This Confiftence of the Brain has befides a very mifchievous Effect, efpecially on more Aged fort of People, which is, to incapacitate them for Thought and Meditation: They are unable to faften their Attention upon any thing they have a Mind to know, and fo are incapable of reach- ing to Truths that are any thing obfcure or intricate, They are utterly infenfible to the molt rea- fonable Opinions, when founded upon Principles that to them feem Novel, though as to thofe other concerns, that Age has given them Experience in, they are very underftanding Men. But all that I here affirm is only to be underftood of thofe, who have ipent their younger days with- out the due life and Improvement of their Mind, and applying it as they mould do.
To illuftrate thefe things, 'tis neceflary to know, that not any thing whatever can be learned without Advertencyand Attention; and that 'tis impoflible we fhould be attentive to any thing, unlefs we Imagine it, and frame a lively Reprefentation of it in our Brain. But to the end we may Imagine any Objects, 'tis neceflary we fhould inflect fome part of our Brain, or imprefs fome other kind of Motion in it, that we may frame the Traces, whereuntoare confociated the Ideas that reprefent thefe Objects to us: So that if the Fibres of our Brain were any whit hardned, they would be capable of no other Inflection or Motions, than thofe they were formerly us'd to. And thus the Soul could form no Imagination of, nor confequently be attentive to what Ihe plea- fes; but only to fuch things as are cuftomary and familiar to her.
Hence we ought to conclude, that 'tis of very great Advantage to ufe a Man's felf to Medi- tate upon all forts of Subjects, in order to acquire an Habitual Facility of Thinking on what he will- For as we acquire a great Readinefs at moving our Fingers all manner of ways, and with a prodigious Nimblenefs, by the frequent life we make of them in playing on a Mulical Inftru- mentj fo the parts of our Brain, the Motion whereof is neceflary to the Imagining what we pleafe, attain by Ufe a certain Facility of Plying and Inflecting themfelves, which makes us imagine the things we have a Mind to, with a great deal of Eafe, Readinefs, and Di- stinction.
Now the beft means of procuring this Difpofition, which caufeth the Principal Difference be-^ tween a Man of Parts,and another \ is to accuftom a Man's felf from his Youth totheDifquilitionof the Truth of things very abftrad and difficult: Becaufe in that Age the Fibres of the Brain are pliable and flexible all manner of ways.
I fuppofe not however, that this Facility can be acquir'd by thofe we call Men of Books and Learnings who only apply themfelves to Reading, without Meditation, and without fearching v out the Refolution of Queftions themfelves, before they Read them in Authors. 'Tis palpable enough, that hereby they only acquire a Facility of Remembring what they have read, 'lis daily obferv'd, that Men of much Reading, are unable to bring Advertency of Attention to things that are new to them, and unheacd of •, and that the Vanity of their Learning, inclining them to form a Judgment of them, before they conceive them, makes them fall into grofs Errors, to which other Men are not obnoxious.
S But 66 K Maleuasche Concerning Book IL But though the want of Advertency is the main Caufe of their Errors, there is one ftill that id peculiar to them \ which is, that finding ever in their Memory abundance of confus'd Notions^ they prefently felect fome one of them, and confider it as the fubject. of the Queftion » And be- caufe the things a Man fpeaks, are not conformable to it •, they ridiculouily conclude he is irt an Error. Should you endeavour to reprefent to them that they are deceiv'd themfelves, and that they underftand not fo much as the ftate of the Queftion } they fall into a Paffion, and not being able to conceive what is faid to them, they perfift to embrace that falfe Notion their Me- mory has fuggefted. But fhould the falfity of it be made too manifeftly apparent, they fubfti- tute afecond, and a third in its room, which they defend fometimes againft all appearances of Truth, and even againft their own Conference; as having but little Refped or Love for Truth, but a great deal of Shame and Confufion in acknowledging, there are things another knows bet- ter than themfelves. rn. All that has been faid concerning Men of forty or fifty Years old, ought with greater allow- concermng ance to be underftood of Aged Men; becaufe the Fibres of their Brain being ftill more inflexible^ the Magi- anc[ wanting Animal Spirits to imprint new Traces in it j their Imagination is altogether faint OhiM °f and lan§uid- And whereas generally the Fibres of their Brain are loaded with abundance of fuperfiuous Hu- mours, they lofe by degrees the Memory of things part, and return to the Weaknefles ufual- ly incident to Childhood. Thus in this Decrepid Age, they have the Defects which de- pend on the Conftitution of the Fibres of the Brain; which are found both in Children and in grown Men. Though it may be laid they have more Prudence than either of them, becaufe they are lefs fubjed to their Paffions, which proceed from the Commotion of the Animal Spirits.
I (hall not explain thefe things more at large, becaufe it is eafie to judge of this Age, by the others before treated of j and to conclude that Old Men have more difficulty than others at conceiving what is laid to them, that they are more zealoufly devoted to their Prejudices and Ancient Opinions; and confequeijtly are more confirmed and ftrengthened in their Errors, in their corrupt Habits, and other things of like Nature. 'Tis only to be advertis'd, That the ftate of Old Age is not precifely determined to Sixty or Seventy Years j that all Old Men are not Dotards •, and that thofe who have pafs'd the Sixtieth Year, are not always delivered from the Paffions of Youth; and that we ought not to draw too general Confluences from the Prin- ciples eftablifh'd.
CHAP. II.
That the Animal Spirits generally run in the Tracks of Ideas that are moft familiar to «j, which is the Reafon of our prepofierous Judg- ments, I Have, I think, explain'd in the fore-going Chapters, the various Changes happening in the Animal Spirits, and in the Conftitution of the Fibres of the Brain, according to diffe- rent Ages: Wherefore fuppofing a Man to have meditated a little upon what has been faid upon that Subject, he muft neceflarily have a'diftind Knowledge enough of the Imagination, and of the moft common Natural Caufes of the differences obfervable between the Minds of Men; fince all the Changes happening in the Imagination and the Mind, are only the Con- fequences of thofe which are to be found in the Animal Spirits, and the Fibres that compofe the Brain.
But there are many particular, and fuch as we may call Moral Caufes of the Changes which happen in the Imagination of Men j namely, Their different Conditions, their various Employ- ments; and, in a word, their feveral ways of Living •, which deferve to be attentively con- fider'd} becaufe thefe forts of Changes are the Caufes of a numberlefs multitude of Errors, every Man judging of things with reference to his own Condition: We think it not fo much our Bull- nefs to ftand to explain the Effeds of fome lefs cuftomary Caufes j fuch as great Difeafes, fur- prizing Misfortunes, and other unexpected Accidents, which make very violent Impreifions in the Brain, and which fometimes totally fubvert it; becaufe thefe things are of very rare occur- rence-, and befides, the Error fuch fort of Perfons fall into, are too grofstobe contagious, fince they are palpable and difcernible to all Mankind.
But that we may perfectly comprehend all the Changes the different conditions and ftates of Life produce in the Imagination; 'tis abfolutely neceffary to be call'd to mind, that our Imagi- ning Objects is only the framing Images thereof to our Selves; and that thefe Images are nothing but the Traces delineated by the Animal Spirits in the Brain; that we Imagine things fo much ftronglier as thefe Traces are more deep and better cut, and as the Animal Spirits more fre- quently and violently pafs through them j that thefe Spirits, by their frequent com fe, fo plain and open the PafTage, as to enter the fame Tracks with greater readinefs than any other neigh- bouring parts, through which they either have nut pafs'd, or not fo frequently. This is the molt ordinary Caufe of the Confuiion and Falfity of our Idea's. For the Animal Spirits which were Chap. tl. The Search after Truth. £j were direfted by the Action of External Obje&s, or even by the orders of the Soul to the pro- duction of certain Traces, frequently produce others, which indeed have fome refemblance with them, but are not altogether the Traces of thefe fanie Objeds, nor thofe the Soul defir'd to reprefent -y becaufe the Animal Spirits finding fome Refiftance in the parts of the Brain through which they ought to pafs, are eafily diverted to throng into the deep Traces of Idea's which are moft familiar to us: Here are fome very grofs and fenfible Inflances of thefe things.
When thofe who are not extraordinary fhort-fighted behold the Moon, they fee in her two Eyes, a Nofe, and a Mouth \ in a word it looks to them as if they faw a Face, tho there be nothing in her of what they fancy they perceive. Many Perfons fee in her quite another thing. And thofe who believe the Moon to be fuch as fhe appears, would quickly be undeceived, did they but be- hold her with felefcopes, though of a moderate fize \ or did they only confult the Defcriptions Heveliw, Riccioli, and others have made Publick. Now the Reafon why a Man ufually fees a Face in the Moon, and not thofe irregular Blotches that are in her, is becaufe the Traces of a Face, which are imprinted in the Brain, are very deep, for that we frequently look on Faces, and with great Attention. So that the Animal Spirits meeting with oppofition in the other parts of the Brain, eafily fwerve from the Direction the Light of the Moon imprefleson them, when a Man beholds her; to accomodate themfelves to the Traces whereunto Nature has affix'd the Idea's of a Face. Befides that the apparent Magnitude of the Moon differing not much from a common head at a certain Diftance •, She by her Impreffion forms fuch Traces, as have Connection, with thofe which reprefent a Nofe, a Mouth, and Eyes •, and fo fhe determines the Spirits to take their courfe in the Traces of a Face. There are fome who difcern in the Moon a Man on Horfe-back, or fomething elfe than a Face, becaufe their Imagination having been briskly fmit- ten with fome particular Objects, the Traces of thefe Objects open at any thing that bears the leaft Analogy to them.
'Tis upon the fame grounds we Imagine we fee Chariots, Men, Lions, and other Animals in the Clouds, when there is any little refemblance between their Figures and thefe Animals: and all Men, efpecially thofe who are ufed to Defigning, fee fometimes Heads of Men on Walls, whereon there are many irregular ftains.
'Tis for the fame Reafon ftiil that the Spirits of Wine, entering without any Direction of the Will into the moft familiar Traces, make Men betray their Secrets of the greateft concernment j and that when a Man fleeps he ufually dreams of Objects he has feen in the Day-time, which have form'd very great Traces in the Brain: becaufe the Soul is ever reprefenting thofe things, where- of fhe has the greateft and deepeft Traces. But fee other Examples of a more complex kind.
A Diftemper is new: and it makes fuch havock and deftrudtion, as amazes all Men. This im- prints Traces fo deep in the Brain, that this Difeafe is never abfentfrom the Mind. If this Di- feafe be call'd, for inftance, the Scurvy •, all Difeafes muft prefently be call'd Scurvy: the Scurvy is new, therefore all new Diftempers' is the Scurvy • The Scurvy is accompany 'd with a dozen Symptoms, whereof many are common to other Diftempers, that matters not: If a fick Per- fon fortunes to have any one of the Symptoms, he muft needs be fick of the Scurvy -7 and other Di- ftempers are never fufpected, or thought of, that have the fame Symptoms. "Tis expected that all the Accidents which befal thofe that have been fick of the Scurvy, muft befal him too: The fame Medicines therefore are prefcrib'd him, and 'tis matter of amazement, to find they have not the lame Effect, as they have been known to have had in others.
An Author applies himfelf to one kind of Study; The Traces of the Subject he's imploy'd about, are fo deeply imprinted, and make fuch lively Radiations through the Brain, as to con- found and efface fometimes the Traces of things of a quite different kind. There has been a Man, for inftance, that has wrote many bulky Volumes on the Crofs-f this made him difcover a Crcfs'ui every thing he look'd upon; and 'tis with Reafon, that Father Morinm handfomly rallies him, for thinking a Medal reprefented a Crofs, though it reprefented quite another thing. 'Twas by fuch another unlucky turn of Imagination Gilbert its and many others, after having ftudied the Load-ftone, and admir'd its properties, muft needs reduce to thefe Magnetick Qualities abundance of Natural Effects, that had no Relation to them in the World.
The Inftances I have here alledg'd, fuffiee to prove that the great facility of the Imagination's reprefenting Objects that are familiar to it, and the difficulty it finds in Imagining thofe that are Novel, is the Reafon of Mens forming almoft ever fuch Idea's as may be ftyl'd mix'd and impure; and of the Mind's judging of things only with Relation to it felf, and its former Thoughts. And thus the different Pafllons of Men, their Inclinations, Conditions, Imployments, Qualities, Stu- dies, finally all their different Ways and Scopes of Life, putting very confiderable Differences in their Idea's, occafion them to fall into innumerable Errors, which we fhall explain in the follow- ing Difcourfe: Which was the reafon of My Lord Bacon's fpeaking this moft judicious Sentence: Omnes perceptiones tarn fensus quam mentis funt ex analogia hominis, non ex analogia univerfi ': Eftque - Intelletlus humrnw infiar fpeculi in&qnaltf, ad radios return qui fitam Naturam natura renim immifcet, eamtfo diftorquet9 & inficit.
C HAP.
£g F. MalebrAnche Concerning Bbok II.1 CHAP, til; Of- the Mutual CoMeclion between the Ideas, and the Trace* of the Brain j and of the Mutual Conne&ion there is between Traces and Traces^ Ideas and Idea s.
A M O N G the whole Mafs of Material Beings, there is nothing more worthy of the Con* templation of Mten, than the Contexture of their own Body, and the Correfpondence found between the Parts that compofe it. And among all things Spiritual, there is nothing, the Knowledge whereof is more neceflary, than that of their Soul, and of all the Rela- tions ihe is indiftenfably under to GOD, and Naturally to the Body.
'Tis not enough to have a confus'd Knowledge or Senfation, that the Traces of the Brain are mutually connected to each other, and that they are purfued by the Motion of the Animal Spirits 9 that the Traces when excited in the Brain, excite the Idea's in the Underftanding, and that the Motions that arife in the Animal Spirits, raife the Paflions in the Will. We ought, as far as is poflible, to have adiftinct Knowledge oftheGw/^ of all thefe different Connexions; butefpeci- ally of the Effefls they are capable of producing.
We ought to know the Canfe thereof, in as much as it is neceflary to know our Guide and Conductor, who alone is capable of acting in us, and of rendring us happy or miferable; and we ought to know the Effetl of them, it being neceflary to know our felves as much as poflible, and other Men with whom we are oblig'd to live: So fhould we know the means, both of conducting our felves to, and preferving our felves in, the raoft happy and perfect flate we are capable of at- taining, by the order of Nature, and the Precepts of the Gofpel: and fo fhould we be able to frame our Lives fociably with Men, by exactly knowing the means of making ufe of them in our Exigencies, and aflifting them in their Miferies.
I pretend not to Explain in this Chapter a Subject fo vaft: and Comprehenfive: nor have I that Opinion of my felf, as to think I fhould throughly do it in this whole Work. There are many- things I am ftill ignorant of, and defpair of ever knowing well: and there are others which I prefume I know, but am unable to explicate: For there is no mind fo little and fo narrow, but may by Meditation difcover more Truths, than can be deduc'd at length by the raoft Eloquent Man in the World. }■ We are not to imagine with a great part of the Philofophers, that the Mind becomes Body °f thi when united to the Body" and that the Body becomes Mind when united to the Mind. The Soul the'soui ls not exPanded through all the parts of the Body, in order to give Life and Motion to it, as the ani Body. Imagination reprefents: nor does the Body become capable of Senfation by its Union with the Mind, as our treacherous and abufive Senfes would feem to perfwade us. Either Subftance pre- fer ves its own particular Being, and as the Soul is incapable of Extenfion and Motions; fo the Bo- dy is incapable of Thought and Inclinations. All the Affinity that we know between the Body and Mind, conlifts in the Natural and Mutual correfpondence of the Thoughts of the Soul, with the Traces of the Brain; and of the Emotions of the Soul, with the Motions of the Animal Spirits.
When the Soul receives fome new Idea's, fome new Traces are imprinted on the Brain; and when Objects produce new Traces, the Soul receives new Idea's. Which is not faid, as if the Soul confider'd thefe Traces, fince (he has no knowledge of them; or, as if thefe Traces inclu- ded thefe Idea's, fince there is no Analogy betwixt them: or laftly, as if (he receiv'd her Idea's from thefe Traces; for 'tis inconceivable, as fhall be explain'd hereafter, how the Mind fhould re- ceive any thing from the Body, and become more enlightned than fhe is, by turning towards it, as the Philofophers pretend, who would have the Souls Perception of all things to be caus'd Per con- verfwnem ad fhantafmata, by the Converfion to the Phantafms, or Traces of the Brain.
Thus when the Soul wills the moving of her Arm, the Arm is mov'd, though fhe not fb much as knows what ought to be done to the moving it: and when the Animal Spirits are agitated, the Soul finds a Commotion in her felf, though fhe is ignorant whether there be any fuch thing as Ani- mal Spirits in her Body.
When I come to treat of the Paflions, I fhall fpeak of the Connection there is between the Traces of the Brain, and the Motions of the Spirits; and of that which is between the Idea's, and the Emotions of the Soul: for all the Paflions have their Dependance thereon. I am to Difcourfe at prefent only of the Connection between Traces and Idea's, and the Connection Traces have with one another.
Os'ofae There are tnree very confiderable Caufes of the Connection of Idea's with the Traces of the Conne&ion Bran1,. T^e ^r^ anc* inoft general, is the Identity of time: for our having had certain thoughts tf Traces at tlic inffant of our having certain new Traces in the Brain, is oftentimes fufficient for our nUbliatt. having a-frefh the fame thoughts, as often as thefe Traces are re-prod ue'd in our Brain. If the Idea of G O D has been offer'd to my Mind, at the fame time my Brain receiv'd an Impreflion from the fight of thefe three Letters Jab, or from the found of the fame word, 'tis enough that the Traces produe'd by the found or light of thefe Characters be re-printed, to caufc me to think on G O V; nor can I think of G 0 £>, but fome confus'd Traces of the Charaders ' or Chap. III. The Search after Truth.
or founds, that the thoughts I had of G 0 D were attended with, will be re-produc'd in my Brains For the Brain being never empty of Traces, there are conftantly fuch as are fomewhat related to what we think of, though thefe Traces are frequently very imperfect artd confus'd.
The fecond Caufe of the Connection between Idea's and Traces, and which everfuppofes the former, is the Will of Men. This Will is necefTary to the intent this Connection of Idea's with the Traces, may be regulated and accommodated to ufe. For were not Men naturally inclin'd to a mutual Agreement about affixing their Idea's to Senfible Signs; this Connection of Idea's would not be only abfolutely ufelefs to fociety, but would moreover be very irregular, and ex- treamly imperfedt.
And that, firft becaufe Idea's have never any ftrong Connection with the Traces, except when the Spirits being agitated and fermented, make the Traces deep and permanent. So that, fince the Spirits are only agitated by the Paflions, had Men no Paflion for communicating their own thoughts and participating thofe of others, it is plain that the exadt Connexion of their Idea's to particular Traces, wou'd be very weak \ fince they would never ufe themfelves to thofe exact and regular Connections, were it not to become intelligible one to another.
Secondly, the repeated concurrence of the fame Idea's with the fame Traces, being necefTary to make fo ftfong a Connedtion, as may be durable and lafting jj f fince a firft meeting, unlefs attended with a violent Motion of the Animal Spirits, cannot confederate them fo ftrongly as is requifite) it is manifeft, that fhould not Men contrive to agree, it would be the greateffc chance in the World, for the fame Traces and the fame Idea's to meet a fecond time. Thus the Will of Men is necefTary to regulate the Connexion and Alliance of the fame Traces with the fame Idea's; though this Will of Agreeing is not fo much the refult of their Choice and Reafon, as an Impreffion of the Author of Nature, whd has difpos'd and made us all for the Benefit of each other, and given us a ftrong Inclination to unite in Mind, as much as we are united in our Bodies.
The third Caufe of the Connexion of Idea's with the Traces, is the Nature* or the conftant and immutable Will of the Creator. There is, for inftance, a Natural Connection, and indepen- dent on our Will, between the Traces produc'd by a Tree or a Mountain which we fee, and the Idea's of a Tree or a Mountain: between the Traces produc'd in our Brain by the cry of a Man or an Animal fuffering Tains, and whofe Plaints we hear: by the mein of a Man's Countenance that threatens ox fears US} and the Idea's of Pains, Strength, Weaknefs-, and alio the Senfationsof Tity, Fear, and Courage, which are occafion'd in our felves.
Thefe Natural Connections af e of all others the ftrongeft; they are generally alike in all Man- kind: and they are abfolutely necefTary tothe Prefervation of Life. And this is the Reafon they have no dependence on our Will. For if the Connection of Idea's with Sounds and certain Cha- racters, is weak and very different in different Countries; 'tis becaufe it depends on the weak and changeable Will of Men. And the Reafon why it depends thereon, is becaufe this Connection is not abfolutely necefTary to their Living; but only to their Living as Men-, who ought to form themfelves into Civil and Rational Societies.
It is here very obfervable, that the Connection of Idea's, which reprefent things Spiritual di- ftindt from us, with the Traces of our Brain, is not Natural, nor pofiible to be fo: And confe- quently that it is or may be different in all Men; fince it has no other caufe than their own Will, and the Identity of time -, whereof I have fpoken before. On the Contrary, the Connection of Idea's of all things material with certain particular Traces, is Natural • and confequently there are particular Traces which excite the fame Idea in all Mankind. It cannot be doubted, for in- ftance, but all Men have the Idea of a Square upon fight of a Square, becaufe that Connecti- on is Natural: but it may be very well doubted whether all Men have the Idea of a Square, when they hear the word Square pronounc'd; becaufe that Connection is altogether arbitrary. We ought to think the fame thing of all thofe Traces that are connected with the Idea's of things of a Spiritual kind.
But becaufe the Traces which have a Natural Connection with Idea's, give the Mind concern andapplication, and confequently render it attentive; the generality of Men are very ready at comprehending and retaining fenfible and palpable Truths: that is to fay, the Relations, which Bodies have to oneanother. And on the other hand, becaufe the Traces, which have no other Connection with Idea's, than that which the will has effected between them, ftrike notvigoroufly on the Mind •, all Men in general find it very difficult to comprehend, and harder yet to retain ab- ftradted Truths; that is to fay the Relations which are between things which come not within the Verge of Imagination.. But when thefe Relations are any whit compounded, they feem-abfolutely incomprehenfible \ efpecially to thofe who are not us'd to them; becaufe they have not ftrengthen- ed the Connection between thefe abftradr. Idea's and their Traces, by a pefpetual Meditation. And though others have perfectly comprehended them, they forget them again in a little time; be- caufe the Connedion is hardly ever fo ftrong, as the Natural.