However, 'tis vifible to any attentive Perfon, that thofe little Beings, for inftance, that are faid to be diftinguifhed from Fire, and fuppos'd to be contained in it for the producing Heat, Light, Hardnefs, Fluidity, &c. are but the Contrivances of the Imagination, that rebells againft Reafon; fince Reafon has no particular Idea that reprefents thofe little Beings. When the Philo- fophers are asked, What is the illuminating Faculty in Fire? They only anfwer, That 'tis a Be- ing which is the Caufe that Fire is capable of producing Light. So that their Idea of that illu- minating Faculty differs not from the general Idea of Caufe, and the confufed Idea of the Effect, they fee; and therefore they have no clear Idea of what they fay, when they admit thofe parti- cular Beings •, and fo fay what they not only underftand not, but what's impoflible to be under- ftood.
CHAP. III.
Of the mofl dangerous Errour in the Philofophy of the Ancients.
)Hilofophers not only fpeak without underftanding themfelves, when they explain the EfFe&s of Nature by fome Beings of which they have no particular Idea ^ but alfo eftablifh a Prin- ciple whence very falfe and pernicious Confequences may direcf ly be drawn.
For, fuppofing with them, that there are in Bodies certain Entities diftinguifhed from Matter, and having no diftincf Idea of thofe Entities •, 'tis eafie to imagine, that they are the real or prin- cipal Caufes of the Effecf s we fee. And this is the very Opinion of the vulgar Philofophers. The prime Reafon of their fuppofing thofe fubftantial Forms, real Qualities, and other fuch like Entities, is, to explain the EffecFs of Nature: But when we come attentively to confider the Idea we have of Caufe or Power of a£ting, we cannot doubt but that it reprefents fomething Di- vine: For, the Idea of a Sovereign Power is the Idea of a Sovereign Divinity ^ and the Idea of a fubordinate Power, the Idea of an inferiour Divinity, yet a true Divinity-, at leaft, according to the Opinion of the Heathens, fuppofing it to be the Idea of a true Power or Caufe. And there- fore we admit fomething Divine in all the Bodies that furround us, when we acknowledge Forms, Faculties, Qualities, Virtues, and real Beings that are capable of producing fome Effe£ts by the force of their Nature ^ and thus infenfibly approve of the Sentiments of the Heathens, by too great a Deference for their Philofophy. Faith indeed corrects us, but. it may perhaps be faid, that the Mind is a Pagan, whilft the Heart is a Chriftian.
Moreover, it is a hard Matter to perfuade our felves, that we ought neither to fear nor love true Powers and Beings, that can aft upon us, punifh us with fome Pain, or reward us with fome Pleafure. And as Love and Fear are a true Adoration, it is hard again to imagine why they mult not be ador'd: For, whatever can acf upon us as a true and real Caufe, is neceffarily above us, according to Reafon and St. Auftw -, and, by the fame Reafon and Authority, 'tis likewife an immutable Law, That inferiour Beings fhouki be fubfervient to fuperiour: Whence that great Fa- * Ego emm ther concludes, That the Body cannot operate upon the Soul *, and that nothing can be above her nb anima \mt God only.
hoc. corpus ammari non puto, nifi intentions facientii: nee ab iflo quicquam ilium pati arbitror, fed facere de Mo, <fy in Mo, tanquam fubjelh divinitiu domination! fug. 1. 6. Mufc. c. 5. See alfo De quantit. Anim. c. 34.
The chief Reafons that God Almighty ufes in the Holy Scriptures, to prove to the Ifraelitcs, that they ought to adore, that is, to love and fear him, are drawn from his Power to reward Or pu- nifh them •, reprefenting to them the Benefits they have received from him,thePunifhments he has inflicted upon them, and his Power that is always the fame. He forbids them to adore the Gods of the Heathens, as fuch as have no Power over them, and can doe them neither harm nor good. Fie commands them to honour him alone, as the only true Caufe of Good and Evil, Reward and Pu- Amos %. 6. nifhment:, none of which can befal a City, according to the Prophet, but what comes from him, by reafon that natural Caufes are not the true Caufes of the Hurt they feem to doe us; and as it is ( ioJ alone that ach in them, fo 'tis He alone that muft be fear'd and lov'd in them: Soli Deo Honor ■ ' Gloria. ■ Laftlv, Chap. lit. 'I he Search after Trtith, eS Laltly, The Sehle Of fearing and Loving what may be the true Caufe. of Good and Evil, appears lb natural and juft, that it is not poflible to caft it off. So that in that falie Suppofition of the Philolbphers, which we are here endeavouring to deitroy, that the iurrounding Bodies are the true Caules of our Fain and Pleasure's Reafon feems to jultifie a Religion like the Pagan Idola- try, and approve the univerfal Depravation of Morals.
Reafofl I grant, teaches not, to adore Onions and Leeks, for inftance, as the Sovereign Divi- nity; becaufe they can never make us altogether happy when we have them, or unhappy when we want them: neither did the Heathens worfhip them with an equal Homage as their great Jupite>\ whom they fanfied to be the God of Gods:, or as the Sun, whom our Settles reprefent as the univetfal Caufe, that gives Life and Motion to all things, and which we can hardly forbear to look on as the Sovereign Divinity, if we fuppofe, as the Pagan Philolbphers, that he Compre- hends in his Being, the true Caules of what he feems.to produce, as well upon our Soul and Bo- dy, as upon all the Beings that furround us.
But if we mult not pay a Sovereign Wbrftiip to Leeks and Onions, they deferve, at lea ft, fome particular Adoration h I mean they may be thought upon and loved in fome manner, if it be true, that they can in fome fort make us happy, and may be honour'd proportionably to the good they doe us. Surely Men that lilten to the Reports of Senfe, think Pulfe capable of doing them good\ other wile the Ifraelites would not have bewailed the lofs of them in the Wildernefs, or look'd on themfelves as unhappy, for being deprived thereof had they not fanfied to themfelves fome great Happinefs in the Enjoyment of them. See what an Abyfs of Corruption Reafon plunges us into, when it goes hand in; hand with the Principles of Pagan Philofophy, and follows the foot-- iteps of the Settles.
But that the Falihood of that wretched Phylofophy, and the Certainty of our Principles, and Diftincfnefs of our Ideas may not be longer doubted; it will be necelTary plainly to eftablifh the Truths that contradict the Errours of the Ancient Philofophers, or to prove in few words, that there is but one true Caufe, fince there is but one true God •, that the Nature and Force of every rhing is nothing but the Will of God ^ that all Natural things are not real, but only occafional Caules j and fome other Truths depending on them.
It is evident, that all Bodies, great and little, have no force to move themfelves: a Mountain, a Houfe, a Stone, a Grain of Sand, the minuteft and bulkieft Bodies imaginable, are alike as to that. We have but two forts of Ideas, viz. of Spirits and Bodies 5 and as we ought not to fpeak what we conceive not, fo we muft only argue from thofe two Ideas. Since therefore our Idea of Bodies, convinces us that they cannot move themfelves, we muft conclude that they are mo- ved by Spirits. But conlidering our Idea of finite Spirits, we fee no necelTary Connexion betwixt their Will, and the Motion of any Body whatfoever •, on the contrary, we perceive that there is not nor can be any. Whence we muft infer, if we will follow Light and Reafon, That as no • Body can move it felf, fo no Created Spirit can be the true and principal Caufe of its Motion.
But when we think on the Idea of God, or of a Being infinitely perfect, and confequently Almighty, we are aware that there is fuch a Connexion betwixt his Will and the Motion of all Bodies, that it is impoflible to conceive he mould will that a Body be moved, and if fliould not be moved. And therefore if we would fpeak according to our Conceptions, and not according to bur Senfations, we muft fay that nothing but his Will can move Bodies. The moving force of Bodies is not then in themielves, this force being nothing but the Will of God: Bodies then have no proper Acfion, and when a moving Ball meets with another, and moves it, the former communicates nothing of its own to the latter, as not having in it felf the Impreflion it com- municates; though the former be the Natural Caufe of the latter's Motion; and therefore a na- tural Caufe is not a true and real Caufe, but only an occafional -, which in fuch or fuch a Cafe de^ termines the Author of Nature to act in fuch or fuch a manner.
'Tis certain that all things are produced by the Motion of vifible or invifible Bodies •, for Ex- perience teaches us, that thofe Bodies, whole parts are in greater Motion, are always the molt active, and thole that Caufe the greateft Alterations in the World: fo that all the Forces of Na- ture are but the Will of God, who Created the World •, becaufe he wilfd it, who /pake and it tons done * •, who moves all things, and produces all the Effecfs we fee, becaufe he has eftablilhed * pfal. 33, fome Laws, by which Bodies Communicate their Motion to each other when they meet toge- 9- ther •, and becaufe thofe Laws are efficacious, they and not the Bodies aeF. There is then no Force, Power, nor true Caufe in all the Material and fenfible World: Nor need we admit any Forms, Faculties, or real Qualities to produce Effects, which the Bodies bring not forth, or to di- vide with God his own ElTential force and Power.
As Bodies cannot be the true Caules of any thing ^ fo likewife the molt Noble Spirits are fub- jecf to the fame impotency on that refpect: They cannot know any thing, unlefs God enlightens them, nor have the Senfation of any thing, unlefs he modifies them •, nor wz/Y, unlefs he moves them towards himfelf: They may indeed determine the Impreflion God has given them to him- felf, towards other Ob]ects •, but I doubt whether it can be calfd a Power. For if to be able to fin is a Power, it is fuch a one, as the Almighty wants, faith St. Aufiin fomewhere. If Men had of themfelves the Power of loving Good, it might be laid that; they.have fome Powers but they cannot fo much as love, but becaufe God Wills it, and that his Will is Efficacious. They love, becaufe God continually drives t-liefn towards Good in general, that is, towards himfelf, for whom alone they are Created and preferved. God moves them, and not themfelves, towards Good in general; and they only follow that Impreflion by a free Choice, according to the Law of God, or cj6 F. Maleeranche Concerning Book VI.
or determine it towards falfe and feeming Goods, according to the Law of the Flefh -, Bat they cannot determine it but by the fight of Good. For being able to doe nothing without an Im- preilion from above, they are incapable of loving any thing but Good.
But though it mould be fuppofed, which is true in one fenfe, that Spirits have in themfelves the Power of knowing Truths, and loving Good; mould their Thoughts and Will produce no- <: ems thing outwardly, it might itill be faid, that they were impotent and unoperative. Now it undeniable, that the Will of Spirits is not able to move the fmalleft Body in die World; it being evident there is no necefTary Connexion betwixt the Will, we may have of moving our Arm, lor inftance, and the Motion of the fame Arm. It moves indeed whenever we will it, and we may becall'd, in that fenfe, the natural caufe of the Motion of our Arm; yet natural Caufes are not true, but only occafional^ as acting by the mere force and efficacy of the Will of God, as we have already explain'd.
For how is it poffible for us to move our Arm? To perform this, 'tis requifd we mould have Animal Spirits, and fend them through certain Nerves towards certain Mufcles, to fwcli up and contract them, for fo that Motion is perform'd, as fome pretend, though others deny it, and af- fert that the Myftery is not yet:difcover'd. However it be, molt Men know not fo much as that they have Spirits, Nerves and Mufcles, and yet move their Arms with as much and more dexte- rity than the molt skilful Anatomilts. Men therefore will the moving their Arm, but 'tis God that is able, and knows how to doe it. If a Man cannot overthrow a Tower, yet he knows what mult be done to effect it: but not one amongft them knows what the Animal Spirits muft doe to move one of his Fingers. How fhould they then move the whole Arm of themfelves? Thefe things appear very evident to me, and, I fuppofe, to all thinking Perfons; though they may be incomprehenfible to others, fuch as are only ufed to the confufed voice of the Senfes.
But Men are fo far from being the true Caufes of the Motions produc'd in their Body, that it feems to imply a Contradiction they mould be fo. For a true Caufe is that betwixt which and its Efreft, the Mind percieves a necefTary connexion ^ for fo I underftand it. But there is none be- fides the infinitely perfe£t Being, betwixt whofe Will and the Effects the Mind can perceive a necefTary Connexion, and therefore none but God is the true Caufe, or has a real Power of mo- ving Bodies..Nay, it feems unconceivable, that God fhould communicate this Power, either to Angels or Men: And thofe that pretend that the Power we have of moving our Arm is a true Power, muft by Confequence grant that God can give Spirirs the Power of creating, annihilating, and doing all poffible things ^ in fhort, that he can make them Almighty, as I am going to pove.
God needs not Inftruments to aft, 'tis enough he fhould Will the Exiftence of a thing, in or-: der to its Exifting; becaufe it is contradictory that he fhould will a thing, and his Will fhould not be fulfilled. And theiefore his Power is his Will, and to communicate his Power is to com- municate his Will ^ fo that to communicate his Will to a Man or an Angel, can fignifie nothing elf*, but to Will that whenever that Man or Angel fhall defire that fuch or fuch a Body be moved, it may actually be moved. In which Cafe I fee two Wills concurring together, that of God, and that of the Angel, and to know which of them is the true Caufe of the Motion of that Body, I enquire which is the Efficacious. I fee a necefTary Connexion betwixt the Will of God, and the thing willed:, in this Cafe God wills that whenever the Angel fhall defire that fuch a Body be moved, it be really fo. There is then a necefTary Connexion betwixt the Will of God, and the Motion of that Body, and confequently God is the true Caufe of that Motion, and the Will of the Angel is only occafional.
Again, to make it more evidently manifeft, let us fuppofe God wills it fhould happen quite contrary to the Defire of fome Spirits, as may be thought of the Devils, or fome other wicked Spirits in Punifhment of their Sins. In that Cafe it cannot be faid God communicates his Power to them; fince nothing happens of what they wifli. However the Will of thofe Spirits fhall be the natural Caufe of the produced Effects: as fuch a Body fhall be removed to the Right, be- caufe they wifh it were moved to the Left -, and the Defires of thofe Spirits fhall determine the Will of God to act, as the Will of moving the Parts of our Body, determine the firft Caufe to move them ^ and therefore the Defires of all finite Spirits are but occafional Caufes.
If, after all thefe Reafons, it be itill afTerted, that the Will of an Angel moving a Body is a true, and not a bare occafional Caufe •, 'tis evident, that the felf-fame Angel might be the true Caufe of the Creation and Annihilation of all things, fince God might as well communicate to him his Power of Creating, and annihilating Bodies, as that of moving them, if He fhould will that they fhould be created, and annihilated: in a word, if he will'd that all things fhould be per- formed according to the Angel's Defires, as he wills that Bodies be moved as the Angel pleafss^ if therefore it may be faid, that an Angel or Man are true Movers, becaufe God moves Bodies as they defire •, that Man or Angel might likewife be call'd true Creatours, fince God might cre- ate Beings on occafion of their Will: Nay, perhaps it might be faid, that the vileft of Animals, or even mere Matter, is the real Caufe of the Creation of ibme Subftance ^ if it be fuppofed with fome Philofophers, that God produces fubftantial Forms, whenever the Difpofition of Matter re- quires it. And laftly, fince God has refolved from all Eternity, to create fome certain things, at Lome certain times; thofe Times might alfo be called the Caufes of the Creation of fuch Beings; with as much right as 'tis pretended, that a Ball meeting with another is the true Caufe of the Motion that is communicated to it h becaufe God, by his general Will, that conftitutes the Order of Nature, has decreed, that fuch or fuch Communication of Motions fhould follow up- on the Concourfe of two Bodies.
v There Chap. IV". 1 he Search after Truth. tj There is then but one true Caufe, as there is one true God: Neither mud we imagine, that what precedes an Effect does really produce it. God himfelf cannot communicate his rower to ( 4 fu- tures according to the Light of Reafon; He cannot make them true Caufes, and change them in- to Gods. But though he might doe it, we conceive not why he fhould will it. Bodies, Spirits, pure Intelligences, all can doe nothing. Tis he who has made Spirits, that enlightens and moves them; 'tis he who has created Heaven and Earth, that regulates all their Motions: In fine, 'tis the Authour of our Being that performs our Defires-, Semet jiijjit, few per punt.- He moves even our Arms, when we life them agairift his Orders-, for he complains hy his Prophets, That wre make him fubfervient to our urijirft and* criminal Defires.
All thofe little Divinities of the Heathens, all thole particular Caufes of Philofophers, areC/v- vicras, which the wicked Spirit endeavours to fet up, that he may deltroy the Worfhip of the true God. The Philofophy we have received from Adam^ teaches us no iuch things; but that which has been propagated by the Serpent; for, ever fince the Fall, the Mind of Man is turned Heathen. That Philofophy, join'd to the Errours of the Senfes, has made Men pay their Wor- fhip to the Sun, and is itill the univerfal Caufe of the Diforders of their Mind, and the Corrup- tion of their Heart. Why, fay they, by their Actions, and fometimes by their Words, fhould vvc not love Bodies, fince they are able to afford us Pleafure? And why are the lfrjclhes blam'd for lamenting the Lofs of the Garlick and Onions of Egypt, fince the Privation of thofe things, which enjoyed, afforded them fome Happinefs, made tliem in fbme fort unhappy? But the Philofophy that is mif-call'd New, and reprefented as a Bugbear to frighten weak Minds; that is defpifect and condemned without hearing: that New Philibfophy, I fay, (fince it muff, 'nave that name,) deitroys all the Pretences of the Libertines, by the eftablifhing its very firii Principle that perfectly agrees with the firft Principle of the Chriltian Religion*, namely, That we mult love and * ffkc cjl fear none but God, fince none but He alone can make us happy. Religh ChrijHana, fratres met, qua pr&dkatur per univerfum mundurn horreniibm inimkis, & ubi vincuntur murmurantibm, ubi prevalent [avkntibw; b&c ell Religh Chriftmna, mt COLATVR VNVS DEVS, NON MVLTI DII, QVIA NON FACIT ANIMAM BE- AT AM NISI VNVS DEVS. Aug. Tr. 23. in Joan.
As Religion declares that-there is but one true God, fd this Philofophy mews that there is but one true Caufe. As Religion 'teaches that all the Heathen Divinities are but dead Metals, and immovable Scone; fo this Philofophy difcovers, that all the fecond Caufes, or Divinities of the Philofophers, are but una&ive Matter, and ineffeftive Wills. As Religion commands, not to bow to thofe Gods that are not Gods, fo this Philofophy teaches, not to proftrate our Minds and Ima^ gination before the phantaftick Grandeur and Power of pretended Caufes, which are not Caufes: which we ought neither to love, nor to fear, nor be taken up with; but think upon God alone, fee and adore, love and fear him in all things.
But that's not the Inclination of fome Philofophers; they will neither fee God, nor think upon him; for ever fince the Fall there is a fecret Oppofitiort betwixt God and Man. They delight in Gods of their own Invention; in loving and fearing the Contrivances of their Heart, as the Hea- thens did the Works of their Hands. They are like thofe Children, who tremble at the fight of their Play -Fellows, after they have dawb'd and blacken'd them. Or, if they defire a more noble Comparifon, though perhaps not fo juft, they referable thofe famous Romans, who reverenced the Fi&ions. of their Mind, and foolifhly adored their Emperours, after they themfelves had let loofe the Eagle at their Canonization.
CHAP. IV.
An Explication of the Second Part of the General Rule: That the Philo- fophers obfeirve it noty but that Des Cartes has exaBly followed it.
WE have been (hewing to what Errours Men are liable, when they reafon upon the falie and confufed Ideas of the Senfes, and their rambling and undetermin'd N otions of Lo- gick; whence it appears, that to keep to Evidence in our Perceptions, 'tis abfolutely necefTarv exact ly to obferve that Rule ive have prefcrib'd; and to examine which are the clear and diftinct Ideas of things, that we may only argue by deduction from them.
In that fame general Rule, concerning the Subject of our Studies, there is yet a remarkable Circumftance; namely, That we mult ftill begin with the molt fimple and eafie things, and in- fill: long upon them, before we undertake the Enquiry after the more compofed and difficult. For if, to preferve Evidence in all our Perceptions, we mull only reafon upon diftinft Ideas, 'tis plain that wre mull never meddle with the Enquiry of compound things, before the fimple, on xvhich they depend, have been carefully examin'd, and made familiar to us by a nice Scrutiny; fince the Ideas of compound things, neither are, nor can be clear, as long as the molt fimple, of which they are compofed, are but confufedly and imperfectly known.
We know things imperfectly, when we are not lure to have confidered all their Parts: and we know them confufedly, when they are not familiar enough to the Mind, though we may be cer- tain of having confider'd all their Parts. When we know them but imperfectly, our Argumen- tations are only probable: when we perceive them confufedly, there is neither Order not Light P in" in our Inferences; and often we know not where we are, or whither we are going: But when we know them both imperfectly and confufedly, which is the commoneit of all, we know not io much as what we would look for, much lefs by what Means we are to find it: So that it is al- together necejfary to keep ftrictly to that Order in our Studies, Of JIM beginning by the mqft .fimple 'Things, examining all their Parts, and being we'll acquainted with then/, before we meddle with the more compqfed, that depend on the former.
But that Rule agrees not with the Inclination of Man, who naturally defpifes whatever ap- pears eafie; his Mind being made for an unlimited Object, and almoft incomprehenfible, cannto make a long Stay on the Consideration of thofe fimple Ideas, which want the Character of Infi- nite, for which he is created. On the contrary, and for the lame Reafon, he has much fenera- tion, and an eager Pailion, for great, obfcure, and myfterious Things, and fuch as.participate of Infinity: Not that he loves Darknefs \ but that he hopes to find in thofe deep ReceiTes a Good, and Truth capable of fatisfying his Defires.
Vanity likeWife gives a great Commotion to the Spirits, flirting them to what is great and ex- traordinary, and encouraging them with a foolifh Hope of hitting right. Experience teaches, that the molt accurate Knowledge of ordinary Things gives no great Name in the World -, whereas to be acquainted with uncommon Things, though never fo confufedly and imperfectly, always procures the Efteem and Reverence of thofe who willingly conceive a great Idea of what- ever is out of their depth of Underftanding: And that Experience determines all thofe who are more fenfible to Vanity than to Truth, (which certainly make up the greateft Number) to a blind-fold Search of a fpecious, though chimerical, Knowledge of What is great, rate, and un- intelligible.
How many are there that reject the Cartejian Philofophy, for that ridiculous Reafon, That its Principles are too fimple and eafie: There are in this Philofophy no obfcure and myfterious Terms; Women, and Perfons unskilfd in Greek and Latin, are capable of learning it. It mult then be, fay they, fomething very inconfiderable, and unworthy the Application of great Genius's. They imagine, that Principles fo clear and fimple are not fruitful enough to explain the Effects of Nature, which they fuppofed to be dark, intricate, and confufed: They fee not prefently the life of thofe Principles, that are too fimple and eafie to flop their Attention long enough to make them underftand their Ufe and Extent. They rather chufe to explain Effects whole Caufes are unknown to them, by unconceivable Principles, than by fuch as are Jboth fimple and intelligible. For the Principles thefe Philolbphers are wont to explain obfcure Things by, are not only obfcure themfelves, but utterly incomprehenfible.
Thofe that pretend to explain Things extremely intricate, by Principles clear and generally re- ceiv'd, may eafily be refuted, if they fiicceed not -, fince to know whether what they fay be true, one needs only comprehend well what they fay. The falfely-learn'd are not pleafed with this, and obtain not the Admiration they purfue in ufing intelligible Principles; for, as foon as one un- derftands their Notions, he plainly perceives that they fay nothing: But when they make ufe of unknown Principles, and fpeak of very complex^d Things as though they exactly knew all their Relations, they are admired by their Hearers, who underftand not what they fay; becaufe we are naturally inclined to reverence whatever goes above the reach of our Underftanding.
Now, as obfcure and incomprehenfible Things feem to hang better with each other, than with fuch as are clear and intelligible •, fo incomprehenfible Principles are much more made ufe of in Aery difficult and abftrufe Queftions, than fuch as are eafie and intelligible. There is nothing fb difficult, but, by the means of thefe Principles, Philofophers and Phyficians will folve it in few Words; for their Principles being yet more incomprehenfible than any Queftions that can be pro-1 pofed them, thofe Principles being taken for granted, no Difficulty can afterwards put them to a Nonplus.