But though 1 am not willing to dwell too long upon thefe things,yet I cannot fo eafily pafs by the contempt Men generally have for Infects, and other little Animals which are produc'd out of a Matter call'd by them Corrupted. 'Tis a very unjuft contempt, founded only on the Ignorance of the thing defpis'd, and the fore-mention'd Prejudice. There is nothing defpicable in Nature, and all the Works of G O D are worthy of our Refpeft and Admiration; efpecially if we attend to the wouderful way she takes both in making, and perferving them. The leaft of Flies are as corapleat, as Animals of an exceflive bulk or ftature: The proportions of their Limbs are as juft as thofe of the other: And it feems moreover that GOD has defign'd them greater Orna- ments to recompenfe them for the Littlenefs of their Bodies. They have Coronets and Plumes, and other Attire upon their Heads, which but-fhine all that the Luxury of Men can invent. And I dare venture to fay, that all thofe who have never made ufe of any thing but their Eyes, have never feen any thing fo fplendid, fo exad,or fo magnificent in the Palaces of the greateft Princes, as may be feen with Glaires on the Head of an ordinary Fly.
'Tis true, thefe things are. exceedingly Little, but it is ftill more furprizing to find fuch a Col- lection of Beauties in fo little Room? and though they are very common, yet that is no Diminu- tion to their Value •, nor are thofe Animals thereby lefs perfeft in themfelves -7 but on the contrary, the Power and Wifdom of GOD appear more wonderful, who with fuch Profufion and Magnifi- cence has fhewnan almoft infinite number of Miracles in their Production.
And yet our Sight conceals all thefe Beauties from us: It makes us defpife all- thefe Works of G 0 D fo worthy of our Admiration: And becaufe thefe Animals are little in Relation to our Bo- dy, it caufes us to confider them as little abfilutely, and confequently as defpicable by reafbn of their Littlenefs \ as if Bodies could be little in themfelves.
Let us ftrive then to forbear following the Impreffions of our Senfes, in the judgment which we pafs on the Magnitude of Bodies: And when we fay, for Inftance, That a Bird is little, let it not be abfolntely underftood: For nothing is Great or Little in it felf: Even a Bird is great in comparifon of a Fly \ and if it be little in refpett of dur Body, it doth not follow it is abfilutely fo; fince our Body is not the moil per fed Rule by which we ought to meafure others. It is it felf" very little in reference to the Earth, as is the Earth it felf in refpecf of the Circumference which the Sun or Earth defcribe round each other: And fo is that Circumference in relation to the fpace contain'd betwixt us and the fix'd Stars; and fo continuing the progreffion on. For we may ftill imagine fpaces greater and greater ad infinitum.
But it muffc not be imagin'd that our Senfes exactiy inform us of the Relation other Bodies have III. to our own: For Exadtnefs and Juftnefs are no ways eflential to fenfible Notices, which mould oftheEr- only be Inftrumental to the Prefervation of Life. It is true we know exadl ly enough the Rela- rors °f tion Bodies, which are near us, have with our own. But in proportion to the diftance thefe Bo- ^ht^ouci" dies are remov'd from us, we know lefs of them, becaufe then they have lefs relation to our Bo- fifn rda-" dy. The Idea or Senfation of Magnitude, which we have upon fight, of a Body, leffens in pro- tively cow- portion to the Body's being in. a lefs capacity of hurting us: And that Idea or Senfation increa-^er'^ fes proportionabiy as the Body approaches nearer, or rather, as the Relation it has to our Body, is augmented. Finally, If this Relation altogether ceafes; that is, if any Body is fb little or fo diftant from us, as to be incapable of hurting us, we forthwith lofe the Senfation of it. So that by our Sight we may fometimes judge pretty nearly of the Relation other Bodies have to ours: And of that which they have to one another: But 'we ought never to think they are of the fame Magnitude they appear to us.
Our Eyes, for Example, reprefent the Sun and Moon of one or two Feet diameter but we fhould not imagine with Epicurus and Lucretius, that they are really of that dimenfion. This fame Moon feems to us upon fight far greater than the greateft Stars, yet no Man doubts but it is in- comparably lefs: Thus we fee daily on the Earth two things or more, of whofe magnitude we can have no exact affurance; becaufe to make a judgment of this Nature, 'tis necefTary to know the precife diftance of thefe Bodies, which is very difficult to be known.
We are even hard put to't to judge with any kind of certainty of the Relation there is betwixt two Bodies though never fo near us. We are forc'd to take them in our hands, and hold them one againft the other to compare them; and after all, we often heiltate without being able iuftlv to determine any thing. This'is vifibly acknowledge as often as a Man would examine which are biggeft of fome pieces of Coin that are almoft equal; for he is then oblig'd to put them one upon another, to difcover by, a furer Method than by Sight whether they correfpond in bi^nefs Our Eyes therefore not only deceive us in the Magnitude of Bodies absolutely confider'd but even m the Relation thofe Bodies have betwixt themfelves. y ' l evea CHAR CHAR i8 K Malebranche Concerning Book L CHAP. VII.
t: Of the Errors of Sight about Figures. It. We have no Knowledge of the leap of them. III. The Knowledge we have of the greater, is not exacl. IV. An Explication of fome Natural Judgments which prevent ourDeceptU on. V. That thefe very Judgments deceive us in fome particular junBures.
*• /"^\^ ^ s*Sh£ *s *e*"s liable tp deceive us in the Reprefentatiori of Figures, than in the Repre- Tcrsoff?h\ J J*entat^oa °f any otner thing j becaufe Figure is not a thing of an abfoiute kind, but its about n- ^^-^ Nature confifts in the Relation which is between the parts which terminate fome (pace, gures. and a certain point, which we conceive in that fpace, and which we may call, as in a Circle, the Centre of the Figure. Notwithftanding, we are miflaken a thoufand ways in Figures, and the Knowledge we receive from our Senfes, is not exceedingly exact concerning any one of them.
**• We have already prov'd that our Sight difcovers not to us all forts of Extcnfion, but only that W0\t.iVt~ wmcn *s m f°me confiderabte proportion to our Body; and that for this reafbn we fee not all the ledge of the Parts °f the minuteft Animals, nor thofe that conftitute all hard and liquid Bodies, Thus, not leafl of being able to perceive thefe parts by reafon of their Littlenefs, it follows we are as unable to them, perceive their Figures; fince the figure of Bodies is nothing but the Term that bounds them.
See here what an infinite number of invifible figures prefent themfelves in an inftant, which are far more numerous than thofe our Eyes acquaint us withal: which yet induce the Mind, that trulls too much to their reach and capacity, and Hands not to examine things to the bottom, to believe thefe Figures don't exift.
IIT. As for Bodies proportion'd to our Sight, (the number whereof is very inconflderable in com- Tfofenoir-parifon of the other) we difcover their figure tolerably well, but never know it exa&ly by our Uige we Senfes. Nay, we cannot fo much as be aflur'd from our Sight if a Circle or a Square, which inater is are tw0 °^ tne rao^ ^mP^e figures that are, be not an EUipfis and a Parallelogramme, though thefe not exit}, figures be both in our Hands, and very near our Eyes.
I add farther, that we cannot exactly difcern whether a Line be Right or not, efpecially if it be fomewhat long. We mull then have a Rule for it: But to what purpofe? we know not whe- ther the Rule it felf be fuch as we fuppofe it ought to be; nor can we be fully fatisfy'd concern- ing it. And yet without the knowledge of this Line, we can never know any figure, as is ev£ dent to all the World.
This is what may be laid in general of Figures, which we have before our Eyes, and in our Hands. But if we fuppofe them at a diflance from us, how many changes do we find in the proje&ion they make in the fund of our Eyes. I will not Hand to defcribe them here; they may eafily be learnd in any Book ofOpticks, or by examining the Figures which we fee in Piftures.
For fince the Painter is oblig'd to change them almoil all, to the end they may appear in their Natural lite, and to paint, for inftance, Circles like Ellipfes: 'Tis an infallible fign of the Errors of our Sight, in Objetts that are not Painted j But thefe Errors are corre&ed by frefh Senfations, which poffibly may be lookt upon as a fort of Natural Judgments, and may be term'd the Judgments of the Senfes.
IV. In beholding a Cube, for Example, it is certain that all the fides we lee of it never caufe a AnExdj.' proje&ion, or an Image of an equal dimenfion in the fund of our Eyes; fince the Image of all SIJ at«»- theI"e fides> when painted in the Retina or the Optick Nerve, nearly refembles a Cube piftur'd rd \udg- in Perfpettive', and confequently the Senfation we have of it, ought to reprefent the faces of a memsvoh'uh Cube nneqaal; becaufe they are fo in Perfpedtive. This notwithftanding, we fee them all equal, prevent our n0r are we jn an £rr0r.
deception. jyjow jt mignt be faid, That this is occafion'd by a kind of Judgment, which we are naturally inclin'd to make -7 namely, That the Faces of the Cube which arefartheft from us, ought not to call on the fund of our Eyes fo large Images as the Faces which are nearer j but whereas Senfa- tion, is only peculiar to the Senfes, and Judgment jn propriety of Speech cannot be afcrib'd to them; it is certain this Judgment is only a Compound-fenfation, which confequently may be fometimes falfe.
However, fince that which is only Senfation in us, may in Relation to the Author of Na- ture, who excites it, be confider'd as a kind of Judgment, I fpeak fometimes of Senfations as of Natural Judgments; becaufe this form of Speaking is expedient in giving an ac- count of things; as may be feen towards the End of the Ninth Chapter, and in feveral other places. V. Though the Judgments I fpeak of, are ferViceable in correcting our Senfes, a thoufand dif- Uat thefe ferent Ways, and without them we fhould hardly ever be in the Right, neverthelefs they tail "menu de- not t0 be fometimes the occafion of our Error. If it happens, for inftance, that we fee the ceiveutin Spire of a Steeple behind a great Wall, or beyond a Mountain, it will appear to us to be both fome parti- little and at no great diflance: But it' we fhould fee it at the fame diflance, but with many cuiarjun- fields and Houfes lying betwixt us and it, it would undoubtedly appear both much bigger and u more remote j although in both cafes the projection of the Rays of the Steeple or the Image of the Chap. VIII. The Search after Truth*, iy the Steeple, which is pidur'd in the fund of our Eye, is altogether the fame. Now it may be faid that the reafon why we fee it greater, is the judgment we naturally make, viz.. That be- caufe fo many Fields lie betwixt us and the Steeple, it muft needs be more remote, arid confe* But if on the other hand, we faw no interjacent Lands betwixt our Eyes and the Steeple, tho' at the fame time we knew there were many, and that it was a great way off, which is very ob- fervable, it would notwithltanding feem to us to be very little and very near, as I have faid be- fore: which we may farther, fuppofe to happen from a kind of judgment natural to our Soul, whereby fhe fees the Steeple in this manner, becaufe (he judges it to be at five or fix hundred paces diftance. For generally our Imagination reprefents no greater fpace betwixt the objects and our {elves, unlefs affifted by a fenfible view of other intervening objects; and beyond which, it has ftill liberty to imagine fomething more.
'Tis for this reafon that the Moon at the Rifing or Setting, is feen much bigger, than when See tke elevated a good height above the Horizon: For this elevation removes our view from oft the ob- ^'^Jf*le jeds lying betwixt us and her, the dimenfioris whereof We know; fo that we cannot judge of that enim of the Moon by forming the compaqfon between them. But when ihe is juft rifen, or about to fet, we fee a great many Fields, betwixt her and us, of whofe extenfion we have a tolerable know- ledge j and thus it is that we judge her more remote, and upon that reafon fee her fo large as we do.
And it muft be obfervM, That when fhe is elevated above oiir heads, though our Reafon molt infallibly afiures us, Ihe is vaftly diftant, yet we cannot avoid feeing her Very hear, and very, little; becaufe indeed thefe Natural Judgments of the Sight, are founded only on the Percepti- ons of the fame Sight, and Reafon is unable to Corfed them: So that they frequently lead us in^ to Error, by making us form voluntary judgments, that go hand in hand along with them. For when we judge according to our Senfations, we are always deceiv'd, though we never err in judg- ing according to our Conceptions: becaufe the Body is no farther inftrudive, than is condu- cing to the Body, and 'tis only GOD who always teaches us the Truth, as fhaU be fliewn here- after.
Thefe falfe Judgments not only deceive Us iri the Diftance and Magnitude of Bodies, which are not the Subject of this Chapter, but in reprefenting their Figure otherwife than it is. We fee, for Inftance, the Sun and Moon, and other very remote Spherical Bodies as if they were flat, and only circular: Becaufe at that great diftance we are unable to difcern whether the part oppofite to us, is nearer us than the others-, and on that account, we judge it is equally diftant from us % And thus upon the fame grounds we conclude the Stars with the Azure which appears in the Heaven, are rang'd in the fame juft diftance, in a vault perfectly convex, fince our Mind ever fuppofes Equality, where it difcovers no Inequality •, which yet it ought riot pofitively to admit, unlefs there be evident conviction for it.
I fhall not here infift longer on the Errors of our Sight, in relpecr of the Figures of Bodies," fince a Man may be fufficiently inftruded in any Book of Opticks. That Science in efied does only inftrud us how to put fallacies on our Eyes; and its whole drift and artifice confifts meerly in finding means of making us form thofe Natural Judgments, I have been fpeaking of, at a time when they are moft impertinent and unfeafbnable. And this cheat may be aded in fb m^riy dif- ferent ways, that, of all the Figures that are in the World, there is not any fingle one, but may be painted in a thoufand different fafhions; fo that the Sight muft unavoidably be deceiv'd. But, this is not the proper place of explaining thefe things more throughly. What I have faid is fuffici- ent, to let us fee we fhould not give over-much credit to the Teftimony of our Eyes, even in their Reprefentations of the Figures of Bodies^ though in point of Figures, their reports are much more faithful than in any other occafion.
CHAP. VIII.
CHAP. VIII.
I. That our Eyes are incapable of informing us of the Quantity or Swiftnefs of Motion conjidered in it felf II. That Duration^ which is neceffary to our Knowledge of the Quantity of Motion^ is unknown to us6 III, An Id- fiance of the Errors of Sight about Motion and Reft.
HAVING already difcover'd the moft Fundamental and General Errors of our Sight touching Extenfion and its Figures, I come now to correct thofe in which this fame Sight ingages us, about the Motion of Matter. And. this has no great difficulty in it, after what I have already (aid of Extenfion. For there is fo neceffary a relation and depen- dence betwixt thefe two things, that if we are deceived in the Magnitude of Bodies, we muft as certainly be deceiv'd in their Motion too.
But, that I may advance nothing but what is clear and diftind, it is neceffary to take off what- ever is equivocal from the word Motion. For this Term has generally two fignifications* The firft firft denotes a certain Paver ot Force, which we imagine in the Body movM, and which we fuppofe the caufeof its Motion: f he fecond is the Tranflation or continued Conveyance of a Body, either, in its removal fromj or approaching to another, which we coniider as at rcfi.
When Ifay, for Inftance, That a Boul has communicated its Motion to another, the word Mo- rion is to be underftood in its firft fignification: But if I fay (imply, that I fee a Boul in a great - Motion, it is to be taken in the fecond. In a word, the Term Motion fignifies at once both Caufe and Effett, which are yet two things altogether different.
I am perfwaded that Men are under moft palpaple and molt dangerous miftakes, concerning the Force that gives this Motion, and Tranflation to the Bodies mov'd. Thofe fine Terms, Na- ture and Imprefs'd Qualities, are good for nothing but to fhelter the Ignorance of the Falfly Learn- ,.,, ed, and the Impieties of the Libertine; as I could eafily demonftrate. But this is not a place pro- ck. of the Per t0 difcourfe of the Power that moves Bodies, fince that is not of a.vifible Nature •, and I am ■2d. Pm of only fpeaking here of the.Errors of our Eyes. I defer it till a time when it will be morefea- the &B'ook. fonable.
Motion taken in the fecond fenfe, that is, for the Tranflation of a Body in its removal from an- other, is fbmething of a vifible kind, and the Subject of this Chapter. I. I have, I think, fufficiently demonltrated in the iixth Chapter, that our Sight does not acthat our quaint us with the Quantity or Magnitude of Bodies, in themfelves^ but only with the mutual ^itLibie Nation tn.eY fend in, to each other, and efpecially to our own. From whence I infer, that of wfem- we are incapable of knowing the true and abfolute Magnitude of their Motion, that is, of their we, m of fwiftnefs or flownefs, but only the relation thefe Motions have to one another, and more efpe- the Quami- dally to the Motion ordinarily incident to our own Body. Which I thus prove. X^Fm' **■ *s certain that we know not how to* judge how great the Motion of a Body is, but by the tion conZ Length of the Space the Body has ran over. Thus our Eyes not informing us of the true Length dsr\i in h of the Space defcrib'd by the Motion, it follows that 'tis impoflible for us to know the true Qiian- flf. tity of the Motion.
This Argument is only a Corollary of that which I have faid of Extenfion, and all the force it has proceeds from its being a neceffary Conclufion of what I have there Demonftrated: I fhall now give one which depends on no Suppofition. I fay then, that fuppofing we were able clearly to dis- cover the true Quantity of the Space defcrib'd, it would no way follow, that we could know the Quantity of Motion alfo.
The Greatnefs or the Swiftnefs of Motion includes two things. The firft is the Tranflation or Conveyance of a Body from one place to another, as from Paris to St. Germains: The fecond is the Time that necefiarily goes to the making this Conveyance. Now it is not enough to know exacf ly how far Paris is diitant from St. Germains, to know whether a Man has gone it with a Quick or a Slow Motion: But it muft moreover be known how much time he has imploy'd in his Jour- ney: Granting then that the Length of the Journey may be truly known •, I utterly deny we can have an exact knowledge by our Sight, or indeed any other way whatever, of the Time that is fpent in the paffage, and of the true Quantity of Duration.
This is fufficiently evident, in that at certain times one Hour feems to us as long as four •, and lhat m-on the contrary at other times, four Hours flip infenlibly away: When, forlnftance, a Man's rmion Mind is filfd with Joy, Hours feem no longer than a Moment; becaufe then the time paffes away which « without thinking of it. But when a Man is dejefted with Grief, and lies under fome fenfible Pain necepryto Qr Afflidion, every day is thought an entire Year. The reafon of which difference is, That in. fed /Tie this cafe the Mind is weary of its Duration, becaufe it is Painful. The more it applies it felf to * Quantity of the thought of it, the more it difcovers it, and thereby finds it longer than in the feafon of Mirth Motion, is and Joy, or fome diverting I.mployment,_ which as it Were carries the Soul out of it felf, to fix her unknown dofer to' the Object of her Joy, or her Diverfion. For as a Man finds a piece of Painting fo much larger by how much he ftands to confider all the little things reprefented in it, with greater at- tention- or as he finds the head of a Fly confiderably great, when he difcerns all the parts of it with a Microfcope; fo the Mind finds its duration fo much longer, as it conliders it with greater Attention and is fenfible of all the parts of it.
Jnfomuch that I dont at all doubt, but that GOD could fo apply our Mind to the parts of its Duration, by giving us abundance of Sulfations in a very little time, as to make one Hour appear as long as many Ages. For as there are no Indivijible Points in Bodies, fo there are no Indivijible In- Rants in Duration. But as the leafl parts of Matter may be divided to Infinity, fo the parts of Du- ration may be afllgn'd lefsand lefs to Infinity, as is eafy to demonftrate. If then the Mind were made Attentive to the minuteft parts of its Duration, by its Senfations which fhould leave fome Traces in the Brain, whereby to remember them, it would undoubtedly fecm much longer to it But finally, the ufe of Watches is a convincing proof, that there can be no exact knowledge {.'Duration, and 1 defire no more. For fince the knowledge of the abfolute Greatnefs or Intenfer ">f Motion depends on a preceding knowledge of the Length of Duration, as we have nf C,'t docs; it thence follows, that on Suppolition we can never exactly know the abfolute Ouatttitv of Duration, we fhall never be able to know exactly the abfolute Quantity of Motion.
But becat'fe *°me Relations, which Duration, or one time has to another may be known, fome Relations lik\"wi**e wnicn Motions have to one another may be equally underftood: For as we certainlv k» n°w tnat theory Year is longer than the Lnnary; fo we can certainly know W aCannonkllletiiasgr^terMotiou thaua Tortoife. So that though our Eyos will not let to Ui, US Chap. IX. The Search after Truth.
us fee the abfolute Quantity of Motion, yet they fail not to affift us in difeovering, nearly enough ' the Relative Intenfenefs of it; I mean the Relation or Proportiori of one Motion to another: And we have no need of any farther knowledge thereof for the Prefervation of our There are many Inftances to be given, which manifeftly fhew that our Sight deludes us touch- ing the Motion of Bodies; it very often happens, that the things which feem to us in Motion, are perfectly at Reft-, and on the contrary thofe which feem to us at Reft, notwithstanding, -are in Motion. As when a Man, for inftance, fits on fhipboard whilft the Veifelis under fail in a fwift and fteady Motion, he feems to fee the Lands and Towns fly from him; they feem to be in motion, and the Veifel to ftand ftill. r So if a Man were plac'd upon the Planet Mars, he would conclude upon fight that the Sun, the Earth and the i"eft of the Planets together with all the Fixed Stars perform'd their circumvolu- tion in about 24 or 25 hours:, which is the fpace of time that Mars imploys in turning round his own Axis. And yet the Earth, the Sun, and the Stars never circuit round that Planet. So that this Man would fee things in Motion which were at Reft, and would think himfelf at Reft,, tho' he were in Motion a the time.
I ftand not here to explain, how it comes to pafs that the Man on fhipboard would eafily cor- rect the miftake of his Eyes, but the Man fuppos'd on the Planet Mars would obftinately defend his Error. The Reafon of it is eafie to be known: and we mail more readily find it by reflecting on what would happen to a Man that were afleep in a Veifel, who ftarting on a fudden, faw no- thing when he wak'd, befides the top of a Maft of fome Veffel that made towards him. For in cafe he faw not the Sails fwell'd with the Wind, nor the Mariners at work, nor felt any Agitation or concuflion of the Ship, or the like, he would abfolutely be at a lofs and in doubt, without know- ing which of the two VefTelswas in Motion j and neither his Eyes nor his Reafon could give him any Information.
21 III.
An In" fiance of the Errors of Sight in refpelt of MoiiotimA.
A Continuation of the fame Subjetl. I. A general Demonftration of the Er- rors of our Sight concerning Motion. II. That the Difiance of Obje&s is neceffary to be known^ in order to judge of the Quantity of their Mo- tion. III. The Mediums, whereby we know the Diflances of Obje&s^ are Examind.
I CO ME now to give a General Demonftration of all the Errors, into which our Sight I. leads us, in refpedt of the Motion of Bodies. A general Let A be the Eye of the Spectator; Cthe Object, which I fuppofe at a convenient di- £^J" c ftancefrom A. I fay, that though the Object remains fix'd in C, it may be thought to be rc~ the Errors mov'd as far as D, or to approach as near as B. And though the Object recedes towards D, it ofoursight concerning Motion.
concerning Motion.
may be believed immoveable inC, and even to approach towards B j and on the contrary, though it approaches towards B, it may' be thought to be immoveable in C, or even to recede towards D. That though the Object be advanc'd from C as far as E or H, or to G or K, it may be thought to have mov'd no farther than from C to F or I. And again on the other hand, that though the Ob- ject be mov'd from C unto F or I, a Man may think it mov'd to Eor H, or elfe unto G or K. That if the Object be mov'd in a line equally diftant from the Spectator, that is, in a circumference whereof the Spectator is the Centre j though that Objed be mov'd from C to P, it may be thought to be mov'd only from B to O: and on the contrary, though it be mov'd only from B to O, it may be thought mov'd from C to P.
If 33 KMalebranche Concerning Book I.
If beyond the Object C there happens to Be another Object, fuppofe M \ which is thought at reft, and which notwithftanding is in motion towards N: Though the Object C remains unmo- ved, or is mov'd with a more gentle motion towards F, than M is mov'd towards N, it will yet feem to be oppofitely mov'd towards Y \ and on the contrary, if &c Tfat'tbe It ls V^n tnat tne proof of all thefe Propofitions except the laft, in which there is no difficulty, Diftmce of depends on One Suppofition only, namely this, that we cannot with any affurance determine objetts w concerning the Diftance of Objects. For if it be true that we cannot judge thereof with any cer- necejptry to tainty, it follows that we cannot be allured whether C is advanc'd on towards D, or has ap- JjjJ0Wt*'*proached towards B, and foof the other Propofitions;; judge of Now to know whether the judgments we forrri of the Diftance of Objects are infallible, we ihsQuanti- have no more to do than to examine the means we make ufe of to judge concerning it. If thefe ty of their means are uncertain, 'tis not poffible the Judgment's depending on them mould be more infallible. Motion, -j-nere are many of them, which it is neceffary to explain.