days of that emperor.
h Csesar was obliged to remove the governed pursuant to the ancient plan, publicans from the province of Asia, obtained to be of the number of those and to establish there another kind of which the emperor governed by hts regulation, as we learn from Dio; and officers. ^,,., «to^ i Tacitus informs us that Macedonia and i See Sir John Chardin s 1 ravels Achaia, provinces left by Augustus to through Persia," torn. vi.
the people of Rome, and consequently j Tacitus, ' Annal. XIII.
2 20 MONTESQUIEU 20. — Of the Farmers of the Revenues When the lucrative profession of a farmer of tke revenue becomes likewise a post of honor, the state is ruined. It may do well enough in despotic governments, where this employ- ment is oftentimes exercised by the governors themselves. But it is by no means proper in a republic, since a custom of the like nature destroyed that of Rome. Nor is it better in monarchies, nothing being more opposite to the spirit of this government. All the other orders of the state are dissatisfied; honor loses its whole value; the gradual and natural means of distinction are no longer respected; and the very principle of the government is subverted.
It is true, indeed, that scandalous fortunes were raised in former times; but this was one of the calamities of the Fifty Years' War. These riches were then considered as ridiculous; now we admire them.
Every profession has its particular lot. That of the tax- gatherers is wealth; and wealth is its own reward. Glory and honor fall to the share of that nobility who are sensible of no other happiness. Respect and esteem are for those ministers and magistrates whose whole life is a continued series of labor, and who watch day and night over the welfare of the empire.
I BOOK XIV OF LAWS IN RELATION TO THE NATURE OF THE CLIMATE I. — General Idea IF it be true that the temper of the mind and the passions of the heart are extremely different in different cHmates, the laws ought to be in relation both to the variety of those passions and to the variety of those tempers.
2. — Of the Difference of Men in different Climates Cold air constringes the extremities of the external fibres of the body;a this increases their elasticity, and favors the re- turn of the blood from the extreme parts to the heart. It con- tracts^ those very fibres; consequently it increases also their force. On the contrary, warm air relaxes and lengthens the extremes of the fibres; of course it diminishes their force and elasticity.
People are, therefore, more vigorous in cold climates. Here the action of the heart and the reaction of the extremities of the fibres are better performed, the temperature of the humors is greater, the blood moves more freely towards the heart, and reciprocally the heart has more power. This superiority of strength must produce various effects; for instance, a greater boldness, that is, more courage; a greater sense of superiority, that is, less desire of revenge; a greater opinion of security, that is, more frankness, less suspicion, policy, and cunning. In short, this must be productive of very different tempers. Put a man into a close, warm place, and for the reasons above given he will feel a great faintness. If under this circumstance you propose a bold enterprise to him, I believe you will find him a Tbis appears even in the counte- b We know that it shortens iron.
nan«e: in cold weather people look thin- ner.
222 MONTESQUIEU very little disposed towards it; his present weakness will throw him into despondency; he will be afraid of everything, being in a state of total incapacity. The inhabitants of warm coun- tries are, like old men, timorous; the people in cold countries are, like young men, brave. If we reflect on the late wars,c which are more recent in our memory, and in which we can bet- ter distinguish some particular effects that escape us at a greater distance of time, we shall find that the northern people, trans- planted into southern regi.ons,c^ did not perform such exploits as their countrymen, who, fighting in their own climate, pos- sessed their full vigor and courage.
This strength of the fibres in northern nations is the cause that the coarser juices are extracted from their ailments. Hence two things result: one, that the parts of the chyle or lymph are more proper, by reason of their large surface, to be ap- plied to and to nourish the fibres; the other, that they are less proper, from their coarseness, to give a certain subtility to the nervous juice. Those people have, therefore, large bodies and but little vivacity.
The nerves that terminate from all parts in the cutis form each a nervous bundle; generally speaking, the whole nerve is not moved, but a very minute part. In warm climates, where the cutis is relaxed, the ends of the nerves are expanded and laid open to the weakest action of the smallest objects. In cold countries the cutis is constringed and the papillae compressed: the miliary glands are in some measure paralytic; and the sensation does not reach the brain, except when it is very strong and proceeds from the whole nerve at once. Now, imagina- tion, taste, sensibility, and vivacity depend on an infinite num- ber of small sensations.
I have observed the outermost part of a sheep's tongue, where, to the naked eye, it seems covered with papillae. On these papillae I have discerned through a microscope small hairs, or a kind of down; between the papillae were pyramids shaped towards the ends like pincers. Very likely these pyra- mids are the principal organ of taste.
I caused the half of this tongue to be frozen, and observing it with the naked eye I found the papillae considerably diminc Those for the succession to the d For instance, in Spain.
Spanish monarchy.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS ished: even some rows of them were sunk into their sheath. The outermost part I examined with the microscope, and per- ceived no pyramids. In proportion as the frost went off, the papillae seemed to the naked eye to rise, and with the micro- scope the miliary glands began to appear.
This observation confirms what I have been saying, that in cold countries the nervous glands are less expanded: they sink deeper into their sheaths, or they are sheltered from the action of external objects; consequently they have not such lively sensations.
In cold countries they have very little sensibility for pleas- ure; in temperate countries, they have more; in warm coun- tries, their sensibility is exquisite. As climates are distin- guished by degrees of latitude, we might distinguish them also in some measure by those of sensibility. I have been at the opera in England and in Italy, where I have seen the same pieces and the same performers; and yet the same music pro- duces such different effects on the two nations: one is so cold and phlegmatic, and the other so lively and enraptured, that it seems almost inconceivable.
It is the same with regard to pain, which is excited by the laceration of some fibre of the body. The Author of nature has made it an established rule that this pain should be more acute in proportion as the laceration is greater: now it is evident that the large bodies and coarse fibres of the people of the North are less capable of laceration than the delicate fibres of the in- habitants of warm countries; consequently the soul is there less sensible of pain. You must flay a Muscovite alive to make him feel.
From this delicacy of organs peculiar to warm climates it follows that the soul is most sensibly moved by whatever re- lates to the union of the two sexes: here everything leads to this object.
In northern climates scarcely has the animal part of love a power of making itself felt. In temperate climates, love, at- tended by a thousand appendages, endeavors to please by things that have at first the appearance, though not the reality, of this passion. In warmer climates it is liked for its own sake, it is the only cause of happiness, it is life itself.
In southern countries a machine of a delicate frame but 224 MONTESQUIEU