XX. Neverthelefs, it cannot be deny'd, but God may juftifiethe Infant, without interrupting the Dominion of his Body over his Mind; or convert his Will towards him, bydepofiting in his Soul a Difpofition like that, which remains after an Aftual Motion of our Loving God. But that way of afting, I doubt, feems lefs Natural than the Other •, for it cannot clearly be conceiv'd what thefe remaining Difpofitions can be. 'Tis true, that ought not to be much admir'd • fince having Panii of noc^ar ^4ea °f °nr Soul, as I have elfewhere prov'd, we need not wonder if we know not all the Bookii. Modifications it is capable of. But the Mind cannot be fully fatisfied upon things, which it does with toll" not clearly conceive; and without recourfe to an extraordinary Miracle, we cannot fee what can lufcration? give the Soul thefe Difpofitions, without a preceding Ail: furely it cannot be done by jways that feem moft plain and fimple. Whereas the fecond Adam afting on the baptized Infant's Mind for one moment, the contrary to what the firfi Adam product in it before, Regeneration is perform'd by the ufual ways of afting which God takes in his fanftifying the Adult: For the Infant, at that moment, being void of Senfations and Paffions, which divide its Thinking and Willing Capacity, has nothing to encumber it, and prevent its knowing and loving its true Good. This is all I fay at prefent, becaufe it is not neceffary to know precifeIy,how Regeneration of Infants is perform'd; provided we admit in them a true Regeneration, or an inward and real Juffcification, caus'd by Afts, or at leaft by Habits of Faith, Hope, and Charity. My offering an Explication, fo repug- nant to Prejudices, isdefign'd for the Satisfaction of thofe, who will not allow of Spiritual Habits, and to prove to them the Poffibility of the Regeneration of Infants: For the Notion of Imputa- tion feems to me to include a manifcflrContradiftion; it being impoflible, That God fhould con- fider his Creatures as Righteous, and aftually love them, whilft they are aftually in Diforder and Corruption. Though he may for his S O N's fake have a Defign to re-inftate them in O R D E R, and love them when re-inftated- OBJECTS The Search after Truth. i $ o OBJECTIONS Againft the Proofs and Explications of Original Sin.
OBJECTION againft the fir ft Article.
GO D wills Order, it is true:, but 'tis his Will that makes it: it does not fuppofe it: What- ever God wills is in Order purely for this Reafon that God wills it: If God wills that At every Minds mould befubjeft to Bodies, mould love and fear them, there is no diforder in all °bJeftion this. If God will'd that two times two mould not be four, we mould not fpeak falfe, SeArti- in faying two times two were not four.• For it would be a Truth. God is the Principle of all deicis Truth: and the Matter of all Order: he fuppofes nothing; neither Truth, nor Order: but makes made a" all. gainfo ANSWER.
Then all is thrown in Confufion. There is no longer any Science nor Morality, nor undeniable Proofs of our Religion. Which confequence is evident to any Man who clearly comprehends this falfe Principle -, That God produces Order and Truth by a Will abfolutely Free. But this is not to anfwer it.
I Anfwer then that God can neither do nor will any thing without knowledge-, that therefore his Will fuppofes fomething; but what it fuppofes is nothing of a created nature, Order, Truth, Eternal Wifdom, is the Exemplar of all the Works of God: which Wifdom is not made; God who makes all things never made it, though he conftantly begets it by the necefllty of his Being.
Whatever God wills is in Order, for that fole reafon, that he wills it: No body denies it. But this is becaufe God cannot aft againft himfelf, that is, his Wifdom and his Knowledge. He is at liberty not to produce any External Work: but fuppofing he will aft ^ he cannot aft other- ways than by the immutable order of his Wifdom, which he necefTarily Loves. Hor Religion and Reafon teach me that he works nothing without his SON, without his WORD, without his WISDOM. Therefore I fear not to affirm, that God cannot pofitively will that the mindfbould be fubjetl to the Body. Becaufe that Wifdom, whereby God wills, whatever he wills, makes me clear- ly underftand it is contrary to Order: And I fee this clearly in that fame Wifdom; becaufe it is the Soveraign and llniverfal Reafon, which is participated by all Spirits, for which all Intelligences are created, and by which all Men are Reafonable. For no Man is his own Reafon, Light, and Wifdom j unlefs it be when his Reafon is Particular, his Light, an Ignis" fatuus, and his Wifdom Folly...As the Generality of Men know not diftinftly that it is only Eternal Wifdom which enlightens them \ and that Intelligible Ideas which are the Immediate objeft of their Mind, are not created j .. As the Generality of Men know not diftinftly that it is only Eternal Wifdom which enlightens them \ and that Intelligible Ideas which are the Immediate objeft of their Mind, are not created j fo they imagine, that Eternal Laws and Immutable Truths, receive their Eftablifhment from a free will of God. And this is what occafion'd M. des Cartes to fay,that God was able to effeft that twice four mould not be eight; and that the three Angles of a Triangle mould not be equal to twoRights. Becaufe there is no Order, fays he, no Law, no Reafon, Goodnefs or Truth, but depends on God, and that is he who from all Eternity, has ordairfd and eftabliftfd, as fupreme Legiftator, 'Eternal Truths, ^"^f1"^0 This Learned Man did not obferve that there was an Order, a Law, a Sovereign Reafon Coeternal obwtion with God, and necefTarily lov'd by him, and accordingly to which he mull necefTarily aft, fuppo- againfthis fing he will aft. For God is indifferent as to his External Workings, but the manner of his work- Meditatir ing, though he be perfectly free, is not indifferent to him. He always afts in the wifeft and perfeft- ons- Art- eft manner poffible: he conftantly follows immutable, and necefTary Order. Thus God is at liber- 6" Art" 8* ty not to make either Spirits, or Bodies, but if he creates thefe two Kinds of Beings, he muft See the II- create them by the fimpleft ways, and fituate them in the moft perfeft Order. He may for Exam- luf"tratI°n pie unite Spirits to Bodies, but 1 maintain that he cannot fub]e& them thereunto, unlefs in purfuance ^hcLp. of the Order which he always follows, the Sin of Spirits obliges him to ufe them in that manner: of Pan 11. as I have already explain'd in the feventh Article, and in the firft Explication towards the end. Book ill.
To anticipate fome inftances that might be urg'd againft me, I think it necefTary to fay that Men are to blame to confult themfelves when they would know what God can do or will. They are notto judge of his wills by the inward fenfe they have of their own Inclinations. Eor otherwise they would often make him an unjuft, cruel, finful,infteadof an Almighty God. They ought to lay slide the generalPrinciple of theirPrejudices,which difpofes them to judge of all things with reference to themfelves, and not- to attribute to God what they do not clearly conceive to be included in the Idea of a Being infinitely perfeft. For they ought not to judge of things fave by clear Ideas. And then ISO - F. Malebranche Concerning then the God they worfhip, will not be like thofe of Antiquity, Cruel, Adulterous, Voluptious, as tbePerfons who have imagin'd them: nor will he referable the God of fome Chriftians, who to make him ds powerful as the Sinner wifb.es him, afcribe to him an a&ual power of a&irig againit all Order, of leaving Sin unpunifhf, and of condemning to eternal Torments Perfons never fo righteous and Innocent.
Second OBJECTION againft the Fir ft Article.
If God wills Order, what is it that makes Monfters, I fay not amongft Men; for they have fin- ned, but amongft Animals and Plants? What is the caufe of the general corruption of the Air which breeds fo many Difeafes? By what Order is it that the Seafons are fo irregular, and that the Sun and the Froft burn upand kill the Fruits of the Earth? Is it to aft with Wifdom and Order, to furnim an Animal with parts quiteufelefs, and to congeal the Fruits after they are perfectly form- ed? Is not this rather becaufeGod does what he pleafes,and that his power fuperfedes all Order and Rule? For to mention things of greater Importance than the Fruits of the Earth, wherewith he may do as he fees good: the Clay whereof God makes Vcftfels of wrath, is the fame with that which he fafhions Feffels of Mercy.
ANSWER.
Thefe are the difficulties which ferve only to obfeure the Truth, as proceeding from the dark- nefs of the Mind. We know that God is juffc: we fee that the wicked are Happy: ought we to deny what wee fee; ought we to doubt of what we know, becaufe we may poffibly be fo ftupid as not to know, and fo Libertine as not to believe what Religion teaches us of future Torments? So we know that God is Wife •, and all that he does is Good •, mean while we fee Monfters, or defective Works. Whatare we to believe that God is out of bis aim, or that thefe Monfters are not his handiwork? Certainly if we have fence and conftancy of Mind, we fhall believe neither the one nor the other. For 'tis manifeft that God does all, and that whatever he does is as perfect as . poffible, with relation to the fimplicity and fewnefs of the means heimploys, in the Formation of his Work. We mull hold faft to what we fee, and not quit our ground for any difficulties im- poffible to be refolv'd 5 when our Ignorance is the caufe of that Impoffibility. If Ignorance muffc raife Difficulties, and fuch like Difficulties overthrow the beft eftablifht Opinions, what will re« main certain among Men who know not ail things? What? Shall not the brighteft Lights be able to difperfe the leaftDarknefs; and fhall any little fhadow Eclipfe thecleareft and the liveliellLight?
But though the anfwering fuch fort of Difficulties might be difpene'd with, without Prejudice to the fore-eftablifnt Principle:, yet it is not amifs to (how they are not unanfwerable. For the Mind of Man is fo unjuft in its Judgments, that it may poffibly prefer the Opinions which feem to refult from thefe imaginary Difficulties, before certain Truths, which no Man can doubt of, but becaufe he will', and with thatdefign ceafes to examine them, I fay then that God wilisorder, though there are Monfters; and 'tis moreover becaufe God wills order, that there are Monfters; and this is my reafon..
Order requires that the Laws of nature whereby God produces th3t infinite Variety, foconfpi- cuousinthe World, fhould be very fimple, and very few in number. Now 'tis the limpficity of thefe general Laws, which in fome particular Juncture^, and becaufe of the Difpofition of the fub- ject, produces irregular Motions, or rather Monftrous Combinations: and confequently God's willing order is the caufe of thefe Monfters. Thus God does not pofitively or directly will th& Exiftence of Monfters: but he pofitively wills certain Laws of the Communication cf Motions, whereof Monfters are the neceflary confequences; becaufe thefe Laws, though of a moft fimple kind, aremeverthelefs capable of producing that variety of forms which can't be fufficiently ad- mired.
For Example: In confequence of the general Laws of the Communication of Motiens, there are fome Bodies which are driven near the Centre of the Earth. The Body of a Man, or an Animal is one of thefe.• that which upholds him in the Air breaks under his Feet: isitjuft, or according to Order /hatGod fhould change his general Will,for that particular Cafe? Surely it ieems not pro- bable. That Animal therefore muft neceffarily break, or maim its Body. And thus we ought to argue about the generation of Monfters.
ORDER requires that all Beings fhould have what's necefiary to their Prefcrvation, and the Propagation of the Species; provided this may be done by moSi fimple Means, and worthy the Wif- dom of God. And fo we fee that Animals, as alfo Plants have general Means to preferve them- felves, and to continue their Species: and if fome Animals fail thereof, in fome particular Occa- fions, 'tis becaufe thefe general Laws, whereby they were form'd, reach not thefe private Emer- gencies, becaufe they refpecr. not Animals feparately, but generally extend to all Beings; and thac the Good of the Publick muft be preferr'd before Particular Advantages.
'Tis evident, That if God made but one Animal, it would not be Monftrous: But Order would require, That he fhould not make that Animal by the fame Laws that he at prefent forms all o- thers • for the Adion of God muft be proportion^ to his Defign. By the Laws of Nature he de- figns not the making one Animal, but a whole World; and he muft make it by the fimplicfl Means, asOrJerrequires, 'Tis enough then that the World be not monftrous, or that the general Effe&s be fuitableto the general Laws, to vindicate the Work of Gcd from Cenfure and Reproach, If The Search after Truths lit If, for all particular Changes, God had inftituted fo many particular Laws; or if He had con- jlitpred in1 every Being a particular Nature or Principle, of all the Motions that arrive in it; I con- feis it would be hard to julBfie his Wifdom again ft fo viiible Difordejs. Wi; inould perhaps be forc'd to confefs, either that God wills:.ot 0*der, or that he knows not how, or is not able to re- difie Diforder. For, in fliort, it feeras co me impoffible to afcribe an almoft infinite Number of fecond Canfes, of natural Forces, Vermes, Qualities and Faculties, to what we call the Sports and Disorders of Nature, with a Salvo to the infinite Power and Wifdom of the Author of all thing OBJECTION againfi the Second Article.
GOD can never ad for Himfelf. A wife Being will do nothing ufelefs; but whatever God fliould do for himfelf, would be ufelefs • becaufe he wants nothing. God wills nothing for him-- felf, if by theNeceffity of his Elfence he has al'l the Perfection he can. defire. And if God defires nothing for himfelf, he works nothing for himfelf, fince he works only by the Efficacy of his Will. The Nature of Good, is to be communicative and diffufive • 'tis to be ufeful to others, and not to it felf; 'tis to feek out; 'tis, if it be poffible, to create, Perfons whom it may make. happy.There- fore it is a Contradiction, for God, who is eilentially and foprcmely good, toad for himfelf.
A'NSWER.
A'NSWER.
GOD may be faid to aft for himfelf two ways; either with intent to derive fome Advantage from what he does; or to the end, his Creature may find its Happinefs and Perfection in him. I inquire not, atprefent, whether God ads for himfelf, in the firftfenfe; and whether to receive an Honour worthy of himfelf, he has made, and reftor'd all things by his SON, in whom, ac- cording to the Scripture, all things fubftft. I only affert, that God cannot create, and preferve Spirits, in order to know, and love created Beings. 'Tis an Immutable, Eternal, and neceffary Law. That they fhould know, and love God; as I have explain'd in the Third Article. Thus this Objection does not impugn my Principle, but, on the contrary, corroborates it: and if it be certain, that 'tis the Nature of Good to difleminate, and communicate it felf abroad, (for I Hand not to examine that Axiome) 'tis evident, That God being eifentially and fupreamly Good, it is no Contradiction he fhould ad in the Sencel intended.
' OBJECTION agakft the Fourth Article.
Ignorance being a Conference of Sin, Adam before his Fall had a perfect Knowledge of the Na- ture of his own Body, and of thofe he livM amongft: He mult, for Example, have been perfect- ly acquainted with the Nature of all Animals, to give them, as he did, fuch Names as agreed to them.
ANSWER.
'Tis a Miftake: Ignorance is neither an Evil, nor a Confequence of Sin. 'Tis Errour or Blind- nefs.of Mind, which is both one, and the other. None but God knows all things without any Shadow of Ignorance; Ignorance is incident to the brighter!, and molt enlightned Intelligences. Whatever is finite cannot comprehend Infinity: and thus there is no Spirit that can comprehend \ only all the Proper ties of Triangles; Adam knew, the firft minute of his Creation, whatever was requifite he mould know, and nothing more •, and. it was to no purpofe for him to know exactly the Difpofition of all the Parts of his Body, and of thofe he madeufe of: the Reafons are to be feen in this Article, and elfewhere.
The Impofition of Names, in Scripture, rather denotes the Authority than the perfed Knowledge And calls of the Impofer. As the Lord of Heaven had made Adam the Lord of Earth, he conceded him the them dlby Privilege of giving Names to the Animals, as he himfelf had done to the Stars,. 'Tis evident,That T^elrmm^ Sounds, or Words, neither have, nor can have any natural relation to the things they fignifie; let ' 47" the Divine Ylato, and the Myflerious Pythagoras fay what they pleafe of it. One might perhaps ex- plain the Nature of an Horfe, or an Oxe, in an entire Book, but a Word is not a Book: and it's ridiculous to imagine, That Monofyllables, as Sus, which in Hebrew fignifies a Horfe, and Schor, which fignifies an Oxe, fhould reprefent the Nature of thefe Animals. Notwithstanding there is great probability thefe Names were impos'd by Adam, fince they are found in Gene/is: the Author ChaP- *° whereof allures us, That the Names which Adam gave the Creatures were the fame which were in I9' ufe in his time; for I cannot fee what elfe can be meant by thefe Words, Omne quod vocavit Adam > anima v'wentis, ipfum eft nomen ejus. And whatfoever Adam call'd every living Creature, that was the Name thereof.
But I grant that Adam gave Names to Animals, which have fome reference to their Nature, and I fubferibe to the Learned Etymologies that an Author of this Age. gives us of them. I will that he call'd domeftick Animals Behemoth, becaufe of their keeping filence; the Ram Ajil, becaufe he is ftrong; the Buck Sair, becaufe fwift; the Hog Chazjr, becaufe of his little Eyes; the Afs Cha- H h morf mor, becaufe in the Eaft Country red AfTes are common. But I cant conceive that any more is requlfite, than to op-n the Eyes to know if a Buck be fwift, an Afs red, and whether a Hog has little or great Eyest Adam calls by the Name of 'Belt and Behemah, what we term a Brute, or a great domeftick Creature, becaufe thefe Beafts are mute and ftupid. What fhould we thence con- clude? That he knew oerfectly their Nature? That is not evident: I fhould rather beapprehen- five, left it mould be thence concluded, That Adam, being fimple enough to put a Queftion to an Oxe, as being the largeib cf domeftick Animals, and'wondring that he could not anfwer him, de- fpis'd him, and nam'd by a Term of Contempt, Beir and Behemab.
Second OBJECTION aga'mftthe Fourth Article, Some preventing Senfations are incommodious and painful: Adam was juft and innocent, and confequently ought not to feel the fmart of them. He ought then on all occafions to be guided by Reafon and Knowledge, and not by preventing Senfations, like thofe we have at prefent.
1 confefs there are preventing Senfations, which are difagreeable and painful, but they never occafion'd any Fain in the firft Man;■ becaufe in the inftant they gave him any, he, by an Act of his Will, withftood the!mpreffionv and, in the very inftant of that Volition, he ceas'd to be touch'd with it. Thefe Senfations did only refpe&fully caution him what ought to be done, or omitted; and did not incommode his Felicity: They but made him fenfibl'e that be was capable of lofing it - and that he who made him Happy, could punifli and make him miferable, if he faifd in his Fide- lity.
But to perfwade our felves, that the firft Man was never overtaken with the Senfe of any lively Pain, we need but confider thefe two things. Firft, that Pain is very light, when the Motions it is annex'd to are very languid •, becaufe it is always proportion'd to the force of the Motions, that are communicated to the chief part of the Brain. Secondly, That is of the Nature of Motion, to include a SucceJJion of Time -, and it cannot be violent at the firft inftant of its Communication. Which being fpppos'd, it is plain, that the firft Man never felt a violent furprizing Pain, that was capable to make him miferable •, becaufe he could put a ftop to the Motions that caus'd it. But if fo be, he could effectually ftop them, at the firft inftant of their Action, there is no doubt but he would do it, fince he was always defirous of Happinefs; and that Averfion is naturally conjoin'd to the Senfe of Pain.
Adam therefore never fuffer'd any violent Pain; but I think we are not oblig'd to fay, that he never felt any light and inconfiderable fmart, fuch as is that when we taft a fpwre Fruit, fuppofing- it to be ripe. His Felicity had been very tender, if fo little a thing had been able to.di.fh irb it. For fuch Delicacy is a fign of Weaknefs: for how can that Joy and Plealure be fubftantial, that . fuch a Trifle can diffolve and annihilate? Pain never truly molefts our Happinefs but when it is involuntary, and poffeffes us in fpight of our Refiftance. JESUS CHRIST was happy, though on the Crofs, in the midft of his Groans, and Agonies,becaufe he fuffered nothing, but what he was willing to undergo. Thus Adam fuffering nothing againft his will, it cannot be faid we make him unhappy before his Sin, in fuppofing him admonifh'd by preventing, but refpe&ful, and fubmiffive Senfations, of what he ought to avoid, for the prefervation of his Life.
OBJECTION againft the Fifth Article.
Adam felt preventing Pleafures: But thefe are involuntary Motions; Therefore Adam was agitated with involuntary Motions.
ANSWER.
I Anfwer that Adam's, Senfations preceded his Reafon, the proofs I have fhown for it in the Fourth Article. But 1 deny that they preceded bis Will; or that they ftirr'd up in it any parti- cular Motions. For Adam was willingly admonifh'd by thefe Senfations, what he ought to do for the prefervation of his Life: But he was never willing to be perturbated by them in fpight of his VVtll. For that's a Contradiction. Moreover, when he dejtr'd to apply himfelf to the contem- plation of Truth, without any diftra&ion of Thought, hisSenfes and his Paffions kept an intire Si- lence. Order would it fhould be fo -, |br that's a necefTary fequel of that abfolute power he had over his Body.
Sec the II- I anfwer fecondly, that it is not true, that the Pleafure of the Soul is the fame thing with its luftmion Motion, and its Love. Pleafure and Love are modes of the Souls Exiftence. But Pleafure has no upon the neceilary relation to the objeft that feems tocaufe it; and Love is neceffarily related unto Good. lookv!' pleafure is t0.thc Soul wnat Fi£we is to Body: and Motion is to Body what Love is to the Soul. But the Motion of a Body is very different from its Figure. I grant that the Soul which has a.con- ftantPropenfitytoGood, advances, as I may fay, more readily towards it, when mitigated by a fenfe The Search after Truth. j 2?
fenfe of Pleafure, that when difcourag'd by her flittering Pain; as a Body when driven ru,.i eafief along if it have a Spherical, than if if have a Cubical Figure. But the figure of a Body differs from its Motion, and it m,iy be Spherical, and yet remain at reft. 'Tis true in this cafe it goes not with Spirits as with Bodies; thole cannot feel a Pleafure but they mu.ft be in motion: becaufe God who only makes, and prefewes them for himfelf, drives them perpetually on towards good. But that doesnbt prove that the pleafure of the Soul, is the fame thing as its Motion: For two things, though differing from each other, may yet be always found inseparably together.
I anfwer laftly, that although pleafure were not different from the Love or Motion of the Soul, yet that which the firft Man felt in the ufe of the goods of the Body, did not incline him to the Loving Bodies. 'Tis true, Pleafure carries theSoul towards the cbjedt, that caufes it in her, But it is not the Fruit that we eat with Pleafure, which caufes the Pleafure in us. Not Bodies but God only can a£t upon the Soul, and in any manner make it happy. And vte are in an Error to think that Bodies have in them, what we feel occafionally from their prefence. Adam before his Sin be- ing not fo flupid as to imagine, that Bodies were the caufes of his Pleafures, was not carry'd to the love of them, by the motions that accompany'd his Pleafures. Jf pleafure contributed to the fall of the firft Man, it was not by working in him what at prefent it does in us:, But only by fill- ing up or dividing his capacity of Thought, ic effae'd or diminiftfd in his Mind the prefence of his true good, and of his Duty.
OBJECTION againft the fixth Article.
What likeiyhood is there that the immutable Will of God had a dependance on the will of Man, and that on Adam's behalf there were exceptions made to the generalLaw of the Communication of" Motions.
ANSWER.
At leaft it is not evident but fuch exception might be made ^now it is evidentthat immutable or- der requires the fubjecYion of the Body to the Mind: and 'tis a contradiction for God not to love, and will order-, * for God neceflarily loves his Sun. Therefore it was neceffary before the Sin or Inthe. the firft Man, that exceptions fhould be made in his favour to the general Law of the Gomrauni- ^llul^ati- cation of Motions. This feems it may be of a too abftradted nature: Here then isfomewhat of a the^ature more fenfible kind. of ideas, I fball more particularly explain what is Order, and why God neceflarily loves it.
Man though a Sinner has the power of moving and flopping his Arm when he pleafes. There- fore according to the different Volitions of Man, the Animal Spirits are determin'd to the railing, or flopping fome Motions in his Body; which certainly cannnot be perform'd by the general Law of the Communication of Motions. If then the will of God be flill fnbmitted to our own: why might it not be fubmitted to the will of Adam! If for the good of the Body, and of civil Society, God flops the communication of motions in Sinners, why would he not do the like in favour of a Righteous Man, for the good of his Soul, and for the prefervation of the Union and Society with his God for whom only he was made. As God will have no Society with Sinners, fo af- ter the Sin he depriv'd them of the power they had to fequefter themfelves, as it were, from the Body to unite themfelves with him. But he has left them the Power of flopping or chang- ing the communication of Motions, with reference to the prefervation of Life, and erf Civil So- ciety. Becaufe he was not willing to deftroy his Work; having before the conftructionof ic, de- creed according to St. Paul, to re-eflablifh and renew it in Jefus Chrifi.
OBJECTION againft the Seventh Article.
Man in his prefent ftate conveys his Body all manner of ways: he moves at pleafure all the parts of it, which are neceffary to be mov'd for the profecution, and fhunning of fenfible good and 'evil: and confequently he flops or changes every moment the natural communication of motions, not only for trifles, and things of little importance, but alfo for things ufelefs to Life and civil Society, and even for Crimes, which violate Society, fhorten Life, and difhonour God all manner of ways. God wills order, it is true: But will order have the laws of motions violated for the fake of Evil, and kept inviolable on the account of Good. Whymuft Man lofe the power of flop- ping the motions which fenfible objects produce in his Body, fince thefe Motions keep him from doing good, from repairing to God, and returning to his duty? and yet retain the power of do- ing fo much evil, by his Tongue and his Arm, and other parts of his Body, whofe motions de- pend upon his will?
ANSWER.
To the anfwering this Objeftion it muffc be confider'd, that Man having fin'd ought to have re- • fcnrn'd to his Original nothing. For being no longer in Oder, nor able to retrieve it, he ought rJchr5ia.
Iogue of Cbriftian Converfations. * to