'Tis fo true, that all the difficulty Men have to comprehend and retain things Spiritual and Ab- ftradt, proceeds from the difficulty they find to corroborate the Connection of their Idea's with the Traces of the Brain •, that when they find the means of Explaining by material Relations, thofe that are between things Spiritual, they make them eafily underftood; imprinting them in fuch manner on the mind, as not only to be ftrongly convinc'd of them, but alfo to retain them without any trouble. The general Idea we have given of the Mind in the firft Chapter of this Work, is perhaps a fufficient Proof of what I fay.
T On jo F» Malebranche Concerning Book lt« On the contrary, when the Relations that are between material things are fo exprelb, that there is noneceffary Connection between the Idea's of thefe things, and the Traces of their Expreffi- ons; they are difficultly comprehended and eafily forgotten.
Thofe, forinflance, who enter upon the Study of Algebra, or Analytkh, are incapable of ta- king ^^/rZ' Demonftrations without a great deal of pains; and when they have once mafter'd them, tney retain them but a fhort time • becaufe Squares, (for example) Parallelograms^ Cubesy Solids, and the like, being expreft by aa, ab, ^3, abc, &c. the Traces whereof have no Natural Connection with their Idea's; the Mind finds no hold to fallen the Idea's to, and to examine the Relations of them by.
But thofe who begin to Study Common Geography, molt clearly and readily conceive the little Demonftrations that are explain'd to them; provided they diftindtly underftand the Terms made rife of: Becaufe the Idea's or a Square, a Circle, or the like, are Naturally Connected with the Traces of the figures they fee defcrib'd before their Eyes. And it often happens, that the meer (hewing of the figure nfed in the Demonftration, makes them fooner comprehend it, than the Difcourfes made to explain it. Becaufe words being Connected to Idea's by an arbitrary inflitutipn only, excite not thefe Idea's readily and diftindtly enough, to make us eafily under- ftand their Relations. For 'tis chiefly upon that account, there is fo much difficulty found in learning the Sciences.
By the way, it may be difcover'd from what I have been faying, that thofe Writers who coin abundance of new Words and Figures, to explain their Notions by; fpendmuch pains to very lit- tle purpofe. They think to make themfelves intelligible, when indeed they take the way of -be- coming ineomprehenfible. We define, fay they, all our Terms, and all our Characters, and others ought to agree to them. It is true, others agree to them with their Will, but their Nature is re- pugnant. They cannot fallen their Idea's to thefe Novel Terms; becaufe to that is required cullom and long practice. The Authors perhaps have attain'd that cullom, but the Readers have not: And when a Man endeavours to initruct the Mind, 'tis neceffary he firft know it; fince he ought to conform to Nature, and offer her nothing provoking or offenfive.
Yet we ought not to condemn the Indufhy and Care Mathematicians take in defining their - Terms; for Definition is evidently neceflary to take away Equivocation. But the ordinary and receiv'd Terms ought to be imploy'd as far as poffibly they can; or fuch whofe common figni- fi cation is not very remote from that which they pretend to introduce; which is a thing not con- Handy obferv'd among the Mathematicians.
Nor do we pretend by what has been faid, to condemn Algebra; efpecially fuch as Mr. Des- Cartes has reflor'd, and left it to us. For though the Novelty of fome Expreffions in that Science, give the Mind fome trouble at firft; yet there is fo little variety and confufion in thefe Expreffions; and the Affiftances the Mind receives from them fo much out-weigh the Difficulty found in them, that I am of Opinion 'tis impoffible for a Man to invent a way of Reafoning and Expreffing his Reafonings, more fuited or better accomodated to the Nature of the Mind, or that can carry it farther in the Difcovery of unknown Truths. The Expreffions of that Science do not diftracr, the Capacity of the Mind; they burden not the Memory; they contract and abridge in a won- derful manner all our Idea's and our Reafonings, and even render them in fome meafure fenfible by Practice. In fine, their ufefulnefs is much greater than the Natural Expreffions of the deline- ated Figures of Triangles, Squares, and others of like Nature; which are inferviceable to the Dif- quifition and Unfolding of Truths any whit intricate and obfcure. But fo much for the Conne- ction of Idea's with the Traces of the Brain. Tis feafonable to fay fomething pf the Connection of Traces with one another, and confequently of the Connection between the Idea's correfpon- ding to thefe Traces. ^ II. This Connection confifls in this, that the Traces of the Brain arefo firmly connected to one ojtheMu- another, as 'tis impoffible to excite them again, without the whole retinue which were imprinted tuaifon- at tiie fame time, if a Man for inftance, happens to be in fome publick Solemnity, in cafe he ob- rieTr ferves aN tne Circumftances, and all the Principle Perfons that affifted at, the time, the place, races' the day, and all other Particularities; the remembrance only of the Place, or fome other lefs ob- fervable Circumflance of the Ceremony, will be fufficient to bring the Reprefentation of all the other to his Mind. T is upon this account that when we can't recollect the Principal Name of a thing, we fufficiently fpecifie it by making ufe of a Name, which fignifies fome Circumflance of that thing; as not being able to call to Mind the proper Name of. a Church, we can make ule of another Name, fignifying a thing that has fome Relation to it, We can fay, 'Tis that Church where there was fuch a Throng; where Mr. fuch a one Preach'd; where we went on Sunday. And thus not having the proper Name of a Perfon ready at hand} or when it is more convenient to denote him in another manner, we can do it by faying, He whofe Face was disfi- gured by the Small-pox -, the Portly and well-made Gentleman; the little crooked Man, according as we Hand affected towards him; though to exprefs a Man in terms of contempt, is nei- ther a fign of good Nature nbr good Manners.
Now the mutual Connection of thefe Traces, and confequently of their Idea's one with an- other, is not only the foundation of all the Figures of Rhetorkk, but alfo of infinite other things of grcateft concernment in Morality, and Politicks, and in all Sciences in general, which are any ways related to Man} and confequently of many things we fhall treat of in the. fequel of our Difcourfe.
The CHap. IV. The Search after Truth.
The caufe of the Connection of many Traces together, is the Identity of time, wherein they were imprinted on the Brain. For 'tis enough for many Traces to have been produc'd at the fame time, to caufe that they mould never afterwards be excited, but in company of one another, becaufe the Animal Spirits, finding the Channel of thefe Co-temporary Traces gaping and half open, continue their courfes in them, by reafon of their meeting with a more free paffage through them, than through the other parts of the Brain. This is the caufe of Memory, and the Corpo- real Habits which are common to us with Beafts.
The Connections of the Traces are not always conjoyn'd with the Emotions of the Spirits, be- caufe all the things we fee do not always appear either Good or Evil: Thefe Connexions too may change or break, becaufe being not of perpetual neceffity for the prefervation of Life, there is no need they fhould always be the fame.
But there are certain Traces in our Brain which have a Natural Connection with one another 5 as alfo with certain Commotions of the Spirits; that being neceflary to the Prefervation of Life. And this Connection can't be broken, at leaft not eafily, becaufe 'tis convenient it mould always be the fame. For inftance, the traCe of a great Precipice, which a Man fees under him, and from which there is danger of falling, or the Traces of fome bulky Body imminent over his Head, and ready to fall and crufh him, is naturally Connected with that which reprefents Death, and with a Commotion of the Spirits, which difpofes him to flight or the defire of fly- ing it. This Connection admits no alteration, becaufe 'tis neceflary it fhould always be the fame;.and it coniifts in a difpolltion of the Fibres of the Brain, which we bring with us into the World.
All the Connections which are not Natural, may, and ought to break; becaufe the different Circumftances of times and places ought to change, to the end they may be ufeful to the Pre- fervation of Life. 'Tis convenient the Partridge, for infrance, fhould fly the Sports-man with his Gun, at the feafon and the places of his purfuing the Game. But there's no neceffity it fhould fly him in other places, or at other times: Thus 'tis neceflary all Animals for their Pre- fervation fhould have certain Connections of Traces eafily made, and eafily broken; and that they fhould have others very difficult to be fever'd; and laftly, others incapable of Diflb- lution.
'Tis of very great ufe, to make diligent enquiry into the different Effects thefe different Conne- ctions are able to produce: For there are Effects, which as they are very numerous, lb they are no lefs important to the Knowledge of Man, and all things relating to him. We fhall fee hereafter, that thefe things are the principal Caufes of our Errors. But 'tis time to return to the Subject we have promis'd to Difcourfe on, and to explain the different Changes which happen to the Imagination of Men, by reafon of their different ways and purpofes of Life.
7* 7* I. That Men of Learning are the mo§l fubjeff to Error. II. The Cau-> . Jes why Men had rather be guided by Authority^ than make ufe of their own Reafon.
THE Differences obfervable in Men, as to their Ways and Purpofes of Life, are almoft infinite. Their, different Conditions, different Employments, different Pofts and Offices, _ and different Communities are innumerable. Thefe Differences are the Reafon of Men's acting upon quite different Defigns, and Reafoning upon different Principles. Even in the fame Community, wherein there fhould be but one Character of Mind, and all the fame Defigns; you fhall rarely meet with feveral Perfons, whofe Aims and Views are not different. Their various Employments, and their many Adhefions, neceffarily diverfifie the Method and Manner they would take to accomplifh thofe various things wherein they agree. Whereby 'tis manifeft that it would be an impoffible Undertaking, to go about to explain in particular the Moral Caufes of Error •, nor would it turn to any great Account fhould we do it in this place. I defign therefore only to fpeak of thofe Ways of Living, that lead^us into great - multitudes of Errors, and Errors of moft dangerous Importance. When thefe fhall be ex- plain'd, we fhall have open'd the way for the Mind to proceed farther; and every one may difcover, at a fingle View, and with the greateft eafe imaginable, the moft: hidden Caufes of many particular Errors, the Explication whereof would coft a world of Pains and Trouble. When once the Mind fees clearly, it delights to run to Truth; and it runs to it with an inex- preffible fwiftnefs..
The Imployment that feems moft neceflary to be treated of at prefent, by Reaion or its pro- L ducing moft confiderable Changes in the Imagination of Men, and its conducting them into Er- mm of rors moft, is that of Men of Books and Learning; who make greater ufe of -their Memory, L™™&„ than Thought. For Experience has ever manifefted, that thofe who have applied themfelves the ^ - J moft fervently to the Reading of Books, and to the Search ofTritth, are the Men that have fed J us into a very great part of our Errors.,„.
Error.
«i F. Malebranche Concerning Book II* >-Tis much the fame with thofe that Study, as with thofe that Travel. When a Traveller has unfortunately miftaken.his way, the farther he goes, at the greater diftance he is from his Tourney's end • and he ft1 11 deviates fo much more, as he is mduftnous and in halte to arrive at the place defied. So the vehement purfuits Men make after Truth caufe them to betake them- felves to the Reading of Books, wherein they think to find it j or put them upon framing fome Phantaftical Syftcm of the things they defire to know, wherewith when their Heads are full and heated they try by fome fruitlefs Sallies and Attempts of Thought to recommend them to the tafte of others, with hopes to receive the Honours that are ufually pay'd to the firft Founders of Syficms. Thefe two Imperfections are now to be confider'd* 'Tis not eafie to be underftood how it comes to pafs, that Men of Wit and Parts ehoofe rather to trult to the Conduct of other Men's Underitanding in the Search of Truth, than to their own, which GOD has given them. There is doubtlefs infinitely more Pleafure as well as Honour, to be conduced by a Man's own Eyes, than thofe of others. And a Man who has good Eyes in his Head, will never think of (hutting them, or plucking them out, under the hopes of having a Guide. And yet the ufe of the Underitanding is to the ufe of the Eyes, as the Underitanding is to the Eyes; and asxhe Underitanding is infinitely fupefiour to the Eyes, fo the ufe of the Un- deritanding is accompany'd with more folid Satisfactions, and gives another fort of Content, than Light and Colours give the Sight. Notwithftanding Men employ their Eyes in Guiding and Conducting themfelves, but rarely make ufe of their Reafon in Difcovery of Truth. ■Il But there are many Caufes which contribute to this overthrow of Reafon. Firft, Men's Na- The c'avfes tural CarelelTnefs and Ofcitation, that will not let them be at the Pains of Thinking. - ■why Men Secondly, Their Incapacity to Meditate, which they have, contracted, for want of applying had rather themfelves to it from their Youth •, as has been explahfd in the Ninth Chapter. bb gAutho- Thirdly, The inconcernednefs and little Love they have for Abftraft Truths, which are the rty, tLn Foundation of all that can be known in this World, male ufe of The Fourth Reafon is the Satisfaction which accrues from the knowledge of Probabilities, their own which are very agreeable, and extreamly moving, as being founded upon fenfible Notions.
Reafon. ^he p^ Caufe is that ridiculous Vanity, which makes us affecl: the feeming Learned. For thofe go by the Name of Learned, who have read molt Books: The Knowledge of Opinions is of greater ufe in Converfation, and ierves better to catch the Admiration of the Vulgar, than the Knowledge of True Philofophy, which is learned by Meditation.
In the fixth place, we may reckon that unreafonable Fancy, which fuppbfes the Ancients were more enlightned, than we can be; and that there is nothing left for us but what they have fuc- ceeded in.
The Seventh is a Difingenuous RefpecT: mix'd with an abfurd Curiofity, which makes Men ad- mire things that are molt Remote and Ancient, fuch as are far fetch'd, or come from unknown Clarusob Countries, as alfo Books that are molt Mylterious and Obfcure. Thus Heraclitush Repute here- obfcuram tofore was owing to his Obfcurity. Men are very inquifitive after Ancient Medals, tho' corroded linguam. with rult; and the Shoe or Slipper of one of the Ancients is refpedtfully preferv'd, though eaten Lucretius. Up wjth Worms: Their Antiquity makes them Venerable. There are fome Men who' apply them- felves to the Reading the Rabbins, becaufe they wrote in an outlandifh, very corrupt, and ob- fcure Language. Ancient Opinions are in greater efteem, for being more remote from us. And doubtlefs if Nimrod had written the Hiltory of his Reign, all the molt refin'd Politicks, and even all the other Sciences, had been found contain'd in't •, jult as fome have been able to difcover in Homer and Virgil, the perfect Knowledge of Nature. Deference, fay they, is due to Anti- Veritas fi- quity: How could Arifiotle, Plato, Epicurus, thofe grand Sages be miftaken? They do not confi- lia tempo- der,that Arifiotle,Plato,Epicurus,were Men like us, and of the fame Species with us; and moreover AS'n£" au" that the World fince their Time, is grown more than two thouiand Years older •, that it has or^ti3' gain'd greater Experience, and ought to be more enlightned; and that 'tis the Age and Experi- ence of the World that makes the Difcovery of Truth.
The Eighth Reafon is, That when a New Opinion or a modern Author is in Vogue, our own Glory feems to be obfcur'd, by being too near him: But we are under no fuch Apprehenfions from the Honour that is given to the Ancients.
The Ninth is, That Truth and Novelty are inconfiltent in matters of Faith. For when Men will not diltinguifh between Truths which depend on Reafon, and thofe which rely upon Tra- dition, they don't confider that they ought to be learn'd in a very different manner., They con- found Novelty with Error, and Antiquity with Truth. Luther and Calvin, and others, fay they, have Innovated and Err'd; therefore GalUUus, Harvey, and Des-Cartes, in what they have ad- vane'd as New, are deceiv'd. Luther's Confubftamiation is Novel, and is Falfe: Therefore Har- vey's Circulation of the Blood is Falfe, becaufe 'tis New; and for this Reafon they indifcriminately give the odious Title of Innovators, to Heretkh and New Philofophers. The Idea's and Terms of Truth and Anticfuity, Faljljood and Novelty, have been Connected one with another: And this is the Effed of it; the Vulgar part of Men no longer feparate them; and Men of Senfe find fome difficulty to feparate them, as they fhould do.
The Tenth is, That wc live in an Age wherein the Science of Ancient Opinions is ftill in great Repute: And 'tis only thofe few who can take the Liberty of Thinking, that are able, by the force of their Reafon, to fet themfelves above corrupt and evil Cuftoms. When a Man is in a prefs and a throng, 'tis a hard matter not to follow the torrent.
Laltly, dhap. V. The Search after Truths h% Laftly, Becaufe Men are aded only by Intereft; which is the Reafon that thofe themfelves who find out the Abufe, and difcover the Vanity of thefe forts Of Studies, flick clofe to them ftill *. Becaufe Honours, Preferments, and Benefices, are entail'd to them; and thofe who are Eminent herein, have a greater fhareof them, than thofe that are ignorant of them.
All thefe Reafons make it, one would think, eafie to be eonceiv'd, why Men implicitly follow the Ancient Opinions, as true; and rejed the New ones univerfally, asfalfe; finally, why they make no ufe, or very little of their Reafon. Undoubtedly there are abundance of other more particular Reafons, that contribute to it; but if thefe we have brought be attentively confi- der'd, it will be no matter of furprize to find fome Men obftinately Bigotted to the Authority of the Ancients.
CHAP. V.
CHAP. V.
Two pernicious EjfecJs Reading has upon the Imagination.
f~ "^HAT difingenuous and loofeRefped, which Men award the Ancients, is productive of abundance of very mifchievous Effeds, which 'tis worth while to confider.
JL. TheFirftis, That by accuftoming them to a difufe of their Reafon, it by little and see the little puts them under an utter Incapacity of ufing it. For it ought not to be imagin'd, that thofe ftfi Anidt who grow Gray in the Study of Arifiotle and Plato, make much ufe of their Underftanding: °fthe Pre~ They generally fpend fo much time in the Reading of thefe Books, meerly to enter into the c^&cf>A" Sentiments of their Authors: And their main Scope and Purpofeis, to know truly the Opinions * they held, without troubling themfelves much about thofe of them which ought to be held, as fhall be prov'd in the fucceeding Chapter. Thus the Science and Philofophy they learn, is pro- perly a Science of Memory, and not a Science of the Vnderftanding. They know only the Hifto- ry, and the matter of Fad, and not the evident Truths; and may more juftly be call'd Hiftori- ans, than true Philofophers.
The Second Effed produe'd in the Imagination by the Reading Ancient Authors, istheftrange confufion it makes in the Idea's of moft Men that give themfelves to it. There are two different ways of Reading Authors: The one is very Advantagious and Ufeful; the other very Ufelefs^ and alfo Dangerous. Reading is of great ufe, when one meditates on what one reads: When a Man by an EfTay of Thought endeavours the Refolution of the Queflions he fees in the Contents of the Chapters, before he begins to read them; when he Methodizes and Collates the Idea's of things with one another; in a word, when he ufes his Reafon. On the contrary, Reading is of no account, when he underftands not what 'tis he is about: But 'tis of dangerous confequence for a Man to read, and comprehend what he reads, when he does not flridly fearch and examine into it, fo as to be able to judge of it; and efpecially if he has Memory enough to retain what he conceives, and Imprudence enough to confent to it. The firft way enlightens the Underftanding, it corroborates and enlarges it Capacity. The Second ftraightens its Capacity, and renders it by degrees weak, obfeure, and confus'd.
Now the generality of thofe, who glory in the Knowledge of others Opinions, ftudy only the fecond Manner: And fo the more Reading they have, the more feeble, dark, and confus'd their Underftanding grows. The Reafon whereof is, that the Traces of their Brain are con- founded with each other; as lying in great numbers, and being never Poftur"d and Methodiz'd by Reafon •, which is the thing that hinders the Mind from imagining and reprefenting clearly the things it has occafion for. When the Mind would open fome particular Traces, finding others that are more familiar to it in the way, 'tis eafily impos'd upon. For the Capacity of the Brain being not infinite, 'tis hardly poffible a great quantity of Traces, form'd without Order and Me- thod, mould not entangle and perplex themfelves, and thereby put the Idea's in confufion. 'Tis upon this fcore, that Men of a great Memory are commonly incapable of judging well,concerning things that demand a great Attention, * But that which is efpecially remarkable, is, That the Knowledge Men acquire by Reading, without Meditation, and with defign only of retaining the Opinions of others; in a word, all Science that depends on Memory, is properly the Science that puffs up, and makes them Arro- gant; becaufe this is that which glitters moft to appearance, and makes the pofleffors vain and conceited, And thus we generally obferve thofe that are this way Learned, to be proud, haugh- ty, and prefuming; pretending to have a right of judging of all things, though very little quali- fy'd for that purpofe; which is the Reafon of their falling into multitudes of Errors.
But this falfe Science is the Caufe of a greater mifchief ftill. For thofe Perfons fall not into Error along, but draw whole troops of Vulgar Minds along with them; as alfo a vaft retinue of Young People, who Believe their Decifions, as Articles of Faith. Thefe falfly Learned, having opprefs'd and overborn them by the weight of their profound Literature, and maz'd them with the Dodrine of uncouth and extravagant Opinions, and the Names of Ancient and Unknown Authors, gain fuch an irrefiftible Sway and Authority over their Minds, that they reverence and admire as Oracles, whatever proceeds from their Mouth; and blindfold, and implicitly fubferi be • to all their Sentiments. Nay, Men of far greater Underftanding and Judgment, who had U never never known them, and who fhould not be inform'd what and who they were, feeing them talk info Magifterial a way and Decifive a ftrain, in fo haughty, fo imperious, and fo grave an Air, could fcarce forbear having a Refpeft and Efteem for what they fay, becaufe 'tis an hard matter to be unaffected with the Air, the Carriage, and Senfible manners of the Speaker. For as it often happens that your Arrogant and Confident Men are too hard for others of greater Abilities, but that are more Judicious and referved: fo thofe Men that maintain things nei- ther true, nor probable, often filence their Opponents, by talking in an Imperious, Haughty, or grave ftrain, that furprizes and amufes them.
Now thofe of whom we fpeak, have fo much Value and Efteem for themfelves, and Contempt for others, as to be confirm "d in a certain Faftuous Habit, mix'd with a fort of Gravity, and Fictitious Modefty, which prepoffeifes and wins the Hearer's Mind.
For it ought to be obferv'd, that all the different Airs and Behaviours of Men of different Con- ditions, are only the Natural Refults and Confequences of the Efteem every Man has for himfelf, in Relation to others: as is eafie to be feen if a Man confiders them a little. Thus an Haughty and a Brutal Air is peculiar to a Man that highly efteems himfelf, and difregards the Efteem of other Men: An Air of Modefty is the Air of a Man that fets little by himfelf, but has much E- fteem for others. The Grave Air is that of a Man who has a great Efteem for himfelf, and defire of being Efteem'd by others. The Simple and Down-right Air and Carriage is that of a Man neither folicitous about himfelf nor others.
Thus all the different Airs, which are almoft infinite, are only the Effects which the different de- grees of Efteem every Man has for himfelf, and for thofe with whom he converfes, naturally pro- duce in his Face, and in all the External parts of his Body. We have explain'd in the Fourth Chap- ter, that Correfpondence which is between the Nerves which excite the Paffions within us, and thofe that evidence them outwardly, by the Air they imprint upon the Face.
CHAR VI.
That Men of Learning generally are fo Opinionated with an Author^ that their Principal Drift Is the Knowing what he held^ without caring to know what ought to be held.
rnriHERE is ftill another Defect, of very great Importance, that Men of Reading are ordi- narily fubject. to: which is that they grow conceited with an Author. If there be any