£reat number of Errors, unlefs fhe Hands always upon her guard, with an inviolable Refolution of obferving the Rule given in the beginning of this Work: that is, of Denying an entire Content- gxceft to things entirely evident.
I pafs over the evil Choice that is generally made of the kind of Study Men apply themfelves to «S properly belonging to Moral Philofophy, to treat of} though it may likewife be reduc'd here to what has been faid of Prepolfeflion. For when a Man is fallen beyond retrival into the Reading of the Rabbins, and Books of all forts of moft unknown, and conlequently molt ufelefs Languages j and fpends his whole Life therein; he does it donbtlefs out of PrepofTeffion, and the Imaginary hopes of becoming Learned: though it is impoffible by that Method to acquire any true Sience. But becaufe this Application to unprofitable Studies does not fo much fubjeftus to Error, as wafte our Time, to polTefsus with a foolifh Vanity } I fhall notfpeak here of thofe who fondly think of becoming Learned in all thefe forts of fordid and unprofitable Sciences, the number whereof is very great, and the Study ufually too paffionate and earnelt.
CHAP. VIII.
CHAP. VIII.
I. Of the Inventors of new Syflems. II. The lafi Error of Men of Learning.
E have been manifefting the ftate of the Imagination of Men, of Books, and Study, I. who refign up all to the Authority of fome certain particular Authors. There are others of the Y f fti'l very oppofite to thefe; who have no refpecl: at all for Authors, let their Efteem /»w*'or* be what it will among the Learned. If they efteem'd them formerly, they are now of a contrary %fiem. Mind, and fet themfelves up for Authors. They love to be thought Inventors of fome new Opi- nions, thereby to procure Reputation in the World: and are well fatisfy'd, that by faying fbme- thing that was never faid before, they fhall not fail to have their Admirers.
This fort of People are generally of a ftrong Imagination; the Fibres of their Brain are in fuch a difpofition, as topreferve for a long time the Traces of what has been imprinted on them. Thus when once they have imagin'd a Syftem that has in it any thing of probability, 'tis impoffible to beat them out of it. Whatever any way makes for its confirmation, is moft heartily embrac'd and retain'd. And on the contrary, all the Objections that are made to it, are over-look'd j at leaft are eluded by fome frivolous Diftindtion. They are inwardly pleas'd with the fight of their own Workmanfhipi and of the Efteem, they hope, will redound to them from it. They only apply themfelves to confider the Image of Truth, deduc'd from their probable Opinions. They fix this Image ftedfaftly before their Eyes, but never behold with a fteddy View the other fides of their Sentiments, which would betray their Falfhood.
There muft go great Qualifi cations, to capacitate a Man to be the Inventor of any true Syftem. For 'tis not enough to have a quicknefs of Parts; there muft befides be a certain Capacioufnefs of Thoughts, and Reach of Mind, which can at one View take in a clear profpedt of a great many things. Little and narrow Minds with all their Vivacity and Delicacy, are too fhort-fighted to furvey all that is neceflary to be feen, for the eftablifhing a Syftem. They are check'd and even ftop'd with fome little Difficulties that difcourage them, or with fome glimmering Lights, which dazzle and carry them away: their Sight is too narrow to furvey at once the whole body of a capacious Subjedt.
But however Capacious and Penetrating the Mind is, unlefs it be withal exempt from Paffion and Prejudice, there is no Good to be hoped from it. Prejudices take up one part of their Mind, and tinge and infect all the reft. The Paffions confound all the Idea's a thoufand ways; and make us generally difcover in the Objedts, all that we have a mind to find in them. Even the Paffion, that we have for Truth, fometimes deceives us, when it is too vehement; But the Am- bition to be thought Learned, is the great Impediment to our becoming really fo.
Nothing then is more rare and extraordinary, than to find fuch Men as are capable of making new Syftems-, and yet nothing is more common than to find fuch, as have fram'd fome Syftem or other to their Humour. We fee few of thofe, who ftudy much, reafon upon common Notions-, there is ever fome Irregularity in their Idea's; which is an evident fign they have fome particu- lar Syftem we are unaquainted with. 'Tis true, all the Books they compofe, do not favour of it. For when their Bufinefs is to write for the Publick, Men are more cautious of what they fay •, and a bare Attention is often enough to undeceive them. Yet we fee Books Publifh'd from time to time, which are a fufficient Proof of what I fay. And there are Perfons who are proud to let the World know at the beginning of their Book, that they are the Founders of fome new Syftem.
The number of the Inventors of new Syftems is much increas'd by thofe, who have been pre- poflefs'd with any Author. For it often falls out, that having not met with Truth, nor any folid foundation in their Opinions of the Authors they have read; they firft enter into a great DiC like, and an high Contempt of all forts of Books; and thereupon fall to Imagining fome- proba- ble Opinion, which they hug and cherifh, and wherein they ftrengthen themfelves in the manner I have explain'd.
But So' F. Malebranche Concerning Book II; But as foon as this Heat of Affeftion for any Opinion is boyl'd over and abated, or the Defign of Appearing in Publick has oblig'd them to examine it with a more exact and feriouS Attention- they difcover the Falfrfy of it, and throw it up-, but with this Condition, that they will never take up any other, but utterly condemn all thofe, who lhall pretend to the Difcovery of any Truth...: So that the laft and raoft dangerous Error, which Men of Study fall into, is their Imagining there can be nothing known. They have read many Books, both Ancient and Modern, and have milVd of Truth in them: They have had many fine Notions of their own, which they have II found to be falfe, after a more Uriel: and attentive Examination. From whence they conclude a Confider tnat all Men are like themfelves; and that if thofe who fancy they have difcover'd fome Truths 'ruble Er- foo^d ferioufly confider them j they would be undeceiv'd as well as themfelves. And this is 'dor0)LMtU' enough for them to condemn them, without making any more particular Enquiry; becaufe if to en. ^^ ^.^ ^ condemn them, it would be a kind of Confeffion, that they were wifer than them- felves; a thing they cannot think very probable.
They look therefore upon thofe as Bigotted to their own Thoughts, who give out any thing as certain and infallible: Nor will they fuffer a Man to talk of Sciences, as of Evident Truths, which cannot reafonably be doubted of j but only as of Opinions, of which it is good not to be ignorant. Yet thefe Gentlemen would do well to confider, that though they have read a great number of Books, yet they have not read all j or that they have not read them with all the Atten- tion, that was neceffary to a perfeft Underftanding of them. And that though they have had many fine Thoughts, which they have found falfe in the Conclufion, yet they have not had all that are poffible; and fo 'tis no improbable thing, that others fhould have found better than themfelves. Nor is it necefTary, abfolately fpeaking, that others mould have greater Senfe than they, if that offends them \ for 'tis enough to have had greater Fortune. They need not be af- fronted to hear it faid, That others have Evident Knowledge of what they are Ignorant •, fince we fay at the fame time, that many Ages have been ignorant of the fame Truths: Not for want of excellent Wits; but becaufe thefe excellent Wits have not luckily fall'n upon them.
. Let them not be angry therefore, that a Man fees clearly,' and fpeaks as he fees; but let them apply themfelves to what is faid to them, if their Minds be ftill capable of Application, after all their Excurfions; and then let them judge if they pleafe. But if they will not examine it, let them hold their Tongue. But I would have them refled a little, whether that Anfwer fo readily made by them, to molt of the things demanded of them, No body Vnderftands it, No body knows how 'tis done, be not an injudicious Anfwer? Since to anfwer fo, a Man mult of neceflity believe he knows all that all Men know, or all that is poffible to be known by them. For had they not this Notion of themfelves, their Anfwer would be Hill more impertinent. And why mould they be fo hard put to it, to fay they know nothing of them, fince in fome particular junctures, they ac- knowledge they know nothing at all? And why muft all Men be concluded Ignorant, becaufe they are inwardly convince! they are Ignorant themfelves?
There are then three forts of Perfons that apply themfelves to Study. The firft are fuch as are prepoiteroufly Bigotted to fome Author, or fome inlignificant or falfe Science: The fecond are fuch as are prepoffefs'd, and full with their own Fancies: The laft, which ufually proceed from the other two, are fuch as Imagine they know all that is poffible to be known; and who fancying they know nothing with Certainty, conclude univerfally that nothing can be Evidently known, and regard all things that they hear, as bear Opinions.
'Tis eafie to be feen that all the Faults, incident to thefe three forts of Men, depend on the Properties of the Imagination, explain'd in the X. and XI. Chapters, and efpecially of the Firft. That all this is owing to Prejudice, which choaks up their Minds, and makes them infenfible to all other Objects, but thofe they are prepoffefs'd with. It may be faid that their Prejudices do in their Minds, what theMinifters of Princes do in refpecl: of their Matters j for as thefe Gentlemen permit, as little as poffible, any others than thofe of their own Party and Intereft, or fuch as are unable to difplace them from their Matter's Favour, to come to the fpeech of them; fo the Prejudices of the former fuffer not their Minds to take a full View of the pure and unmix'd Idea's of Objects. But they difguife them} they cloath them with their own Liveries; and thus all mask'd and difcolour'd prefent them to the Mind: So that 'tis next to impoffible it fhould difcover, and throw off its Errors, CHAP, Chap. IX. The Search after Truth. 8 i I. Of Effeminate Minds. II. Of Superficial Minds. III. Of Men of Authority. IV. Of the Experimental Philofophers.
I Have, if I miftake not, faid enough to difcover in general, what are the Faults of Imagina- tion j and the Errors whereunto Men of Books and Study are molt obnoxious. Now where- as there are few befides, who trouble their heads with Searching after Truth; and the reft of the World take up with their Opinion:, it feems we might put an end here to this Second Part. However, 'tis not amifs to add fomething concerning the Errors of other Men -, as being no un- ufeful thing to take notice of them.
Whatever flatters the Senfes, extreamly affect us \ and whatever affects us,makes us mind it in i. proportion to its affecting us. Thus thofe who refign themfelves up to all forts of molt Senli- of Effemi- ble and Pleafing Diverfions, are incapable of Penetrating into Truths ever fo little abltrufe and nm Mink difficult; becaufe the Capacity of the Mind, which is not infinite, is fill'd up with their Pleasures; or at leaft is very much divided by them.
The generality of Great Men, of Courtiers, of Rich, and Young, and of thofe We call the fine Wits, giving themfelves to perpetual Diverfions, and ftudying only the Art of Pleafing, by all that gratifie the Concupifcence and the Senfes 5 by degrees obtain fuch a Nicenefs in thefe things, or fuch a Softnefs, that it may be often faid, they are rather the Effeminate, than the fine Wits, which they would fain be thought. There is a great deal of difference betwixt a true Finenefs, and Softnefs of Mind. Though thefe two things are ordinarily confounded.
The Fine, or the Curious Wits are thofe whofe Reafon defcend to the leafl: Differences of things. Who fore-fee Effects which depend on hidden, un-ufual, and invifible Caufes. In brief, they are thofe who dive fartheft into the Subjects they confider. But the foft Minds have only a. counterfeit Delicacy and Nicenefs. They are neither Lively nor Piercing: They cannot fee the Effects of even the moll grofs and palpable Caufes. In fhort, they are unable to comprehend or penetrate any thing •, but are wonderfully nice as to Modes and Fafhions. An ungentile Word, a Ruftick Accent, or a little Grimace, fhall provoke them infinitely more than a confus'd mafs of lame and inconcluding Reafons. They cannot difcover the Defect of an Argument, but can cri* tieally difcern a falfe Step or an incompos'd Gefture. In a word, they have a perfect Underftan- ding of Senfible things, as having made continual ufe of their Senfes •, but have no true Know- ledge of things depending on Reafon, becaufe they have fcarce ever imploy'd their own.
Yet thefe are the Men that flourifh moft in the Efteem of the World ^ and who moff. eafily ad- vance to the Reputation of the Fine Wits. For when a Man talks with a free and eafie Air •■, when his Expreffions are pure, and well chofen •, when he ferves himfelf with Figures that pleafe the Senfes, and excite the Paffions in an imperceptible manner j though what he fays be nothing but Impertinence and Folly, though there be nothing good or true in his Difcourfe, yet he fhall be voted by the common Opinion the Fine, the Curious, the Acute Wit. 'Tis not perceiv'd that this is only a Soft and Effeminate Mind, that glitters with falfe Lights, but never fhines out with a genuine Brightnefs \ that only perfwades becaufe we have Eyes,and not becaufe we have Reafon.
For what remains, I do not deny but that all Men have a Tincture of this Infirmity we have now remark'd in fome part of them. There is no Man whofe Mind is not touch'd with the Im- preffions of his Senfes and Paffions -0 and confequently who has not fome Adherences to Senfible Manners. All Men differ in this but in degree of more or lefs. But the Reafon of charging this Fault upon fome particular Men, is, becaufe there are thofe who acknowledge it to be a Fault, and labour to correct it: Whereas the Men we have been fpeaking of, look upon it as a very ad- vantagious Quality: They are fo far from owning this falfe Delicacy as the Effect of an Effeminate Softnefs, and the Original of infinite Diftempers to the Mind, as to imagine it the Product and Sign of the Beauty and Excellency of their Genius.
To thefe may be added a vaft number of Superficial Minds, who never go to the bottom of II. ' things •, and have but a confus'd Perception of the Differences between them; but they are not in °f ^uperfi- the Fault, as are thofe before-mention'd •, for 'tis not their Divertifements that ftraiten their Souls cial^i"^s' and make them little-minded \ but they are naturally fo. This Littlenefs of Mind proceeds not from the Nature of the Soul, as may perhaps be imagin'd. 'Tis effected Sometimes by the pau- city or dulnefs of the Animal Spirits, fometimes by an immoderate plenty of the Blood and Spi- rits, by the inflexibility of the Fibres of the Brain, or by fome other Caufe not neceffary to be known.
There are then two forts of Minds. The one eafily obferves the differences of things; and this is the folid Mind. The other imagines and fuppofes a refemblance between them, which is the fuperficial Character. The firfr. has a Brain fitly difpos'd for the Reception of the clear and diftinct Traces of the Objects it confidersj and becaufe 'tis very attentive to the Idea's of thefe Traces, it fees the Objects at hand, and furveys every part of them. But the Superficial Mind receives only the faint and confus'd Traces thereof} and that, by the by, very remotely and ob- fcurely •, infomuch that they appear alike, as the Faces of thofe we behold at too great a diftance \ becaufe the Mind ever fuppofes Similitude and Equality, where 'tis not oblig'd to acknowledge Difference and Inequality; for the Reafons I fhall give in the Third Book, Y In g 3 Pi MAtEBiANCHE Concerning Book 1I0 In this Clafs may be reckon'd all your Publick Haranguers, and great Talkers -, arid many of thofe whoiiave a great Facility at delivering themfelves, though they fpeak but feldom. For 'tis extreamly rare for Men of ferious Meditation, to be able to exprefs themfelves clearly upon, the things they have thought. They generally hefitate when they come to Difcourfe about them, as bein? fcrnpulous and fearful of ufing fuch Terms, as may excite a falfe Idea in the Hearers. Being aftiam'd to talk purely for Talking fake (asis the way with a great many who talk peremp- torily on all adventures.) They are at a lofs at finding words expreffive of their un-obvious and ■ not common Thoughts. '.'-.".
III. Though I have the greateft Deference and Efteem imaginable for Pious Men, Divines, and of Men of Aged Perfons, and, in general, for all thofe who have defervedly a great Sway and Authority Anthony. over others \ yet I think my felf oblig'd to fay thus much of them, That it is ufual for them to think themfelves infallible, becaufe the World hears them with Refpeft \ that they exercife their Mind but little in difcovering Speculative Truths -y that they are too liberal in condemning what- ever their Pleafure and Humour fuggefts, before they have attentively confider'd it. Not that they are to be blam'd, for not applying themfelves to the Study of many Sciences, not veryne- ceflary for them to know; we allow them to omit them, and likewife to defpife them; but 'tis not fair to judge of them out of a fanciful diflike, and ill-grounded fufpicions. For they ought to confider that the Serious Air and Gravity wherewith they fpeak, the Authority they have ob- tain'4 over the Minds of others, and that cuftomary way of confirming their Difcourfe with a Text" of Scripture, mult unavoidably engage in Error their refpedlful Auditors \ who being in- capable of Examining things to the bottom, are caught with Modes and external Appearances.
When Error comes cloath'd in the Drefs of Truth, it frequently has more refpeft than Truth it felf: And this illegitimate Refpeft has very dangerous Confequences: Pefftma res eft Errorum Apotheofts, & pro pefte inteltetlus habenda eft ftvanis occedat veneratio. Thus when fbme Men out of a falfe Zeal, or a Fondnefs for their own Thoughts, bring the Holy Scripture to countenance or fupport falfe Principles of Phyficks, or other of like Nature, they are often attended to as Oracles, by the admiring Crowd, who credit them upon their word, becaufe of the Reverence they af- cribe to Divine Authority: Whtn at the fame time fome Men of a worfe Completion, have ta- ken occafion hereby to contemn Religion. So that by ftrangely perverting its Nature, Holy Scri- pture has been the Caufe of fome Men's Errors, and Truth has been the Motive and Original to other's Impiety. We fhould then be cautious, fays the fore-cited Author, of fearching after Dead things among the Living \ and of prefuming by our own Sagacity of Mind, to difcover in the Holy Scriptures, what the Holy Spirit has not thought fit to declare in it. Ex Bivinorum & Hu- manorum malefano admixtione, continues he, nonfolum educitur Philofophia phantaftica, fed etiam Relitrio haretica. Itaq^falutare admodum eft ft mente fobria fidei tantum derttur qua fidei funt. All Men, who have any Authority over others, ought never to determine till they have fo much themSre feri- oufly confider'd, as their Determinations are more obftinately adher'd to \ and Divines fhould be more efpecially regardful, left they give fcandal and contempt to Religion, through a falfe Zeal, by an ambitious defire of their own Fame, and of giving Vogue to their Opinions. But it being not my Bufinefs to prefcribe to them their Duty, let them hearken to St. "Thomas Aquinas their opufi. 2. Mafter, who being confulted by his General for his Opinion touching fome Points, anfwers him in thefe words of St. Auftin.
Multum autem nocet talia, qua ad pietatis doclrinam non fpeElant, vel offer ere vel negare, quaft perti- nent! a ad Sacram doclrinam. Dicit enim Auguftinus in 5. Confeff. Cum audio Chriftianum aliquemfra- trem ifta qua Philofophi de coelo aut ftellis Gr de Solis & Luna motibus dixerunt, nefcientem, & aliudpro aliofentientem,,patienter intueor opinantem hominem 5 nee illi obeffe video cum de ff, Domine Creator om- nium noftrurn, non credat indiqna, ft forte fit us Gr habitus creature corporalis ignorct. Obeft autemft h&c ad ipfam doclrinam pietatis pertinere arbitretur, & pertinacius affirmare audeat quod ignorat. Quod aut em obftt manij "eft at Auguftinus in \. fuper Genef. Ad liter am. Turpe eft, inquit, nimis & pemiciofum ac maximc cavendum, ut Chriftianum de his rebus quafifecundum Chriftianas lit eras loquentem, it a deli- rare quilibet infidelis audiat, ut quemadmodum dicitur toto coelo err are confpiciens; rifunt tenere vix poffit. Et non tamen mole ft um eft, quod errans homo vide at ur: fed quod Author es noftri ab eis qui for is funt, talia fenftffe creduntur & cum magno eorum exitio, de quorum falute fat ogimus, tanquam indotli repre- henduntur at que refpuuntur. Vnde mihi videtur tutius effe, ut hac qu& Philofophi communes fen ferunt, & noftra fidei non repugnant, nequc effe ftc offer enda, ut dogmata fidei, licet aliquando fub nomine Philofopho- rum introducantur, nequeftc effe neganda tanquam fidei contraria, ne fapientibus hujus mundi contemnendi doclrinam fidei, occafto pr&beatur: • 'Tis a dangerous thing pofitively to determine concerning matters, that are not of Faith, as if they were: St. Auftin is our Author for it, in the fifth Book of his Confcffwm: " When I fee c (fays he) a Chriftian, who is un-inftrufted in the Opinions of Philofophers about the Heavens, " the Stars, and the Motion of the Sun and Moon, and who miftakes one thing for another; I " I leave him to his Opinions and Uncertainties. Nor do I fee what injury it can do him (pro- ** vided he has right Notions of Thee our LORD and CREATOR) to be ignorant, of the 1 Site and Pofition of Bodies, and the different Regulations of Material Beings. But he does • himfelf wrong, in that he fancies thefe things concern Religion, and takes upon him obftinate- 1 ly to affirm what he does not underftand. The fame Holy Man explains his Thoughts more clear- ly yet, in his firft Book of the literal Expofition of Genefts, in thefe Words. " A Ghriftian fhould " be extreamly cautious of fpeaking of thefe things, as if they were the Dodrinc of the Sacred Writings; Chap. IX. The Search after Truth. 8| fe Writings j fince an Heathen vvho fhould hear him utter his Abfurdities, that had no appearance "of Truth, would Ridicule him for it. Thus the Chriftian would be put in confufion, and the " Heathen but ill-edify'd. Yet that, which on thefe occafions is matter of greatefi trouble, is, not " that a Man is found in an Error; but that the Heathens, whom we labour to convert,falfely,and " to their unavoidable deftruction, imagining that our Authors abound with thefe" ridiculous " Notions, condemn them, and fpurn them as Ignorant and Unlearned •, which makes me think " it much the fafer way, not to affirm as the Maxims of Faith, the common receiv'd Opinions tc of Philosophers, though not inconfiftent with them, ('though the Authority of Philosophers may " fometimesbe us'd to make way lor their reception,) nor to reject their Opinions as contrary " to Faith, left occafion be given to the Wife Men of the World, to contemn the Sacred Truths tc of the Chriftian Religion. * The generality of Men are fo carelefs.or urireafonablc, as to make no diftin&ion between the Word of GOD and that of Men, when joyn'd together. So that they fall into Error, by ap- proving them both alike; or into Irreligion by the contempt of both indifferently. 'Tis ealle to fee what is the Caufe of thefe laft Errors, and how pthey depend upon the Connexion of Idea's, explain'd in the XI. Chapter, and I need not ftaud more largely to explain them.
It feems feafonable to fay fomething here of the Chymifis, and of all thofe in general that im- f JV" ploy their time in making Experiments. Thefe are the Men that are in Search after Truth: Their ^1" Ex- Opinions are ufually embrae'd without Scruple and Examination. And thus their Errors are fa perimentsi much the more dangerous, as they are communicated to others with greater Facility.
The Study of Nature is undoubtedly more Noble, than of Books; Vifible and Senfible Experi- ments afford us much more certain Proofs of things, than the Reafonings of Men; and no Obje- " ction can be made to thofe Men, whofe Circumftances of Life have engag'd them in the Study of Natural Philofophy, for endeavouring to excel in it, by making continual Experiments; provided their greateft Application be made to the more neceflary Sciences. We find no fault with Ex- perimental Philofophy, nor the Improvers of it} but only with their Defects.
The firft of which is, that ufually 'tis not the Light of Reafon which conducts them in the Method of their Experiments, but only Chance. Which is the reafon that they grow little more Learned or Skilful, after having wafted much of their Time and Fortune therein.
The fecond is their infilling rather upon Curious and Extraordinary Experiments, than ori thofe that are more Common •, when 'tis plain that the Commoner being the more fimple, they ought firft to be dwelt upon, before a Man applies himfelf to the more Compounded, and to thofe which depend upon a multitude of Caufes.
The third is their earneft and diligent Search after Profitable Experiments •, and their neglect of thofe, which only ferve to illuminate the Mind.
The fourth, that they are too un-exad in their Obfervations of all the particular Circumftan- ces of Time, Place, the Quality of the Drugs made ufe of; though the leaft of thefe Circum- ftances is capable of fruftrating the defir'd Effect. For 'tis obfervable that the Terms the V~mnofi ufe, are Equivocal: The Word Wine, for inftance, fignifies fo many different things, as there are different Soils, various Seafons, and feveral ways of making and preferving it. So that it may be faid in general, there are no where two Veffels of it altogether alike. And when a Chymisl fays, To make fuch an Experiment, take wine, we have but a very confus'd Idea of his meaning. For which Reafon they fhould ufe a moft exact Circumfpection jn Experiments, and notdefcend to the Compound fort, till they are very well acquainted with the more Simple and Ordinary.
The fifth is, That they make too many Deductions from a fingle Experiment; when on the contrary, to the Eftablifhing any one good Conclufion, there fhould go generally many Experi- ments. Though a fingle Experiment may be affiftant to the inferring many Conclufions.
Laftly, The moft part of Naturalists and Chymifts confider only the particular Effects of Na- ture. They never afcend up to the firft Notions of the Things Bodies are compos'd of. When yet it is moft certain we can have no clear and diftinct knowledge of any particular Phenomena, unlefs we are firft mafters of the moft general Principles, and run them up as high as Metaphy- fich. To conclude, they commonly want Courage and Conftancy, and are tir'd and difcourag'd with the Toil and Expence. There are many other Faults thefe Gentlemen are fubject to, but I defign not to reckon them all up.
The Caufes of thefe Faults which I have remark'd, are the want of Application j the Proper-* ties of the Imagination explain'd in the Tenth and Eleventh Chapters; and Men's judging of the Difference of Bodies, and the Changes they undergo, only from the Senfations they have of them 3, according to the Explication given in the Firft Book.
The The THIRD PART: Concerning The CONTAGIOUS COMMUNICATION Of Strong Imaginations.