quences he is pleas'd to draw from my Principles-, for 'tis not potiible but Monfieur de la FiuYs Boole muit have dsceiv'd fome one or other. If at prefent I am fufpedted of Herefie, 'tis a Misfortune I cannoc help.
But if it be a Crime,'tis not I that have committed it,but rath2;- he that draws confequences from, aPrinciple not including them. For my part I difown thefe confequences: I believe them falfe,and Heretical •, and if I clearly faw they were directly inferr'd from anyone of my Principles, I would- forfake it:,For that Principle would be falfe, Trnths being not contrary to one another.
But be it granted that Monfieur <& la ViWi Reafonihgs were juft, and that -Heretical Confequences - were'perfedtly well dedue'd from their Principle; yet neither I, nor many others, that he ill-ufes faw before he wrote his Book, that they were ccntahYd in it. So that his Conduct is indefenfible which way foever.w-e examine it. For in fine the Ankles of Faith depend not on theQuicknefs and Reach of thought of any Particular Divine, as I indeavour to fhow:. and thougli we Ihould be certain that fome principles included impious Confequences, yet no Man has. tight to treat the Maintainers of thefe principles as Heretich.
*Ep.z I have feen in the Fathers, and chiefly in St. Auftin, the * principle 1 have advane'd, but never ch. 2.28. obferv'd Monfieur de la Fillers there. To me it appear'd a common Notion, that if God had Annich.2.^7. hilated all the extcnfionin the World, all the matter, the World is made up of,.would be Annihilated. \ cb.6.con- had confulted feverallferibas- about it, to know- whether they had the fame Idea as my felf of the ^Mtmict'i matter» whofe anfwersconfirm'd me in my Opinion. I concluded, for the Reafons I ihall give ch. 16.de anon, that we could no longer have any direel and Natural Demonftration, that the Soul is diftin- Tran.i. -10. guifh'd from the Body, or that (he is Immortal, if that principle be laid afide. 1 faid in the Search & alibi, after Truth that I did not believe any confequence could be inferr'd from this principle repugnant to Faith, which fame thing was defended in the Sorbon, before my maintaining it, in the publick Thefe*. Nay,-I proceeded to fay, Tpat if it were'/equifite, I would explain how.tHs'C opinion: might be reconciled with what the Fathers,' 'and.Councils have left us touching our Faith, about ihe myftery of Tranfubftantiation. Laftly, I renoune'd all ^Heretical Confequences, and even the Principle, if it contain'd them, which I could not believe, nor can I to this hour.
What ought I to fay more, to clear my Faith from the fufpicion of Herefie,even to the malicious? Could I imagine any Man would have the boldnefs to rank St. Auftin,and other Fathers, among the Calvinifts, by condemning in the Perfon of the Cartefians and Gaffendifts, the Sentiment of that Holy" Doclor^ as contrary to Tranfubftantiation? No, doubtlefs. For either Monfieur de la Ville durft do it, fave in a collateral manner. St Auftian in an hundred places advances as undeniable, the principle now in difpute. He never goes to prove it, becaufe ft does not appear that any Man in his time doubted of it. For indeed 'tis a principle that ought to be look'd on as a common Notion with all thofe, whofe mind is not prepofTefs'dwtb falfe ftudies. Whence this Father concludes, That the Soul is immortal -, That. fhe. is more noble than the Body -That (he is a diltindt fubftance from it* with many 01 her like Truths of the utmoft importance. And yet Monfieur de la ViHe, under Part 2. Ambiguous Terms,advances.that this Principle is not to be found in St. Auflin: He anfwers but one Arj/6'# fingle paflage of that Father's Works, and to explain it, makes that learn'd Man argue at an Extravagant rate. Laftly, he oppofes to his conflant Doctrine, only the Book of Categories, as if he knew.not that Book to be none of St. An/tin's, and that it belongs rather to Logick, than to Phyficks.
1 will not Hand to prove this in particular; for I fee no neceffity of anfweiing Monfieur de la ViWs Book: And I defign to keep inviolably to the refolution I made, and have declar'd at the end of the Preface to the Second Vol. of the Search after Truth, viz. That I would anfwer none of thofe who oppos'd me before they underftand me, or whofe Difcourfes gave occafion to believe they were made from fome other motive than the Love of Truth. As for the reft, I fhall indeavour to content them. I have no delight in difquieting Mens Minds, and troubling my own repofe by contentious Books, or Works absolutely ufelefs to the difcovery of Truth; and only proper to - violate Charity, and fcandalize our Neighbours. And if I now put Pen to Paper, 'tis becajfe E ought not to fuffer my Faith to be call'd in Queftioh, and that I delire to make it clearly undcrilood That no Man is permitted to charge me with Herefie for confequences deducible from the Principles 1 have eftablifh'd.
Which is not as if I thought it poffible^ to inferr directly, any Herefie, or even Error from the Book concerning the Search after Truth. I am ready to anfwer with Charity and Refpect, all thofe who fhall do mc the honour to make their Animadverfions without Paffion; and 1 fhall always be glad to follow Truth, as foon as any Man can difcovcr it to me. I difown all principles from which may be concluded any falfliood. But I offer to prove, 1 nat we cannot juftly treat as Here- ticks, even obftinate Defenders of fuch Principles, as-Divines may inferr impious Conclufions from (provided the Embracers of thefe Principles difown the confequences:) Since,if it might be aliow'd' no Writer whatever could efcapc the Imputation of Herefie. My proofs- of my aflertion are as foil low; ; -.
agamft- M. de la Vitle, low -: Which I do not deduce from that which is leaft Reafonable in the common Opinions ^ \ fophers, with defign to make them Odious, or Ridiculous; but choofe to tikfe for the ful i I What I offer to prove, untverfally receiv 'd Opinions, upon which the Peripateticks are fo bo'd prefumwg, as to infult perpetually over their Adverfaries.
ARGUMENT I.
ARGUMENT I.
The Peripateticks, and almoft all Men, believe that Beafts have Souls, and that thefe Souls are ftobler than the Bodies which they Animate. 'Tis an Opinion receivM in all times, and in all Na- tions, that a Dog fuffers Fain when he is beaten ■ That he is fufceptible of ali the' Motions of tne Paffions, Fear, Defire, Envy, Hatred, Joy\ Sorrow, and even that he knows and loves The firfr Confequence oppofite to Faith.
That God is Vnjuli.
j r. Beafts fufFer Pain, andfomeof them, are more miferable than others. Now they never finn'd; or made an ill ufe of their Libirty, tines they have none: Therefore GodVLteja/^in Punifhing them' and making them Mi ferable 5 and unequally Miferable, ffrice" they are equally Inno'enc. There fore this Principle is falfe, That under a Righteous God, a Creature can be miferable Without defervin- it, a Principle neverthelefs imploy'd by St. jlujlin, to Demonftrate Original Sin -againft the Pelagians.
j Moreover there is^ this difference between the condition of Men and Beafts, that Men after- Death may receive ah' Happinefs which may countervail the Pains endur'd in Life. But Beafts at Death lofe all; they have been miferable, and innocent, and have no Future Retribution. There- fore, though God be juft, yet Man may fufftr in Order to Merit ■ but if a Beaft fuffers, God is not Juft.
It maybe faid, perhaps, that God may do with the Beaft as he thinks fit, provided he obfet ves the Rules of Juftice, with refpect to Man. But if an Angel fhould think in like manner, that God could not punifh him without fomeDemerits; and that he was not oblig'd to do 'jaitice unto Man, Ihould we like that thought? Certainly God lendets Juftice to all his Creatures; and if the mean- eft of them are liable to Mifery, they muft needs be capable of being Criminal.
The fecond Confequence contrary to Faith.
That God Wills Diforder, and that Nature is not corrupted.
The Soul of a Dog is fubftance more noble than the Body Animated by it. For according to St. Auftm *,'tis a fpiritual Subftance more noble than the nobleft Body. Befides which, reafon demon- * De Qhm- ftrates that Bodies can neither Know, nor Love; and that Pleafure, Pain,. Joy, Sorrow, and the *»«***» other Paffions, cannot be Modifications of Bodies. Now 'tis believed that Dogs know, and Love "**£*• 3 *i their Matters, and that they are fufceptible of Paffions, as of Fear, Deiire, Joy and Sorrow, and iiL4.de many others: The Soul of a Dog therefore is not a Body, but a Subftance nobler than Bodies. But dnima, £J the Soul of a Dog is made for his Body, and has no other End, or Felicity, than the enjoyment of eii!S origl- Bodies: Therefore God makes the more noble for the lefs noble: Therefore God Wills diforder: ^>5^'-12, Therefore Man's Nature is not corrupted i Concupifcence is.no diforder. God might make Man u for the enjoyment of Bodies, and fubjed him to the Motions of Con;cupifcence, &c.
It may be frill faid perhaps that the Soul of Beafts is made for Man: but 'tis hard to efcape by this fubterfuge. For whether my Dog, or my Horfe, has, or has not 2 Soul, is indifferent to me. 'Tis not my Horfe's Soul, which carries, or draws me, but his Body. "Tis not the Soul of a Chicken which nourifhe* me, but its flefh. Now God might, and ought confequently to create Horfes, to perform all their functions which we need, without a Soul, if it be true that he has made them only for our ufe. Again,, the Soul of an Horfeis more valuable than the noblefc Body: God therefore ought not to create it for the Body of Man. Laftly, God ought not to have given Souls to Flies which Swallows feed upon. Swallows a; e of very little Ufe to Man, and they might have fed upon grain, as other Birds.
What need then of fo innumerable a number of Souls to be Afinihilated, to preferve the Bodies of thefe Birds, fmce the Soul of a Fly is more worth than the Body of the perfecteft Animal? Wherefore in affirming that Beafts have Souls, that is to fay, fubftanccs, more noble than Bodies, we deprive God of Wifdom, make him act without Order, deftroy Original Sin, and confequently overthrow Religion, by taking away the necaffnyof a Mediator, The The third Confequence contrary to Faitn*.
The Soul of Man is Mortal^ or atleaft the Souls of Beafts pafs from one Body to anotbet.
The Soul of a Beaft is a Subftdnce diftinft from its Body. This Soul is Annihilated, and there- fore Subftarices may naturally/be Annihilated. Therefore though the Soul of Man be a Subftance diftintt from his Body, itafay be Annihilated, when the Body is deftroyed: And tlius the lmmor« tality of the Humane Soul canrtot be Demonftrated by Reaf6n. Biit if it be ownM to be molt cer- tain, That no Subftance can be naturally reduc'd to nothing, the Soul of Beafts will fubfift after Death; and fince they have no reward to hope for, and are made for Bodies, they muft at leaft pafs out of one to another, that they may not remain ufelefs in Nature: Which feems to be the moft reafonabklnfefence, Now 'tjsfMatter.of Faith, That God is juft and Wife, That he Loves not Diforder, That Na- ture is corrupted, That the Soul of Man is Immortal and that That of Beafts is Mortal: Be- caufe indeed it is not a diftinct Subftance from their Body, nor confequently capable of Knowledge and Love, or of any Paffions and Senfations like ours. Therefore in the Stile of Mpnfieur de la Ville, who condemns Men upon Confequences that he draws from their Principles, the Cartefiam may juftly charge him with a Crime, and all Mindkind befides, for believing Beaffs have Souls.., What would Monfieur.«fc la Vifte fay, if in his way of proceeding we mould tax him of Impiety, for entertaining Opinions, from whence it might be concluded, That God is riot Juft, Wife, or Powerful; Opinions that overthrow Religion, that are oppofite to Original Sin, that take away the only Demonftration Reafon can give of the Immortality of the Soul? What would he fay, if wefhould charge him with Injufticeand Cruelty for making innocent Souls to fuffer, and even for Annihilating them, to feed upon the Bodies which they Animate? He is a Sinner, but they are Innocent; and yet for the Nourifhment of his Body he kills Animals, and Annihilates their Souls, which are of greater Worth than his Body. Yet if his Body could not fubfift without the Flefh of Animals, or if the Annihilation of a Soul mould render his Body for ever Immortal •' this Cruelty, as un juft as it is, might perhaps be excufeble: But with what Pretence can he Anni- hilateSubftances altogether innocent, to fuftain but a few days a Body juftly condemnM to Death becaufe of Sin, Would he be fo little a Philofopher, as to excufe himfelf upon the Cuftom of the Place he lives in? But what if his Zeal mould carry him into the Indies ^ where the Inhabitants found Hofpitals Ihf. c.n. f°r Beafts; and the Pbilofopbers, and the better and more gentile Part of them, are fo charitable to to the fmalleft Flies, that, for fear of killing them, by Breathing, and Walking, they wear a fine Cloath before their Mouths, and fan the Ways through which they pafs? Would he then fear to make innocent Souls to fuffer, or to Annihilate them for the Prefervation of a Sinner's Body? Would he not rather chufe to fubfcribe to their Opinion, who give not Beafts a Soul more Noble than their Body, or diftin& from it; and by publifhing this Opinion acquit himfelf of the Crimes of Cruelty and Injuftice, which thefe People would charge upon him j if having ^he fame Principles he follow'd not their Cuftom? / This Example may fuffice to fliew, that we are not permitted to treat-Wen as Heretich7 and dangerous Perfons, becaufe of Irreligious Confequences that may be d^duc'd from their Princi- ples, when thefe Confequences are difown'd by them. For though I think it would be an infinitely harder Task, to anfwer the aforefaid Difficulties, than thofe of M. de la Ville\ yet the Carteftans would be very Ridiculous, if they mould accufe Monfieur de la ViUe^ and others, that were not of their Opinion, of Impiety and Herefie. *Tis only the Authority of the Church, that may decide about Matters of Faith ^ and the Church has not oblig'd us, and probably whatever Confequence may be drawn from common Principles, never will oblige us to believe, that Dogs have not a Soul more Noble than their Body, that they know not their Matters •, that they neither fear, nor defire, nor fuffer any thing, becaufe it is not neceflary that Ckriftians mould be inftru&ed in thefe Truths, ARGUMENT II.
ARGUMENT II.
Almoft all Men are perfwaded, That fenfible Objects are the true Caufes of Pleafure, and Pain, which we feel, upon their Prefence. They believe, that the Fire fends forth that agreeable Heat which rejoyces us •, and that our Aliments Aft in us, and give us the Welcome Senfations of Tafts. They doubt not but 'tis the Sun which makes the Fruits necefTary for Life, to thrive •, and that all fenfible Objetts have a peculiar Vertue^ by which they can do us a great deal of Good and Evil, Let us fee, if from thefe Principles we cannot draw Confequences contrary to Religion and Points of Faith.
A Confeagainfi M. de la Ville. 187 'A Confequence oppofite to the firfr Principle of Morality, which obliges us to lorn God with all our Strength, and to fear none but Him.
'Tis a common Notion, by which all Men Order their Behaviour, That we ought to love, and fear what has Power to do us Good and Harm, to make us feel Pleafure and Pain, to render us* hap- py or miferable ■ and that this Caufe is to be lov'd, or fear'd, proportionably to its Power of Act- ing on us. But the Fire, the Sun, the Objects of our Senfes,can truly Ad on us, and make us in fome manner happy or miferable. This is the Principle fuppos'd; we may therefore Love and Fear them. This is the Conclufion which every one naturally makes, and is the general Principle of the corrup- tion of Manners.
. 'Tis evident by Reafon, and by the Firft of God's Commandments, That all the motions of our Soul, of Love or Fear, Defire or Joy, ought to tend to God; and that all the Motions of our Body may be Regulated and Determin'd, by encompafling Objects. By the Motion of our Body we may approach a Fruit, avoid a Blow, fly a Beaft that's ready to devour us. But we ought to Love and Fear none but God; all the Motions of our Soul ought to tend to Him only-, we are to Love Him with all our ftrength; this is an indifpenfible Law. We can neither Love or Fear what is be- low us, without diforder and corruption: Freely to fear a Beaft ready to devour us, or to fear the Devil, is to give them fome honour; to Love a Fruit, to defire Riches, to rejoyce in the light of the Sun,as if he were the true caufe of it •, to Love even our Father,our Protestor, our Friend, as if they were capable of doing us good, is to pay them an Honour which is due to none but God, in which fenfe it is lawful to Love none. But we may, and ought to Love our Neighbour, by wifn- ing and procuring him, as Natural or Occafional Caufe, all that may make him happy, and no o- therwife. For we to Love our Brothers, not as if able to do us good, but as capable to enjoy together with us the true Good. Thefe Truths feem evident to me •, but Men ftrangely obfeure them, by fuppofmg that the furrounding Bodies can Aft on us as True Caufes.
Indeed, molt Cbriftian Philofophers acknowledge, That the Creatures can do nothing, unlets God concur to their Action; and that fo, fenfible Objeds being unable to Ad on us without the Efficacy of the Firft Caufe, muft not be lov'd or fear'd by us, but God only, on whom they depend.
Which Explication makes it manifeft, That they condemn the confequences, which I have now dedue'd from the Principle they receive: Butif in imitation of Monfieur de la ViUe\ Condud, I mould fay 'twas a flight and fubterfuge of the Philofophers, to Cloak their Impiety -, if I mould urge them with the Crime of fupporting Arijlotleh Opinions, and the prejudices of Senfe, at the expence of their Religion; if piercing too into the inmoft recefTes of their Heart, I Ihould impute to them the fec*et defire, of debauching Men's Morals by the defence of a Principle, which ferves to juftifie all forts of diforders, and which by the confequences I have drawn from it, overthrows the firft Principle of Chriftian Morality. Should I be thought in my Senfes whilft I went to con- demn moft Men as impious upon the ftrength of the inferences I had dedue'd from their; Premifes?
Monfieur de la ViUe will no doubt pretend that my Confequences are not rightly inferr'd; but I pretend the fame of his; and to ruinethem all, I need but explicate fome Equivocal Terms, which I (hall fometime do, if 1 find it neceffary.
But how will Monfieur de la rills juftifie the common Opinion of" the Efficacy of Second Caufes, and by what fort of concourfe will he afcribe to God all that is due to Him? Will he make it clearly appear, that, one individual Adiort is all of God, and all of the Creature? Will he demonftrate that the Power of the Creature is not ufelefs, though without its Efficacy, the ibleAftion of God would produce the fame effed? Will he prove that Minds neither ought tp Love nor Fear Bodies, though the latter have a true Power of Ading, on the former; and will he make multitudes of Converts hereupon, among thofe whofe Mind and Heart are taken up with fenfible ObJe&s ■> fr°m a confus'd Judgment they make that thefe Objeds are capable of making them Happy or Miferable? Let him confefs then, That if we might treat, as Hereticks, and profane Perfons, all that hold Principles, from which Heretical and Impious Confequences may be drawn, no Man what ever could fecure his Faith from being fufpeded.
ARGUMENT III.
ARGUMENT III.
The Confequence of the Principle proposed by Monfieur de la Ville, as a Point of Faith, viz. That the Eflence of Body confifts not in Extension. This negative Principle overthrows the only demonflrathe and diretl Proof we have of the SouVs being a diftincl Subftance from the Body, and confe- quently of her Immortality.
When this truth is receiv'd, which I prefume, with many other Perfons, to have demonftrated; which Monfieur de la ViUe impugns as contrary to the decifions of the Church, viz. That the Ef- Y y fence fence of matter confifts in Extenfion in Length, Breadth, and thicknefs. It is eafte to comprehend that the Soul, or that which is capable of Thought, is a diftinft fubftance from the Body. For it's manifeft that Extenfiont whatever Divifion and Motion be conceiv'd in it, can never arrive to Rea~ fan, Witt or Senfe. Wherefore that thinking thing which is in us, is neceffarily a fubftance diftincl: Intellectual Notices, Volitions, and Atlual Senfations, are Actually Modes of fome fubftances Ex- iftence. But all the Divifions incidental to Extenfion can produce nothing but Figures: ISJbr all its various Motions, any thing but Relations of Diftance: Therefore Extenfion is not capable of other Modifications. Therefore our Thought, Defire, Senfations of Pleafure, and Pain, are Modes of a Subftances Exiftence, which is not a Body. Therefore the Soul is diftinft from the Body, which being conceded, we thus demonftrate her Immortality.
No fubftance can be Annihilated by the Ordinary ftrength of Nature. For as nature cannot pro- duce fomething out of nothing: So fhe cannot reduce fomething into nothing. Modifications of Beings may be Annihilated; Rotundity of a Body may be deftroy'd; for that which is round may become fquare. But this roundnefs is not a Being, a Thing, a Subjlance; but only a Relation of E- quality of diftance, between the terminating parts of the Body, and that which is in the Center, Which relation changing, the Roundnefs isdeftroy'd, but the fubftance cannot be reduc'd to no- thing. Now for the foremention'd Reafons the Soul is not a Mode of a Body's Exifting. There- fore fhe is immortal; and though the Body be diffolv'd into a Thoufand parts of a different Na- ture, and the ftru&ure of its Organs broke to pieces, fince the Soul confifts not in that ftrudture, nor in any other Modification of matter, 'tis evident that the diffolution, and even the Annihilati- on of the fubftance of an humane Body, were that Annihilation true, could not Annihilate the fubftance of our Soul. Let us add to this another proof of the immortality of the Soul, grounded upon the fame Principle.
Though the Body cannot be reduc'd to nothing, becaufe it is a fubftance, it may notwithftand- ing die, and all its parts may be diffolv'd: Becaufe Extenfion is divifible. But the Soul being a fub- ftance diftind from Extenfion, cannot be divided. For we cannot divide a Thought, a Defire, a Senfation of Pain, or Pleafure, as we may divide a fquare into two or four Triangles. Therefore the fubftance of the Soul is indiffoluble, incorruptible, and confequently immortal, becaufe unextended.
But if Monfieur de la VtUe fuppofes that the Effence of Body confifts in fomething befides Exten- fion, how will he convince the Libertines that fhe is neither material nor mortal. They will main- tain, that fomething wherein the Effence of Body confifts, is capable of thinking, and that the fub- . ftance which thinks is the fame with that which is extended. If Monfieur de la Ville denies it, they'll fhow that he does it,without Reafon,fince according to his Principle,Body being fomething elfe than Extenfion; he has no diftind Idea of what that can be, and confequently cannot tell but that un- known thing may be capable of Thought. Does he think to convince them, by faying as he does in his Book, that the Effence of Body is to have Parts without Extenfion? Certainly they will not take his Word for it •, for finding it as hard to conceive parts without Extenfion, as indivifible Atoms, or Circles, without two Semi-circles, they muft have more deference for him, than he has for God himfelf. For Monfieur de la Ville, in the laft part of his Book, pretends that God him- felf cannot oblige us to belive contradictory things, fuch as are the Parts of a Body, without any Adtual extenfion.
But the Libertines on their part would not fail of probable Reafons to confound the Soul with the Body. Experience, they'll fay, teaches us, That the Body is capable of Feeling, Thinking, and Reafoning. Tis the Body which is fenfible of Pleafure, and Pain. 'Tis the "Brain which thinks and reafons. The weight of the Body makes heavy the Mind. Madnefs is a truediftemper 5 and thofe who have moft Wifdom lofe it, when that part of the Brain, where it refides, is difeas'd. The EfTences of Beings are unknown to us, and therefore Reafon cannot difcover of what they are fufceptible. So that reafon refers us to Experience, and Experience confounds, the Soul with the Body, and teaches us, that this is capable of thinking: Such would be their Rea'fons.
And in Truth thofe who affureus, That the EfTences of Being are unknown; and make it Cri- minal for Philofophets to demonftrate Extenfion no Modification of Being, but the very Effence of Matter; would do well to confider the mifchievous Confequences, deducible from their Principles; and not go to overthrow the only Demonftration we have,for the Diftin&ion between the Soul and Body. For, in fine, the Difiintlion of thefe two Parts of our Selves, prov'd by clear Ideas, is the moft Fruitful and neceffary of all Truths in point of Philofophy, and perhaps of Divinity, and Chri- flian Morality. But this Diftin&ion is likewife exactly demonftrated in many Places of the Search * BooklV. after Truth * And I undertake to Monfieur de la Ville, notwithftanding his Anfwsr fraught with chap. 2. Ambiguities, Figures, and ContradicJions; or rather, I undertake to the Libertines, for as for him, I Book VI. believe him fo fetled in his Faith, as not to.want fuch fort of Proofs. I undertake, 1 fay to the chap 7 Liberti"es-> Tllat they will never find any Sophifm in my Demonftraftion, That 'tis impoffible to Booklil. COnceive i,; clearly and diftin&ly, without embracing it; and that ail the Proofs they offer, to