The Senfes then do extreamly warp and bend down the Soul to what they reprefent to her: "But whereas fhe is of a limited and finite Nature, and fo cannot conceive diflinctly many things at once} fhe cannot have a diftinct Perception of what the Underflanding reprefents to her at the fame time her Senfes offer any thing to her confideration. She forfakes then the clear and di- flincl: Idea's of the Underftanding, however proper to difcover the truth of Things in their own Nature, to apply her felf intirely to the confus'd Idea's of the Senfes, which affect her tenderefl part, and give her not a reprefentation of things as they are in their own Nature, but only as they fland related to her Body. s If a Man, to give an inflance, would explain any Truth, he muft neceffarily make ufe of it Speech and exprefs his Notions and Internal Senfations by Motions and Manners fenfible. Now An Exa^- the Soul is incapable of perceiving many things diltinct ly at the fame time; fo having always a ple tdke? great Attention to what comes in to her by way of the Senfes, fhe is fcarce at leifure to covA- clnvtrfl- der the Reafons which fhe hears alledg'd: But her greateft Application is confin'd to the fenfible tion of Pleafure fhe receives from the finely turn'd Periods, the Conformity of the Geftures to the Men> Words, from the Genteel Mein of the Face, from the Air, and the Way and Manner of the Speaker: Yet after fhe has heard, fhe will needs judge, becaufe it is the Cuflom. And thus her Judgments muft be different, according to the diverfity of the Impreffions fhe has receiv'd through the Senfes.
If, for example, the Speaker has a voluble Tongue, and eafinefs of Delivery } if he obferves the numeroufnefs of Words, and a delightful Cadence in his Periods; if he has the Look of a Gentleman, or of a Man of Parts; if he be a Perfon of Quality, oris attended with a great Re- tinue; if he dictates with Authority, or fpeakes in a grave decifive Manner; if others liflen to him with Silence and Refpedt. j if he has fome Reputation in the World, or is acquainted with the great Wits of the Age •, In fine, if he has the happinefs to pleafe, or to be efleem'd, he will have Reafon in every word that he advances; and there fhall be nothing even to his Band and Cuffs, but fhall prove fomething or other.
M But 41. F« Malebranche Concerning Book h But if he be fo unfortunate as to have the Qualities quite contrary to thefe, let him demon- ftrate as long as he pleafes, he fhall prove nothing. Let him fay the fineft things in the World, no Man fhall ever regard them. The Attention of the Auditors being imploy'd upon that only ' which (hikes their Senfes, the Difguft they conceive at the fight of a Man fo uncouth and ill-con- triv'd, will wholly take them up, and hinder the Application they ought to allow to his Thoughts -7 A dirty or a rumpled Band is enough to make the Wearer defpis'd, and all that comes from him;■ and that way of talking like a Dotard or a meer Philofopher, will make the moll noble and ex- alted Truths, which are above the reach of the generality of Mankind, be look'd on as Ravings and Extravagances.
Such are the ordinary Judgments of Mankind. Their Eyes and their Ears fet74ip for Judges of Truth, and not their Reafon, even in things that depend only on Reafon} becaufe Men apply themfelves meerly to the Senfibie and Agreeable Manners of Men, and feldom afford any Atten- tion that is Refolute and Serious, towards the Difcovery of Truth. Ut. Yet what greater Injuftice is there, than to judge of things by the Manner of them, and to That s'evfi- defpife Truth, becaufe it comes not drefs'd in thofe Ornaments that pleafe us and indulge and bk'ani flatter our Senfes? It mould be reckon'd a Reproach to Philofophers, and fuch as pretend to Agreeable senfC) t0 be more inquifitive after thefe agreeable out-fide Manners, than Truth it felf •, and ra- ouThTZt *her to entertain their Mind with the Noife and Emptinefs of Words, than with the Solidity of to be re- Things. 'Tis for Men of a Vulgar Stamp, 'tis for Souls of Flefh and Blood, to fuffer themfelves garded. to be won with Rhetorical Periods, and captivated with Figures and Motions that awake and excite the Pafllons.
Omnia enim flolidi niagU admirantnr amantque, Inverfis qu& fub verbis latitantia cernunt: Veraque confiitnnnt, qua, belle t anger e pojfnnt uiures^ & lepido qua funt fucata fonore.
But wife Men endeavour to arm themfelves againft the malignant force, and the powerful charms of thefe fenflble Manners. The Senfes impofe on them as well as on other tyLen, fince they are no more than Men, but they have the Wifdom to difregard the Reports they make. They imitate that famous Example of the Judges of the Areopagus, who, upon a fevere Penalty, forbad their Advocates the ufe of any fallacious Words and Figures, and never heard them plead but in the dark } for fear the Pleafantnefs of their Words and Infinuating Geftures mould per- fwade them to any thing prejudicial to Truth and Juftice, and to the end they might apply them- felves with lefs diftradtion to the Solidity of their Reafons.
CHAP. XIX.
Two other Examples. I. The firft^ concerning our Errors about the Na- ture of Bodies. II. The fecond, concerning thofe which refyeB the Qua- lities of the fame Bodies.
WE have been fhewing that there are a vaft multitude of Errors, which are originally owing to the ftrong Application of the Soul to that which enters by the Seafes, and that Lukewarmnefs and Indifference to things reprefented by the Under/landing. We have given an Inftance of very confiderable Importance in Morality, taken from the Conver- fation of Men; we fhall produce fome others drawn from the Commerce we have with the reft; of Nature, which are abfolutely neceflary to be obferv'd in Natural Philofophy. T# One of the Principal Errors we fall into in point of Natural Philofophy, is our Imagining the Errors there is much more Subftance in Senfibie, than in Imperceptible Bodies. The generallity of Men concerning are of Opinion there is much more Matter in Gold and Lead, than in Air and Water: And theJJature children who have made no Obfervation by their Senfes of the EfFe&s of Air, ordinarily imagine cjnoaies. k has nothing of Reality in it.
Gold and Lead are extreamly ponderous, very hard, and very fenfible -7 Water and Air, on the contrary, are fcarce perceptible by the Senfes. Whence Men conclude the former are more real than the other. They judge of the Truth of things by the Senfibie Impreffion, which is ever fallacious; and they neglect the clear and diftind Idea's of the Intelled which never deceives us} becaufe that which is fenfible affecfs us, and challenges our Application;, but that which is Intelligible lays us to fleep. Thefe falfe Judgments refpect the Subftance of Bodies; let us now fee the others about the Qualities of the fame Bodies. II. 'Tis the way for Men, almoft univerfally, to judge that the Obje&s which excite in them the Errors con- moft Pleafant Senfations, are the molt Perfect, and Pure of all others? without fo much as know- cer"jT'Kthe 'mg wherein the Perfection and Purity of Matter confifts, and, indeed, without caring whether fntTer- they do or not. jetlion of Bodies.
They Chap. "XIX. The Search after Truth. *i They fay, for inftance, that Mud is Impure, and that the cleareft Water is very pure. But Camels which love Muddy Water, and thofe Animals which delight to wallow in Mire, would be of another opinion. They are Beafts, 'tis true; but thofe Men who love the Entrails of a Wood- cock, and the Excrements of a Civit-Cat, do not fay they are Impure, though they fay fo of the Excrements of all other Animals. Finally, Musk and Amber are in general Efteem with all Men, though they are fuppos'd to be nothing but Ordure.
It is certain Men judge of the Perfedion and Purity of Matter, with Relation to their Owrt Senfes:, whence it falls out, that the Senfes being different in all Men, as has been abundantly. explain'd, they mult needs judge very differently of the Purity and Perfection of Matter. So that thofe Books which are daily compos'd upon the Imaginary Perfections attributed to cer- ' tain Bodies, mull: needs be fluff" 'd with Errors, in all the ftrange and odd variety that can be; fince the Reafonings they contain are founded only on the falfe, confus'd and irregular Idea's of the Senfes.
It is not the Part of Philofophers to call Matter Pure or Impure, till they know what they precifely mean by the Words Rare and Impure. For a Man mould never talk without knowing what he fays; that is to fay, without having diftind Idea's, which anfwer to the Terms he ufes. Now if they had fixt clear and diftind Idea's to each of thefe Terms, they would fee that what they call Pure would prove often very Impure, and what feems to them Impure would be found pure in an high degree.
If, for inftance, they would have that Matter to be mofl Pure and Perfed, whofe 'Parts are moft fine and difunited and eafieft to be mov'd; Gold, Silver and Precious Stones, would be extreamly Imperfed Bodies; Air and Fire on the other hand would be the moft perfed, When Flefh began to putrifie, and caft a very noifom ftench, it would then be commencing its Perfection,.and ftinking Carrion would be a more perfed Body, than found and common Flefh.
Again, if on the other hand they would have thofe to be the moft perfect Bodies, the parts where- of are moft grofs, folid, and difficult to be mov'd; the Earth would be perfeder than Gold, and Air and Fire would be more imperfed Bodies.
But if they are not willing to affix the clear and diftind Idea's I have mention'd, to the Terms Ture and TerfeEt, let them fubftitute others in their room. But if they pretend to define thefe words only by fenfible Notions, they will eternally confound things with one another, fince the Signification of the Terms that exprefs them can never be fix'd and determin'd. All Men, as we have already prov'd, have very different Senfations of the fame Objeds: Wherefore a Man ought not to define thefe Objeds by the Senfations he has of them, unlefs he has a mind to be unintelli- gible, and to put all things in confufion.
But at the bottom, there is no matter to be found, fnot that which the Heavens are fram'd of J which has more Perfedion in it than any other. All that Matter feems capable of, are Fi- gures and Motions, and 'tis indifferent to it whether it has Figures and Motions regular or irregu- lar. Reafon does not tell us that the Sun is more Perfed or more Luminous than Dirt; nor that the Celebrated Beauties of Romancers and Poets, have any advantage over the moft corrupted Car- caffes; they are our falfe and treacherous Senfes thot tell us this. It is in vain for Men to cry out againft what we fay; all their Railleries and Exclamations will appear frigid and ridiculous, to fuch as fhall ferioufly examine the Reafons we have alledged.
Thofe who are us'd to no other Preception than that of their Senfes, believe the Sun to abound with Light; but thofe who can be Senfible and Reasonable at the fame time, are of another opinion 5 provided they have as good a Faculty of Reafbning, as they have of Senfation. I am very well perfwaded, that even thofe who pay the greateft Deference to the teftimony of their Senfes, would clofe with our Opinion, had they well confider'd the things that we have laid: But they are too much in love with the Delufion of their Senfes; they have obey'd their Prejudices too long, and their Soul is too unthoughtful, or forgetful, to acknowledge or remember that all the Perfedions fhe imagines fhe fees in Bodies, belong only to her felf.
But it is not to this fort of Men we addrefs our felves, we are very little concern'd for their Approbation and Efteem: They refufe to hearken to us, and confequently are incompe- tent Judges; we are fatisfy'd in defending Truth, and having the Approbation of thofe who ferioufly labour to rid themfelves of the Errors of their Senfes, and to employ the Light of their Underftanding. We only require of them, that they would ferioufly Meditate on thefe Thoughts, with the greateft Attention they can, and then let them judge of them: Let them condemn them or acquit them; we fubmitthem to their Judgment, fince by their Meditation they have ob- tain'd a Supreme Power and Jurifdidion over them, which without Injuftice cannot be eoritefted with them.
CHAP* 44- K Malebranche Concerning Book L CHA P. XX.
The Conclufton of the Firfi Book. I. That our Senfes are given us only for the Prefervation of our Body, II. That we ought to doubt of the Re~ ports they make. III. That 'tis no little thing to doubt, as we ought to do.
H A V E, if I am not miftaken, made a fufficient Difcovery of the General Errors into which our Senfes lead ns, whether in regard to their own Obje&s, or in refped of Things, which can only be perceiv'd by the Underftanding: And I am of an Opinion, that we fall into no Error by their Conduct, the caufe whereof may not be difcover'd by the things that have been laid, in cafe a Man will bellow a little Meditation upon them. I.? We have hitherto feen, that our Senfes are moll faithful and exa& in inftru&ing us in the Re- list our lations, which all the Bodies which furround us have with our own, but are incapable of teach- Senfes are ing us what thefe Bodies are in their own Nature-, that to make the beft: ufe of them, they muffc fniTfcr on^ ^e imploy'd to the Prefervation of our Health and Life; and that they can't be fufficiently the Prefer- defpis'd, when they pretend to raife themfelves to a Sovereignty above the Underflanding. This vaxlon of is the Principal Thing I would gladly have well remembred in all this Firfl Book, viz.. Let a our Body. Man throughly confider, that our Senfes were only given us for the Prefervation of our Body, let him fortifie himfelf in this Notion •, and in order to free himfelf from the Ignorance he is under, let him feek out other Succors and Affiltances, than thofe his Senfes furnifli him withall. H. But fuppofing there be fome fuch Men to be found, (as doubtlefs there be but too many of T^at we them ) who will not be perfwaded of thefe lail Propofitions by what we have hitherto faid, we doubt of demand °f tnem flill much lefs than this \ we only defire of them to enter into fome Diflruft the sports °? their Senfes, and if they cannot entirely reject their Teflimonies as falfe and treacherous, which our let them only ferioufly doubt, left thefe Reports fhould not be abfolutely true: And certainly, senfes [n my Opinion, enough hath been faid, to call at leaft fome Scruple in the Mind of Reafonable Thin J ^en, anc* confequently to excite them to the Employing their Liberty otherwife than they have s hitherto done: for if they could once begirt to doubt, that the Reports of their Senfes were not true, they might with greater Eafe with-hold their Confent, and fo prevent their falling into thofe Errors, into which they have hitherto fallen efpecialJy if they could remember that Rule We have given at the Beginning of this Difcourfe, That we ought not to give an entire Confent, ex- cept to Things that appear entirely evident, and to which we could not forbear confentin/r, without beina certainly convinced, wejlwuld make an ill ufe of our Liberty in not consenting.
Iir^ y por whai- remai11Sy let not a Man imagine he has made but an inconfiderable Progrefs, if he has no little" onty te*m,& t0 Doubt. To know how to Doubt with Judgment and Reafon, is not fb fmall a thing to thing as is fuppos'd. For we muft needs fay, there is a great deal of difference betwixt Doubt- doubt as ing and Doubting. Some Doubt out of a Rafh Paflion, and a Brutifh Refolution; others out we ought of Blindnefs and Malice, out of Humour and Fancy, and becaufe they will do fo; But there are others likewife, that Doubt out of Prudence and Caution, out of Wifdom and Penetration of Mind. The Academich and Atheifts Doubt after the former manner; but true Philofophers Doubt in the latter. The firfl Doubt is a Doubt of Darknefs, which never condu&s us towards the Light, but fets us at a greater Diflance from it. The fecond Doubt proceeds from Light, and is affiftant in fome meafure, to the production of it, in its turn.
Thofe who only Doubt in the former manner, know not what it is to Doubt with Under- flanding: They Laugh at Monfieur Des Cartesh teaching us to Doubt, in the firfl of his Metaphy- sical Meditations, becaufe it feems to them, that it is no other, than a Fantaftick Doubting j That it can only be faid in general, that our Nature is Infirm, that our Mind is full of Blind- nefs, that we ought to be very careful to rid our felves of our Prejudices, and fome fuch things as thefe. They fuppofe that this is enough to prevent being feduc'd by their Senfes, and not to be deceiv'd at all. But it is not enough to complain, that the Mind is weak; we muft make her fenfible of her Weakneffes: It is not enough to fay, She is fubjeft unto Error \ we muft difcover to her wherein her Errors confifi, to which I think we have given an Introduction in this firfl Book, by accounting for the Nature and Errors of our Senfes; and we will flill purfue the fame Defign, in explaining the Nature and Errors of our Imagination in the Second.
F. MALE- ■ R MJLEBRJNCHE'S TREATISE CONCERNING The Search after TRUTH.
BOOK the SECOND, Concerning Imagination.
the' first part.
CHAP. J.
I. A General Idea of the. Imagination. II. That it includes two Faculties^ an ABiiie and a Pajfive. III. A General Caufe of the Changes which hap- pen in the Imagination of Men, and the Foundation of the Second Book..
N the foregoing Book I have treated concerning the Senfes; I have endeavour'd to Ex- plain their Nature, and precifely to determine the life that ought to be made of them. I have difcover'd the Principal and moil Genei'al Errors, wherein they ingage us: and have attempted fuch a Limitation of their Power, as to put Man in a capacity of Hoping much, and Fearing nothing from them; whilft they keep them within thofe Boundaries I have prefcrib d them. In this Second Book I mall Difcourfe concerning the Imagination, as the Natural Order of things obliges me. For there is fo near a Relation and Affinity betwixt the Imagination and the Strifes^ that they in no wife ought to be feparated. We lhall fee too in the Sequel of the Difcourfe, that thefe two Powers are no farther Different than according to Degree of more or lefs.
This then is the Method which I have Obferv'd in this Treatife.• It is divided into three Parts. In the Firft I Explain the Natural Caufes of the Diforder and Errors of the Imagination: In the Second I make fome Application of thefe Caufes to the more General Errors of the Imagination •, and I Difcourfe of fuch as may be term'd the Moral Caufes of thefe Errors. In the Third I treat of the Contagi- ons Communication of Strong Imaginations.
Though the greateft part of the things contain'd in this Trad may not be fo new, as thofe I have already deliver'd in Explaining the Errors of the Senfes, yet their life and Advantage will be no lefs considerable. Men of bright and clarify'd Underftandings can eailly difcover the Er- rors, and the Caufes of the Errors I am treating of: But there are few fuch Men as can make fufficient Reflection thereupon: I pretend not to give Inftru&ions to all the World, my defign is only to Inform the Ignorant, and to Caution and Remind the reft, or rather I try to be my own Inftru&our and Remembrancer.
It has been faid in the Firft Book, that the Organs of our Senfes were compos'd of little Fi- bres, which terminate, on one hand, upon the External parts of the Body, and on the Skin;, and on A Gene- the other, center in the middle of the Brain. But thefe Fibres may be moved in a two-fold manner ^ ral idea of either by commencing their Motion at thofe Extremities which terminate in the Brain, or at thofe the imtgi- which terminate on the Surface of the Body. Being the Agitation of thefe Fibres cannot be com- natic'"> municated to the Brain, but the' Soul muft have fome Perception or other ^ if the Agitation be begun by the Impreffion of Obje&s, made upon the External Surface of the Fibres of the Nerves, N and T.
4-6 F. Male bran Che Concerning Book II.
and be communicated to the Brain; the Soul thereupon receives a Senfation, and * By a N*m-*J fn&g- judges * what fhe has the Senfation of, to be without 5 that is to fay^ She perceives te^ret7£w5ran Object as Prefent: bmrif it be only the Internal Fibres that are agitated by the preceding Book. Courfe of the Animal Spirits, or in fome other manner, the Soul Imagines and judges what fhe imagines to be not withoutr but within the Brain; that is, fhe perceives an Object, as Abfent. And this is the difference there is between Senfation and Ima- gination.
But it ought to be obferv'd, That the Fibres of the Brain are more violently agitated by the Impreffio.n of External Obje&s, than by the Courfe of the Animal Spirits; and that, for this reafon the Soul is more nearly toucVd by External Objeds, which fhe judges as prefent, and, as it were, capable of making her inftantly fenfible of Pleafure or Pain, than by the Courfe of the Animal Spi- rits. And yet it happens fometimes inPerfbns whofe Animal Spirits are put in extream Commotion, by Fallings, Watchings, a fcorching fever, or a violent Paffion, that thefe Spirits move the Inter- nal Fibres of the Brain with as great a force, as External Objefts, fo that thefe Perfons have "the Senfation of what they mould onlf have the Imagination, and think they See Objects before their Eyes, which they only Imagine in the Brain. Which evidently fhews, that, in regard of what oc- curs in the Body, the Senfes and Imagination differ but in Degree of more or lefs, as I have before declar'd.
But in Order to give a more diftinct and particular Idea of the Imagination, we mufb know that as often as any Change happens in that part of the Brain where the Nerves unite, there happens a Change alfo in the Soul: That is, as has* been already explaiu'd, if there happens any Motion in this part which alters the Order of its Fibres, there happens, at the fame time, a new Perception in the Soul; and fhe either Feels or Imagines fomething afrefh: And that the Soul is in- capable of receiving any frefh Senfation or Imagination, without fome Alteration in the Fibres of that part of the Brain.
So that the Vacuity of Imagining, or the Imagination, confuts only in the Power the Soul has of framing the Images of Objects, by effecting a Change in the Fibres of that part of the Brain, which may be call'd the Principal Part, as being that which correfponds to all the Parts of our Body; and is the Place where the Soul keeps her immediate Refidence, if I may be fo allow'd to fpeak.
IL - This manifeftly. fhews that this Power which the Soul has of Forming thefe Images, includes Two Fa- two things; one that has its Dependence on the Soul, and the other on the Body. The firffc is cutties in the Action and the Command of the Will, The fecond is the ready Obedience paid to it by the the Magi- Animal Spirits which delineate thofe Images, and by the Fibres of the Brain wherein they muft ^AtTveaul ^e iraPrmtec^ In this Tract, both one aud the other of thefe two things go indifferently by a Pajfive. tne Name of Imagination; nor are they diftinguifh'd by the Terms Attive and Pajfive, which might be given them ', becaufe the Senfe of the thing fpoken of, eafily determines which of the Two isunderftood, whether the Ailive Imagination of the Soul, or the Pajfive Imagination of the Body.
I fhall not here particularly determine which is that Principal Part of the Brain before-men- tion'd; Firft, Becaufe it would be but an ulelefs thing to do it. Secondly, Becaufe it is not perfectly and infallibly known. And laflly, Since I could not convince others, it being a Matter incapa- ble of Probation in this place; though. I fhould be infallibly affur'd which was this Principal Part, I fhould think it more advifeable to fay nothing of it.
Whether then it be according to the Opinion of Dr. Willis, in the two little Bodies, call'd by him Corpora Striata, that the common Senfe refides; and the Cells of the Brain preferve the Spe- cies of the Memory, and the Corpus Callojum be the Seat of Imagination. Whether it be according to Femelius's Opinion, in the Pia Mater, which involves the Subftance of the Brain: Whether it be in the Pineal Gland, according to the Notion of Dcs-Cartes; or, laflly, in fome other part hitherto undifco'ver'd, that our Soul exercifes her Principal Functions, is of no great concern to know. '.Tis enough to be affur'd that there is a Principal Part, fand this is moreover abfo- lutely neceflaryj and that the Bafis of Mr. Des-Cane$\ Syfiem flands its ground. For 'tis to be well obferv'd, that though he fhould be miflaken in alluring us it is the Pineal CLmd, to which the Soul is immediately united, this could no ways injure the Foundation of his Syfiemt from which may ever be dedue'd all the profit that could be expected from the true, to make all neceflary advances in the knowledge of Man. rn. Since then the Imagination confifts only in the Power the Soul has of Forming the Images of A general Obje&s, by imprinting them (as I may fo fay) in the Fibres of the Brain •, the greater aud more caufiofthe diftindf. the Impreffes of the Animal Spirits are, which are the ftrokes of thefe Images, the Ckw¥SC more Wrongly and diflinctly the Soul will imagine Objects. Now, as the Largenefs, and Depth, 7eninthe ant(* Ckavernefs of the flrokes of any Sculpture depend upon the Forcible Acting of the Gia- imaginati- ving Inftrument, and the plyable yielding of the Plate; fo the Depth, and the Diftinctnefs of en; and the the Imprefles of the Imagination, depend on the Force of the Animal Spirits, and the foundation Conftitution of the Fibres of the Brain: And 'tis the Variety that is found in thefe two "Lfl Se,' things, which is almoft the univerfal Caufe of that great Diverfity we obferve in the Minds of different Men.
For 'tis no hard thing to account for all the different Characters to be met with in the Minds of Men: On the one hand, by the Abundance and Scarcity, by thellapidnefs and Slownefs, by the Groffnefs and the Littlenefs of the Animal Spirits; and on the other hand, by the Finenefs and Chap. IL The Search after Truth.