If I thought the World would be concern'd to know exactly that the Animadverter has not underftood what he has pretended to encounter, I would thus continue him on to the end of his Book, and would make it undeniably appear that he has hardly ever taken my Senfe, and that he had no Idea of my Defign; but I believe that reafonable Men will be very indifferent in this particular:, and therefore not to weary them to no purpofe, and yet to difcharge that Debt which fome perfons think I owe to Truth, I will an- fwer in few words all the Chapters of the Animadverfions ^ and I defire fuch as mail have leafure and cu- riofity enough, to examine whether my Anfwers are jult, by confronting the Animadverfons with the Search. In the fourth Article or Chapter, the Animadverter oppofes my Opinions at large, without knowing them. He does not confider there are two forts of Traces, one which the Mind forms to reprefent things by, as the Trace which accompanies the Idea of a Square •, the other which accompanies ahftraft Ideas but re- prefents them not; fuch are the Traces which the Sound of Words and the Sight of Characters produce irt the Brain, which naturally have no power to reprefent or raife Ideas. This one Diftincf ion overthrows the grand Reafonings of our Author.
In this fifth Chapter he puts upon me many Opinions which I never had. 'Tis not true, Page 44. That I acknowledge all our Ideas to be but Modes of our SouPs exifiing. On the contrary, I have in the third Book which he reflects on, given a Chapter on purpofe to /hew that Opi- nion indefenfible. When a Man will play the Critick, 'tis fit, methinks, he mould read the Page 47. Book he takes to task. Nor is it true, that I own that the Ideas we receive by the Senfes^ re- prefent only the Effecls produced in us by external Objetfs. I have faid the contrary in feveral places, in the fifteenth Chapter of the firft Book, and elfewhere. Why does he not cite, or rather why does he not examine what he Criticifes on? For what remains, I cannot diftincf ly conceive all the Argu- mentations he here makes. I know not the Reafon of them: thofe who attentively read them may think of them what they pleafe. But I fcruple not to affirm, that he is fo far from impugning my Opinion about the manner of the Minds perceiving external Objects; that on the contrary, what he fays in this Article (hews he knows nothing of it. In his fixth Chapter, he impofes on me what he calls my fixth Supposition; or rather he has no knowledge of my Opinion upon that Subject: To me he feems not fo much as to have read what I Page 56,57. have written on it 5 he affirms in feveral places that I bottom upon Mr. des Cartes"' s refolution upon that ^uefticn, when yet my Opinion is intirely different from his. But 'tis evident to all that underftand Mr. des Cartes, and have read what I have faid upon that Queftion, that the Author neither underftands mine nor Mr. des Cartes's Opinions. Mean-while he argues vehemently without know- ing what he oppofes, and even fometimes without difcovering what he aims at.
The Author is very much in the wrong in his feventh Chapter, to require me to prove the Page 62. Exiftence of Extenfion^ when I mean only to aflault the Errours of the Senfes in point of fenfible Qualites, and I mould have repented if I had follow'd that Method. I prove what is ferviceable to me in the fequel, and I eftablifh nothing upon the Suppofition he attributes Page 64. to me. Moreover I cannot tell how it came into his Head, after feven years, to complain of an Anfwer of Monfieuj^Rohault -, he mould have replied to it whilft he was alive, but he want- ed courage: for every one knows with what accuracy and force that learned Man repell'd the Blows that were ofier'd him, and with two or three words, pronounc'd without all manner of Heat and Paifion, hum- bled the Imagination of fuch as being full of themfelves, thought to cover him with confufion.
In anfwer to the eighth Chapter, I defire the Author to take notice, firft, that there is dif- Page 80. ference between an Evil, and the Reprefentation of it ■, and therefore the Will may fly the for- mer, and yet aquiefce in the latter. Secondly, that though the Will be nothing but the na- tural Motion of the Soul towards Good in general? yet the Reft or Acquiefcence of the Soul in evident Truths proceeds from the Will, becaufe Reft is produ'd by Motion. God will ftill imprint on us this na- tural Motion of Love, when we fhall intirely repofe our felvesupon him. For the Motion of Love doth not ceafe by the poifeffion of Good, and by the view of Truth, as Motion of Bodies is interrupted by Reft. We might fay farther, that even Bodies reft not as capable of Figures, but with refpecl: to Motion. The reft need no Anfwer, if the Reader will carefully confider thofe places in the Search which he attacks; for 'tis needlefs to anfwer Objections which vanifh upon a diftincl: Underftanding of what I have written, though they appear confiderable in themfelves.
In the ninth Chapter the Author oppofes my own Objections, and neglects the Anfwers I have given them j and not knowing there are feveral forts of Liberty, he fancies, with a great deal of Joy, that I have fallen into a Contradiction.
I have nothing to fay to his Tenth Chapter, but that what he comments on feems too clear Page 98. to ltand in need of his Reflexions ^ and that I think it cannot reafbnably be doubted there is a City in Italy call'd Rome, though it cannot be mathematically demonftrated. In the eleventh Chapter, the Author does notobferve that I have referred to fome Books of St. Aufiin, and the Meditations of Mr. des Cartes, to prove a thing, which yet is fufficiently receiv'd, and which he pretends I had no right to fuppofe. He ought to know my Defign was not to eftablifh a Syftem, and to re- member that all I vigoroufly demand, is, to enter into fome diffidence of our Senfes; as I have caution'd in the laft Chapter concerning the Errours of the Senfes.
In anfwer to the Coniequences he infers in his Twelfth Chapter, againft an Example alleadg'd by me, and which he will have to pals for an Head of my Method, we need but (ay, that Men ought to reafon only upon their clear and diftincl Ideas, whithout being follicitous about what they cannot reach -, and that 'tis not neceflary to know whether there are actually Bodies without us, to conclude many Phyfical Truths.
I have PREFACE.; I have no more to fay to his Thirteenth Chapter, bur that I wifh a Man would attentively read what I have laid concerning the manner of our knowing the Soul, in the Seventh Chapter of the Second Part of the Third Book, and the Chapter following, where I fpeak of the Effence of Matter.
Laft of all, to do juftice to the Reafonings of the laft Chapter ^ it fuffices to know diftin&ly my manner of explaining how we fee external Objefts.
This is all I thought neceffary to anfwer to the Animadverter, as being perfuaded that thofe who tho-r roughly conceive my Notion will have no need of an Illuftration upon the pretended Difficulties he urges to me; and others who have not read nor comprehended the things I treat of in the Book he oppofes, would not underftand the largeft Anfwers I could give them.
'Tis fufficiently manifeft from the three firft Chapters of the Animadverfions, which I have refuted more at large, what, we are to think of the other, which I have anfwerd in a word or two. Thofe who have Time and Inclination may examine them more exactly: but for my own part I mould think I wafted both my own time and that of others, if I fhould ftay to collect all the Paralogifms which are fcatter'd through his Book, to acquaint thofe perions with them, who doubtlefs have little or no delire to know them.
The Reafon and Judgment of worthy Men cannot fuffer thofe long-winded Difcourfes, which tend to no good, but onely (hew the Spleen and ill Humour of their Authors; and 'tis a ridiculous thing to imagine that others interefs themfelves in our Quarrels, and to call them to be WitnelTes of the weakneis and vain ef- forts of our Adverfary.
He that attacks me has no reafon to find fault with my manner of Defence; for if I anfwer not all his Animadverfions in an ample way, 'tis not becaufe I defpife him. He may conclude, that I mould not have warded off the Blows he defign'd me, if I did not think him able to hurt me; and I think I have more reafon to complain of the negligence of his Animadverting, than he has to be angry at my manner of anfwering him. Had our Author zealoufly buckled to engage me, I am perfuaded he had found me Exercife:, for I judge hot of the Strength of his Parts by a venturous Sally of his Pen, which he feems only to make by way of Paf- time. Thus the negligence he manifefts is to my advantage, and for my part I complain not of his remif1 nefs, as being unworthy his Application and his Anger. All that I am forry for, is, that he fpeaks not fe- rioufly of ferious things j that he fports with Truth, and wants fome of that Refpeft which is due to the Pub- lick, when he trys to over-wit it feveral different ways, as this Anfwer in part has manifefted.
If I have been oblig'd to lpeak of him as I have done on fome occafions, he muff, thank no body but himfelf} for I have fupprefs'd, for fear of difpleafing him, many Exprefhons and Thoughts, which his man- ner of a£ting breeds naturally in the Mind. I have fo great an Averfion to all ufelefs Contefts, and that are pre- judicial to Charity, that I will never anfwer thofe who oppofe me without underftandingme, or whofe Dif- . courfes give me fome reafon to believe they have fome other motive than the Love of Truth. As for others I fhall endeavour to fatisfie them. I fee' plainly, that if I were oblig'd to anfwer all that have the good Will of affaulting me, I mould fcarce ever enjoy the repofe I defire. But as there is no Law in France which hinders them from lpeaking, fo there is none which forbids me to be filent.
It may be whilft I am filent, my Infulters may find themfelves ill treated by fome invifible hand -, for I cannot help it, if the Love of Truth provokes fome Wits, who might do it with better Grace, to defend a Work in which they had no part. But I wifh this promife I make, and freely without any conftraint, may be remembred $ and that thofe Writings may not be imputed to me, which I might make, but which I de- clare I never will. Mean-time I think that thofe that have nothing folid to oppofe to me, had much better lay nothing, than fatigue the World with Writings, which break Charity, and are ufelefs to the difcovery of Truth.
ADVERTISEMENT.
ADVERTISEMENT.
Since the firft Impreffion of this fecond part, two Books have been publifh'd relating to it. The firft en- tituled, Animadverfions upon the Animadverfions on the Search after Truth, wherein is difcovered, &c. lam highly oblig'd to the Author of thefe Animadverfions for the Honour he feems to do me by the Title of his Book} but fince this Title may make the World believe I had fome hand in his Work, I think my felf oblig d to fay, that though I am very well fatisfied with his Perfon, I am not extremely pleas'd with his Book. Methinks that thofe who meddle in defending or oppofing others, ought to read their Works carefully, fo as to be throughly acquainted with their Opinions. But the Search after Truth, you'll fay, me- rits not the Application of Men of Parts: True, it deferves not therefore that the Perfon fpoken of, who un- doubtedly is a Man of great Senfe and Worth fhould either impugn or defend it.
The Title of the fecond Book runs thus^ The Animadverter" s Anfwer to the Preface of the fecond Volume of the Search after Truth, wherein is examined &c. I intreat thofe who interefs themfelves in the diffe- rence of others, not to believe me on my bare word, nor eafily to imagine I am in the right. I think I have Liberty to demand of them, that they will carefully examine the Anfwers I have made to the Animadverfions in that Preface, and the Argumentations of the Animadverter, in reference to the Book oppos'd > fol think I may without offence to the Author of this Anfwer, require of thofe who would judge of it, not to ima- gine he has reafon on his fide, upon a flight and tranfient reading of his Book. I defire them not to judge of any of his Anfwers before having examined it, with reference to this Preface and the preceedmg Books. Take here for an inftance the firft of his Anfwers, which begins thus.
Upon what the Author of the Search pretends, the Animadverter impofes on him The Animad* touching his Defign ( a ). ' - gj* An' 5Tis not impofing on him, to make his Book pafs for a Collection ofObfervations, thought by him ufefultothe difcovery of Truth. 'Tis plain I have pofitively declared that I look upon his Book, as a Collection oj many Re* marks^ &c. If the Author had confider'd thefe words, he would not have aceus'd me of impofing on him s ' fox 8 PREFACE.
for he could not deny but he had a Defign of offering fomething ferviceable to the difcovery of Truth, which is all that I attributed to him. And lower, Wherein I even prove that that is not to be imputed to him, which he affirms I impofe upon him. Laflly, he concludes this Article with thefe words; "lis therefore evident the Author of the Search cannot prove I impofe on him, unlefs he will maintain he had a Defign of Writing a Book altogether ufelefs to the Search of Truth.
Thefe Words?night pojjibly make a Man imagine, I had without Reafon accused the Animadverter cfimpo- fing on me in the Dejign of the Search -, but whoever would but confront what he here fays with the foregoing Preface, or with what he has f aid himfelf pag. 9, 10. of his Animadverfions, would 1 hope be of another mind. That I may not give the trouble of turning to it, thefe are my words.
Neverthelefs as he is pleas'd to make me undertake a Defign I do not execute, that he may have the more to charge upon my Conduft, fo he goes to prove it was my Defign to lay down a Method in that Book. I do him no injury, fays he, in looking on his Book as a Method to lay the Foundation of the Sciences. For befides that the Title expreffes fo much, he declares himfelf upon the Point in the following manner: " Let us " examine the Caufes and Nature of our Errours; and fince the Method of examining things by confideiing " them in their Birth and Origin is the moft regular and perfpicuous, and ferves better than others to give w us a thorough knowledge of them, let us try to put it here in pra&ice.
Methinks tiyefe words, I do him no injury, fays he, &c. which I cite out of the Animadverfions, are clear enough, and that a Man need but underftand Englifh to fee that the Animadverter impofes on me a Defign of giving a Method, and pretends too to prove it by the Title of the Search, as alfo by a paffage of the fame Book; and yet he boldly concludes this Article with thefe words, 'Tis therefore evident the Author of the Search cannot prove I impofe on him, 2tc.
But what! he has pofitively declar'd he look'd upon the Search after Truth, as a Colle&ion of many Ob- fervations. I cannot deny, fays he, but he had a Dejign of offering fomething ufeful to the difcovery of Truth, which is ALL (mark that word) I attribute to him. Since he has a mind to be diverted, fee my Anfwer.
A Painter has drawn a Polyphemus, and Handing behind his Piece, hears fome Critick fay, Look here, Gentlemen, the Artift defign'd to paint an Hercules •, but if you mind it, it is a Polyphemus. The Pain- ter, out of patience, ftarts from behind the Scene, and gives the Spectators to undreltand, he had no Defign of reprefenting an Hercules, and that he impofes on him. The Critick furpriz'd, addreffes the Painter, Sir, why fo angry? what did you defign to reprefent? Polyphemus, returns the Painter. Strange, Sir! replies the Critick, why do you fay I impofe on you? I call thefe Gentlemen to witnefs, that ALL that I laid, was, you had drawn a Polyphemus: upon which the Painter withdraws contented, and fays no more.
I think my felf therefore obliged to reft filent upon fuch like Anfwers. I have fhewn by the Animadver- ter's own words, that he impofes on me a Defign of giving a Method in the firft Book of the Search, and • that he likewife pretends to prove it. I have cited the place of the Animadverfions, from whence I have taken my proof. Neverthelefs, this Author affirms he does not impofe on me-, that 'tis evident I can- not prove it •, that he proves quite contrary; that what I fay he impofes on me is not to be imputed to me -, that ALL he atributes to me is a Defign of offering fomething ufeful to the difcovery of Truth. In a word, that he has pofitively declared he look'd on the Search as a Colle&ion of many Obfervations > as if from his regarding the Search as a Collection, it were to be concluded I had no other Defign.
I fay no more then, but hope this Example may keep Men from judging without examining. I have ta- ken the three firft Pages of his Book, and have not given my felf the liberty of chufing, which ought to be confider'd; yet I intend not this for an Anfwer, remembring the obligation I have laid on my felf at the end of the preceding Preface •, and I had rather thofe who think I have not 'fatisfied the Animadverfions, becaufe I have anfwer'd but three Chapters at length, fhould fay, this Book whereof I anfwer but three Pages re- mains without Reply, than weary the World with Anfwers, which tend only to the juftifyng other Replies.
F. MALE* F. MALEBRANCHE's Concerning the SEARCH after TRUTH.
TOMEII. BOOKV.
CHAP. L Of the "Nature and Original of Pajpons in general.
TH E Mind of Man has two effential or neceffary Relations extreamly difFerent; the one to God, and the other to its Body. As mere Mind, it is eflentially united to the Di- vine Word, the Eternal Wifdom and Truth; fince it is only by that Union that 'tis ca- pable of thinking, as is proved in the Third Book. As a humane Mind, it has an ef- •fential Relation to its Body, fince it is by Virtue of that Union that it imagines and perceives by its Senfes, as is explained in the Firji and Second Book. We call the Mind Senfe or Imagina- tion, when the Body is the natural or occasional Caufe of its Thoughts: and we call it Under' fianding, when it a&s by it felf, or rather, when God a&s in it, or his Light illuminates it feve- ral different ways, without a neceffary Relation to what is done in the Body.
It's even fo with the IK/7/ of man-, as a Will, it effentially depends on the Love that God bears to himfelf, on the Eternal Law, and in fhort on the Will of God. It is only becaufe God loves himfelf, that we love any thing-, for if God did not love himfelf, or did not continually influence the Soul of man with a Love like his own; that is, with the Motion of Love, whichr a Man feels in himfelf for Good in general -, we mould love nothing, we fliould will nothing-, and ccnfequently mould be deftitute of Will -, fince Will is nothing elfe but that Impreflion of Nature that carries us towards Good in general, as hath been faid feveral times *. *5M£ r; But the Will, confidered as the Will of Man, effentially depends upon the Body, fince it is cf}aP-?• by reafon of the Motion of the Blood and Animal Spirits, that it feels its felf affected with all alV* elfe°- its fenfible Commotions. And therefore I have called Natural Inclinations all the Motions, which re" the Soul has common with pure Intelligences, together with fqme in which the Body hath a great Share, but of which it is only the indirect Caufe and End, and I have explained them in the fore- going Book. Here I underltand by Paffions, All the Motions which naturally affett the Soul, on occafwn of the extraordinary Motion of the Blood and Animal Spirits. And lb mall thefe fenfi- ble Commotions be the Subject of this Book.
Though the Paffions be infeparable from the Inclinations, and Men be only fufceptible of a fen- fible Love and Hatred, becaufe they are capable of a Spiritual Love and Hatred -, however it was thought fit to treat of them feparately, in order to prevent Confufion. For if it be confidered, That the Paffions are far ftronger and livelyer than the Natural Inclinations -, that they have for the moft part other Objecfs, and are always produced by different Caufes: it will be granted, That we do not diftinguifh, without Reafon, things that are infeparable in their own Nature.
Men are capable of Senfations and Imaginations only becaufe they are capable of pure Intellecti- ons, the Senfes and Imagination 'being infeparable from the Mind; and yet none finds fault with thofe that diitincbly treat of thofe Faculties of the Soul, which are naturally infeparable.
Laft ©fall, the Senfes and Imagination differ not -more from the pure Undemanding, than the Paffions from the Inclinations. And therefore as the three firft Faculties ufe to be diftinguifhed, fo ought alio the two Lift:,' that we may the better diftinguifh what the Soul receives from its Au- thor, with Relation to its Body, from that which it alio lias from him, but without that Relation.
The only Inconveniency that may grow out of the diftincfion of two things fo naturally united, is the necefiity of repeating fome things that had been faid before, as is ufual in the like occafions.
Man is one, though he be Compounded of feveral parts, and the union of thofe parts is fo intim.ite, that one ot' them cannot be affected without a Commotion of the whole. All his A Faculties ' F. Malebranche Concerning Book V1.
Faculties are linked together, and fo fubordinated, that it is impoffible to explain fome of them, without touching upon the others: St) that when we labour to find out a Method to prevent Con-- fufion, we neceflarily fall into Repetitions: but 'tis better to repeat, than not to be Methodical, becaufe we ought above all to be plain and intelligible; and therefore whatever we can doe in this occafion, is to repeat^ if poffible, without wearying the Reader.
The Paihons of the Soul are Imprefiions of the Author of Nature, which incline us to love our- Body, and Whatever is ufeful for its prefervation: As the natural Inclinations are Impreflions of the- lame Author;, that principally move us to love him as the Sovereign Good.
The natural or occafional Caufe of thefe Impreffions is the Motion of the Animal Spirits, which difperfe through the Body, to produce and maintain in it a difpofition fuitable to the Object per- ceived, that the Mind and Body may in that conjuncture mutually help each other. For 'tis the Inftitution of God that our Willings be attended with fuch Motions of our Body, as are fit to pur them in execution •, and that the Motions of our Body which Machinally rife in us, at the per- ception of fome Object, be followYi with a Paflion of the Soul, that inclines us to will what feems at that time profitable to the Body. It is the continual Impreffion of the Will of God upon us, that keeps; us fo ftrictly united to a portion of matter •, for if that Impreffion of his Will mould ceafe but a moment, we fhould inftantly be fid of the Dependency upon our Body, and all the Changes it undergoes.
For I cannot underftand what fome people imagine, that there is a necelTary Connection betwixt the Motion of the Blood and Animal Spirits, and the Commotions of the Soul. Some fmall Par- ticles Of Choler violently move in the Brain, muft therefore the Soul be agitated with fome Paffi- on, and muft that Paflion be Anger rather than Love? What Relation can there be conceived be- twixt the Idea of an Enemy's Imperfections, the Paflion of Contempt or Hatred, and the Corpo- real Motion of fome Particles of the Blood, that beat againft fome parts of the Brain? How they can imagine that the one depend upon the other, and that the Union or Connection of two things fo diftant, and fo incompatible, as the Mind and Matter, can be caufed and preferved any other- wife, than by the continual and Almighty Will of the Author of Nature, is to me unconceivable.
Thofe that fuppofe that Bodies necelTarily and by themfelves communicate their Motion to each other, in the inftant of their concourfe, make but a probable fuppofition? neither is their preju^ dice altogether groundlefs, fince Bodies feem to have an EiTential Relation to Bodies. Bat the. Mind and Body are two forts of Beings fo oppofite, that thofe who think that the Commotions! of the Soul neceflarily follow upon the Motion of the Blood and Animal Spirits, do it without the leaft probability. For nothing but our own Confcioufnefs of the Union of thofe two Beings,' and the Ignorance of the continual Operations of God upon his Creatures, can make us imagine another Caufe of the Union of our Soul and Body, than the Will of God.
It is hard to determine, whether that Union d'r Connection of the thoughts of the Mind of Man, with the Motions of his Body, is a punifhment of Sin, or a Gift of Nature. And fome perfons believe it a rafh and imprudent Attempt to chule one of thefe Opinions rather than the other. It is well known, that Man before his Sin was not a Slave, but abfolute Matter of his Paffions, and that he could, merely by his Will, Hop at his pleafure, the Agitation of the Blood that caufed them. But we can hardly perfuade our felves that the Body did not importune the Soul of the frrft Man to find out fuch things as were fit for the prefervation of his Life: We can fcarce believe but Adam before his Sin found Fruits pleafant to the fight and grateful to the Taffe, if we rightly confider the words of the Holy Scripture; nor (hall we come to think that the Oeconomy of the Senfes and Paflions, which is fo wonderfully contrived and adapted to the pre- fervation of the Body, is a Corruption of Nature, inftead of its Original Inftitution.
Doubtlefs Nature is at this prefent corrupted: the Body acts too violently upon the Mind: and whereas' it ought only to make an humble Reprefentation of its wants to the Soul, it domi- neers over her, takes her off from God, to whom fhe ought to be infeparably united, and conti- nually applies her to the fearch of fuch fenfible things, as tend to its prefervation. She is grown as it were material and tereftrial ever fince her Fall; the EiTential Relation and Union that fhe had with God being broken, that is to fay, God being withdrawn from her, as much as he could be without her deftruction and annihilation. A. thoufand diforders have attended the abfence or de- parture of him that preferv'd her in Order •, and without making a longer Enumeration of our Mi- series, I freely confefs that Man fince his Fall is corrupted in all his parts.
That Fall however has not quite deftroyed the Work of God -, for we can ftill difcover in Man, what God at firft put in him; and his immutable Will, that conftitutes the Nature of every thing, was not changed by the Inconftancy and Ficklenefs of the Will of Adam. Whatever God has once wilfd he ftill wills, and becaufe his Will is efficatious, brings it to pafs. The Sin of Man was indeed the Occafion of that Divine Will, that makes the Difpenfation of Grace, but Grace is not contrary to Nature h neither do they deftroy each other -y fince God is nor oppofed to himlelf, that he never repents, and that his Wifdom being without Limits, his Works will be without End.
And therefore the Will of God, that conftitutes the Difpenfation of Grace, is -fuperadded to that which makes the Oeconomy of Nature, in order to repair and not to change it. There are then in God but thefe two general Wills, and the Laws by which he governs the World depend on one or other of them It will plainly appear, by what follows, that the Palhons are very well order'd, if conlidered only in reierence to the Prefervation of the Body, though they deceive us in fome \ery ore and particular Oc^afions. which theuniverfal Caufe did not think fit to remedy, * Thence * Thence Chap, H. • The Search after Truth. 4 Thence I conclude, That the Paflions belong to the Order of Nature, fince they cannot be ranked under the Order of Grace.
. Tis true, that feeing the Sin of the firfi man has deprived us of the Help of an always- prelent God, and always ready to defend us; It may be laid, That Sin is the Caufe of our ex- ceihve adhefion to fenfible tilings, becaufe Sin has eftranged us from God, by whom alone we can be rid of our Slavery.
But without infilling longer upon the Enquiry after the firft Caufe of the PaiTions let- us ex- amine their Extent, their particular Nature, their End, their life, their DefeQs, and whatever they comprehend.
CHAP. II.
# Of the 'Union of the Mind with fenfible things j or of the Force and Extent of the Paffions in general.
F all. thofe who read this Work would be at the pains to refleft. upon what they feel within themfelves; it would not be necelTary to infill upon our Dependency upon all fenfible Ob- jects. I can fay upon this Head but what every one knows as well as I do, if he will but think on it; and was 'therefore very much inclined topafs it over. But Experience having taught me, That Men often forget themfelves lb far, as not to think or be aware of what they feel, nor to en- quire into the Reafon of what pafles in their own Mind; I thought it fit to propofe fome Confi- derations that may help them to refle£t upon it. And even I hope, That thofe who know fuch things will not think their Reading ill bellowed: for though we do not care to hear limply re- hearied what we very well know, yet we ufe to be affe&ed with Pleafure at the hearing of what • we know and feel together.