and therefore in finning, we produce no new Modification in our felves. we love a particular Good: True^ but Sin confilts not precifely in that: For all Good is amiable, and ought to be loved. Our Love is in it felf good-, and even in our loving that particular Good, we follow the Impreflion which God gives us. Our Sin precifely confifts in our fatten- ing upon that particular Good the Impreflion which God gives us to love all Gocd, or univerfal Good, at the time when we both might, and ought to love it. Therefore Sin is nothing-, and though God does all, he dees it not. Now whilft, <(jc.
However, I own that when we fin not, but refill: Temptation, we may be faid in one fenfe to give our felves a new Modification; becaufe we chufe to think on other things than the feeming. Goods wherewith we are tempted. But all that we then do, is produe'd by the Aft ion which God puts in us-, that is, either by our Motion towards Good in general, or by our JF/Y/affifted by Grace -, I mean, enlightned by Knowledge, and forwarded by a preventing delegation. For in fine, If the willing different things be fuppos'd to be giving different Modifications, I deny not but in this.Senfe, the Mind may diverfly modifie it felf by the Action it receives from God.
But 'tis always to be obferv'd, that this Action deriv'd into us from God depends upon our felves, and is not irrefiftible, with relpecl: to particular Goods. For upon the prefentation of a. particular Good, we are inwardly confeious of our Liberty on its behalf, as we are of our Plea- fure and Fain, when they fenfibly afTecl: us: And the fame Reafon convinces us we are Free, that > convinces us we Ex iff •, for 'tis the inward confeioufnefs or feeling of our own Thoughts, that give us to know we have a Being. And, if at the lame time that we are fenfible of our Liberty, with f efpeCt to a particular Good, we ought to doubt of it, for want of having a clear Idea thereof -, We ought no lefs to doubt of our Pain, -and our Exiftence at the time of our Milery, fince we have no clear Idea either of our Soul or Pain.. - It goes quite otherwife with our inward Senfation or Confcience, than with our outward Sen- ■fes. The latter always deceive us in fomething, when we follow their reports: but the former never deceives, us. Tis by the outward Senfes I fee Colours on the furface of Bodies, that I hear Sound in the Air, thatT feel Pain in my Hand-, and their Teftimony deceives me, if I rely upon it: But 'tis by my inward Senfation that I fee Colour, that I hear Sound, that I fuffer Pain 5 and I err not in believing I fee When I fee, hear when I hear, and fuffer when I fuffer ^ provided I flop and go no farther. Thefe things are too felf-evident to be longer infifted on. Therefore being inwardly confeious of our Liberty, at the time of a particular Good's being prefent to the Mind, we are not to be doubtful of our Freedom on its refpecl. But whereas this inward Senfiu tion is ibmetimes abfent from our Mind", and we confult only what confus'd remains it has left in To 4 g., F. Malebranche Concerning in our Memory; we. may by the confederation of bbjfoafted reafons, which keep us from an in- ward feeling, perfuade our lelves that 'tis impoffible for Man to be free: Jult as a Stoick who in want of nothing, and Philoibphizing at his Cafe,, may imagine that Pain is no Evil, becaufe the . Internal Serif e he has of himfelf, does not actually convince him of the contrary; and fo he may prove, like Seneca, by reafons in one fenfe moft true, that 'tis a contradiction for the wife man to fee. miferable.
But though our Self '-confeioufnefs were inefficient to convince us of our Freedom, yet Reafon might evince as much: For fince the light of Reafon allures us that God a£ts only lor himfelf, and that he can give no Motion to us, but what mull: tend towards him; the Imprefficn towards Good in general may be irrefiftible; but 'tis plain, that that which we have for particular Goods muff be necelTarily free. For if it were invincible, we fhould have no Motion to carry us to God, though he gives it only for himfelf; and we mould be confhain'd to fettle on particular Goods j though GOD, ORDER and REASON, forbid us. So that Sin could not be laid at our door, and God would be the real Caufe of our Corruptions •, forafmuch as we mould not be Free, but purely Natural, and altogether necejfary Agents. ' Thus though inward Senfation did not teach us we were free, Reafon would difcover it was neceflary for Man rb be created fo •, if we fuppofe him capable of defiring particular Goods, and only capable of defiring them through the Impreflion or Motion which God perpetually gives us for himfelf Which likewife may be prov'd by Reafon. But our capacity to fuffer Pain can- not be prov'd this way; but can only be difcover'd by Confidence, or inward Senfation-, and yet no Man can doubt but a Man is liable to fuffer Pain.
As We know not our Soul by any clear Idea we have of it, as I have before explain'd, fb 'tis in Vain to try to difcover what it is in us that terminates the A£tion which God imprefles, or that yields to be conquer'd by a refiftible Determination, and which we may change by our Will, or by our Impreflion towards all Good, and our Union with him, who includes the Ideas of all Beings. For in fhort, we have no clear Idea of any Modificarion of our Soul: Nothing but our Internal Senfe can teach us that we are, and what we are: and this only mull be confulted to convince us we sue free. And its Anfwers are clear, and fatisfa£tory enough upon the Point, when we actually propole to our lelves any particular Good -, for no Man whatever can doubt whether he be invinfibbj inclin'd to eat of a Fruit, or avoid fome flight inconfiderable Pain. But if inftead of hearkning to our Inward Senfation, we attend to abftra£ted Reafons, which throw us off the Contempla- tion of our f elves, poflibly lofing fight of them, we may forget that we are in Being •, and trying to reconcile the prefcience of God, and his abfolute power over us, with our Liberty, we f hall plunge into an Errour that will overturn all the Principles of Religion and Morality.
I produce here an Objection which is ufually made againft what I have been faying, which though but very weak and defective, is ftrong enough to give a great many trouble to evade. The Hating of God, fay they, is an Action which does not partake of Good; and therefore is all the Sinner' sr God having no part in it: And confequently Man a£ls and gives himfelf new Modifications, b^ an action which does not come from God.
I Anfwer, That Sinners hate not God, butbecaufe they freely and falfly judge that he is Evil; for Good, confider'd as fuch, cannot be the Objett of Hatred. Therefore they hate God with that very Motion of Love he influences them with towards Good. Now the Reafon why they conclude he is not Good, is their making an undue ufe of their Liberty; for being not convine'd with irrefiftible Evidence that he is not Good, they ought not to believe him Evil, nor confequently to hate him.
In Hatred two things may be diftinguif h'd, viz. the Senfation of the Soul, and Motion of the WilL This Senfation cannot be Evil •, for it is a Modification of the Soul, and has neither Moral Good nor III in it. Nor is the Motion more corrupt, fince it is not diftinguifhable from that of Love. For Ex- ternal Evil being only the privation of Good, 'tis manifeft, rhat to fly Evil, is to fly the privation of Good, that is, to purfue Good. Wherefore all that is real and pofitive, even in our Hatred of God. himfelf, has nothing Evil in it •, and the Sinner cannot hate God, without an abominable abufe of the action which God inceflantly gives to incline him to the Love of Him.
Cod worlds whatever is real in the Sensations of Concupifcence ^ and yet is not the Author of Concupifcence.
This Ilk- A S the Difficulties that are rais'd about Concupifcence, sre near akin to thofe before expkin'd % flratim re- f\_ I think it convenient to (hew, that God is not the Author of Concupifcence, though it be lares to the jie tiiat WOrks all in us, even in the production of fenfible Pleafure.
rerofthe*" *c oug'u^ ^'^ t0 be granted for the Reafons produe'd in the Fifth Chapter of the Firft Book of firft F.cok the preceding 1 real if e, and elfewhere, that by the natural Laws of the Union of the Soul and Body, of the Man, even before the Fall, was inclin'd by preventing Pleafures to the ufe of fenfible Goods-, and Search. that as often as fuch and fuch Traces were delineated in the principal part of his Brain, fuch and fuch Thoughts arofe in his Mind. Now thofe Laws were molt Proper and Equitable, for the Rea- fons I there have given: Which being fuppos'd, as before the Trangreflions all things were perfe&ly well ordefd, ib Man had neceflarily that Power over his Body, as that he could prevent the pro- duction of thefe Traces when he would -, Order requiring that his Mind fhould have the Dominion over his Body: Which Power of his Mind precifely confuted in this, that according to its different Defires The Search after Truth, 105 Defires and Applications, it flopt die Communication of Motions which were produc'd in his own Body by circumambient Objects, over which his Will had not an immediate and direft Authority, as over his proper Body: And it cannot, I think, be conceiv'd how he could hinder the Formation of the Traces in his Brain any other way. Therefore fhe Will of God, or the general Law of Na-< ture, which is the trueCaufe of the Communication of Motions, depended on fome occafions, upon the Will of Adam: For God had that confideration for him:, that he produc'd not without his confent new Morions in his Body, oratleaftinthe principal part to which his Soul was immediately united. Such was the Inltitution of Nature before the Sin. ORDER would have it fo •, and confequent- ly HE whole efiential and neceffary Will is always conformable to ORDER. Which Will re* maining immutably the fame, the EilablHh'd Order was fubverted by the firft Man's Difobedience; becaufe for the demerits of his Sin, it was confonant to Order, that he fhould be Lord of nothing-. It is not reafonable that the Sinner mould fufpend the Communication of Motions, that the Will In tj,e ob_ of God fhould conform to his; or that any exceptions fhould be made to the Law of Nature on jeflion to his Behalf: In fo much that Man is fubjeel: to Concupifcence, his Mind depends on his Body -, the Article he feels in himfelf indeliberate Pleafures, and involuntary and rebellious Motions, purfuant to that P^*6.11' molt juff and exaft Law which unites the two Parts of which he is eompos'd. upon "he feventh Chapter of the fecond Book, I explain what I here fay in general of the lofs of Power, Man had over his Body.
Thus the forma/ Re of on of Concupifcence, no lefs than that of Sin, is nothing real and pofitive; being no more in Man, than the lofs of the Power he had to wave, and fufpend to the Commu-» nication of Motions on fome occafions: Nor are we to admit any pofitive Will in God to produce it-. For this lofs which Man has fuftain'd, was not a confequence of Order, or of the immutable Will of God, which never fwerves from it, and is conftantly the fame; but only a confequence of Sin, which has rendred Man unworthy of an Advantage due only to his Innocence and Up- rightnefs. Wherefore we may fay, that not God, but Sin only, has been the Caufe of Concu- pifcence.
Neverthelefs, God Works all that is Real 'and Pofitive in the Senfations and Motions of Concupif- cence; for God does every thing: but all that has nothing of Evil. 'Tis by the general Law of Na- ture, that is, by the Will of God, that fenfible Objefts produce in Man's Body certain Motions, and that thefe Motions raife in the Soul certain Senfations, ufeful to the prefervation of the Body^ or the Porpagation of the Species. Who then dare prefume to fay thefe things are not good in themfelves?
I know it is faid that Sin is the Caufe of certain Pleafures. But do they that fay it, conceive it? Can it be thought that Sin, which is nothing, fhould aftually produce fometbing? Can notbingbe fuppos'd to be a (real) Caufe. However 'tis fo laid: but poffibly for want of taking due pains of ferioufly confidering what they fay-, or becaufe they are unwilling to enter on an Explication that is contrary to the Difcourfes they have heard from Men, who, it may be, talk with more Gravity and AfTurance, than Reflexion and Knowledge.
Sin is the Caufe of Concupifcence, but not oft leaf ure -, as Free Will is the Caufe of Sin, though not of the natural Motion of the Soul. The Pleafure of the Soul is good, as well as its Motion or Love: and there is nothing good but what God does. The Rebellion of the Body, and the guilt of Pleafure, proceed from Sin: As the Adherency of the Soul to a particular Good, or its Reff, proceeds from the Sinner: But thefe are only Privations and Nothings, whereof the Creature is capable.
Every Pleafure is Good, and likewife in fome meafure makes happy the PofTeflbur, at leaft for the time of the Enjoyment: But it may be faid to be evil\ becaufe inffead of elevating the Mind to Him that is the true Caufe of it, through the Errour of our Intellectual, and corruption of our Moral Part, it proftrates it before fenfible Objects, that only feem to produce it. Again it is evil, in as much as it is Injuftice in us who are Sinners •, and confequently meriting rather to be punifh'd than rewarded, to oblige God purfuant to his (Primitive) Will, to recompenfe us with pleafant Senfations. In a word (not to repeat here what 1 have faid in other places) it is evil, becaufe God at prefent forbids it, by Reafon of its alienating the Mind, from himfelf, for whom he hath made and preferves it. For that which was ordain'd by God to preferve RighteousMan in his Innocence, now fixesV//?/tf/Manin his Sin •, and the Senfations of Pleafure, which he wifely eftablifh'd as the eafieft and moft obvious Expedients to teach Man, (without calling off his Reafon from his true Good,) whether he ought to unite himfelf with the invironing Bodies; at prefent fill the Capaci- ty of his Mind, and fatten him on Objects incapable of afting in him, and infinitely below him * becaufe he looks upon thefe Objefts to be the true Caufes of the Happinefs he enjoys occafonal/y from them.
Dd « THE 0(5 F. Malebranche Concerning ■ THE SECOND ILLUSTRATION UPON THE Firft CHAPTER of theFirft BOOK; Where I fay, That the Will cannot diver fly determine its Propensity to Good, but by com- manding the ZJnderftanding to represent to it fome particular ObjeU.
IT muft not be imagin'd that the Will commands the Underjianding any other Way than by its Dcjires and Motions, there being no other A&ion of the Will: nor muft it be believ'd that rp-iTthe tue Underjianding obeys the Will, by producing in it felf the Ideas of Things which the Soul de- 6th chapter fires-, for the Undemanding afts not at all, but only receives Light, or the Ideas of Things, of Tan if.through its neceflary Union with Him who comprehends all Beings in an intelligible manner, as Boo\ in. js explained in the * Third Bock.
Here then is all the Myftery -, Man participates of the Sovereign Reafon, and Truth difplays it felf to him proportionably to his Application, and his praying to it. Now the Defire of the Soul is a Natural Prayer, that is always heard; it being a natural Law, that Ideas mould be fo much readier, and more prefent to the. Mind, as the Will is more earneft in defiling them. Thus, pro- vided our Thinking Capacity, or Underltanding, be not clogg'd and fill'd up by the confus'd Sen- faticns we receive occasionally from the Motions occurring in our Body^ we fhould ho fooner de- fire to. think on any Objecf, but its Idea would be always prefent to our Mind; which Idea, Ex- perience witneffihg, is fo much more prefent and clear, as our Defire is more importunate, and our confus'd Senfations, furnifh'd to us" by the Body, lefs forcible and applicative, as I have faid in the foregoing Illuftration.
Therefore, in faying that the Will commands the Underjianding to reprefent to it fome particu- lar ObjoSt, I meant no more than that the Soul, willing to confider that Obje£t with Attention, draws near it by her Defire; becaufe this Defire, confequently to the efficacious Wills of God, which are the inviolable Laws of Nature, is the Caufe of the Prefence and Clearnefs of the Idea that reprefents the Objecf. I could not at that time fpeak otherwife than I did, nor explain my felf as I do at prefent, as having not yet prov'd God thefole Author of our Ideas, and our parti- cular Volitions only the occajional Caujes of them. I fpoke according to the common Opinion,, as I have been frequently oblig'd to do, becaufe all cannot be faid at once: The Reader ought to be equitable, and give Credit for fome time, if lie would have Satisfaction; for none but Geometric cians pay always down in hand.
THE ILL USTR ATION UPON THE Third CHAPTER of the Firft BOOK; Where I fay, That Myfteries of Faith being of a Supernatural Order, we need not wonder if we want the Evidence, jince we want the Ideas of them.
'TTTl fell I fay that we have no Ideas of the Myfteries of faith, it is vifible from the foregoing W and following Difcourle, that I fpeak but of clear Ideas, which are productive of Light and Evidence, and which give us a Comprebenjion of the Objecl, if we may be allow'd fo to fpeak.
] grant that a Peafant could not believe, for Example, that the Son of God was made Man, or that The Search after Truth. toy that there were Three Perfons in the Godhead, if he had no Idea of the Union of the WORD wifih our Humanity, and no Notion of Per/on. But if theie Ideas were clear, we might by con- fidering them, perfectly comprehend thefe Myfteries, and explain them to others -, and fo they would be no longer ineffable Myfteries. The Word Per/on has, as * St. Auftin fays, been apply 'd * Kc o'mnl- •to the Pother, Son and Holy Ghoft, not fo much to exprefs diftinQly what they are, as not to be"0 tfycre-. filent upon a Myftery whereof we are obliged to fpeak. mm '."ter:, tres cum trcs cffefatc.imur j S.Aufl. deTrin. lib. 7. cap. 4. And in another place, Cum qwritur quid tres? Magna prorfm inopia hu- lriMum laborat Eloquium. Dittum ejl tamcn tres pcrfoiu non ut Mini diceretur, fei ne taceretur. Ibid. lib. 5. cap. 9.
I fay here that we have no Ideas of our Myfteries, as I laid elfewhere we have no Idea of our Sottl^ becaufe the Idea we have of the latter is no clearer than thole we have of the former: Therefore the Word Idea is equivocal •, fometimes I have taken it for whatever reprefents to the Mind any Object, whether clearly, or confus'd and darkly -, fometimes more generally, lor what- ever is the immediate Object of the Mind • fometimes likewife for that which reprefents Things *Chap. to. lb clearly to the Mind, that we may with a bare Perception difcover whether fuch or fuch Modi- Bw{ 1. ■rations do belong to them. For this Reafon I have fometimes laid we * had an Idea ol the Soul, t See ch,f* and ibmetimes deny'd it i t for "tis difficult, and often wearifom and ungrateful to obferve a too B*^.m- .vigorous Exactnels in one s Exprethons. luftrarion.
When an Author contradicts himfelf but in the Opinion of his Criticks, or fuch as would, fain have him do ir, he ought not to be much concern'd at it; and if he would fatisfie by tedious Ex- plications whatever the Malice or Ignorance of Men might object to him, he would not only com- pofe an ill Book, but all his Readers would be difgufted with the Anfwers he gave to Objections, either imaginary, or contrary to that equitable Temper which all the World pretends to; for a Man cannot endure to be fufpected either of Malice or Ignorance •, nor is it allowable to anfwer weak or invidious Objections for the raoft part, except when there are Men that have urg'd them, and fo have skteen'd the Reader from the Reproach which fuch Anfwers feem to afperfe on thofe that demand them.
THE ILLUSTRATION On thefe Words of the Fifth CHAPTER of the Firft BOOK, This being the Cafe, it ought to be concluded that Adam was not invited to the Love of God, and the reft of his Duty, by a preventing Fleafure; for- afmuch as the Knowledge which he had of God, as of his Good, and the Joy he was continually poffefsd with, neceffarily confequent to the View of his felicity in his uniting himfelf with God, were fujfeient Motives to re- commend his Duty to him, and to make his A&ions more meritorious than if he had been], as it were, determined by a preventing Fleafure, IN order to our diftinct underftanding all this, it mull be known that we are determin'd to act: from only Knowledge and Pleafure; for whenever we begin to love an Object, 'tis from our difcovering by Reafon that it is good, or feeling by Pleafure that it is agreeable. But there is great difference between Knowledge and Pleafure: Knowledge enlightens our Mind, and mani- fefts the Good, but does not actually and efficatioufly incline us to the loving it; whereas Plea- fure effectually drives and determines us to love the Object that feems to caufe it. Knowledge, or Light, does not induce us of it felf -, but leaving us wholly to our felves, lets us freely deter- mine our own Motion to the Good which it prefents: Pleafure, on the contrary, anticipates our Reafon, interrupts us from confulting it, leaves us not to our' own Conduct, and weakens our Liberty.
Therefore, as Adam had before his Pall, a Time appointed to merit Eternal Happinefs, and had a full and perfect Liberty to that intent -, and as his Light was fufficient to hold him clofe- ly united to God, whom he already lov'd by the natural Tendency of his Soul; he ought not to be carry'd to his Duty by preventing Pleasures, which would have lelTen'd his Merit by leiTen- ing his Liberty. Adam might have had lome fort of Right to complain of God, if he had hin- dered him from meriting his Reward as he ought to do; that is, by Actions abfolutely free s And Fsrtijfam And it had been a fort of injuring his Free Willy for God to have given him that kind of Grace qnifte dt^ -whjch js at prefent only neceffary to counterpoife the preventing Delights of Concupifcence. ™amiftt'fa- Whtlft Adam had all neceffary Supplies for his Perfeverance, it had been to fulpect his Venue, cere cere qu'yJ and, as it Were, to accuie him of Infidelity, to give him any Prevention: It had been leaving vcUet.hu*. him an Occafion of Glorying in himfelf, to have taken away all Senfe of the Wants pofiible deCotfupt t0 hetall him, and Infirmities he was obnoxious to -, for I own that as yet he had neither Want ~*L. ™* nor Weaknefs. Laftly, What is infinitely more confiderable, it had been to render the incarna- Sest\x$&tion of JESUS CHRIST indifferent; which certainly was the firft and greatelt Defign of Dialogue Him who fuffer'd all Men to be involv'd in Sin, that he might mew them Mercy in JESUS £*.rlje C H R IS T, to the end that he who glories might glory only in the LORD. Conventions, towards the End of the Byuffcfs Edition.
To me therefore it feems undeniable that Adam had no Senfe of Preventing Pleafure * in his Dit- ty, but it does not feem equally certain that he had a Senfe of Joy, though I fuppofe it here, as believing it highly probable. But to explain my felf: There is this Difference between Preventing Pleafure and the Pleafure of Joy, tliat the former precedes Reafbn, and the latter follows it; for Joy naturally refults from the Knowledge one has of his own Happineis or Perfections, becaufe he cannot coniider himfelf as happy or perfect, but he mult inttantly thereupon feel a certain Joy. As we may be confeions of our Happineis by Plea- fure, or dif cover it by Reafon, fo Joy is of two forts •, I fpeak not here of that which is purely /iv?- fible, but of that which Adam might have been poffefs'd with, a* neceffanly confequent to the KnotK- ledgehe had of his -Happinefs in uniting himfelf with God: And fbme Realbns there are, which rndke it doubtful whether he was actually poffeis'd of it.
The Principal of all is, that his Mind perhaps had been fo taken up with it, that it had rob- bed him of his Liberty, and invincibly united him to God; for 'tis reafonable to believe that this Joy ought to be proportion'd to the Happineis which Adam poffefs'd, and confequently exceed- ing great...But in anfwer to this, I fay, Firft, That purely Intel/etfual Joy leaves the Mind to its entire Li- berty, and takes up but very little of its Thinking Capacity; wherein it differs from Senfible Joy, which commonly difturbs the Reafon, and leffens the Liberty.
• I anfwer, Secondly, That the Happineis of Adam at the flrit Inftant of his Creation, did not confift in a plenary and entire Pofleltion of the Supreme Good, it being poflible for him to lofe it, and become miferable: But herein his Happinefs especially confifted, That he fuffer'd no Evil, and was in the good Favour of Him who mult have perfected his Felicity, if he had perievefd in his State of Innocency. Thus his Joy was not exceffive ■, nay, it was or ought to have been temper' d with an Alloy of Fear, for he ought to have been diffident of himfelf.
I anfwer, Laftly, That Joy does not always intend the Mind upon the true Caufe that produces it: As a Senfe of Joy arifes upon the Contemplation of one's own Perfections, it is natural to be- lieve that Prolpecl: is the Caufe' of it; for when a Thing conftantly follows from another, 'tis na- turally look'd upon as one of its Effects. Thus a Man confiders himfelf as the Author of his own prefent Happinefs, he finds a fecret Complacency in his Natural Perfections, he loves himfelf and thinks not of Him who operates in him in an imperceptible manner.