It may notwithstanding happen that we may fee the firfl Sun which is intimately united to our Soul, though the other were not above the Horizon, or though it did not Exift at all. And thus we may fee the firfl Sun greater when the other rifes, than when elevated high above the Horizon, and though it be true that the firfl Sun, which we fee immediately, be greater at the other's Riling, it doth not follow that the other is fo too. For 'tis not properly that which Rifes which we fee, fince that is many Millions of Leagues remote; but 'tis the former, which is truly greater, and fuch exactly as we fee it} becaufe all the things we immediately fee, are always fuch as we fee them: And we fhould not be Deceiv'd, did we not judge that what we immediately fee is to be found in External Objects, which are the caufe or occafion of what we fee.
In like manner, when we fee Light by beholding the Firfl Sun, which is immediately united to our Mind, we are not miflaken in believing that we fee it: 'Tis even impoffible to doubt of it.
But herein confifls our Error, that without any Reafon, and indeed againfl all ReafOn, we will have this Light, which we fee immediately, to exift in the Sun, which is without us; and thus it is with the other Objects of our Senfes.
Upon a due Attention to what has been faid from the Beginning,and in the Procefs III. That Error & not in 0f this Work, it will be eafie to fee, that amoneft all the things which occur in our SinutWHs, but only in _,.. ' _.,., £,. i i j 1...thefe judgments. every Senfation, Error is only to be round in the Judgments we make, that our Senfations exifl in the Objects.
Firfl: 'Tis an Error not to know that the Action of Objects confifls in the Motion of fome of their Parts, and that That motion is communicated to the Organs of our Senfes, which are the two firfl things obfervable in every Senfation: For there is a great deal of difference between not knowing a Thing, and being in an Error in refpeft of that thing.
Secondly, We are right as to the third thing, which is properly Senfation. When we Feel Heat, when we fee Light, Colours, or other Objecls, it is certainly true that we fee them, though we are Mad or Phrentick, for there is nothing more infallibly true, than that your Vifi- onary People fee what they think they fee; and their Error confifls only in the Judgments which they make, that what they' fee has a real Exiftence without them, becaufe they fee it wit h- out them.
This is the Judgment that implies a Confent of our Liberty, and which confequently is lia- ble to Error. And it is our Duty ever to refrain from making it according to the Rule which was given in the beginning of this Book: That we fhould never judge of any thing whatever, when we could avoid it, and were not oblig'd to't by the certainty and evidence thereof, a^ it .happens in this place: For though we feel our felves extreamly difpos'd by a confirm'd and inve- terate Habit to judge our Senfations are in the Objects, as that Heat is in the Fire, and Colours in the Pictures } yet we can fee no evident and convincing Reafon, or forcible enough to oblige us to believe it. And thus we voluntarily fubjedt our felves to Error by the ill ufe we make of our Liberty, when we freely form fuch Judgments as thefe.
Ghap. XV. The Search after Truth 37 CHAP. XV.
An Explication of the Particular Errors of the Sight^ which may ferve as an Exemplar of the general Errors of our Senfes.
Have, if I am not miflaken, given a fufficient inlet to the Difcovery of the Errors of our Senfes in refpett of fenfible Qualities in general, of which I have fpoken, on the account of Light and Colours, which our Method oblig'd us to explain. It may now be expe&ed I mould defcend to Particulars, and examine the refpective Errors into which each of our Sen- fes calls us: But I Ihall not infill: long upon thefe things, becaufe after what I have already faid, a little Attention will do the bufinefs of thofe tedious Difcourfes I Ihould be oblig'd to make. I fhall only recount the general Errors our Sighj occafions us to fall into, touching Light and Colours-, and this Example will, I believe, fuffice togiveusaninfightinto the Errors of all our other Senfes.
When we have fixt our Eyes upon the Sun for fbme moments, this is what occurs both in our Eyes and in our Soul, and thefe are the Errors into which we fall.
Thofe who are acquainted with the Firfl Elements of Dioptrkh, and with any thing of the admirable Contexture of the Eyes, know that the Rays of the Sun are refra&ed in the Cryftal- line, and in the other Humours; and that they are thence recolle&ed upon the Retina or the Optick Nerve, which cloathes all the Fund of the Eye; in the lame manner as the Rays of the Sun palling through a convex burning Glafs, reunite in the Focus, or in the burning point of the Glafs at three or four Inches diftance from it, in proportion to its convexity. Now we are taught by Experiment, that if we place in the Focus of the Glafs a piece of fluff or Brown paper pre remit brown Paper, the Rays of the Sun make fo great an Impreffion on the fluff or on the takes fin; but the Glafs Paper, and agitate the little parts thereof fo violently, as to break and feparate mufl be larger or more them from one another; or, in a word, to burn them, and reduce them into fmoak convex, to bum white and allies. *'*"• So we ought to conclude from this Experiment, that if the Optick Nerve were black, and the Pupil or the Aperture of the Vvea, through which the Light enters into the Eyes fhould widen and enlarge it felf, to take in freely the folary Rays, inflead of which it contracts and flraitens it felf to prevent their palfage, the fame thing would happen to the Retina, as to the fluff or the black or brown Paper, and its Fibres would be fo violently agitated as to be fpeedily broken, and burn'd in pieces. And for this reafon it is, that the generality of Men feel great Pain in be- holding the Sun for a moment; becaufe they cannot fo clofely fhut the Aperture of the Pupil, but there will flill pafs Rays enough to agitate the Fibres of the Optick Nerve fo violently, as to give us Reafon to apprehend their breaking.
The Soul is altogether ignorant of all this we have faid; and when fhe beholds the Sun, fhe neither has any Perception of her own Optick Nerve, nor of any Motion in the Nerve: But this cannot be call'd an Error, 'tis purely Ignorance: The firfl Error fhe falls into, is her judging the Pain fhe feels, to be in the Eye.
If inflantly upon a Man's beholding the Sun, he withdraws into a dark place with his Eyes open, that Concuffion of the Fibres of the Optick Nerve, caus'd by the Rays of the Sun, de- creafes and wears off by little and little; and this is all the alteration we can conceive in the Eyes. But the Soul perceives nothing of this in them, but only a whitifh or a yellowifh Light; and the fecond Error is, her judging this Light which fhe fees, to be in her Eyes, or in the Neighbour- ing Wall.
Finally, The Agitation of the Fibres of the Retina conflantly decreafes and dwindles away by degrees: For after a Body has been vibrated or fhaken, we fhould confider nothing in it more than the Diminution of its Motion. But this is not the thing the Soul is fenfible of in her Eyes. She fees the whitifh Colour metamorphos'd into Orange, after chang'd into Red, and laftly into Blue. And the third Error into which we fall, is our judging there are in our Eye, or on the next Wall, fuch alterations as differ more than Secundum magis & minus; becaufe the Colours Blue, Orange, and Red, which we fee have a more confiderable difference than according to de- grees of more or lefs.
Thefe are fome of the Errors into which we fall in point of Light and Colours; and thefe are the occafion of our falling into many others, as we are going to explain in the following Chapters.
CHAP, 3S:v K Maxebranche Concerning Book I.
CHAP. XVI.
I. That the Errors of our Senfes ferve us inftead of general and very fruit- ful Principles, from whence to draw falfe Conclufions; and thefe Conclusi- ons again become other Principles in their turn, II. The Origine of Ejfen- tial Differences. IIL Concerning Subftantial Forms. IV. Of feme other Errors of the School-Philofofhy.
that the Erms of our fah as are capable of Thinking any thing Attentively) of the Nature of our saifesferve us inftead of 1 enfations and 0f the general Errors that accompany them: It is not amifs §33*? fZfr:ite to mew at prefent that thefe general Errors are made ufe of as uncontroverted ItSfilji^cvSZ Principles, to explain all things by: That infinite falfe Confequences. have been and thefe Conciufwns again ^rawn from them, which in their Turn have ferv'd as Principles tor a train ot other become other rrincipks in ronreauences. and thus by little and little thofe imaginary Sciences void of Body m their mm. ^ R4 haye been eftabiifllt) which have fuch multitudes of blind Followers; but which like Fantoms leave nothing in their Embraces, but:the Shame and Confufion of fufferine Zemfelves to be feduc'd, or that Brand and Character of Folly, which makes Men delight to feed on Delufions and Corner *V. This is what we muft lhew in particular by fotne Examples.
It has been already faid, that we are us'd to attribute to Objefts our own Senfations and we judge that Colours, Smells, Tails, and other fenfible Qualities, are in the Objefts which we call Colour'd, and fo ot the reft. We have found this to be an Error. At prefent 'tis our Bufinefs to fhew that we make ufe of this Error by way of Principle, to deduce falfe Confequences from: which laft Confequences afterwards we refpeft as other Principles, upon which we go on to found our Reafoninss. In a word, we fhall here manifeft what Progrefs and Advances an Humane Mind makes in the Search of fome Particular Truths, when once this falfe Principle has been taken for granted, That Our Senfations are in Objects. ■. _ * But in order to render this more fenfibly manifeft, let us fuppofe fome Particular Body, whofe Nature fome Perfon is in Search, of: Let us fee what a Man would do, who has a mind to know what Honev or Salt is. The firft thing this Man would do, would.be to examine the Colour, the Tafte and Smell, and the other fenfible Qualities of them: What are the Properties of Salt and what of Honey: Wherein they agree, and wherein they differ; and the Analogy there may be betwixt thefe, and thofe of other Bodies. Which done, he would doubdefsreafon and infer much after this manner, fuppofing he laid this down as an uncontroverted Principle, That our Senfations were in the Objefts of our Senfes. ''-..■"♦L IT. Whatever I have a Senfation of in Tailing, Seeing, and in Handling Salt and Honey,.is in the rhe 0r>- Salt and in the Honey. But it is certain that what I fenfibly perceive in the Honey eflentially diffr'nt fers from what I fenfibly perceive in the Salt: The whitenefs of the Salt differs more doubtlefs Zcfst than according to the degrees of more or lefs, from the Colour of the Honey; and the Sweetnefs tSLl of the Honey from the pungent Tafte of the Salt; and confidently there muft be an eflential difobjeSs: ferrence betwyixt Salt and Honey, fince all that I am fenfible ot both in the One and the Other, not That thef diff acCording to more or lefs, but has an eflfenual Difference.
fs'stTm This s the firft flip this Gentleman would make. For doubtlefs he could not judge there was the soul an eflential Difference between Salt and Honey, did he not think the SenfMc -appearances of the One eflentially differed from thofe of the Other: that is to fay, That the Senfations he has 01 Honey eflentially difTerr'd from thofe he has of Salt j for as much as he only judges ot them by the Impreflion they make upon the Senfes. Hence he looks upon this his Conclufion as a new Principle from whence he deduces other Conclufions in like manner. JU' ■ Seeine then Salt and Honey, and other Natural Bodies differ eflentially from one another, it Zl7 follows, that thofe are grofly deceiv'd, who would have us believe That all the difference which SftlaJis found in Bodies, confifts only in the different Configuration of the little parts that go to their Form. conftitution. For fince Figure is not eflential to a figured Body, let the Figure of thefe little parts, which they imagine in the Honey, change how they will, the Honey will ftill continue Honey even though the parts of it fhould take the Figure of the little parts ot Salt. And thus there muft ofneceffity befomefubftauce or other, which being joyn'd to the firft Matter, that is common to all different Bodies, muft caufe an eflential difference betwixt them.
This then is the fecond Advance this Gentleman would make, and the happy Difcoyery otSw*- (tantial Forms: Thofe fruitful fublfances which caufe every thing we fee in Nature, though they have no fubfiftence of themfelves, except in the- Imagination of our Philofopher. But let us lee the Properties which he goes fo liberally to bellow on this Being of his own Creation; tor doubtlels he will rob all other Subftances of their molt eflential Properties, to cloath this Creature of his withal!.
Since Chap. XVII. The Search after Truth. 39 Since then there is found in every Natural Body, two Subftances which go to its Compofition; IV* j the one which is common to Honey and Salt, and all other Bodies; and the other which makes ^f J?^ Honey to be Honey, and Salt to be Salt, and all other Bodies to be what they are; it follows %e Jher that the firft of them which is Matter, having no Contrary, and being indifferent to the Recepti- moregene- on of all Forms, muff, remain without Force and A&ion, fince it has no occafion to defend it felf: r*l Errors But as to the others, which are the Subftamial Forms^ they have need always of being attended with ^ f Qualities and Faculties, for their own defence. They mult neceffarily be always upon their guard, philosophy. for fear of being furpriz'd: They muft belabouring continually for their Prefervation, and ex- tending their Dominion over the bordering Matters, and pufhing their Conquefts as far as poffi- bly they can •, becaufe if they were forcelefs, or fhonld defift from their Activity, the other Forms would fall upon them by furprize, and forthwith reduce them to Nothing. They muft then be always fighting; and nourifhing thefe Antipathies and irreconcilable Hatreds againft their Rival Forms, which are continually feeking to deftroy them.
Let it happen that a Form fhould feize the Matter of another: Let the Form of a Carcafs, for in- ftance, feize the Body of a Dog; it is not enough for this Form to reft fatisfy'd in the Annihila- tion of the Form of the Dog, fhe muft gratifie her Hatred and Revenge with the Deftruftion of all the Qualities which have fided with her Enemy: The Hair of the Carcafs muft immediately turn white with the whifenefs of a new Creation-, the Blood muft be red with the rednefs, which was never dreamt of; and the whole Body muft be furrounded with Qualities faithful to their Miftrefs, whom they muft defend according to the fmall ftrength and capacity, which may be fup- pofed in the Qualities of a dead Body, which in their turn muft quickly perifh too. But becaufe it is impoffible to be always in Battel, and all Bodies have a place of Reft; the Fire, for inftance, muft undoubtedly have its Centre, where it ever ftrives to go by its Own Levity, and Natural Inclination, in order to Reft, to burn no longer, and alfo to refign its Heat, which it preferv'd here below, meerly for its own fafety and defence.
Thefe are a fmall part of the Confequences which are deduced from thislaft Principle, that there are Subftamial Forms; which Confequences we have brought in Our Philofopher, fomewhat too frankly and airily concluding; for generally others fay the fame things, in a more ferious ftrain than he hath clone here.
There are ftill infinite other Confequences, which Philofbphers daily infer according as their Humour and Inclination leads them, or according as they are determin'd by the Fruitfulnefs or Barrennefs of their Imagination; for this is all the Difference that is between them.
I fhall not ftand here to ingage thefe Imaginary Subftances^ others have fufficiently examin'd them. They have made it evidently appear, that there were never Subftantial Forms in Nature; and that they ferve for no other ufe, than to infer abundance of Falfe, Ridiculous, and even Contradictory Concluflons. I am fatisfy'd to have difcover'd their Origine, in the Mind of Man, and to have fhewn that they are at prefent altogether owing to that Prejudice common to all Men^ That Senfations are in the ObjeEts of their Senfes. For if what I faid before beconfider'd with any attention, namely, that it is neceflary for the Prefervation of our Bodies, we fhould have Senfa- tions effentially differing, though the Imprefiions which Obje&s make upon our Bodies, differ ve- ry little; it will manifeftly appear he his much in the wrong, who imagines fuch wide differences in the Objefts of our Senfes.
But, by the way, I think it not amifs to declare, that no fault is to be found with thefe Terms, ofForm, and Efential Difference. Honey is doubtlefs Honey, by its Form, and thus it is that it differs effentially from Salt; but this Form or this Ejfential Difference confifts only in the different Configuration of its Parts. 'Tis this different Configuration, which makes Honey to be Honey, and Salt to be Salt: And though it be accidental to Matter in general, to have the ConfiguratK on of the parts of Honey or Salt, and fo to have the Form of Honey or Salt; yet it may be faid to be effential to Honey or Salt, that they may be what they are, to have fuch or fuch a Configurati- on in their parts; juft as the Senfations of Cold, of Heat, of Pleafure, and Pain, are not effential to the Soul, but only to the Soul which feels them; in as much as by thefe Senfations, fhe is faid to feel Heat, Cold, Pleafure, and Pain.
CHAP. XVII.
I. Another Inftance taken from Morality, which Jhews that our Senfes offer us nothing but falfe Goods. II. That GOD alone Is our true and proper Good. III. The Origine of the Error of the Epicureans and Stoicks.
IH A V E, I think, brought fufficient Arguments to prove that this Prejudice, That our Sen- fations are in the ObjetTs, is a molt fruitful Principle of Errors in Natural Philofophy. It is my Bufinefs at prefent to bring others drawn from Morality, wherein the fame Prejudice joyn'd with this other, That the ObjeBs of our Senfes are the true and fole Caufes of our Senfations^ is molt highly dangerous.
There 40 R Malebranche Concerning Book I# I- There is nothing fo common in the World, as to fee Men devoted to fenfible Goods; fome „^1 *nr love Mufick, fome Banquetting, -and others have a Paflion tor other things. Now this is the way ken%om °^ Reafoning thefe Men mull have taken to perfwade themfelves that thefe Objeds are their Morality, ■ Goods. All the pleafant Tafts we are delighted with in Feafting, the Sounds which gratifie the' wfcfe/fcew* Ear, and thofe other Pleafures we are fenfible of, upon other occafions, are dou briefs contain'd 1rMr °ur# m fenfible Objects, or, at leaft, thefe Obje&s give us the Senfation of them; or, laftly, are the uY whiZ on^Y means of Conveying them to our Senfes. Now it is impoflible to doubt that Pleafnre is good, but faife and Pain evil. We receive a Convidion from within, and confequently the Objeds of our Paffions, goods. are moll real goods, to which we mull cleave, if we will be happy.
/ will ex- This is the Reafoning we generally fall into almoft without being aware of it; Thus, becaufe plain in the we believe that our Senfations are in Objeds, or that the Objects are of themfelves capable of laft Book, giving us the Senfation of them, we confider thefe things as our own Goods, though we are inn"- fenfi ob- nit:ely exalted above them; fince they are able to aft only upon our Bodies, and to produce jetfj aft fome Motion in their Fibres, but are incapable of ading upon our Souls, or making us fenfible upon the either of Pleafure or Pain.
BoiJ- Certainly if our Soul ads not upon her felf, on occafion of what happens in the II. Body, it is GOD alone who hath that Power: And if Ihe be not the Caufe of her ThatGODonij U our own Pleafure and Pain, according to the Diverfity of the Vibrations of the Fibres Goody and that all fenfi- 0f j)er gocjy7 as it is mofl highly probable lhe is not, -fince Ihe feels Pleafure and %°S oT'lkaf^l!" Pain without confenting thereunto -7 I know no other Hand potent enough to make J } [ her fenfible thereof, except that of the Author of Nature.
Certainly it is GO D alone who is our true Good: He only is able to fill us with all the Plea- fures we are capable of enjoying; and it is only by the Knowledge of Him and Love of Him He has refoly'd to make us fenfible of them. Such as He has affixt to the Motions which hap- pen in our Body, to make us the more follicitous for its Prefervation, are very 'little in themfelves very weak as to their Capacity, and very Ihort in their Duration. Notwithstanding in the eitate Sin has redue'd us to, we are, as it were, become their Vaflals. But thofe which He Ihall make His Eled fenfible of in Heaven, will be infinitely greater, fince He hath Created us that ■we might know and love Him. For whereas ORDER requires the Perception of the grea- tefl Pleafures in the Pofiefiion of the greateft Goods, GOD being infinitely above all other things, the Pleafure of thofe who Ihall enjoy Him, will certainly exceed all other Pleafures. HI. What we have faid of the Caufe of our Errors in refped of Good,gives us a fufficient Knowledge tine of the °^ ^ ^ltY °f l^e Opinions the Epicureans and Stoicks embrae'd, touching the Sovereign Good. Errors of The Epicureans placed it in Pleafure; and becaufe a Man is fenfible of this no lefs in Vice than in the Epicu- Vertue, and more generally in the former than in the other, it has been commonly thought they reans and \et loofe the Reins to all forts of Senfible Pleafures.
Stoicks. Now the firil caufe of their Error is this, That judging falfly there is fomething pleafant and agreeable in the Objeds of their Senfes, or that they were the real Caufes of the Pleafures they felt; and being moreover convine'd by an Internal Senfation, which they naturally had, that Plea- fure was good for them, at leail for the time wherein they enjoy'd it, they let themfelves loofe to all forts of Paffions, from which they had no Apprehenfions of receiving any dammagein the Confequence. Whereas they ought to have confider'd, that the Pleafure they reap'd from fenfi- ble things, could not exifl in thofe things as their true Caufes, nor any other way, and confe- quently that fenfible Goods could not be Goods in refped of the Soul, and they ihould have thought of the things we have already explained.
The Stoicks on the other hand, being perfwaded that fenfible Pleafures were only feated in, and fitted for the Body, and that the Soul ought to have a peculiar Good of her own, plac'd Felicity in Vertue; fee then the Origine of their Errors, Viz..
They believ'd that Senfible Pleafure and Pain were not in the Soul, but in the Body only •, and made ufe of this their falfe Judgment as a Principle for other falfe Concluilons^ as that Pain was not an Evil, nor Pleafure a Good: That the Pleafures of the Senfes were not Good in their own Nature, that they were common to Men and Bealts, &c. Notwithflandiug it is eafie to fee, that though the Epicureans and Stoicks were in the wrong in many things, they were in the right in fome} for the Happinefs of the Blelfed confifls only in a perfed and accompliih'd Vertue, that is to fay, in their Knowledge and Love of G O D, and in a molt exquifite Pleafure that never fails to accompany them.
Let it then be well remembred, That External Objeds contain nothing either Pleafant or Trou- blefome in themfelves; that they are not the Caufes of our Pleafures; that we have no reafon ei- ther to fear or We them; but it is GOD alone, whom 'tis our duty to fear, and our duty to love i fince 'tis only He that has Power enough to Punifh and Reward us j to make us fenfible of Pleafure and of Pain: Finally, it is only in GO D and from GOD, we ought to hope to receive the Pleafures, towards which we have foflrong, fo natural, and fo jult an Inclination.
CHAP.
Chap. XVIII. The Search after Truth ' \ ■ ' %f CHAP. XVIIL I. That bur Senfes make us liable to Error, even in things which are not fen* fible, II. An Example taken from the Converfation of Men. III. That fenfible Manners are not to be regarded.
E have diffidently explain'd the Errors of our Senfes, in refpedt. Of their Objects \ as of Light, Colours, and other Senfible Qualities. Now let us fee how they mifguide us^ even in regard to thofe Objects which are not of their Jurifdi&ion, by diverting us from an attentive Confideration of them, and inclining us to judge of them from their Tefti- mony and Report; a thing that well deferves to be throughly explain'd. _ Attention and Application of the Mind to the clear and diftind Idea's we have Of Objects, is fi,#out> the moil neceflary thing in the World, to difcover what truly they are: For as it is impoffible to fenfesmale fee the Beauty and Excellency of any piece of Art, without opening the Eyes, and looking fixed- «* liable to jy upon it: So the Mind cannot evidently fee the moft part of things, with the Relations they Ewrfven bare one to another, uhlefs it confiders them with Attention. But it is certain that nothing calls ™i!%lfes us off more from our Attention to clear and diftindt Idea's, than our Own Senfes,and confequently n0t fenfible nothing fets us fo remote from Truth, or fo foon throws us into Error.
For our better conceiving thefe things, 'tis abfolutely neceflary to know, That the three ways the Soul has of perceiving, viz*, by the Senfes^bj the Imagination, and by Intelletl, do not all equally affect her} and confequently, fhe does not fix an equal Attention on every thing fhe perceives by their means: For fhe applies her felf moil to that which touches her neareft, and fhe is care- lefs enough of that which affects her but a little.
Now what fhe perceives by the Senfes affe&s her much, and takes up all her Application \ what fhe knows by her Imagination, touches her lefs pathetically: But that which the Vnderftan* ding reprefents to her*, I would fay, whatlhe of her felf perceives independently on the Senfes and Imagination, fcarce quickens or awakens her at all. No body doubts but that the leafi fenfi- ble Pain is more prefent to the Mind, and makes it more attentive than the Meditation of a thing of far greater Importance.
The reafbn which may be given for this, is, That the Senfes reprefent the Objects as prefentj the Imagination reprefents them as abfent. Now the order of things requires that among ma^ ny Goods, or many Evils propos'd to the Soul, thofe which are prefent ihould give her more concern or application than others which are abfent; becaufe 'tis neceflary for the Soul fudden- ly to determine what ought to be done on this occafion. And thus fhe is more intent to a fimple prick of a Pin, than to the moft exalted Speculations. And the Pleafures and Evils of this World make a greater Impreffion on her, than the ineffable Pains and infinite Pleafures of Eternity.