LXII. Tis true, that all that befell the Jeivs, who reprefented JeJ us Chrift, was not a neceflary Confequence of the Order of Nature: There was need of Miracles to make the Jews lively, and exprefs Figures of the Church. But Nature at leaft furnifh'd Ground-work, and Materials, and poihbly the principal Strokes in moft Inftances,. and Miracles finifh'd the reft. Whereas no other Nation would have been fo proper for fo juft and accomplifh'd a Delign.
LXIII. If I miftake not, we are oblig'd to think that God, having a Wifdom prefcious of all the Events and Confluences of all poffible Orders, and all their Combinations, never works Mi- racles when Nature is fufflcient •, and that therefore he mull choofe that Combination of Natural Effects, which, as it were, remitting him the Expence of Miracles, neverthelefs moft faithfully executes his Defigns.
For Example: 3Tis neceflary that all Sin mould be puhifh'd. But that's not always done in this World. Yet fuppoling it was requifite for the Glory of Jefus Chrift, and the Eftablifhment of Religion, that the Jews mould be puniflfd in the Face of the whole World, for the Crime they had committed in murthering out Saviour-, it was fit that Jejus Chrift mould come into the World, about the Reign of Herod; fuppoling that People, by the neceflary Confequence of the Order of Nature, was to be divided about that time; that Civil Wars and perpetual Seditions were to weaken them; and that, laftly, the Romans were to ruine and difperfe thern, with the total Deftru£tion of their City and Temple. 'Tis true, there feems to be fomething extraordi- nary in the Defolation of the Jews: But as it (hews greater Wifdom m God, to produce fo fur- prizing EfteQs, by the moft fimple and general Laws of Nature, than by particular Wills, which are always Miracles 5 I queltion whether on that Occafion we are to fly unto a Miracle. But, for my part, I difpute it not here; fince'tis a Facl that we cannot eafily nor need we explain oui: felves upon: And I produce this Inftance only to make fome Application of my Principles, and to make them more eafily intelligible to others.
I have, I think, faid enough of Nature and Grace^ to fatisfie all equitable and moderate Per- fons about an infinite Number of Difficulties, which difturb only their Minds who muft needs judge of God by themfelves. For if Men' would confult the Idea of an Infinitely Perfeft Being, of a General Caufe, of an Infinite Wifdom; and if they would confent to the Principles I have eftablifh'd conformable to that Idea, I believe they would neither be furpriz'd nor offended at the Conduct of G O D, and that they would change their Murmurs and Cenfures into Wonder and ■Adoration, CONCERNING NATURE and GRACE. 23 CONCERNING Nature and Grace.
DISCOURSE III.
Of the Manner of GKACEs atting in m.
T PARTI.
Concerning Liberty.
*• P" 1' *^H E R E is nothing more rude and unform'd than the Subftance of Spirits, if we fe- parate it from God. For what's a Mind void of Understanding and Reafon, defti- tute of Motion and Love? Yet it is the Word and Wifdom of God which is theuni- verfal Reafon of Minds •* and 'tis the Love whereby God loves himfelf, that gives the Soul the Motion me has towards Good. If the Mind knows Truth, 'tis by its Natural and NecelTary Union with Truth it felf: If it is reafonable, 'tis fo through fupreme Reafon: Laftly, If it be a Spirit, or Intelligence, 'tis in one fenfe, becaufe its Subftance is enlightned, penetrated^ and perfected by the Light of God himfelf Thefe Truths I have explained in another Place. So likewife the Subftance of the Soul is not capable of loving Good, fave by its Natural and Ne- celTary Union with the Eternal and Subftantial Love of the Supreme Good; it advances not to- wards Good any farther than convey'd by God -, it is volent only from the Motion it continually leceives from him j it lives only through Charity, and wills merely through the Love of Good, which God makes it participate, though it abufes it. For, in fine, God making and preferving Minds only for himfelf inclines tbem towards him as long as he preferves their Being, and com- municates the Love of Good to them whilft they are capable of receiving it. Now that natural and continual Motion of the Soul towards Good in general, towards Good indefinite, towards God, is what I here call Will: Since 'tis that Motion which capacitates the Subftance of the Soul to love different Goods.
H. This Natural Motion of the Soul towards Good in general, is invincible; for 'tis not in our Power not to will to be happy. We neceiTarily love what we clearly know and lively feel to be Our Good. All Minds love God by the Neceffity of their Nature • and if they love any thing elfe by a Free Choice of their Will, 'tis not becaufe they feek not God, or the Caufe of their Fe- licity, but becaufe they are deceiv'd. 'Tis becaufe, perceiving by a confus'd Senfation, that fur- rounding Bodies make them happy, they confider them as good, and by an Ordinary and Natural Confequence, love them, and unite to them.
III. But the Love of all thefe particular Goods is not naturally invincible. Man confider'd in his Original State, might fuperfede loving thofe Goods that fill'd not the whole Capacity of his AffeQion. There being but one Good which includes all others, he might facrifice every other ~ Love to the Love of this. For God having made Minds only for himfelf, cannot invincibly carry them to the loving any thing befideshim, or without relation to him. Laftly, our -own inward Confcioufnefs informs us, that we can rejeft a Fruit, though we are inclin'd to take it. Now that Power of loving, or not loving particular Goods, the Kon-invincibility which is found in the Mo- tion, which carries Minds to the loving what does not feem every way inclufive of all Goods. That Power, or Non-invincibilit)\ is what I call Liberty. Thus placing the Definition inftead of the thing defin'd, that Expreffion, our Will is free, fignifies, that the Natural Motion of the Soul towards Good in general, is not invincible in point of Good in particular. To the Word Free* the Idea of Voluntary is commonly annex'd; but' in the Sequel of this Difcourfe, I fhall take the Word in the Senfe I have obferv'd, as being the molt Natural and Ordinary.^ IV. The Word Good is equivocal, and may fignifie either Pleafure which makes formally hap- py, or the true, or feeming Caufe of Pleafure. In this Difcourfe I fhall conftantly take the Word Good in the fecond Senfe; becaufe indeed Pleafure is imprinted on the Soul, that file may love the Caufe that makes her happy, that (lie may advance towatds it by the Motion of her Love, and may ftrictly unite to it, to be perpetually happy. When the Soul loves nothing but her own Pleafure, 2^ F. Malebranche Concerning Pleafure, fhe in cffetl loves nothing diftinft from her felf. For Pleafure is only a Condition or Modification of the Soul, which renders her actually happy and content. But whilft the Soul cannot be the Caufe of her own Pleafure, fhe's unjuft, ungrateful, and blind, if fhe loves her Pleafure, and forgets to pay the Love and Devotion which is due to the true Caufe that produces it in her. As none. but God can a£t immediately and by himfelf on the Soul, and make her fen- fible of Pleafure by the a£tual Efficacy of his all-potent Will; fo he alone is truly Good. How- ever I term the Creatures Good, which are the ieeming Caufes of the Pleafures we feel- occafio- nally from them. For I am unwilling to deviate from the cuitomary way of Speaking, any farther than is neceffary to explain my felf clearly. All Creatures, though Good in themfelves, or Per- feSL, with reference to the Defigns of God, are not Good, with" reference to us. They are not our Good, nor the true Caufe of our Pleafure or Felicity.
V. The natural Motion which God conltantly imprints on the Soul to carry it to love him, or (iO make ufe of a Term which is the Abridgement of feveral Ideas, and can be no longer equi- vocal or confusVl after the Definition I have given of it,) the Will is determin'd towards parti- cular Goods, either by a clear and evident Knowledge, or by a confused Senfatiou which points thefe Goods out to us. Whilft the Mind perceives or tails not any particular Good, the Motion of the Soul remains as it were undetermin'd, it tends towards Good in general.. But this Motion- receives a particular Determination, as fooh as the Mind has the Idea" of Senfatlon of fome parti- cular Good.: For the Soul being continually bent towards Good undetermin'd, ought to move when the Good appears.
VI. But when the Good, which is prefent to the Mind and Senfes fils not thefe two Faculties; when it's difcover'd under the Idea of a particular Good, of a' Good that comprehends not all Goods -j and when it is tafted by a Senfation that takes not up the whole Capacity of the Soul, fhe may ftill defire the Perception and Fruition of fome other Good •, fhe may fufpend the Judg- ment of her Love. She may refufe to acquielce hi the acfual Enjoyment, and by her Defires feek out fome novel Object. And as her Defires are the Occafional Caufes of her Light and Know- ledge, fhe may, by the natural and neceffary Union of all Minds with him, who includes the Ideas of all Goods, difcover the True Good, and in the True, many other particular Goods dif- ferent from that fhe perceiv'd and enjOy'd before.
Therefore having fome Knowledge of the Emptinefs and Vanity of fenfible Goods, and attend- ing to the fecret Reproaches of her Reafon, to the Remorfes of her Conieience, to the Com- plaints and Menaces of the True Good, who will not that fhe fhould facrifice to feeming and imaginary Goods •, may, by the Motion which God continually imprints on her for Good in gene- ral, Sovereign Good, that is, for himfelf, check her felf in her Courfe towards any particular Good. She may refill the fenfible Allurements, fearch and find out other Objects, compare them together, and with the indelible Idea of the Supreme Good, and love none of them with a deter- minate Love. And if the Sovereign Good comes to be fomewhat relifh'd, fhe may prefer it to all particular Goods, though the Pleafure and Satisfaction they feem to infufe into the Soul be extremely great and very agreeable. But thefe Truths require a larger Explication.
VII. The Soul is conltantly driven towards Good • in general; fhe defires the PofTefHon of all Goods, and will never limit her Love; there being no Good that appears fuch that fhe refufes to love. Therefore when fhe actually enjoys a particular Good, fhe has a Tendency to proceed far- ther •, fheftill defires fomething more by the natural and- invincible Impreffion which God gives her:, and to change or divide her Love, it fuffices to prefent her another Good befides that of her prefent Enjoyment, and to give her a Tafl of the Pleafure it affords. Now the Soul may ordina- rily feek and difcover new Goods: She may likewife approach and enjoy them. For, in fine, her Defires are the Natural or Occafional Caufes of her Knowledge; and Objects appear and dfaw towards her in proportion to her Earneftnefs to know them. A Man of Ambition, who confiders the.Lultreof a Dignity, may likewife think on the Slavery, Conflraint, and the true Evils that accompany Humane Grandeur •, he may fumm up the Account, weigh and compare all together, if his Paffion does not blind him: For I confers there are Moments in which Paffion takes away all Liberty from the Mind, and that it always leffens it. Thus as a Dignity, however great it appears, cannot be taken by a perfectly free and rational Man, for univerfal and infinite Good, whilft the Will extends to all Goods: This perfe£tly free and perfe£tly rational Man, may enquire after and find out others, in as much as he can defire them; it being his Defires which difcover and prefent them to him. He may then examine them and compare them with that which he enjoys. But whereas he can find only particular Goods on Earth, he may, and ought, whilft he lives here below, to examine them, and perpetually feek, and nevet acquiefce. Or rather, that he may not be conftantly following a frefh Chafe, he ought in general to neglect all tranfitory Goods, and de- fire only fuch as are Immutable and Eternal.
VIII. But whereas we love not to feek, but to enjoy, and that the Labour of Examination is at prefent very painful, but Repofe and Enjoyment always very agreeable, the Soul commonly refts when me has fonnd any Good; fhe 'flops at it to enjoy it ^ fhe deceives her felf, becaufeby hermiltaking and judging fhe has found what (he looks for, her Defire is chang'd into Pleafure, end Pleafure makes her happier than Defire. But her Happinefs cannot laft long: Her Pleafure being ill-grounded, unjuft, and deceitful, immediately diiquiets and molefts her, becaufe fhe de- fires to be folidly and truly happy. Thus the natural Love of Good quickens her, and produces in her new Defires. Thefe confus'd Defires reprefent new Objects. The Love of Pleafure puts heron the Purfuitof thofe which afford or feem to afford it, and the Love of her Repofe fattens her NATURE W GRACE. 25 her upon them. She does not immediately examine the Defers of the prefent Good, when pre- pofleis\i with itsSweetnels • but rather contemplates it on its belt fide, applies to that which charms her, and thinks only of enjoying it. But the more ftie enjoys, the more the b ives it, and the clo- fer (he approaches, the more cunoufly (he conliders it. But the more (he conhders ir the more Impeifechons (he fpies in it; and fince (he defires to be truly happy, (he cannot for ever be milta- ken. When (lie is rhirfty, and hungry, and weary with locking, Hie prefentlv inebriates and fills her felt with the firft Good (he finds •, but (he is prefently difguited with a Nourilhmcnt which was not made for Man. Thus the Love of the True Good excites in her new Defires tor frefh Goods; and whilft (he conftantly changes her Purfuir, all her Life; and her whole Happinefs on Earth, confifts in a continual Circulation of Thoughts, Defires, and Plea hires. Such is the Soul which makes no ufe of her Liberty, but leaves her felf to the Conduct of Chance, to be guided by the obtaining Motion, and the fortuitous Concourfe of determining Objects. But this is the State of a Man whole Underftanding is lb weak as daily to miltake the falfe for the true Good • and whole Heart is fo corrupt as to betray and fell it felf to every thing it is touch'd with, to the Good which gives it an a£tual Senfe of the moll fweet and agreeable Pleafures.'
IX. But a Man perfectly free, fuch as we conceive Adam immediately after his Creation, knoivs clearly that none but God is his Good, or the true Caufe of the Pleafures he enjoys. Though he feels Satisfa&ion upon the approach of circumambient Bodies, he loves them not; God only he loves, and if God forbid him to unite to Bodies, he is ready to forfake them, what Pleafure focver he finds in rhem. He refolves to fix only in the Enjoyment Of the fupreme Good, and to facrifice all others to it •, and though never fo defirous of Happinefs, or the Enjoyment of Pleafures, no Pleafure is ftronger than his Light. Not but that Pleafures can blind him, perturbate his Reafon, and fill up his thinking Capacity. (For the Mind being finite, all Pleafure is capable of dividing and diftra£ting it:) But that Pleafures being fubje&ed to his Will, he is too cautious to be intoxicated by them. For the fole invincible Plealiire is that of the BlelTed, or that which the Firft Man had found in God, if God {hou\d have prevented and hindred his Fall; not only becaule this Pleafure fills all the Faculties of the Soul, without difturbing her Reafon, or carrying her to the Love of a pretended Good; but alfo becaufe nothing withftands the Enjoyment of this Pleafure; neither the Defire of Perfection, nor that of Felicity. For when we love 'God we are perfect h when we enjoy him we are happy ^ and when we love him with Pleafure, we are happy and perfect all at once. Thus the perfecleft Liberty is that of Minds, which can at all times overcome the greateft Pleafures h of Minds, to which no Motion towards particular Goods is ever irrefiftible: Tis that of a Man before the Sin, before Concupifcence troubled his Mind and corrupted his Heart. And the molt imperfect Liberty is that of thofe to whom no Motion towards a particu- lar Good, though never fo little, but is invincible in all forts of Circumftances.
X. Now betwixt thefe two forts of Liberty there are more and lefs Perfect to an Infinity of Degrees, which is a thing not fufficiently minded. Tis commonly imagined that Liberty is equal in all Men, and rhat 'tis anEffential Faculty of the Mind, the Nature whereof remains conftantly the fame, though its A£tion varies according to the diverfity of Objects. For we regardlefly fup- pofe a perfett Equality in all things, wherein no lenfible Inequality appears. Men indulge their Mind, and rid it of all tedious Application, by giving things an abftract Form, confilting in a fort of indivifible EfTence. But this is an Errour, Liberty being no fuch Faculty as is imagin'd. There are not two Perfbns equally free in refpect of the fame Objects. Children have lefs Liberty than Men arriv'd to the perfect Exercife of their Reafon. Nor are there two Men whofe Reafon is equally clear, conftant, and certain, in regard of the lame Objects. Thofe whole Paffions are unruly, and who have been unaccuftom'd to refill them, are lefs tree than others who have coura- gioufly impugn'd them, and who are naturally Men of Temper; and there are not two Men equally moderate, equally fenfible to the fame Objecls^ and who have equally fought for the Prefervation of their Liberty. Some Perfons there are fo fold to Sin, that they lefs refill, or think of refitting it when awake, than pious Men in their Sleep •, iince we are taught by the Word of Truth, that he who commits Sin becomes a Slave to it.
XI. ''True it is, that by the Inftitution of Nature all Men are equally free: For God does not invincibly-determine Men to the Love of any particular Good. But Concupifcence corrupts the Moral and Intellectual Part • and fince Man has loft the Power of obliterating the Tra£ts of fen- fible Pleafures, and flopping the Motions of Concupifcence: That Liberty which had been equal in all Men, if they had. not finnd, grows unequal, according to their different degrees of Light, and as variouily work'd on by Concupifcence. For Concupifcence it felf!, which is equal in all Men, in as much as they have loft their Power over their Body, is a thoufand ways unequal, be- caufe of the Diverfity that is found in the Conftru&ion of the Body, in the Multiplicity and Mo- tion of the Spirits, and thofe almoft infinite Alliances and Relations obtain'd through the Com- merce of the World.
XII. To our diftincter underftanding the Inequality which is found in the Liberty of different Perfbns, we mult obferve, that every Man perfectly reafonable, perfectly free, and who would be truly happy, may, and ought, upon the Pretence of any Object which gives him the fenfe of Pleafure, fufpend his Love, and carefully examine whether this Object be the true Good, or whe- ther the Motion which carries him towards ir exactly comport with that which leads him to the true Good: Orherwife he would love by Initinct, and not by Reafon; and if he could not fufpend the Judgment of his Love, before he had examin'd it, he would not be perfectly free* But if he clearly difcovers that this Object, which gives him the Senfe of Pleafure, is truly good G to to him •, and if the Evidence in conjunction with the §ehfation be fuch as will not permit him to fufpend his Judgment, then, though perfectly free, he is no longer free in refpect of that Good ^ but he invincibly loves it, becaufe Pleafure agrees with Evidence. But being that God alone can act in us, as our Good, and the Motion which byalTes us towards the Creatures is repugnant to that which carries us towards God; every Man, perfectly reafonable, and entirely free, may and muft forbear to judge that fenfible Objects are his Goods. He may and ought to fufpend the Judg- ment which regulates, or (hould regulate his Love. For he can never evidently fee that fenfible Goods are true Goods, fince that can never be evidently feen which is not.
XIII. This Power of fufpending the Judgment, which is the actual Rule of Love-, this Power, which is the Principle of our Liberty, and by which Pleafures are not always invincible, is very- much weaken'd fince the Sin, though not quite dertroy'd. And that we may have actually this Power, when we are tempted by an Object, 'tis necelTary, befides the Love of Order, to have a thoughtful Mind, and to be fenfible to the Remorfe of Confcience •, for a Child or a Man aileep • have not actually this Power. But all Men are not equally enlightned -7 the Mind of Sinners is full of Darknefs: Confciences are not equally tender, the Heart of Sinners is hardned: The Love of Order, actual Graces are unequal in all Men: Therefore they are not equally free, nor have equal Power of fufpending their Judgment: Pleafure determines them, and moves fome ra- ther than others. This Man can fufpend his Judgment, and wave his Confent, when a prelent Object gives him the Taft of a molt quickning and fenfible Pleafure; and another is of fo nar- row a Mind, and corrupt an Heart, that the leaft Pleafure is irrefiftible, and the leaft Pain infup- portable: Being not wont to fight againfl: fenfible Allurements, he becomes fo difpos'd as not even to think of refilling them: Thus he has not then the Power of deferring his Confent, fince he even wants the Power of making a Reflection j and in regard to that Object, he is like a Man afleep or out of his Wits.
XIV. The more weak is Reafon, the more fenfible grows the Soul, and more readily and falfly fhe judges of fenfible Good and Evil. If a Leaf pricks, or even tickles a Man when aileep, fie wakes in a ftart, frighted, as if bitten by a Serpent. He perceives this little Evil, and judges of it as of the greateft Misfortunes •; fo intolerable it appears to him. His Reafon fainting by the Slumber, incapacitates him from fufpending his Judgment. To him the leaft Goods as well as Evils, are almoft always infuperable. For 'tis the Senfes which judge in him, and thefe are hafty Deciders b which mull be fo for feveral Reaforis. When Reafon is lefs difabled, little Pleafures are not invincible, nor little Evils intolerable ^ and Men are not always bound where moll Plea- fure is to be found. For fome Pleafures are fo little, that they are defpicable to Reafon, which is never quite deftitute of the Love of Order. The prefence of little Evils is not very frightful: A Man, for Example, refolves to be let Blood, and fullers it j he judges not fo haftily, but fuf- pends and examines; and the ftronger is Reafon, the longer is its Sufpence, againfl- fenfible Invita- tions and Difcouragements. Now there is nothing more certain, than that ail Men who partake of the fame Reafon, partake not of it equally; that all are not equally fenfible, at leaft to the fame Objects -, that they are not all equally well born, equally well bred, equally affiited by the Grace of Jefus Chriji ^ and therefore not equally free, or capable of fufpending the Judgment of their Love in point of the fame Objects.
XV. But we are to take notice, that the chief Duty of Minds is to preferve and increafe their Liberty, fince 'tis by the good ufe poffible to be made of it they may merit their Felicity, if fuc- cour'd by the Grace of Jefus Chriji; at leaft leffen their Mifery, if left to themfelves. That which weakens our Liberty, or makes moll Pleafures irrefiftible to us, is the Eclipfe of our Rea- fon, and the Lofs of Power we ought to have over our Body. Reafon therefore muft be inftru- cted by continual Meditations 5 we muft confider our Duties, that we may perform them h and our Infirmities, that we may have recourfe to him who is our Strength. And fince we have loft the Power of flopping the IrriprefTions made by the Prefence of Objects on the Body, which thence corrupt the Mind and Heart, we ought to avoid thefe Objects, and make ufe of the Power that is left us. We ought to watch conftantly over the Purity of our Imagination, and labour with all our Powers to efface the adulterate Traces imprinted by falfe Goods, fince they, kindle Defires in us, which divide our Mind, and weaken our Liberty. By this means the Man whofe Liberty is juft expiring, who cannot conquer the leaft of Pleafures, may obtain fuch a Strength, and fuch a Freedom, as not to yield to the greateft Souls, their Succours being fuppos'd equal. For, at leaft, at the time whilft thefe Pleafures do not importune us to Evil, we may lay in to avoid them. We may fortifie our felves by fome Reafon, that may, through future Pleafures, countervail thofe we don't actually enjoy. For as every one has fome Love of Order, there is no Man but may vanquifh a feeble and light Pleafure by a ftrong and folid Reafon 5 by a reafonable Fear of fome Evil, orby the Hope of fome great Good. Laftly, there is no one but may, by the Ordinary Sup- plies of Grace, vanquifh fome Pleafures and avoid others: Which Pleafures, formerly in- vincible or ftudied, being vanquifh'd or avoided, are a Preparatory to our afTaulting others, at leaft before they tempt us. For the Satisfaction we find in the Victory provokes us again to Battle 5 and the Joy of a good Confcience, and the Grace of J ejus Chrifl adminifter Courage: And even the Fear of a Defeat is not ufelels, fince it makes us fly to him who can do all things $ and make us difcreet in avoiding perillous Occafions. Thus we are always Gainers in this fort of Exercife 5 for if we are worited, we become more humble, wife, and circumfpect, and fometimes more earneft for the Combat, and more capable of Conquering or Refilling.