For though Sin has corrupted all things, it has not utterly deftroy'd them. Though our Na- tural Inclinations have not always God for their End, by the free Choice of our Will; yet they always have by the Inftitution of Nature: fince God who both produces and preferves thefe In- clinations in us, does it only for Himfelf. For all Sinners tend to God, by the Impreffion they receive of Him; though they recede from Him by the Errour and deviation of tlieii Mind. They love well, it being impoffible to love ill, whilft God is the Author of Love: but they love Evil things; Evil, only becaufe God, who gives Sinners the Power of Loving, forbids their loving them, by reafon of their withdrawing Men, ever fince the Fall, from the Love of Himfelf. For whillt they imagine that the Creatures are the Caufe of the Pleafure and Pain they feel, or re- ceive Occafwnally from them, they run fiirioufly to the embracing thefe Bodies, and fo fall into an utter Oblivion of God, who is not Vifible to their Fyes.
We have ftill then the fame Natural Inclinations, or Impreffions of the Author of Nature, as Adam had before his fall. We have even the fame Inclinations as the Ble/fed have in Heaven: tor God neither makes, nor preferves any Creatures, but He poffeffes therri with a Love like His own. He loves Himfelf, and us, and all His Creatures: and therefore Creates no Spirits, but withall inclines them to love God, Themfelves, and all the Creatures.
But as all our Inclinations are only the Impreffions of Nature's Author, which carry us to love Him, and all things for His fake, they can never be regular, but when we love God with ail our Strength, and all things for the lake of God, by a Free and Premeditate Choice of our Will: For The Search after Truth. %zA For 'tis Imufice and Abufmg the Love of God, which he gives us for tiimfelf, to lay it out on any thing oefides, or without Relation to him...,..;...
And thus we now know not only what are our Natural Inclinations, but alio what they ought to be, to become regular, and as they were inftituted by their Author. For all the Diforders of our Inclinations, have no other Root than this, that we fix our Ultimate End in Our felves, and inftead of referring all to God, center all things upon Self, Firft then, we have an Inclination for Good in general, which is the Principle of all our Na- tural Inclinations, all our Paflions, and all the Free Affections of our Will.
Secondly, we have an Inclination for the Prefervation of our own Being, or Welfare.
Thirdly, we have an Inclination for other Creatures -, which are either ufeful to our felves, or thofe we love. We have yet many other particular Inclinations which depend on thefe, which probably we may treat of elfewhere. In this Fourth Book my only Defign is to reduce' the Er- rours of our Inclinations to three Heads, to. the Inclination we have for Good in general, to Love of of Our felves, and of our Neighbour.
CHAP. II.
CHAP. II.
I. The Inclination for Good in general^ is the Principle of the Rejilefnefs of of the Will. II. And confequently of our Inadvertency and Ignorance. III. The firfl Inflame^ (fhewing that) Morals are but little known by the generality of Men. IV. The fecond Injlance, (fhewing that) the Im- mortality of the Soul is controverted by fome People. V. That we are in extreme Ignorance^ in point of JbJlraSl things, and which have but little reference to us.
THAT vaft Capacity which the Will has for all Goods in general, by reafon of its being made £ for a Good that comprehends in it all Goods, can't be fill'd by all the things the Mind re- fhe. InJ prefents to it •, and yet the continual Motion which God impreffes it withall, is never ftopt -, which CqZ1T^T neceffarily gives a perpetual Disturbance and agitation to the Mind. The Will which feeks after matjlfthe what it delires, obliges the Underftanding to reprefent all forts of Objects: which when repre- Principle of fented by the Underftanding, the Soul cannot tafte-, or if fhe tafles, fhe remains unfatisfied.theRfleh She cannot tafte them, becaufe the View of the Mind is leldom accompanied with Pleafure, which ffli0* the- is the Seafoning, whereby the Soul relijhes her Good; and (he is not fatisfied, becaufe nothing can ~ * flop the Motion of the Soul, except the Author of the Impreflion: Whatever the Mind reprefents, as the Good of the Soul, is finite; and whatever is finite, may detain her Love for a moment, but cannot fix it. When new and extraordinary Objects come under the confideration of the Mind, or fuch as have a Character of Infinite, the Will gladly bears with an attentive Difcufiion for fome time, as hoping to find what fhe is in Search of-, becaufe that which appears Infinite, bears the Signature of its real Good? but after a while, is difgufted with this, as with the reft, and leaves it. Hence it is ever reftlels and fluctuating, becaufe it is fated to feek what it never can find, though always in hopes of: And it loves whatever is Great, Extraordinary, and Infinite -, becaufe having mifs'd of its true Good, in common and familiar things, it fancies it may be found in fach as are unknown. We fhall fhew in this Chapter, that the Reftlefsnefs of our Will is one of the Principal Caufes of our Ignorance, and the Errours we are guilty of, upon infinite fubje£ts, and in the two following, mall explain what it is that breeds that our Inclination for all that's Great, and Extraordinary.
Firft, It is plain enough from what has been faid, That the Will is only folicitous to apply the n; Understanding to thole Objects which are related to us, and is very negligent as to the reft: For And con* that being by a Natural Impreffion, ever longing and Impatient after Happinefs, it turns the ~Un-feiueMly°f derftandmg only upon thofe things, which afford us Pleafure and Advantage. wrtenct Secondly, That the Will permits not the Underftanding to bufie it feiflong, even about things andigna^ that afford fome Pleafure; becaufe, as has been faid, all Created things may pleafe us for a feafon, ranee, but they quickly grow diftaftful, and then our Mind declines them, and takes new ways to other Delights, and Satisfactions.
Thirdly, That the Willis prompted to put the Underftanding on thefe defultory advances from Ob- ject: to Object:, from that confus'd, and as it were, diftant Reprefentationthe Underftanding gives of Him; who includes in Himfelf all Beings? as has been faid in the Third Book. For the Will defiring, as I may fofpeak, to bring its real goodclofer, foas to be affected by it, andto receive its quickning Motion; excites the Underftanding, to reprefent it by peice-meal: But then this is no lon- ger the General, the Univerfal, and infinitely Perfect Being, Which the Mind perceives; but fome- thing of a limited and imperfect: Nature, which the Will fpeedily abandons, as finding it unable to flops Its Motion, and pleafe It any considerable time, and fo purfues after another Object.
Mean while, the Advertency and Application of the Mind, being abfblutely neceflary to the difco- very of Truths ever fo little abftrufe, it is manifeft that the Vulgar of Men, muft be molt grofly Ig norant^ 140 F. Malebranghe Concerning wmnt, even in point of iuch things, as have fome reference to them; but inconceivably Blind, as.
to all Abftra£t Truths, and to which they have no fenlible Relation. But we muft try to make thefe things manifeft by fome examples • III. There is no Science that ftands in fo near a Relation to us, as Moral Philofophy: which teaches us Thefirft our Duties to God and our King, our Kindred and Friends, and in general to all about us. Befides inflame, |t points out the way we mult follow to become eternally Happy: fo that all Men are under an thatTm- Euential Obligation, or rather an difpenfible Neceflity of refigning themfelves to the Study of it.
rah are but Notwithftanding Generations of Men have fuccefhvely continued fix thoufand Years, and yet this little known Science is ftill very imperfect.
iythe gene- ^hat' part 0f Morals which refpe&s our Duty to God, and which queftionlefs is the Principal 9 Men. °f a^-> as rating t0 Eternity, has been little known by Men of the greateft Learning -, and there are ftill to be found Men of Senfe, who have no Knowledge of it, though the eafieft part of all Mo- ral Philofopy. For firft of all, What difficulty is there to find out the Exiflence of a God? Every of his works is a proof of it: All the Actions of Men and Beafts prove it: Whatever we think, whatever we fee, whatever we feel, demonftrates it: In a word, there is nothing in the World but proves that there is a God; or at leaft may prove it, to Men of attentive Minds, who feriouf- ly betake themfelves to Search after the Author of all tilings.
Again, it is evident that we muft purfue the Orders of God, if we will be happy: For fince He is Juft and powerful, we cannot Difobey him, without being punifh'd; nor obey Him, with- out a recompence. But what is it he requires of us? That we love Him, that our Thoughts be poP fefs'd with Him, and our Heart fet upon Him. For, what end had God in Creating Minds, and all things elfe? Certainly no other than Himfelf: So that being made for Him we are indifpenfibly oblig'd from diverting elfewhere the Impreflion of Love, which He perpetually maintains in us, in order to Our perpetual loving Him.
Thefe Truths are not very difficult to be difcover'd by any attentive and considering Man; and yet this fole Moral Principle, That to become Vertuous and Happy, "'tis abfolutely neceffary to Love God above all things, and in all things, is the Foundation of all Chriftian Morality. Nor is there need of very great Application to deduce from thence all neceffary Confequences, to fettle the General Rules of our Behaviour? though few there are that do it; whilft daily Difputes arile about Queftions of Morality, which are the immediate and neceffary Refults of fo lelr-evident a Principle as this before us.
The Geometricians are continually making new Difcoveries in their Science-, and if they do not much advance it, 'tis becaufe they have already drawn from their Principles, the moft ulef ul and neceffary confequences: But the greateft part of Mankind, feem incapable of concluding any thing from the Firft Principle of Morals. All their Ideas vanim and diffipate, when their Will inclines them barely to confider it. Becaufe they will not as they ought; and they will not as they ought, be- caufe they cannot tafte it ^ or that having tailed it, are prefently diftafted. For 'tis an AbftraG:, Metaphyseal, and purely Intellectual Principle, and not attainable by Senfe or Imagination. And therefore feems to Carnal Eyes, or Minds that fee no farther than their Eyes, to have no folidity. Nothing appears in this Principle likely to fettle and compofe the reftlefs agitation of their Will, and thereupon to flop the View of their Mind, and fix it attentively on confidering it. What hope then is there they mould fee it well, comprehend it right, and draw thofe direct Inferences from it which they ought?
. Thofe who mould have but an imperfect apprehenfion of this G<w#/#77Vtf/ Proposition, That the fides of Similar Triangles are proportional, could certainly be no great Geometricians: But if, be- fides that confus'd and imperfect Perception of that Fundamental Propofition of Geometry, they had fome Intereft, why the fides of Similar Triangles mould not be proportional; and if Falfe Ge- ometry were as fuitable to their perverfe Inclinations as Falfe Morals, we mould fee as abfurd Pa- ralogisms in Geometry as Morality; becaufe their Errours would be pleafant to them, and Truth would only trouble, perplex, and confound them.
Hence we need not wonder at the Blindnefs of Men in former Ages, who liv'd whilft Idola- try fiourifh'd in the World, or of fuch as live at prefent unenlightned with the Sun-mine of the Gofpel: It was needful for Eternal Wifdom to cloath it felf with Senfibi/ity, to infttuct Men that enquire only of their Senfes. Four thoufand Years together Truth was. manifefted by fpeaking to their Mind; but not entring into themfelves, they did not hear it; 'twas requifite therefore it mould fpeak unto their Ears: The Light which enlightens all Men, fhin'd upon their Darknefs, without difperfing it-, and they could not behold it. Intelligible Light mult veil it felf and be- come Vifible: The Word muft be made F/eff); and hidden and inacceflible. Wifdom muft inftruct Men in a Carnal manner; Carnaliter, fays St. Bernard. The Generality of Men, and efpecially jer. 39. de tjie Yoox, (who are the worthieft Object of their Creator's Mercy and Providence,) thole who are *r.inL' °* 0^'g ^ t0 ^a^or ^or Xneir Living, are extremely ignorant and ftupid. They hear only becaufe they have Ears, and fee only becaufe they have Eyes: But are incapable of retiring into themfelves, by any Effort of Reafon, there to examine Truth, in the filence of their Senfes and their Pafftons.
Truth they cannot apply to, becaufe they cannot reliQi it; and commonly that application enters not their Heads, becaufe they cannot think of applying themfelves to unaffe&ing Objects. Their del ultory and reftlefs Will continually cafts the View of their Mind upon all fenfible Objects, the Variety of which is pleafant and diverting. For the Multiplicity and Diverfity ot Senfible Goods, ferve to conceal their Vanity, and to keep up our Hopes of finding among them the True Good, which we defire.
Thus Chap. It. The Search after Truth. izj-t Thus though the Counfels which JESUS CHRIST, in quality o? Man, of the Way, and of Author of our Faith, gives us in the Gofpel, are much more proportion'd to. the weaknefs of our Mind, than thole which the fame CHRIST, as He is Eternal wifdom, Internal Truth, In- telleUual Light, infpires into our molt inward Realbn; and though He renders thefe His Counfels delegable by His Grace, 'Jenfible by His Example, and convincing by His Miracles; yet Men are lb ftupid and inconliderate, even as to things of greateft importance to be known, that they fcarce ever think of them as behooves them. Not many perceive the Excellency of the Gofpel, nor the Soundnefs and Neceffity of the Precepts of our LORD; few there are that meditate on them, fo as to nourifii and itrengthen the Soul by them: The continual toffing and agitation of the Will, which looks for the Enjoyment of Good, permitting not thofe Truths to be infilled on, which feem to deprive the Soul of it. Here follows another proof of what I am aiTerting.
Doubtlefs it much concerns, and lies upon the Wicked, to know whether their Soul is Mor- JV. tal, as they fuppofe it; or Immortal, as Faith and Realbn allure: as being a thing of geateft mo- Thefcconi ment and importance to them; fince the Queition lays their Eternity at ftake, and the quiet of $*"*?' their Mind depends on the refolve. Whence comes it that they are ignorant, or doubtful in the tLTj'fbc matter, but from their want of ferious Attention, and the Reftlefnefs and Corruptnefs of their MmortalU Will, not fuffering the Mind to take a Iteady View of the Reafons which contradict the Opi- *y of the nion they "wiih to be true? For in brief, is it fo difficult to difcover the difference between the Sml H cf: Body and Soul, betwixt a Thinking and an Extended thing? Muff, a Man bring fo great an At- 2^/pL//. tention to perceive that a Thought is neither Round nor Square; that Extention is capable only of different Figures and Motions; but not oi'' Thought and Reafoning: and fo, that what Thinks and what's Extended, are two Beings altogether oppofite. And yet this is all that's requifite to demonftrate the Immortality of the Soul, and thatlhe is not perijhable, though the Body fhould be annihilated.- True it is, when a Subftance perifbes, that the Modes or Manners of its Exigence perifri with it: as were a piece of Wax annihilated, it is certain the Figures of that Wax would be annihilated alfo: becaufe the Roundnefs, for inftance, of the Wax is really nothing, but the Wax it felf, exifting in fuch a?nanner, and fo cannot fubfift without the Wax, whole Mode it is. But though God fhould deftroy all the Wax in the World, it would not follow from thence that any other Subftance, or Modes of Subftance fhould be annihilated. All Stones, for example, might fubfift, together with their Modes: Becaufe Stones are Subjlances or Beings, and not Modes of Being of the Wax.
So though God fhould annihilate the half of a Body, it would not follow that the other half was annihilated. The latter half is united to the other, but is not one with it. And therefore one half being annihilated, it might be reafonably inferr'd, that the other half was no longer related to it; but not that it did it felf exift no longer: for being a different Being, it could not be reduced to nothing by the annihilation of the other; Thence 'tis manifeft, that Thought be- ing not the Modification of Extenfion, our Soul is not annihilated, on luppofition that our Body were annihilated by Death.
But we have no reafon to imagine that even the Body is annihilated, when it is deftroy M. The parts that make it up, are dilTolv'd into Vapours, and redue'd into Duft: we neither fee nor know them any more, I confefs; but we cannot hence conclude they exift not; For the Mind perceives them ftill. If we feparate a Muftard-feed'into two, or four, or twenty parts, we an- nihilate it to our Eyes, becaufe we fee it no longer; But 'tis not annihilated in it felf, or to the Mind; for the Mind difcerns it, though divided into a thoufand, or an hundred thoufand parts.
'Tis a common Notion, and receiv'd by all that ufe their Reafon rather than their Senfes, That nothing can be annihilated by the ordinary force of Nature. For as 'tis naturally impoflible for fomething to be produced from nothing, fo 'tis impoftible for a Subftance or Being to be reduced, to nothing. Bodies indeed may corrupt, if you call Corruption the Changes that befall them, but cannot be annihilated. What is round, may become fquare; what is Flefh, may become Earth, Vapour, and whatever you pleafe: for all Extention is capable of all forts of Configuration: But the Subftance of what is round, or Flefh, can never perifli: There are certain fettled Laws in Nature, by which Bodies change fucceffrvely their Forms ^ becaufe the fucceffive Variety of thefe Forms, makes the Beauty of the Univerie, and caufes us to admire its Author. But there is no Law in Nature for the annihilation of any Being, becaufe Kothingnefs, wants all Beauty, as well as Goodnefs; and the Author of Nature is the Lover of his works. Bodies then may- change, but can never perifh.
But if any one flicking to the Verditt of his Senfes, fhall obftinately maintain, that the dif- fblution of Bodies is a true Annihilation •, becaufe the parts they refolve into, are invifible: Let him do fo much as remember that Bodies cannot be divided into thefe invifible parts, but by reafon of their Extenfion. For if the Mind be not extended, it muft be indivifible, and if indi- vifible, muft be acknowledg'd incorruptible in rhat fenfe. But how can the Mind be imagined extended and divifible? A right Line will divide a Square into two Triangles, Parallelograms or Trapezia: But by what.Line may a Pleafure, a Pain, or a Deftre be conceiv'd to be divided? and what Figure would refult from that Divifion? Certainly I cannot believe the Imagination fo fruitful in falfe Ideas as to fatisfie it felf in this particular.
The Mind therefore is neither extended, nor divifible, nor fufceptible of the fame chan- ges as the Body^ and yet it muft be own'd, that it is not immutable by its Nature. If the Body is capable of an infinite number of different Figures, and different Configurations; 0 o the 1*2 F. Malebranghe Concerning Book IV.
the Mind is likewife capable of a world of different Ideas, and different Modifications. And as after our Death, the Subllance of our Flem will refolve into Earth, Vapours, and infinite other Bodies, without annihilation; fo our Soul without falling back into Nothing, will have Thoughts and Senfations very different from thofe Hie has during this Life. At prefent 'tis neceiTary that we live, and that our Body be compos'd of Flem and Bone; and in order to live, 'tis neceiTary the Soul mould have Ideas and Senfations, relating to the Body me is joyn'd to. But when me (hall be diverted of her Body, fhe mall enter upon a perfect Liberty of receiving all forts of Ideas and Modifications, very different from thofe me has at prefent; as the Body on its part mall be free to receive all forts of Figures and Canfigurations, nothing like thofe it is oblig'd to make the Body of a living Man.
It is, if I miltake not, manifeft from what I have faid, That the Immortality of the Soul is no liich hard thing to comprehend. Whence comes it then, that fo many doubt of it, but from their Inadvertency, and want of Attention to the Reafons that are requifite to convince them? or whence proceeds this negligence, but from the Unfetlednefs and Inconltancy of the Will, in- ceiTantly dilturbing the Underftanding > So as not to give it leafure for a diltincl Preception, even of Ideas that are the raoft prefent to it, fuch as are thofe of Thought and Ext en/ion: as a Man in the heat of a PatTion, cafting his Eyes round about him, feldom diftinguifhes the Objects that are nearer!, and molt expos'd to View. For indeed the Queftion of the Immortality of the Soul, is one of the eafieft to be refolv'd, when without liltning to the Imagination, we bring the Mind attentively to confider, the clear and diftin£t Idea of Extenfion, and the Relation it can. have with Thought.
If the Inconft ancy and Levity of the Will, hinders the Underftanding from piercing to the bottom of things that are moft prefent to it, and of mightieft Importance to be known; 'tis eafie to judge what greater Remoras it will afford the Mind, to prevent its Meditating on fuch as are Re/vote and Unconceming. So that if. we are under the GroJJeft Ignorance and Blindnejs, as to moft things of greateft confequence to be known •, I can't tell how we mould be very Intelligent and Enlightened, as to thofe that feem altogether Impertinent and Fruitlefs.
This I need not Hand to prove by tedious Inftances, and which contain no confiderale Truths; for if we muff be ignorant of any thing, that beft can be deipens'd with, which is of no ufe: and I had rather not be credited, than make the Reader lofe time by unprofitable things.
Though there are but very few, that are ferioufly taken up with things altogether Vain and Ufeiefs; yet thofe few are too many: But the number can't be too great of fitch as negle£l them and defpifethem; provided only they forbear to judge of them. A limited Underftanding is not blameable for not knowing feveral things, but only forjudging of them. For Ignorance is an un- avoidable Evil: But Errour both may, and ought to be avoided: Ignorance of many things is ex- cujable, but headlong inconfiderate Judgments never, v. When things are nearly related to us, are Senjible and ealily Imaginable -, we may fay that the Thatree Mind intends them, and that fome Knowledge of them is attainable: for knowing that they re- treme te't - ^ate t0 us' we tn^n^ °f them with fttfne. inclination -, and feeling rhem to affeft us, our Applica- 'rance 'm°~ tion grows pleafant and delightful: So that we mould, as to many things, be wifer than we point of are, but for the Reftlefnefs and Agitation of our Will, that perpetually troubles and fatigues Abjiratf 0ur Attention. ■ which'lave ^ut w^en things are abftratl and infenfible, 'tis difficult to acquire any certain Knowledge of tut little them: not that abftracl things are in their own Nature intricate and puzling; but becaufe the reference to Attention and View of the Mind commonly begins and ends with the Senjible View of Objects: m' for as much as we moftly think of only what we fee and feel, and as long as we fee and feel it.
'Tis certain, that if the Mind could ealily keep up to clear and diftinft Ideas, without be- ing as it were fupported by fome Senfation;• and without having its Attention perpetually di- fturb'd by the Reftlefhefs of the Will; we mould find no great difficulties in infinite Natural Queftions, but in a fhort time mould get rid of our Ignorance, and Efrours about them, which we now look upon as inexplicable.
For inftance, 'tis an indilputable Truth to every Man that makes ufe of his Reafon, that Cre- ation and Annihilation exceed the ordinary force of Nature. Should we now ftick to the confe- deration of that pure Notion of the Mind and Reafon, we mould not fo readily admit the Cre- ation and Annihilation of fuch innumerable multitudes of New Beings, as of Subftantial Forms, Real Qualities, and faculties, and the like. We fliould look for the reafon of Natural Effe£ls, in the diftincl: Ideas of Extenfion, Figure and Motion; and this is not fo difficult as is imagin'd: For all Nature hangs in a continued chain, and the parts of it mutually prove each other.
The Effects of Fire, as thofe of Cannons and Mines, are very wonderful; and their Caufe as fecret and conceal'd.. Neverthelefs, if Men inilead of adhering to the Impreffions of their Sen- fes, and laffe and delufive Experiments, fhould infill on that fole Notion of Pure hue! left: That 'tis impoffible for a Body gently mov'd to produce a Violent Motion in another; fince it cannot com- municate more moving Force, than it has it felf -, it would be eaiie from that fingle Notion to conclude, there is fome fubtile and invifible Matter; that it is violently agitated, and univerfally diftus'd among all Bodies, and feveral things of like kind, which might ferve to explain the Nature of Fire, and to difcover other yet more intricate and hidden Truths.
For feeing fo great Motions produced in a Cannon or a Mine, and all the vifible furrounding Bodies, in too little Commotion to effeft: them, we are infallibly affur'd there are other in- vifible and infenfible Bodies, which have at leaft fo much Motion as' the Cannon Bullet; but being Cliap. III. The Search after Truth. t being extremely fine and fubtile may, when alone, pafs freely and without burfting any thing through the Pores of the Cannon, before it is fir'd; that is, as may be feen explain'd at large in Mr. des Cartes, before they have furrounded the hard and grofs parts of the Saltpeter, which the Powder is compos'd of. But when the Fire is kindled, that is, when thefe molt fubtile and agitated particles, have encompaiTed the grofs and folid parts Of the Saltpeter, and fo have com- municated their moil forcible and violent Motion to thein^ all muft neceflarily burft: becaufe the the Pores of the Cannon, which gave a free paffage on all fides to the fubtile parts we fpeak of, when alone •, are not large enough to receive the grofs parts of the Saltpeter, and others that make the Powder, when agitated by the fubtile particles that environ them.
For as the Water of a River (hakes not the Bridge it runs under, becaufe of the minuteness of its parts. So this moft fine and fubtile Matter continually paffes through the pores of all Bo- dies, without caufing any fenfible alteration. But, as again that River is able to overturn a Bridge, when bearing down its Stream huge maffy pieces of Ice, or other more folid Bodies, it daffies them againft it with the fame force that it felf is mov'd by: fo the fubtile Matter is capable of thofe aitonifhing Effects, obfervable in Cannons and Mines; when having communicated to the parts of the Powder, fwimming in the midft of it, an infinitely more violent and rapid Motion, than that of Rivers and Torrents; thefe fame parts of the Gunpowder cannot freely pafs through the Pores of the including Bodies, becaufe of their too great bulk: and therefore open them- felves a way, by violently breaking what withstands them.