Thus if a Man holds his Hand to the Fire, the little parts of the Wood, whereof it continu- ally throws out innumerable quantities with great violence fas Reafon, upon the defect, of our Sight, demonftrat.es J beat againit the Fibres, and communicate a Part of their Agitation to them. If that Agitation be but moderate, that of the Extremities of the Fibres in the Brain which anfwer to the Hand will be moderate alfo. And if this Motion be violent enough in the Hand, to feparate fome Parts of it, as it happens when it is Burnt; the Motion of the Internal Fibres of the Brain will be proportionably ftronger and more violent. This then is what occurs in our Body when Objects ftrike upon us: we muft now fee what happens to our Soul. V. She is principally Refident, if we may be permitted fo to fpeak, in that Part of the Brain, What it is where all the Fibres of our Nerves are centred. She is feated there in order to cherifh and pre- that objects perve ayj ^g parts 0f our Body: and confequently it is neceffary fhe mould have notice of all thesoul andthz Changes that occur therein, and that fhe be able to diftinguifh thofe which are adapted the Keafons and agreeable to the Conftitution of her Body, from the contrary; fince it would be to noufe ■why the or purpofe for her to know them abfolutely and without Relation to the Body. Thus though all the soul per- changes of our Fibres do, in true fpeaking, confift merely in theMotions of them, which are ge- lle^Mofi- nera^y no farther different, than according to the Degrees of more or lefs -, yet it is neceffary ens of the for the Soul to look upon thefe Changes as Effentially different: For though they differ very Hires of little in themfelves, they ought however to be confider'd as Effentially different, in reference the Body. t0 tne prefervation of the Body.
The Motion for inftance, that produces Pain, has rarely any confiderable difference from that Thiscon- wnich caufes Titillation: There is no neceflity there fhould be any Effential Difference betwixt fusd R$a- tjiej-e twQ M0tionS5 DUt it is neceflary there fhould be an Effential Difference betwixt the Titil- thhNuu- lation and the Pain, which thefe two Motions caufe in the 'Soul. For the Vibration of the Fi- rai fudge- bres which accompanies Titillation, certifies the Soul of the good Conftitution of her Body, mem is on- an(\ affures her it has Strength enough to refift the Impreffionof the Object, and that fhe need not lj a Cam- ke un(]er any Apprehenfions of its being injur'd by it: But the Motion which accompanies Pain, fatHn. See being fomewhat more violent, is capable of breaking fome Fibre of the Body, and the Soul ought jfhat/have to be advis'd of it by fome Difagreeable Senfation; fo as to be aware of it for the fu- faid before ture. Thus though the Motions, which are occalion'd in the Body, are no farther differe.it in of Natural themfelves than according to the Degrees of more or lefs; yet being confider'd with Relition tnems'and to the Welfare and Prefervation of our Life, they may be faid to differ Elfentially. t kefirft Ch. of the ^d. Booh 'Tis Chap. X. The Search after Truth. 27 'Tis upon this account our Soul has no Perception of the Vibrations, which are excited by Obje&s, in the Fibres of our Flefh: It would be of very little ufe for her to know them ^ nor could (he from thence receive fufficient Light to judge, whether the things about us were capa- ble of Deftroying or Maintaining the aconomy of our Body. But (he feels her felf touch'd with Senfations efTentially different, which fhewing precifely the Qualities of Obje&s, as they are related to her Body, make her moft exa&ly fenfible in what capacity thefe Obje&s are in to hurt it.
We may farther confider, That in cafe the Soul had no Perception, but of that which hap- pen'd in her Hand, when it were burnt, if fhe faw nothing there but the Motion and Separa- tion of fome Fibres, fhe would not much concern her felf about it: Nay, fhe might probably fometimes out of an Humour or a Frolick, take fome fatisfaction in doing it, like thofe Freakifh kind of Men, who divert themfelves in their Paflions or. Debauches, in breaking all things they light upon.
Or as a Prifoner would not be much concern'd, to fee the Walls batter'd down about him, that confin'd him, but rather would be glad of it, upon the hopes of a Deliverance: So if we had no other Perception than of the Separation of the Parts of our Body, when we were burnt or hurt in any manner, we mould foon be perfwaded that our Happinefs was not confin'd to a Body which prevented our Injoying thofe things, which ought to make us Happy -7 and fo Ihould be glad of feeing it deftroy'd.
Hence it is apparent that the Author of the Union of our Soul and Body, hath with greateft Wifdom ordain'd, That we Ihould be fenfible of Pain, whenever any Change happen'd to our Body, capable of incommoding it; as when a Needle pierced the Flefh, or the Fire feparated fome parts of it ^ and that we fhould be fenfible of a- Titillation, or an agreeable Heat, when thefe Motions were moderate, without perceiving the Truth of that which occur'd in our Body or the Motions of the Fibres, we have been fpeaking of. ■'_ Firft, becaufe in the Senfation of Pleafure and Pain, which are things far more different than in Decree, we diftinguifh with greater Eafe the Obje&s which occafion them. Secondly, be- caufe this way of Informing us, whether the Uniting our felves with the Bodies that encompafs as, or the Separating from them be moft convenient, is the fhorteft and the fpeedieft, and takes up' the capacity of the Mind the leaft; which is only made for G O D himfelf.
Laftly, becaufe Pleafure and Pain are Modifications of our Soul, which fhe feels with Relation to her Body, and which more nearly affeft her than would the Knowledge of the Motion of fome Fibres belonging to it:, this obliges her to be more follicitous about them: And this is a Reafon of the moft ftrift Union betwixt the two Confituent Parts of Man. From all which it is manifeft that the Senfes are given us, for the Prefervation of our Body only, and not for the Difcovery of the Truth.
What hath been faid concerning Titillation and Pain, ought univerfally to be underflood of all other Senfations, as we (hall fee hereafter. I chofe to begin with thefe two Senfations ra- ther than others, becaufe they are more Strong, and Lively, and Proper to make my Meaning more SenfMy conceiv'd.
It is at prefent a very eafie thing to fhew, That we fall into infinite Errors, concerning Light and Colours, and generally concerning all Senfible Qualities; as Cold, Heat, Smells, Tafts, Sound, Pain, and Titillation ^ and if I would ftand to make a particular Enquiry into all thqfe we fall into about all the Obje&s of our Senfes, whole Years would not fufhceto make a De- duction of them •, becaufe they are in a manner Infinite. It will be fufficient therefore to (peak of them in general.
In almoft air Senfations there are four different things which Men confound with One another, becaufe they happen altogether, and as it were in the fame Inftant: And this is the Prin- ciple of all the Errors of our Senfes.
The fir ft is the Attion of the Object, that is in Heat, for inftance, the Impulflon or Motion vl* of the little parts of the Wood againft the Fibres of the Hand.. F°Ur The Second is the PaJJion of the Organ of Senfe, that is to fay, the Agitation of the Fibres ij^fb m of the Hand caufed by that of the little Parts of Fire, which Agitation is communicated to the generally Brain, becaufe otherwife the Soul would have no Senfation of it. confound' The Third is the Pajfwn, the Senfation or Perception of the Soul, that is, What every one Feels eiin^r3 in himfelf when he is near the Fire. Senfation.
The Fourth is the Judgment the Soul makes, that what fhe feels is both in her Hand, and in the Fire: Now this Judgment is Natural, or rather is only a Compound Senfation. But this Senfation or this Natural Judgement, is for the moft part attended with another Free or Voluntary Judge- ment, which is fo cuftomary for the Soul to make, that fhe is almoft incapable of preventing it. Here then are four things of a very different Nature, as may be feen, which Men are not nice enough to diftinguifh, but are apt to confound, becaufe of the ftrict Union of the Soul and Bo- dy, which hinders them from making an exact diftribution of the Properties of Matter, and of the Mind.
'Tis notwithftanding eafie to difcover, That of thefe four things, which occur within us, in the Senfation of an Object; the two firft belong to the Body, and the two laft appertain to the Soul only, provided a Man has any whit meditated on the Nature of the Soul and Body, as he ought to have done, as I before fuppos'd him. But thefe things demand a particular Explication.
CHAP.
I I.
I. The Error we fall into concerning the A&ion of Obje&s againft the Ex- ternal Fibres of our Senfes. II. The Caufe of this Error. III. An Ob- jection and Anfwer.
*N this and the three fucceeding Chapters, I fhall treat of thefe four things above-mention'd, which I faid us'd to be confounded, and taken for a fimple Senfation: and I fhall only give a general Explication of the Errors we fall into, becaHfeif I would defcend to Particulars, there would never bean end of them: But I hope however to put the Mind of thofe, who will ferioufly confider what I am about to fay, in a condition of difcoverine; with a great deal of Eafe, all the Errors our Senfes can make Us Subje& to } But in order to this it is demanded, That they would attentively Meditate as well upon the following Chapters, as upon tha^ they have laft oftheEr- Deen Reading.
rorwefall The firffc of the things we confound, in each of our Senfations, is the A&ion of Obje&s upon imo con- the External Fibres of our Body. It is certain a Man makes hardly any Difference betwixt the eerningthe Senfation of the Soul, and that A&ion of Obje&s •, which is fo plain as not to need any farther obeih - Pr0°f- The generality of Men imagine that the Heat, tor inftance, which they Feel, is in the eJtoft the Fire which caufes it ^ that Light is in the Air, and Colours are upon colour'd Obje&s. They External have no Thought of any Motions of Imperceptible Bodies which are the Caufe of thefe Sea- Fibres of fations.
oursenjes. jt js true t^ey £0 not judge that Pain is in the Needle which pricks them, in like manner as 11I# they judge that Heat is in the Fire: But the reafon of it is, That the Needle and its A&ion are thec'aufe vifible, but the little parts of the Wood that proceed from the Fire, and their Motion againft ofthuEr- ottr Hands are altogether invifible. Thus, feeing nothing that ftrikes upon our Hands when ror. we waym our felves, and yet feeling Heat in them, we Naturally judge this Heat to be in the Fire, for want of discovering any thing in it befides.
So that it is generally true, that we attribute our Senfations to the Obje&s themfelves, when we are Ignorant of the Caufes of thefe Senfations.- And bccaufe Pain and Titiliation are produc'd by Senfible Bodies, as by a Needle or a Feather, which we both fee and touch, we for this Reafon do not conclude, that there is any thing in thefe Obje&s like the Senfations which they caufe in us.
m* And yet I confefs that we do not fail to judge Combuftion \s not in the Fire, but only in the Sion and Hand, though it proceed from the fame caufe, i. e. the A&ion of the little parts of the Wood, Anfwer. as well as Heat, which yet we attribute to the Fire. But the Reafon of this is, That Combuftion is a Species of Pain: For having often judg'd that Pain is not in the external Body which produces it, we are induc'd to form the fame Judgement of Combuftion.
That which is another Reafon of our judging in this manner, is, that Pain or CombufHon, moffc ftrenuoufly applys our Soul to the confederation of the parts of her Body •, and this Imenfion of Se Soul turns off* her thoughts from any other thing: Thus the Mind attributes the Senfation 1 Qombuflion to the Obje& that is moft prefent and nigh her felf. And becaufe we find pre- fently after, that the Combuftion has left fome vifible marks in the part in which we felt the Pain, this is a Confirmation of the Judgement we have made, that Combuftion is in the Hand. But this is no Impediment, why we fhould not embrace this general Rule, That roe are acvuftorrfd to attribute our Senfations to Objeils, vehen-ever they ail upon us by the Motion of fome Invifible Parts. And upon this ground it is, that we ufually believe Colours, Light, Smells, Tafts, Sounds, and fome other Senfations, to be in the Air, or in the External Obje&s which produce them: for as much as all thefe Senfations are produced in us by the Motions of fome Imper- ceptible Bodies. - CHAP. XII.
CHAP. XII.
I. Of our Errors concerning the Motions of the Fibres of our Senfes. II. That we have no Perception, of thefe Motions, or that we confound them with our Senfations. III. An Experiment that proves it. IV. Three kinds of Senfations. V. The Errors that accompanie them.
f ** r"i """"""HE fecond thing thatoccurs in every Senfation is the Vibration of the Fibres of our Nerves, rorT'con-' 1 which is communicated to the Brain: And we err in confounding always this Vibration terningthe with the Senfation of the Soul, and in judging there is no fuch Vibration at all, when Motions or we have no Perception of it through the Senfes. Vibrations of the Fibres of our[Senfcs. We Chap. Xll. The Search nfter Truth. 29 We confound, for inftance, the Vibration excited by the Fire in the Fibres of our Hand, with & the Senfation of Heat: And we fay the Heat is in the Hand i But becaufe we are infenfible ofcJ™Je any Vibration caus'd by Vifible Objects in the Optick Nerve, which is in the Fund of the Eye,j/;,4 whh we think this Nerve is not vibrated at all, nor cover'd with the Colours that we fee. On the the Setifa- contrary, we judge thefe Colours are fpread only onthefurface of the External Objects. Yet tiom of our it is manifeft by the following Experiment, that the Colours are as ftrongly and lively exprefs'd soul, mi bn the Fund of the Optick Nerve as in vifible Objects.. hZTTo For take but the Eye of an Ox juft kill'd, and ftrip off the Coats that are oppofite to the Ptt-* perception pill and fituate near the Optick Nerve, putting a piece of very tranfparent Paper in their room: of them. This done, place the Eye in the hole of a Window, fo as the Pupiil may be towards the Air, in« and the hind-part of the Eye in the Chamber:, which mould be clofe fliut up and darken'd allr/w*j^° over: And upon this the Colours of Objects that are out of the Chamber will appear to be fpread rproves $ upon' the Fund of the Eye, but painted topfy-turvy. If it fortunes that the Colours are not lively enough, on the account of the too little diftance of the Objects reprefented in the Fund of the Eye, the Eye mult be lengthened by conftringing the fides of it, or fhortned if the Ob- jects are too remote.
We fee by this Experiment, that we Ought to judge or perceive that Colours are in the Fund of the Eye-, in like manner as we judge that Heat is in our Hands, if our Senfes were given us for the Difcovery of Truth, and if Reafon conducted us in the Judgments we make upon the Objects of our Senfes.
But in accounting for this inconfiftent Variety of our Judgements about Senfible Qualities, it it mult be confider'd, That the Soul is fo intimately united to her Body, and moreover, has contracted fo much Carnality fince the Fall, that (he attributes a great many things to the Bo- dy which are only peculiar to her Self} and can hardly any longer diftinguifh her felf from it.' Infomuch that fhe does not only attribute to it all the Senfations we are at prefent fpeaking of but alfo the Force of Imagination j and even fometimes the Power of Reafoning.' For there have been a multitude of Philofophers, ftupid and fenfelefs enough to believe, the Soul was no- thing elfe but the more refin'd and fubtle part of the Body.
A Man that fhall read Tertnllian conliderately, will be but too fenfibly convinc'd of what I fay: fince he fubfcribes to this Opinion, after a great number of Authors whofe Authority he al- ledges: This is fo true, that he endeavours to prove in his Book, Concerning the Soul, that we are oblig'd by Faith, Scripture, and particular Revelations, to believe' the Soul a Corporeal Being. I delign not a Refutation of his Notions, becaufe I have fuppos'd a Man to have read fome of St. Juftinh or Mr. Des-Cartes\ Works,* which will fufficiently difcover the Extravagance of thefe Thoughts, and confirm and corroborate the Mind in the Diftinction,of Extenfion and Thought, of the Soul and Body.
The Soul then is fo blind, as not to know her felf, nor difcern that her own Senfations do.Iv* ■■■ belong to her. But to explain this, it is neceffary to diftinguifh in the Soul three kinds of ^j***?" Senfations, fome Vigorous and Lively, others Faint and Languifhing} and laftly, a Middle fort three fons between thefe two. t ■ of senfk- The Vigorous and Lively Senfations, are fuch as furprize and quicken.the Mind with a fort oVlonsofthe Violence: as being either very grateful or difagreeable to it: Such as are Pain, or Titillation* Soul° <*reat Cold, or vehement Heat ^ and, in general, all fuch as are not only attended with. Traces m the Brain, but moreover with fome Motion of the Animal Spirits towards the Internal Parts of the Body ■-, fuch a Motion as is proper to excite the Paffions, as fhall be explain'd in another place.
The faint and languifhing Senfations are fuch as affect the Soul very little; and are neither very Pleafant, nor very Difagreeable to her j as moderate Light, all Colours, weak and ordi- dinary Sounds, &c Laftly, The Middle kind, betwixt the Vigorous and Faint, I call fuch forts of Senfations, as moderately affect the Soul ^ as a great and glaring Light, a loud and mighty Sound, &c. But it is obfervable, that. a Weak and Languid Senfation may become a Middle one, and proceed to be a Vigorous and Lively one. The Senfation, for inftance, a Man has of Light is faint, when the Light of a Flambeau is but glimmering or remote^ but this Senfation may become & Middle one upon the approaching of the Flambeau nearer us: It may, laftly, grow moft ftrong and lively, by holding the Flambeau fo dole to the Eyes as to dazle them •, or fuppofe a Man beholds the Sun: Thus the Senfation of Light may be Vigorous or Faint, or neither, but Mo- derate, according to its different Degrees.
Let us fee then the Judgments the Soul paffes upon thefe three forts of Senfations: wherein v. we may obferve that fhe almoft ever blindly and implicitly follows the fenfible Impreffions, or The Er^ the Natural Judgments of the Senfes -y and that fhe is delighted, if I may fo term it, to dif- rm tbat fufeher felf upon the Objects fhe confiders, by difmantling her own Being, to cloath and adorn 5£w£j-*: External Objects. [ttons* The firft of thefe Senfations are fb Vigorous and Powerful, that the Soul mult, whether fhe will or not, acknowledge they do, in fome meafure, belong to her: So that fhe not only judges them to be in the Objects, but believes them alfo to be in the Members of her Body, which fhe confiders as a Part of her Self. Thus fhe judges that Heat and Cold are not only in the Fire and Ice, but in her own Hands alfo.
1 l As 30 F. Malebranche Concerning Book I As to the Languid Senfations, they fo little concern the Soul, that fhe concludes they do not belong to her; that they are neither in her felf, nor in her Body, but in Objects only. And for this Reafon it is we deveflour own Soul, and our own Eyes, of Light and Colours to cloath and beautifie the Objeds that are without us, though Reafon teaches us that the Idea we have of Matter does not include them in it. And Experience vifibly manifests, that we ought equally to judge them in our Eyes as on the Objeds; fince we fee them no lefs upon the one than the other, as I have experimentally prov'd by the Eye of an Ox plac'd in the hole of a Window.
Now the Reafon why Men do not fo readily perceive Colours, Smells, Talis, and all other Senfations, to be the Modifications of their Soul, is, becaufe we have not anydiftind Idea of the Soul. For when we know a thing by the Idea that reprefeuts it, we know clearly the Mo- difications it is capable of. All Men whatever agree that Rotundity, for initance, is a Modifi- cation of Extenfion; becaufe all Men know what Extenfion is by a clear Idea that reprefeuts it. Thus, becaufe we know not the Soul by its Idea, as I fhall explain hereafter, but only by an Internal Senfation that we have of it, we can't underftand by a limple View, but by the force of Reafbning only, whether Whitenefs, Light, Colours, Sounds, and other faint and languish- ing Senfations are the Modifications of our Soul, or not. But as to the lively Senfations, as Pain and Pleafure, we eafily judge that they are within us; becaufe we feel them feniibiy affed us; and there is no need of our knowing them by their Ideas, to underftand that they belong to as.
As for the Middle Senfations, the Soul feems dubious and at a Fault about them. For on one hand fhe is willing to follow the Natural Judgments of the Senfes, and thereupon ihe removes as far from her as poffible this kind of Senfations,to bellow them upon the Objeds: But,on the other hand, 'tis Impoffible but Ihe mult feel within her felf, and be confcious, that they belong to her; efpecially when thefe Senfations come up near to thofe, which I have named the Strong and Live- ly; whereupon let us fee how (he behaves her felf in refped of the Judgments fhe makes con- cerning them: If fhe is fmartly touch'd with the Senfation, fhe judges it to be in her own Body, as well as in theObjed: If the Senfation afFeds her but a very little, Ihe judges it only in the Objed: If the Senfation be of a Middle fort, betwixt thofe we call the Strong, and the vVeak, the Soul then knows not what to think of it, whilft Ihe judges only by the Senfes.
For inftance, If a Man fees a Candle at a good competent diftance, the Soul judges the Light to be only in the Objed; if he puts it very near his Eyes, the Soul judges the Light to be not only in the Candle, but likewife in the Eyes; but if he withdraws about a foot from it, the Soul is at a paufe without determining whether or not the Light be in the Objed only. But fhe is never fo wife as to think as fhe ought to do, that Light neither is, nor can be any Proper- ty or Modification of Matter; and that it is only within her felf; becaufe /he never thinks of imploying her Reafon in difcovering the Truth of the Matter, but only her Senfes, which never can difcover it, nor indeed were given us for any other ufe than the Prefervation of the Body Now the caufe why the Soul makes no more ufe of her Reafon, that is, of her pure IntelleElion, in considering an Objed which may be perceiv'd by the Senfes, is this, that the Soul is not at all mov'd or concern'd on the account of thofe things Ihe perceives by pure JmelUEHon^ but on the contrary, is molt nearly touch'd by things Senfiblc.- For the Soul applies her felf intenfely to that which affeds her molt; but is too carelefs to apply her felf to things that work in her no Concernment. Thus fhe almoft univerfally fuites her Free judgments to the Natural Judg- ment of her Senfes.
To judge aright then of Light and Colours, as of all other fenfibie Qualities, we mull care- fully diftinguifh between the Senfation of Colour, and the Motion of the Optick Nerve; and we muft find out by our Reafon, that Motions and Impulsions, are Properties of Bodies, and therefore may polfibly be found both in Objeds, and in the Organs of our Senfes, but that Light and Colours which we fee, are Modifications of our Soul, very different from the other, and of which we have quite different Idea's.
For it is evident that a Peafant, for inftance, fees Colours very well, and can diftinguifh them from all things elfe that are not Colour. It is evident too that he perceives nothing of Motion either in the colour'd Objeds, or in the Fund of his Eyes; therefore Colour is not Motion: la like manner, a Peafant is very fenfibie of Heat, and he has knowledge clear enough to distinguish it from all thing clie, which are not Heat. Yet he never fo much as thinks of the Fibres of his Hand's being mov'd. Heat then which he feels is not Motion, fince the Idea's of Heat and Mo- tion are different, and one may be had without the other. For we have no other Reafon to af- firm a Square is not a Circle, but becaufe the Idea of a Square is different from that of a Circle, ' and we can think of one without thinking of the other.
There needs but a little Attention to difcover, that it is not neceffary the caufe which occa- fions a Senfation of fiich or fuch a Thing in us, Should contain that thing in it felf. for, as there is no neceffity ^here Should be Light in my Hand, when I feeaflafh, upon giving my Eye a blow; fo there is no need that Heat Should be in the Fire, to make me fenfibie of it, upon the approach of my Hand towards it; nor indeed that any other feniible Qualities, Should be in the Objeds that produce them. 'Tis enough that they caufe a Vibration in the Fibres of my Flefh, to the end my Soul which is united to it, may be modify'd by fomc Senfation. There is no Analogy, I confefs, between Motions and Senfations: Nor is there any betwixt Body and Spirit C!iap. XIII. The Search after Truth. 2 1 Spirit. Bat fince Nature, or the Will of the Creator, aflbciates thefe two Subftances, though efleatially different, we need not wonder if their Modifications are Reciprocal. It is neceffary it fhould be fo, that both of them might conftitute but one entire Being.
It fhoald be well obfcrv'd, that our Senfes being given us only for the Prefervation of our Body, it is moil conveniently ordered that they fhould induce us to judge of fenfible Qualities juft as we do. It is abundantly more for our advantage to receive the Senfation of Pain and Heat as being in our own Body,than to judge they were only in theObje&s that occafion'd them: Becaufe Pain and Heat being capable of injuring the Members of the Body, it is mofl requifite we fhould be warn'd of them whenever they attacqu'd us, to prevent our Body's being endammag'd by them.
But in point of Colours 'tis another cafe; for the generality, they are unable to hurt the Fund • of the Eye, where they are collected, and it is an ufelefs thing to us to know they are painted on. it. Thefe Colours are only neceflary to us, as far as they are conducible to a more diftinct Dii- covery of Objects 5 and upon that account our Senfes induce us to attribute them to Objects only. Thus the Judgments which the Impreffion of our Senfes incline us to make, are moft exact, if coufider'd only in Relation to the Prefervation of our Body. But yet they are altogether Phantaftical, and very remote from the Truth, as we have already feen in part, and fhall be more abundantly manifeft in that which follows.
CHAP. XIII.
I. Of the Nature of Senfations. II. That a Man knows them better than he thinks he does. III. An Obje&ion and Anfxver. IV. Why a Man imagines he has no knowledge of his own Senfations. V. That ^th an Er- ror to think all Men have the fame Senfations of the fame Obje&s. VI. An Objeclion and Anfwer.
1 H E third thing which is found in each of our Senfations, or that which we Feel, for j inflance, when we are near the Fire, is a Modification of our Soul, in Relation or Cor- fhe Defini- rcfpondence to that which occurs in the Body, to which flie is united. This Modification is tion of the grateful or agreeable when that which occurs in the Body, is proper to promote the Circulation Senfaimf. of the Blood and other Vital Functions: And this is nam'd in an Equivocal Term, Heat: But this Modification is painful, and quite different from the other, when that which occurs in the Body, is capable of incommoding or burning it \ that is to fay, when the Motions which are in the Body are capable of breaking fome of it Fibres, and this generally goes by the Name of tain or tiombuftion; and fo 'tis with the other Senfations: But now let us fee what are the Thoughts Men ufually have upon this Subject.