Seeing we are oblig'd to employ fuch Terms as common life has approved of, the Reader mould not be iurprird to meet with Obfcurity, and fometimes with a fort of Contradiction in our Words. And if it wete but confidefd that the Sedations and Commotions of the Soul, that an- fwer to the Terms us'd in fuch Difcourfes, are not wholly the fame in all Men, becaufe of their different Difpofitions of Mind, they would not fo eafily condemn us; when they could not enter in- to our Opinions. This I fay, not fo much to prevent Objections againft rny felf, as that we may un- defftand the Nature of the "Paflions, and what we are toth'ink of Books treating of fuch Matters..
After fo many Cautions, I (hall not flick to fay, that all the Paflions may be referr'd to the three Primitive, namely, Dejire, Joy 2xA_ Sorrow-^ and that it is fpecially by the different Judg- ments the Soul makes of Goods and Evils, that fuch as relate to the, fame Primitive Paflion dif- fer from each other.
For Inflance, I may fay that Hope, Fear, and Irrefolution, that is the Mean betwixt them both, are Species of Defire: That Boldnefs, Courage and Emulation, £?V. have' a greater Relation to Hope, than to all others g and that Timidity, Cowardife, Jealoufie, &c. are Species- of Fear.
I may fay, that Alacrity and Glory, Kindnefs and Gratefulnefs, are Species of Joy, caufed by the Sight of the Good that we know to be in us, or in thole to whom we are united; as Derifion or Jeering is a fort of Joy, commonly arifing at the Sight of the Evil that befalls thole from whom we are feparated. Lattly, That Diftafte, Tedioufnefs, Regret, Pity, Indignation, are fo many kinds of Sorrow, caufed by the Confideration of fomething difpleafing.
But befides thofe Paflions, and feveral others I pafs by, which particularly relate to fome of the Primitive Paflions, there are yet many others, whole Commotion is almoft equally compounded, either of Defire and Joy, as Impudence, Anger and Revenge ^ or of Defire and Sorrow, as Shame, Regret and Vexation -, or of all Three together, when Motives of Joy and Sorrow meet. And though thefe laft Paflions have no particular Names that I know of, they are however the molt common ^ becaufe in this Life we fcarce ever enjoy any Good without a Mixture of Evil, nor fuffer any Evil without Hopes of being freed of it, and enjoying Good. And though Joy be altogether contrary to Sorrow, yet it allows of its Company, and even admits it an equal Sharer in the Capa- city of the Soul as Volenti when the Sight of Good and Evil divide its Capacity as Intelligent.
All the Paflions therefore are Species of Dejire^ Joy and Sorrow; and the chief difference be- twixt thofe of the fame fort mult be taken from the different Perceptions or Judgments that caufe or accompany them. So that to become learned in the Nature of Paflions, and to make of them the molt accurate Enumeration poflible, it is requifite to enquire into the different Judgments that may be made of Good and Evil. But as we efpecially intend to find out the Caufe of out- Err ours, we need not fo much to infill upon the Judgments that precede or caufe the Paflions, as upon thofe that follow them, and which the Soul makes of Things when Ihe is agitated by fome Paflion, becaufe thofe laft Judgments are the moft liable to Errour.
Such Judgments as precede and caufe the Paflions, are almoft ever falfe in fomething, becaufe they are, for the moft part, grounded upon fuch Perceptions of the Soul as confider Objects in rela- tion to her, and not as they are in themfelves. But the Judgments that follow the Paflions are falfe all manner of ways •, becaufe fuch Judgments being only made by the Paflions, are only grounded upon the Perceptions the Soul has of Objects as relating to her, or rather to her own Commotion.
In the Judgments that precede the Paflions, Truth and Falfhood are join'd together •, but when the Soul is agitated, and judges by every Infpiration of the Paflion, Truth vanilhes, and Falfhood remains to be- the Principle of fo many more falfe Conclufions as the Paflion is greater.
All Paflions juftifie themfelves, continually offering to the Soul the moving Object, in the fitteft way for preferving and increafing her Commotion. The Judgment, or the Perception that cauies it, gets lull new Forces from the Increafe of the Paflion, and the Paflion likewife augments pro- portionably as the Judgment that produces it, in its turn, is ftrengthen'd.
Thus [falfe Judgments and Paflions join in Confederacy, for their mutual Prefervation. And fhould the Fleart never ceafe fending up Spirits for keeping open the Tracks of the Brain, and fupplying the Expences, which that violent Senfation or Commotion make of the fame Spirits, Paflions would perpetually increafe, and never allow us to be fenfible of our Errours. But as all our Paflions depend on the Fermentation and Circulation of the Blood, and that the Heart can ne- ver furnifh as many Spirits as are necelfary for their Prefervation, they muft needs expire when the Spirits diminilh, and the Blood grows ccol again.
Though it be an eafie matter to difcover the ordinary Judgments of Paflions, yet 'tis not a thing to be neglected ^ there being few Subjects that defer ve more the Application of an Enquirer after Truth, who endeavours to free himfelf from the Dominion of the Body, and will judge of every thing by true Ideas.
We may inftruct our felves in this Matter two ways, either by pure Reafbn, or by our inward Conicioulhds, when we are agitated by fome Paflion, For Inftance, Experience teaches us, That Chap. XL lbs Search after Trhth, ■;■■ That we are apt to judge of thofe we love not, to their Difklvantage, and' to fpit all the Venom of' our Hatred at the Object of our Paflion. We alfo know by Reafon, that as we cannot hate bur what is Evil; (o 'tis neceffary for the prefervation of Hatred, that the Mind mould.repreient to it felf the worft part of its Object. For 'tis fufficient to fuppole that all Paflions juitifie themfelve., and give inch a Dilpofition, firft to the Imagination, then to the Mind, as is fit to preferve their own Commotion, directly to conclude what are the Judgments which all the Paflions caufe us to Thofe that are endued with a ftrong and lively Imagination, that are extremely fe rifible, and - much fubjeSt to the Motions of Pallions, may perfectly inform themfelves of thofe things by'their own inward fenfej and it often comes to pafs, that they fpeak of them in a more pleating and iri- ftrucling manner than others, whofe Reafon over-tops their Imagination: yet it follows not, that thofe that difcover beft the Springs of Self-love, that penetrate fartheli into Man's Heart, and more feniibly difcover its Recefies, are always the greatelt Underitandings. This only proves that they are livelier, quicker of Imagination, and fometimes more malicious than others.
But thofe tiiat without confulting their inward Senfe, make ufe only of their Reafon to enquire into the Nature and Erfe&s of Paflions ^ though they be not always fo quick-lighted as others are always, more rational, and lefs obnoxious to Errour j becaufe they judge of things as they are in themlelves: They fee very near what Men polTeft with Paflions can doe, as they fuppole them more or lefs agitated-, but do not raflily judge of the Actions of others, by what they would doe themfelves in fuch Occafions • for they well know, that Men are not equally fenfible to the fame things, nor alike fufceptible of involuntary Commotions, and therefore 'tis not by confulting our Senfations which the Paflions create in us, but by liftening to Reafon, that we muft treat of the Judgments that accompany them; left we f hould draw our own Pitture, inftead of difcovering the Nature of Paflions in general* CHAP. XL That all the Faflions juftifie themfelves. What Judgments they caufe us to mahg in their Vindication.
"E need no long deduction of Arguments to demonftrate, That all Paflions juitifie them- felves; That Principle is Efficiently evident, both by our internal Confcioufhefs of our felves, and the Behaviour of thole we fee agitated by them; and therefore we need only barely propound it, to confider it as we mould do. The Mind is fuch a Slave to the Imagination, that it always obeys when the Imagination is over-heated ^ and dares not anfwer when the fame is in- cenfed, becaufe it meets with Abufes when it refills, and is always rewarded with fome Pleafufe when it humours that imperious Faculty. Even thofe whofe unruly Imagination perfuades them they are tranifnuted into Beafts, find out Reafons to prove they muft live as Beafts do, walk Four-footed, eat Grafs, and imitate every Aclion that is purely Brutal. They find Pleafure in living by the Impreflions of their Paflion, and fuffer inward Pain in refilling it ^ which is fuffici- ent to make Reafon, that commonly defcends to be the Slave to Pleafure, to argue in fuch a man- ner as may beft defend the Caufe of it.
If therefore it be true that all Paflions juftifie themfelves, 'tis evident that Deiire muft of it felf move us to judge favourably of its Object, if it be a Dejire of Love^ and unkindly if it be a Dejlre of Aver/ion. The Deiire of Love is a Motion of the Soul raifed by the Spirits, that provoke it to the Enjoyment or Ufe of fuch things as are not in its power ^ for we deiire even the Continuation of our Enjoyment, becaufe future things depend not on us. 'Tis then neceffary for the Juflifica- tion of that Deiire, that the ObjecV which produces it be efteemed good in itfelf^ or in reference to fbmething elfe: the contrary muft be faid of that Deiire, which is a kind of Averiiori.
I grant, we cannot judge any thing to be good or bad, without fbme Reafon 5 but Paflions have no Object which is not good in fome fenfe. And if it may be faid there are fome, which contain no real Goodflefs, and therefore cannot be contemplated as Good by the Mind-, yet no one can fay but they may be enjoyed as Good, iince they are fuppofed to agitate us ^ and that Commotion, Enjoyment, or Senfe is more than fufficient to move the Soul to entertain a kind Opinion of the Objea If we fo eaiily judge that Fire contains in it felf the Heat we feel, and Bread the Savour we relifh, becaufe of the Senfation thofe Bodies excite in us.$ though that be never fo incompreniible to the Mind, which cannot conceive Heat and Savour as Modifications of a Body: thence it fol- lows, That there is no Object of our Paflions, how vile and contemptible foever it appears, but we may judge it good, when the Enjoyment of it affects us with pleafure. For as we imagine that Heat goes out of Fire when we feel it, fo we blindly believe, that the Objects of the Paflions caufe the pleafure which we receive in their Enjoyment, and that therefore they are good, iince they are able to doe us good. The like may be faid of 'the' Paflions that have Evil for their Object.
But, as I faid juft before, there "is nothing but deferves either Love or Averfion, either by it felf, or by fbmething elfe to which it relates ^ and when we are agitated with fome Paflion, we quickly difcover in its Object the Good or Evil that may nourifh the fame. It is therefore eafieto know by Reafon the Judgments which our Paflions make, whilft agitating us. -.,..
For 3,4 F. Malebranche Concerning BookY.
For, if a fjefiie of Love move us, we may well conceive that it will not fail to juftifie it felf, by the favourable Judgments it (hall make of its Object We eafily perceive that thole Judgments Will have more Extent, as the Defire fhall be more violent •, and that they will be fomecimes abfblute and without exception, though but a very fmall part of the thing appears good. We may without difficulty underftand that thole favourable Judgments will reach all things, that fhall have, or icem to have, any Connection with the principal Object of the Paffion, proportionably to the ftrengtli of the Paffion, and the Extent of the Imagination. The contrary will happen if it be a Defire of J- verfwn, the Reafons of which are as eafily comprehended, and perfectly confirmed and made good by Experience. But let us make thefe Truths more fenfible and familiar by fdme Inftances. ' Men naturally defire Knowledge, becaufe all Minds are created for Truth. But that Defire, how jutt and reafbnable foever it may be in it felf, often becomes a dangerous Vice, by the falfe Judg- ments that attend it •, Curiofity frequently offers to the Mind vain Obje£t s of its Study and Lucubra- . tions, afcilbes to them falfe Ideas of Greatnefs, ennobles them with the deceiving Luftre of Rarity, and dreffes them up with fuch gay and fplendid Apparel, that one Can hardly forbear to' Con- template them with too much Pleafure and Applicatibn.
There* is no Trifle but will wholly take up fome Perfons, whofe fruitlefs Toil is Hill juftifled by the falfe Judgments that arife from their vain Curiofity. For ihftance, thofe that beftow their time in Learning Tongues, imagine that all the Sciences confift in the Knowledge of Terms, and find out a Thou land Reafons to juftifie themfelves \ and the Veneration thofe pay them whom an un- known Teim confounds, is none of the weakeft, though the leaft reafonable.
Some Perfons employ their whole lives in learning to' fpeak, who ought perhaps to hold their Peace all the while j fince 'tis evident he Ought to be filent, who has nothing worth the hearing to fay. But 'tis not that which they propofe from their Learning. They mould know that he muft think well, ufe his Underftanding to exaftnefs, difcern Truth from Falfhood, clear Ideas from Obfciire, thofe of the Mind from thofe of the Imagination, that will fpeak accurately. They imagine themfelves fine and uncommon Wits, becaufe they know how to pleafe the Ear with an Elegant Harmony, how to flatter thePafhonsby Figures and taking Geftures-, how to rejoyce the Imagination by lively and fen- fible Expreffions •, whillt they leave the Mind empty of Ideas, void of Light and Underftanding.
Some probable reafon may juftifie their Paffion, that fpend a great deal of time in the ftudy of their own Tongue, fince they make ufe of it all their Life; but as to thofe who indifferently apply them- felves to all forts of Languages, I know not what to fay in their behalf The Paffion of thofe who. make a complete Library of all forts of Dictionaries, may be excufable, as well as the Curiofity of thofe, who make a collection of Coins and Medals of all Countries and Times; that may be ufeful in fome occafions, and if it doe them not much good, at leaft it does them no harm ^ a Store-houfe of fuch Curiofities being not curriberfome, fince they carry not with them either their Books or Medals. But how may the Paffion of thofe be juftifiable, that make their Head a Library of Dictionaries, that neglect: their Affairs and Effential Duties for words of no ufe. They are fmatterers in their own Tongue, frequently mingling ftrange and unknown words in their Difcourfes, and never paying their Countreymen with Current Money. Their Reafon feems not to be better guided than their Tongue -y for all the Corners and Recedes of their Memory are fo full of Etymologies, that their Minds mult lie as ftifTd under the innumerable number of words that are perpetually flying about it.
However, it muft be granted that Philologers and Linguifts will not flick for Reafons to juftifie their capricious Studies. Which to know, you need but to Men to the Judgments thofe preten- ders to Science make of Tongues; or fuppofe fome Opinions, that are taken amongft them for un- doubted Axioms, together with the Inferences that may be deduc'd from them. For inftance, that thofe Perfons who fpeak feveral Tongues, are as many individual Men as they know different Langua- ges, fince Speech diftinguiihes us from Beafts -, that the Ignorance of Tongues deprives us of a mul- titude of things, fince Ancient Philofophers and Strangers are more Learned then we. Suppofe but thefe and the like Principles and Conclufions, and you'll quickly form fuch Judgments as are fit to beget the Paffion for Tongues, and confequently like thofe," wherewith the fame Paffion infpires the Linguifts to vindicate their Studies.
There is not a Science fo abje£t and contemptible, but fome part of it will fhine very bright to the Imagination, and dazle the Mind, when Paffion heightens thofe falfe Glimpies. That Splen- dour, I own, A'anifhes when the Blood and Spirits cool, and the Light of Truth begins to fhine -y but that Light difappears alfo, when the Imagination grows warm again, and leaves but fome tran- fitory Shadows of thofe folid Reafons which pretended to condemn our Paffion.
Farthermore, when the Paffion that agitates us finds it felf a dying, it repents not of its demea- nour, but on the contrary it difpofes all things, either to an honourable Funeral, or to be reviv'd fpe- dily again; that is to fay, it always prepares the Mind to frame Judgments in its Vindication. In this condition it makes a fort of Alliance with fuch other Paffions as may keep it up in its weaknefs, fupply it with Spirits and Blood, in its neceffity; raife it out of its Afhes, and give it a new Birth. For Paffions are not uneoncern'd for one another, and thofe that can live together, faithfully contribute to their mutual prefervation. So that all the Paffions that are not contrary to the Studies of Tongues, or of any thing elfe, do continually follicite and fully confirm thole judgments that are made to vindicate it.
A Pretender to Learning imagines himfelf, now as furrounded- with refpe£tfull Hearers, then as Conquerour of thole whom he has amaz'd with his unintelligible words * and almoft always as . one rais'd far above the common fort of Men. He flatters himfelf with the Commendations he receives, with theHPrefenncnts that arc propofed to him. with the Courtfhip that is made to him.
He's Chap. XI. The Search after Truth. 33 He's of all Times and Countries: He is not limited, as vulgar Wits, to the prefent, nor connVd within the Walls of his Town -, but is continually communicating himfelf abroad, and his Com- munication makes his Delight. See how many Paflions combine together to manage the Caufe of pretended Learning, how hotly they profecute their Judgments, and bribe the Mind in its favour.
Should every Paflion act feparately, without caring for the reft, they would vanih immediately after their Rife, not being able to make a fufficient number of falle Judgments to maintain them- iclves,and defend the Glimmerings of Imagination againft the Light of Reafon: But all Paflions concur admirably well to their mutual Preservation, afiifting and ftrengthning each other, though never fo remote, provided they be not declared Enemies, as though they were minded to follow the Rules of a well-order'd State.
If the Paflion of Defire were alone, all the Judgments it might pafs would only amount to reprefent the Good as attainable: For the Defire of Love, confider 'd as fuch, is produced by the Judgments we make, that.it is poflible to enjoy fuch a Good: And fo this Defire could only form judgments about the Poflibility of enjoying it-, fince the Judgments which follow and preferVe the Paifions, are exactly like thofe which precede and produce them. But that Defire is animated by Love, fortified by Hope, increafed by Joy, renewed by Fear, attended by Courage, Emulation, Anger, Irrefblution, and feveral other Paflions, that form each in their turn a great variety of Judgments, which fucceed each other, and maintain the Defire that has produced them. °Tis not therefore ftrange that the defire of a mere Trifle, or of a Thing that is evidently hurtful or fruit- lefs, fhould however juftifie it felf againft Reafon for many Years, nay, during the whole Lif^ of a Man that is agitated with it, fince fo many other Paflions endeavour to vindicate it. I fhali here fet down in few Words how Paflions juftifie themfelves, that I may explain Things by diftincl: Ideas.
Every Paflion agitates the Blood and Spirits, which, when agitated, are driven into the Brain by the fenfible Sight of the Obje£t, or the Strength of the Imagination, in fuch a manner as is fit to imprint deep Tracks reprefenting that Object. They bend, and even fometimes break by their impetuous Courfe the Fibres of the Brain, and thereby leave the. Imagination ibil'd and corrupted. For thefe Traces obey not the Commands of Reafon, nor will they be blotted put when it pleafes •, on the contrary, they put a Force upon it, and oblige it inceflantly to confider Objects in fuch a manner as moves and inclines it to favour the Paflions. Thus the Paflions act upon the, Imagination, and the corrupted Imagination makes an Effort againft Reafon, by conti- nually reprefenting Things not as they are in themfelves, that the Mind might pronounce a true Judgment •, but as they are in reference to the prefent Paflion, that it might pafs a favourable Sen^ -tence in its behalf.
The Paflions not only bribe the Imagination and Mind in their favour,, but produce in other Parts of the Body fuch Difpofitions as are neceiFary to preferve them. The Spirits they move, Hop not in the Brain, but run, as I have elfewhere fhewn, to all other Parts of the Body, efpeci - ally to the Heart, the Liver, the Spleen, and the Nerves that furround the principal Arteries ^ and laflly, to all Parts whatsoever, that may fupply neceffary Spirits for the maintenance of the predominant Paflion. But while thefe Spirits difperfe themfelves into all the Parts of the Body, they deftroy all along, and by degrees, whatever might hinder their Courfe, and make their Paf- Tages fo flippery and fmooth, that a very inconfiderable Object exceedingly moves us, and confe- quently inclines us to make fuch Judgments as favour the Paflions: Thus if" comes to pafs, that they eftablifh and juftifie themfelves.
If we confider how various the Conftitution of the Fibres of the Brain, and withal the Com- motion and Quantity of the Spirits and Blood may be, in the different Sexes and Ages, we fhall * eafily and nearly conjecture to what Paflions fome Perfons are molt fubject, and confequentfy, what Judgments they pafs upon Objecls. For inftance, we may make a very near Guefs, by the plenty or want of Spirits that is obfervable in fome People, the fame Thing being propofed and explain- ed to them in the fame manner, that fome of them will make Judgments of Hope and Joy, whilft others fhall pafs fuch Judgments as proceed from Fear and Sorrow.
For thofe that abound with Blood and Spirits, as young Men, cholerick Perfons, and thofe that are of a Sanguine Complexion ufe to doe, being very fufceptible of Hope, becaufe of the ifceret Senfe of their Strength, will not believe that they mail meet with any Oppofition to their Qe- figns, which they may not overcome-, and fo will quickly feed themfelves with a borrowed Tafte of the Good they hope to enjoy, and will pafs fuch Judgments as are fit to juftifie their Hope and Joy. But thofe that want agitated Spirits, as Old Men, and thofe that are of a Phkgmatick and Melancholy Temper, being inclined to Fear and Sorrow, becaufe their Soul is confeious of her own Weaknefs, and deftitute of Spirits to perform her Orders, will make quite contrary Judg- ments, imagine infuperable Difficulties to juftifie their Fear, and give up themfelves to fcnvy, Sorrow, Ddpair, and other forts of Averfion, of which weak Perfons are moft fufceptible.
CHAP, CHAP. XII.
that fuch Pajpons as have Evil for their ObjeB, are the moji Dangerous and IJnjujl: And that thofe that have the leaf: Mixture of Knowledge^ are the moji lively and fenfrble.
OF all the Paflions the feveral forts of Averfions make their Judgments the moll remote from Reafbn, and the molt dangerous; there being no Paflion which corrupts and bribes Reafon fo much in its behalf, as Hatred and Fear •, Hatred chiefly in the Cholerick, or in thofe whofe Spirits are in a perpetual agitation ^ and Fear in the Melancholy, or thole whofe grofs and heavy Spirits are neither eafily moved, nor foon quieted. But when Hatred and Fear conlpire together to bribe Reafon, which is very frequently done, then there are no Judgments fb unjuft and capri- cious, but they will pals and defend them with an infuperable Obftinacy.
The Reafon of this is, That as in this Life Evil ftrikes the Soul more to the quick, than Good -, fo the Senfe of Pain is livelier than that of Pleafure: Injuries and Scandals more lenfibly afFect us, than Commendations and Applaufe; and though there are Men indifferent as to the enjoying fome Pleafures, and receiving certain Honours • yet there is fcarce one that can bear Pain and Con- tempt without Uneafinefs.
And therefore Hatred, Fear, and other forts of Averfton, that have Evil for their Objeft, are moft violent Paflions, which lhake the Mind with fuch unexpected Commotions, as difcompofe and flupifie it, and quickly pierce into the bottom of the Heart, dethrone Reafon, and pals upon all forts of Subjects erroneous and unjuft Sentences, to favour their tyrannical Madnefs.
Of all Paflions they are the moft cruel and diftruftful, contrary to Charity and Civil Society, and at the fame time the moft ridiculous and extravagant, fince they give fuch impertinent and frantick Judgments, as excite the Laughter and Indignation of all other Men. Joh.1147. Thofe Paflions infpired thePharifees with thefe abfirrd Difcourfes: What are we doing? This Man works many Miracles: If we let him alone; all Men will believe in him, and. the Romans will come and deftroy both our City and Nation. They agreed that our Saviour had wrought many Mi- racles; for the Refurre&ion of Lazarus was undeniable: But what were the Judgments of their Paflions > To murther both JESUS and Lazarus whom he had raifed from the Dead! Why JESUS? Becaufe, fay they, // we let him alone, all Men will believe in him, and the Romans ]oh.t2.\i.ft>all.come and extirpate our Nation. And why Lazarus? Btcaufe that, by reafon of him, many of the Jews zvent away, and believed on Jefut. Oh Judgments equally Cruel and Irrational! Cruel, through Hatred -, and Irrational, through Fear: The Romans Jball come, and deflroy our City and Nation. The fame Paflions moved a great Aflembly, confifting of Annas the High Prieft, Caiaphat, John, Aft. 4. 16, Alexander, and as many as were of the Kindred of the High-Prieft, to fpeak thus: What /hall 17. ' we doe with thefe Men? For that, indeed, a notable Miracle hath been done by them, is manifefi to all them that dwell in Jerufalem, and we cannot deny it. hut left it jhould f pre ad farther, let us threaten to punijh them J eve rely, if they preach the Name of JESUS any more.
All thofe great Men, agitated by their Paflions, and blinded by their falfe Zeal, pafs Judgment both impertinent and unjuft. They dare not punifh the Apoftles, becaufe of the People, and that the Matf who had been miraculoufly cured was above Forty Years of Age, and prefent in the Af- fembly k but threaten them, left they mould teach in the Name of Jefus; fuppofing they ought Aft. 5. 28. t0 condemn the Dotf rine, becaufe they put the Author to death: Tou intend, fay they, to bring thh Man's Blood upon us.
When falfe Zeal unites it felf to Hatred, it fhelters it from the Reproofs of Reafon, and jufti- fles it fo well, that we fcruple not to be led by its Motions. When ignorance and Weaknefs ac- company Fear, they extend it to innumerable Subjects, and drive on its Commotions to that heighth, that the leatt Suipicion difturbs and frightens Reafon.
Falfe Zealots imagine they ferve God, when they obey their Paflions: They blindly follow the fecret Motions of their Hatred, as Infpirations from internal Truth; and infilling with great fa- tisfa£tion on the Proofs of Senfe that juftifie that Excefs, their Errours become confirmed with an unconquerable Stubbornnefs.