tiorem.' Notiorem quia interior em: Notiorem quia certiorem. I bring not any other proofs of St. r^mtif«"t Auftinh Opinion: Thofe who defirethem, may fine! all forts in that learn'd Collection Ambrofius ft™^0„~t Vitlor has made of them, in the fecond Volume of his Chriftian Philofophy. dijfimiihZ dinem fiii generis. %ette culp.mwrin libro Japientia inquifitores hujus fxculi. Si enim tantum, iriquit, potuerunt valere utpoflent aeftimare foculum, quomodo ejus Sominum, non facilius inveneruht? Ignou enim funt 'funddmenta Cculis nojiris, £? qui fumavit terram propinqmt metitibus noftrir. De Gen. ad litt. 1. 3. ch. 16, De Trinitate, lib. 8- ch. 8.
But to return to the paffage of St. John, No man has feen God at any time I believe the defign of the Evangelift, in affirming no Man has feen God, is to ftate the difference between the Old and NewTeftament. Between J E S U S CHRIST and the Patriarchs and Prophets, of whom it is written, that they have feen God. For Mofes, Jacob, Ifaiah, and others, faw God only with cor- poreal Eyes, and under an unknown Form: They have not feen him in himfelf, Deum nemovidit unquam; But the only Son, who' is in the Bolbm of the Father, has inftru&ed us in what He has (Qen. Vnigtnitus qui eft in finu Patris: Jpfe enarravit.
OBJECTION. * St. Paul writing to Timothy, fays, that God inhabits inacceffible Light which no man hath f§en\ nor iTim.i$„ i An fee if the Light of God cannot be approached to, we cannot fee all things in it **• 1ST n AN- I2j.a F. MaLebranche Concerning ANSWER. ' St. Paul cannot be contrary to St. John who allures us, that JESUS CHRIST, is the true Light that lightens all Men who come into the World. For. the mind of Man, which many of the * Fathers call Illuminated, or Enlightned Light. Lumen llluminatum, is Enlightned only with * St. CyrlU the Light of Eternal Wifdom, which the Fathers therefore call Illuminating Light, Lumen Illuminans.
of Alexan- jyavid advifes to approach to God, and to be enlightned by him; Accedite ad eum & iUuminaminu the* word" But ll0W can we ^e en^ghtne^ by it, if we cannot fee the Light by which we are to be enlightned?
of st.fohn, Therefore when St. Paul fays, that Light is inacceffible, he means to f Carnal Man who cannot re- Erat lux tire into himfelf to contemplate it: Or if he fpeaks of all Men, 'tis becaufe there are none but are vera. difturb'd from the perfecl: Contemplation of Truth, becaufe our Body incelTantly troubles the at- St. Aug. tenf10n 0f our mind.
upon St. John, St. Greg. c. 27. upon 28 of Job. \ Jnacceffibilem dixit; fed omni bomini bumana fapienti: Scriptura quippefacra omnes carnalium fellatores humanitatis nomine notare fokt. St. (7«g. in,cap. 28. J06.
OBJECT ION. - Ex.33. 20. God anfwering Mofes when he defired to fee him, fays, Thou canjlnotfee my Face; for there fhali no man fee Me and live.
ANSWER.
It is evident that the literal fence of this PalTage is not contrary to what I have faid hitherto.
For I do not fuppofe it poffible to fee God in this life, as Mofes defired to fee Him. However, I Anfwer, that we mult die to fee God: For the Soul unites herfelfto Truth proportionably as (he quits her union with the Body: Which is a Truth that cannot be fnfficiehtly confider'd. Thofe who follow the Motions of their paffions ^ thofe whofe Imagination is dehTd, with the enjoyment of Pleafures; Thofe who have ftrengthned the Union, and- Correfpondence of their Mind with Neither, is i^c\r Body: in a word, thofe who live cannot fee God: For they cannot retire into themfelves to zt found m conr/uit tj-,e Truth. Happy therefore are they who have a pure Heart, a difengag'd Spirit, a clear the living. Imagination, who have no dependance on the World, and hardly any on the Body. In a word, Job 28. ' happy are the Dead, for they (hall fee God. Wifdom has publifhd it openly upon the Mountain; i3» and Wifdom whifpers it fecretly to thofe who confuit Hei* by retiring into themfelves.
Thofe who are conliantly quickning in them the Concupifcence of Pride, who are indefatigably forming a thoufand Ambitious defigns, who unite, and even enflave their Soul, not only to the Bo- dy, but all furrounding Obje&s: In a word, thofe who Live not only the Life of the Body, but alfo that of the World, cannot fee God: For WISDOM inhabits the molt retired and inward Rea- fon, whilft they perpetually expand themfelves abroad.
But fuch as cohitantly deaden the Activity of their Senfes, who faithfully preferve the Purity of their Imagination,, who couragioufly refiftthe Motionsof their Paffions ^ In a word, that break all thofe Bonds whereby others continue enchain'd to theBody'and fenfible grandeur; may difcover in- finite Truths, and fee that Wifdom which is hid from the Eyes of all Living, They after a fort do job 28. ceafe to live when they, retire into themfelves: They relinquish the Body when they draw near to 21, Truth. For the mind of Man obtains that Site and Pofition between God and Bodies, that it can never quit the one but it mult approach the other. It cannot draw towards God bat it mult re- move from Bodies, nor purfue Bodies but it mult recede from God: But becaufe we cannot give an abfolute Farewell to the Body, till Death makes the feparation, I confefs it impoffible, till then, to be perfectly united to God. We may at prefent, as fays St. Paul, fee God confufedly as in a ■ r^ we ' u Glafs, but we cannot fee him face to face. Non videbit me homo & vivet. Yet we may fee him in aiiafs Part* that is, imperfectly and confufedly. darkly, but then face to face. Now I know in part, &c. 1 Cof. 13. 2.
It mult not be imagin'd, that life is equal in all Men living, or that it confifts in an indivifible point. The Dominion of the Body over the Mind, which withftands our uniting our felves with God by the Knowledge of Truth, is fufceptible of more and lefs. The Soul is not equally in all Men united by Senfations to the Body, which fhe animates, nor by Paffions to thofe, her Inclinati- ons carry her to: And there are fome who fo mortifie the Concupifcence of Pleafure, and of Pride within them, that they fcarce retain any Commerce with their Body, or the World; and foare as it were Dead: St. Paul is a great inftance hereof, who chaftis'd his Body, and brought it to fub- je&ion; who was fo humbled, and deftroy'd, that he thought no longer on the World, nor the World on him: For the World was dead, and crucified to him, as he was dead and crucified in the World. And on this account it was, fays St. Gregory, that he was Co fenfible to Truth, and fo prepar'd to receive thofe Divine Lights which are included in his Epiftles; which however all glo- , rious and fplendid, make no impreffion fave on thofe who mortifie their Senfes and Paffions by his rat Man' Example. For as he fays himfelf, the carnal and fenfible Man cannot comprehend Spiritual things: receive tb not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolijbnefs unto him.. 1 Cor. c. 2. 1 4. Ad Moyfen dicitur, non videbit me- homo & vivet, ac fi aperte diceretur: Nullus unquam Deum Jpiritualiter videt qui mundo carwtlitcr vivit. St. Greg, upon the 28. of .fo6ch.2§.
Becaufe The Search after Truth. j »?
■ Becaufe Worldly addrefs the tall of the Age, to finenefs of Wit, the Nicety, the Livelinefs the Beauty of Imagination, whereby we live to the World, and the World to us, infufe into our Mindan incredible ftupidity and a fad infenlibilitytoallthofe Truths which cannot be nerfecllv eonceiv d, unlefs in the fiience and calm of the Senfes and Paffions.
. We mult therefore dejire that Death which unites us to God, or'at leaft the image ofthat Death that is the Myftenons Sleep in which all our External Senfes being lock'd up, we may hear the Voice of internal /Truth, which is never audible but in the fiience of the Night, when Darknefs in- volves fenfible Objeds and when the Woild is as it were dead to us. Thus it is, fays St. Gregory that the iSpoufe heard the Foice of her belowd m her fleep, when Jhe faid, I fleep, but my heart wake?' ■ Outwardly I /lumber but my heart watches within: For having no life nor fenfe with referenced External Objecls. I become extreamly fenfible to the Foice of inward Truth, which accofts me, in my inmoft reafon Htnc eft quodfponfa tn canticis canticorum fponfi vocem quafi per fomnium audierat, qua dicebat Ep'o dormto, & cor meumvigilat. Ac fi dicer et1 dum exterior es fenfus ab hujus vita follicitudinibu- fopio vacante mente, vtvactus interna cognofco. Foris dormio, fed intus cor vigilat: quia dum exterior a quafi mnfentio, interior a folerter apprehendo. Bene ergo Eliu ait quod per fomnium loquitur Deus. St Cre/orv^ Morals upon the 33. Ch. of Job. * 7 ' THE IL LUST RAT IO UPON THE Seventh CHAPTER of the Second P A R T of the Third BOOK.
Where I prove, That we have no clear Idea of the Nature^ or Modifications of our Soul I Have often faid, and think fufficiently prov'd in the third Book, of the preceding Treatife, that we have no clear Idea, but only the Confcience, or inward Senfation of our Soul; and that therefore we have a much more imperfedt knowledge thereof than we have of Extenfion. Anfwerto Which to me feenfd fo evident, that I did not think it necelfary to prove it more at large. the. fifth But the Authority of M. des Cartes,who poffitively fays,7W the nature of the Mind is better known than °bJe&ion that of any other thing, has fo prepolfefs'd fome of his Difciples, that what I have faid upon that thefecond Subject, ferves only to make them think me a weak Perfon unable to reach to, and hold faff ab- Meditati- ftra&ed Truths, which have nothing in them to welcome and retain the attention of their Con- on to- templators. wai-ds the I confefs, I am extreamly Feeble, Senfible, and Heavy, and my Mind depends on my Body more endv ways than I can exprefs. 1 know it: Ifeelit: and I continually labour to increafe this knowledge I have of my felf. For though we cannot help our being miferable- we ought at leaft to have the knowledge, and the fenfeof it; we ought at leaft, to be humbled, upon the fight of our inward Miferies, and to acknowledge the need we have of being deliver'd from. this Body of Death which throws trouble and confufion into all the faculties of our Soul.
But yet the Queftion before us is fo well proportion'd to the Mind, that I can fee no need of any great Application to refolve it, and for that reafon I did not infill: upon it. For I think it may be affirm'd, that moft Mens ignorance about the Soul, as of its diftin&ion from the Body, of its Spiri- tuality, Immortality, of its other properties, is fufficiently demonftrative, that we have no clear and di/tind Idea of it.
It may be faid that we have a clear Idea of Body, becaufe we need but confult the Idea that re~ prefents it, to difcover what Modifications it is capable of. We plainly fee, that it may be either round or fquare, in Reft or Motion. We eafily conceive, that a (quare may be divided into two Triangles, two Parallelograms, or two Trapezia. We never are at aftand what to anfwer to the demand, whether this or that be implied or denied in Extenfion, becaufe the Idea of Extenfion be- ing clear, we may eafily, and, by a bare perception, difcover what it includes, and what it ex- cludes.
But it does not appear to rne that we have any fuch Idea of our Mind, as can difcover when we confult it, the Modifications it will admit. Had we never felt either Pleafure or Pain, we could not tell whether our Soul were fufceptible of either. If a Man had never eaten a Melon, felt Smart, or feen Red or Blue, he might have confulted long enough this pretended Idea of his Soul, before he could diftin&ly difcover whether it was capable or not, of fuch Senfations or Modifications. I fay farther, that though a Man actually feel Pain, or fees Colour, he cannot difcover by a fimple view, whether whether thefe Qualities belong to the Soul. He'll imagine that Pain is in the Body, which* occafi- ons hirn to fuffer it, and that Colour is diffus'd upon the furface of Objeds, though' ir~be clearly conceiv'd, that thefe Objeds are diftinguifh'd from the Soul.
To be fatisfied whether or no fenfible Qualities are Modes of the Mind's exiftence, this pretend^ ed Idea of the Soul is never confulted. On the contrary, the Cartefians themfelves confult the Idea of Extenfion,and reafoh in this manner: Heat, Pain, Colour, cannot be Modifications of Extenfion: For this is capable but of different figures and Motions. Now there are but twO kinds of Beings' Bodies and Minds. Therefore Heat, Pain and Colour, and all other fenfible Qualities, are the Furniture of the Mind. a Whilft they are oblig'd to confult their Idea of Extenfion, to difcover whether fenfible Qualities are Modifications of their Soul; is it not evident they have no clear Idea of it? For otherwise would they ever bethink themfelves of foindired a Condud, When a Philofopher would know^ whether Rotundity belongs to Extenfion, does he enquire into the Idea of the Soul, or any other befides that of Extenfion? Does he not fee clearly in the fame Idea of Extenfion, that Rotundity is a Modification of it? And would it not be extravagance in him to argue thus to be inftruded? There are only two forts of Beings, Minds and Bodies: Roundnefs is not a Modification of a Mind; therefore it is a Modification of a Body.. • We difcover then by a bare perception without Argumentation, and by the meer Application of the Mind to the Idea of Extenfion, that Roundnefs and every other Figure is a Modification belong- ing to Body, and that Pleafure, Pain, Heat, and all other fenfible Qualities, are not Modificati- ons of it. There can be no Queflion propos'd about what does, or does not appertain to Extenfi- on, but may be eafily, readily, and boldly anfwer'd by the fole confideration of the Idea that re- prefentsit. All Men are agreed, in their notion, and beliefs upon this Point. Forj;hofe who will have Matter capable of Thought, do not imagine this Faculty is to be attributed to it becaufe of Extenfion, being perfwaded that Extenfion confider'd, precifely as fuch, cannot Think.
But Men are not fo well agreed about what they are to think of the Soul, and her Modifications: for fome there are, who fancy, that Pain, and Heat, or at leaft that Clour does not belong to her.. And a Man would be laught at among fome Cartefians, that fhould affirm, the Soul grows actually Slue, Red, Yellow, and that fhe is dyed with all the Colours of the Rain-Bow, when fhe contem- plates it. There are many who doubt, and more that don't believe, that the Soul becomes formally fiihking upon the fmell of carrion; and that the taft of Sugar,Pepper, andSalt,are properties belong- ing to her. Where then is the clear Idea of the Soul that the Cartefians may confult it, and may all agree about the fubjed where Colours, Savours, Odours, ought to enter.
But though the Cartefians were agreed upon thefe difficulties, yet we were not to conclude from their agreement, that we have a clear Idea of the Soul: For if they agree at Sail that 'tis Ifie which is adually Green, or Red, when a Man fees thefe Colours, yet this conid act be concluded with- out a long train of Reafonings -, they could not fee it by a fimple view, nor ever difcover it by..con- fulting the pretended Idea of the Soul, but rather by confulting that of the Body.. They could not be certain, that fenfible Qualities belong'd to the Soul, were it not becaufe they did not belong ta Extenfion, whereof they have a clear Idea. Nor could they ever convince of it fuch as, having lit- tle thought, are incapable of complicated Perceptions, or Reafonings- or rather fuch as cannot dwell upon the confideration of the clear Idea of Body,and who are apt to confound all things; And fo there would be always, Clowns, Women, Children, and it may be fome Scholars, and Dodors who would doubt of it. But Women, and Children, Learned and Unlearned, the molt Intelli- gent and moftftupid Per fons, eafily conceive, by their Idea of Extenfion, that it is fufceptible of all forts of Figures •, they clearly comprehend that Extenfion is not capable of Pain, Savour, Odour, or any other Senfation, when they but faithfully and attentively confider the Idea only that repre» fents it: For there is no fenfible Quality included in it's reprefentative Idea.
'Tis true, they may doubt whether Body is^ or is not capable of admitting fome Senfation, or fenfible Quality: But then they underftand by Body fome other thing than Extenfion, and have no clear Idea of Body taken in this fenfe. But when des Cartes, or the Cartefians, whom 1 am con- cerned with, maintain that the Soul isbetter known than Body, they mean only by Body, bare Ex- tenfion. Which makes me admire how they can hold, that the nature of the Soul is clearer known than that of the Body, fince the Idea of Body, or Extenfion,is fo manifeft,that all the World's agreed about what it contains, and what it excludes, whilft the Idea of the Soul is fo confus'd, that the Cartefians themfelves daily difpute, whether the Modifications of Colour appertain to it.
We know, (fay thefe Philofophers, with. their Matter des Cartes) the nature of a fubftance fo much more difiinOly, as we know more of its Attributes. Now there is nothing whereof we know fo many Attri- butes as of our Mind. Becaufe as many as we know in other things we may put to the mind's account from its knowing them; and therefore its Nature is better known than that of any other thing.
But who is it that fees not a great deal of difference between knowing by a clear Idea and know- ing by Confcience. When I know that 2 times 2 are 4, I know it very clearly; but I know not clearly what within me 'tis that knows it. I feel it, Iconfefs; I know it by confeioufnefs, or inter-, nal fenfe: But I have noclear Idea of it as I have of Numbers, whofe Relations I can diftindly dif- cover. I can reckon in my mind three properties, one of knowing that 2 times 2 are 4, ano- ther of knowing that 3 times 3 are 9, a third of knowing that 4 times 4 are 16". And thefe Properties,if you pleafe,fhall be different from one another,and fo I may count an infinite number of Properties belonging to me. But I deny that we can clearly know the nature of the things that we can reckon thus.
It Tfje Search after Truth. tfyy It may be laid that we have a clear Idea of a Being, and that we know its feature, when we can Compare it with others, which we likewifc have a clear Idea of, or at leafc when we can compare together the Modifications incident to it. We have clear ideas of Numbers, and of the parts of fcxtenfion,becaufe we can compare thefc things together. As 2 may be compar'd with 4, 4 with 16, and every number, with any other: So likewife a fquare may be compar'd with a Triangle, a Circle with an Ellipfts, a Square and a Triangle wich every other Square and Triangle; and thus a Man may clearly difcover the relations thefc figures, and thefe Numbers have to one another. But we cannot compare our Mind with other Beings, thereby to difcover clearly their % Relations; nor can we compate the Modifications of the Mind together. Can we clearly difcover what Relation, or Proportion there is between Fleafure and Pain, Heat and Colour? Or to keep to Modifications of the fame fort; can we determine exaclty the Proportion between Green and Red Ifellow and Piirple,or even between Purple and Purple? We fee well enough that one is darker, or brighter than the other. But we know not evidently how much, nor what it is to be Darker or Brighter. We have then no clear Idea either of the Soul, or her Modifications; and though 1 fee or have the fenie of Colours, Tails, Smells; yet I may fay as 1 have done, that I know them not by a clear hie?, kwcz I cannot clearly difcover their Relations.
'Tis true I can difcover the exact proportions betwen founds: That a Diopafon for inftance is i)ouble, that a Fifth is as 3 toi, and that a Fourth is as 4 to 3. But I cannot know thefe proportiT ons by the fenfation I have of them. If! know that an Eighth or Diopafon is double, 'tis becaufe I" Jiave learn't, by Experience, that the fame firing founds an Eighth, when having ffcricken it whole, 1 ftrike it prefently again, dividing it into two equal parts, or becaufe I know the number of Titra- tions is double in equal time, or by fome fuch way, arid this becaufe the Trepidations of the air, the Vibrations of the firings, and the firing it felf are things which may be compared by clear Ideas,and that we diftindiy conceive what relations there can be between a firing and it's parts, as likewife between the celerity of different Vibration's. But 'we cannot compare founds betwixt themfelves, or as they are fenfible Qualities, and Modifications of the Soul; nor that way are their Proportions or Relations difcovercMe. And though Muficians diftinguifh very well the different concords, yet they do not diftinguifh their proportions by clear Ideas. By the ear only they judge by a clear Idea, or otherwife than by fenfation. Therefore Muficians have no clear Idea of founds, as they are fenfation; or Modifications of the Soul: And confequently we conceive not theSoul nor her Mo- difications by a clear Idea, but only by Confidence or internal fenfe.
Moreover we know not wherein conlifl thofe difpofitions df the Soul, which facilitate her to act and rcprefent Objects to her felf. Nay we cannot conceive wherein fuch Difpofitions might poffibly confift. I fay farther, that we cannot bepofitively afTur'd by Reafon, whether the mcer Soul fepurate from the Body, or confider'd without relation to it, be capable of Habits ox Memory. But how can wc be ignorant of thefe things,if the nature of the Soul be better known to us than of the Body. 'Tis eafily difcern'd wherein that readinefs confifts, wherewith the animal Spirits flow into the Nerves, which they have often us'd to glide into; at lead 'tis no trouble to difcover, that whilffc the conduits of the Nerves are widened, and the Fibres recumbent after a particular manner, the Spirits may eafily infinuate themfelves. But what is it we can conceive capable of augmenting the Soul's Facility to aft or think. For my part, I own, I cannot comprehend it: And in vain fhould I interrogate my felf what thefe difpofitions are; For I could give my felf no anfwer, nor light up- on the matter, though I have a moft lively fenfe of that eafinefsv with which fome Thoughts arife in me. And if I had no particular Reafons to induce me to believe that I really have fuch Difpofitions, though I know theln not in me; I fhould judge there neither was fpiritual Habit, nor Me- mory in my Soul. But in fhort, feeing there is doubt and fcruple about it, we have an in- fallible Symptom, that Men are not fo enlightned as is pretended. For Doubt can never be recon- cil'd to Evidence, and clear Ideas.
'Tis certain, that a Man of the greateft Underftanding, cannot evidently know whether he de- ferves Hatred or Love, as fpeaks the Wifeman. My own confeioufhefs of my felf cannot fatisfy Eccjg c> „ me, herein. St. Paul fays indeed, his Confcience reproach'd him with nothing, yet for all that he 1. does not affirm he is juftified; On the contrary he afTerts he is not thereby jultified, and that he I judge not dares not judge himielf, fince he that judges is the Lord. But having a clear Idea of Order; if we ™in? own had another as clear of the Soul, from the inward feeling of our felves we fhould evidently know, ji'0Vf°S whether fhe was conformable to Older. We fhould know whether we were Righteous or not,,hhw by my and we could exactly difcover all our interiour Difpofitions to Good and Evil, whenever we were felf,. yet 1 confeious of them. But if we could know our.felves juft as we are, we fhould not be fo fubjedt to a m "°\ Prefumption; And there is great likelihood that St. Peter would not have faid to his Mafter whom ^fV11' he was no: long after to 'deny, iVIoy cannot I follow thee now? I will lay down my life for thy fake, fj tL:°" ulnimam meam pro te ponam. For being inwardly confeious of his own Strength and good Will, he judgetbme might have icen with Evidence, whether he had Refolution and Courage to conquer Death, or ra- utbe lord ther the infults of a filly Maid, and two or three Servants. 1 Cuv- *"• If the nature of the Soul be more known than any other. If the Idea we have of her be as clear f0^n hat we have of the Body, i ask only how it comes to pafs that there are fo many who confound 37. her with it? Is it poflible to confound two clear Ideas intirely different? Let us do juitice to all 3 Mankind: Thofe who diffent from our Opinion are as rational as our felvc?, they have the fame Ideas of things, and are partakers in the fame Reafon. Why then do they confound what we di- ftinguifn? Do they ufe on other occafions to confound things, whereof they have clear ideas? Do O o they 1^6 F. MalebranChe Concerning they ever confound two different numbers, or take a Square for a Circle? And yet the Soul differs more from the Body, than one of thefe Figures from the other; For they are two fubftances which are in nothing alike, and are confounded notwithftanding. Which mult therefore proceed front fome difficulty there is to difcover their difference, from its not being obfervable by a fimple per-, ception -, and from the Impoffibility of concluding that one is not the other without Argument and Reaioning. It muft come from hence, wt, That the Idea of Extenfion muft be caufioufly con- fulted, and Extenfion difcover'd to be no Mode of Exiftence of a Body, but the Body it felf, as be- ing reprefented a fubfifting Thing, and as the Principle and Foundation of whatever we conceive clearly in Bodies: And thatfo the Modes of which Body is capable, having no Proportion of fen- fible Qualities ^ the fubject of thefe Qualities, or rather the Being of which they are Modes muft needs be different from Body: For fuch like argumentation is requifite to prevent our confounding the Soul with the Body. But if we had a clear Idea of the Soul, as we have of Body, certainly we need not take thefe round-about ways to diftinguifh her from it. Since it would be difcoverable