projected, and in which they are being worshipped. In short: (1) God is unknowable to us and not to be demonstrated by us (the concealed meaning behind the whole of the epistemological move ment); (2) God may be demonstrated, but as some thing evolving, and we are part of it, as our pressing desire for an ideal proves (the concealed meaning behind the historical movement). It should be observed that criticism is never levelled at the ideal itself, but only at the problem which gives rise to a controversy concerning the ideal that is to say, why it has not yet been realized, or why it is not demonstrable in small things as in great. * It makes all the difference: whether a man recognises this state of distress as such owing to a passion or to a yearning in himself, or whether it comes home to him as a problem which he arrives at only by straining his thinking powers and his historical imagination to the utmost. Away from the religious and philosophical points of view we find the same phenomena. Utilitarianism (socialism and democracy) criticises the origin of moral valuations, though it believes in them just as much as the Christian does. (What guilelessrtess! As if morality could remain when the sanctioning deity is no longer present! The belief in a " Beyond " is absolutely necessary, if the faith in morality is to be maintained.) Fundamental problem: whence comes this almighty power of Faith? Whence this faith in morality? (It is betrayed by the fact that even the fundamental conditions of life are falsely interpreted in favour of it: despite our knowledge of plants and animals. " Self-preser vation ": the Darwinian prospect of a reconcilia tion of the altruistic and egotistic principles.)
254. An inquiry into the origin of our moral valuations and tables of law has absolutely nothing to do with the criticism of them, though people persist in believing it has; the two matters lie quite apart, notwithstanding the fact that the knowledge of the piidenda ongo of a valuation does diminish its prestige, and pre pares the way to a critical attitude and spirit towards it. 213 What is the actual worth of our valuations and tables of moral laws? What is the outcome of their dominion? For whom? In relation to what? answer: for Life. But what is Life? A new and more definite concept of what " Life " is, becomes necessary here. My formula of this concept is: Life is Will to Power. What is the meaning of the very act of valuing? Does it point back to another, metaphysical world, or does it point down? (As Kant believed, who lived in a period which preceded the great historical movement.) In short: what is its origin? Or had it no human " origin "? Answer: moral valuations are a sort of explana- ation, they constitute a method of interpreting. Interpretation in itself is a symptom of definite physiological conditions, as also of a definite spiritual level of ruling judgments. What is it that interprets? Our passions.
255. All virtues should be looked upon as physiological conditions: the principal organic functions, more particularly, should be considered necessary and good. All virtues are really refined passions and elevated physiological conditions. Pity and philanthropy may be regarded as the developments of sexual relations, justice as the development of the passion for revenge, virtue as the love of resistance, the will to power, honor as an acknowledgment of an equal, or of an equally powerful, force.
256. Under " Morality " I understand a system of valuations which is in relation with the conditions of a creature s life.
257. Formerly it was said of every form of morality, " Ye shall know them by their fruits." I say of every form of morality: "It is a fruit, and from it I learn the Soil out of which it grew."
258. I have tried to understand all moral judgments as symptoms and a language of signs in which the processes of physiological prosperity or the reverse, as also the consciousness of the conditions of preservation and growth, are betrayed a mode of interpretation equal in worth to astrology, prejudices, created by instincts (peculiar to races, communities, and different stages of existence, as, for instance, youth or decay, etc.). Applying this principle to the morality of Christian Europe more particularly, we find that our moral values are signs of decline, of a dis belief in Life, and of a preparation for pes simism. My leading doctrine is this: there are no moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena. The origin of this interpretation itself lies beyond the pale of morality. What is the meaning of the fact that we have 215 imagined a contradiction in existence? This is of paramount importance: behind all other valuations those moral valuations stand com- mandingly. Supposing they disappear, according to what standard shall we then measure? And then of what value would knowledge be, etc. etc.???
259. A point of view: in all valuations there is a definite purpose: the preservation of an individ ual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a belief, or a culture. Thanks to the fact that people forget that all valuing has a purpose, one and the same man may swarm with a host of contradictory valuations, and therefore zvitk a host of contradictory impulses. This is the expression of disease in man as opposed to the health of animals, in which all the instincts answer certain definite purposes. This creature full of contradictions, however, has in his being a grand method of acquiring knowledge: he feels the pros and cons, he elevates himself to Justice that is to say, to the ascertain ing of principles beyond the valuations good and evil. The wisest man would thus be the richest in contradictions, he would also be gifted with mental antennae wherewith he could understand all kinds of men; and with it all he would have his great moments, when all the chords in his being would ring in splendid unison the rarest of accidents even in us! A sort of planetary movement.
260. "To will" is to will an object. But "object," as an idea, involves a valuation. Whence do valuations originate? Is a permanent norm, "pleasant or painful," their basis? But in an incalculable number of cases we first of all make a thing painful, by investing it with a valuation. The compass of moral valuations: they play a part in almost every mental impression. To us the world is colored by them. We have imagined the purpose and value of all things: owing to this we possess an enormous fund of latent power but the study of compara tive values teaches us that values which were actually opposed to each other have been held in high esteem, and that there have been many tables of laws (they could not, therefore, have been worth anything per se). The analysis of individual tables of laws re vealed the fact that they were framed (often very badly) as the conditions of existence for limited groups of people, to ensure their maintenance. Upon examining modern men, we found that there are a large number of very different values to hand, and that they no longer contain any creative power the fundamental principle: "the condition of existence" is now quite divorced from the moral values. It is much more superfluous and not nearly so painful. It becomes an arbitrary matter. Chaos. Who creates the goal which stands above mankind and above the individual? Formerly morality was a preservative measure: but nobody wants to preserve any longer, there is nothing to preserve. Thus we are reduced to an experimental morality, each must postulate a goal for himself.
261. What is the criterion of a moral action? (i) Its disinterestedness, (2) its universal acceptation, etc. But this is parlour-morality. Races must be studied and observed, and, in each case, the criterion must be discovered, as also the thing it expresses: a belief such as: " This particular attitude or behaviour belongs to the principal condition of our existence." Immoral means " that which brings about ruin." Now all societies in which these principles were discovered have met with their ruin: a few of these principles have been used and used again, because every newly established community required them; this was the case, for instance, with " Thou shalt not steal." In ages when people could not be expected to show any marked social instinct (as, for instance, in the age of the Roman Empire) the latter was, religiously speaking, directed towards the idea of " spiritual salvation," or, in philosophical parlance, towards " the greatest happiness." For even the philosophers of Greece did not feel any more for their TroXt?.
262. The necessity of false values, A judgment may be refuted when it is shown that it was 2l8 conditioned: but the necessity of retaining it is not thereby cancelled. Reasons can no more eradicate false values than they can alter astig matism in a man s eyes. The need of their existence must be understood: they are the result of causes which have nothing to do with reasoning.
263. To see and reveal the problem of morality seems to me to be the new task and the principal thing of all. I deny that this has been done by moral philosophies heretofore.
264. How false and deceptive men have always been concerning the fundamental facts of their inner world! Here to have no eye; here to hold one s tongue, and here to open one s mouth, 265. There seems to be no knowledge or conscious ness of the many revolutions that have taken place in moral judgments, and of the number of times that " evil " has really and seriously been christened " good " and vice versa. I myself pointed to one of these transformations with the words " Sittlichkeit der Sitte." * Even conscience * The morality of custom. 2 19 has changed its sphere: formerly there was such a thing as a gregarious pang of conscience.
266. A. Morality as the work of Immorality. 1. In order that moral values may attain to supremacy, a host of immoral forces and passions must assist them. 2. The establishment of moral values is the work of immoral passions and considera tions. B. Morality as the work of error. C. Morality gradually contradicts itself, Requital Truthfulness, Doubt, CTTO, Judging. The " Immorality " of belief in morality. The steps: 1. Absolute dominion of morality: all bio logical phenomena measured &n& judged according to its values. 2. The attempt to identify Life with morality (symptom of awakened scepticism: mor ality must no longer be regarded as the opposite of Life); many means are sought even a transcendental one. 3. The opposition of Life and Morality. Morality condemned and sentenced by Life. D. To what extent was morality dangerous to Life? (a) It depreciated the joy of living and the gratitude felt towards Life, etc. 220 () It checked the tendency to beautify and to ennoble Life. (c) It checked the knowledge of Life. (cT) It checked the unfolding of Life, because it tried to set the highest phenomena thereof at variance with itself. E. Centra-account: the usefulness of morality to Life. (1) Morality may be a preservative measure for the general whole, it may be a pro cess of uniting dispersed members: it is useful as an agent in the production of the man who is a " tool" (2) Morality may be a preservative measure mitigating the inner danger threatening man from the direction of his passions: it is useful to " mediocre people" (3) Morality may be a preservative measure resisting the life-poisoning influences of profound sorrow and bitterness: it is useful to the sufferers" (4) Morality may be a preservative measure opposed to the terrible outbursts of the mighty: it is useful to the " lowly" 267. It is an excellent thing when one can use the expressions " right " and " wrong " in a definite, narrow, and " bourgeois " sense, as for instance in the sentence: " Do right and fear no one "; * * " Thue Recht und scheue Niemand." 221 that is to say, to do one s duty, according to the rough scheme of life within the limit of which a community exists. Let us not think meanly of what a few thousand years of morality have inculcated upon our minds.
268. Two types of morality must not be confounded: the morality with which the instinct that has remained healthy defends itself from incipient decadence, and the other morality by means of which this decadence asserts itself, justifies itself, and leads downwards. The first-named is usually stoical, hard, tyran nical (Stoicism itself was an example of the sort of " drag-chain " morality we speak of); the other is gushing, sentimental, full of secrets, it has the women and " beautiful feelings " on its side (Primitive Christianity was an example of this morality).
269. I shall try to regard all moralising, with one glance, as a phenomenon also as a riddle. Moral phenomena have preoccupied me like riddles. Today I should be able to give a reply to the question: why should my neighbour s welfare be of greater value to me than my own? and why is it that my neighbour himself should value his welfare differently from the way in which 222 I value it that is to say, why should precisely my welfare be paramount in his mind? What is the meaning of this " Thou shalt," which is regarded as " given " even by philosophers them selves? The seemingly insane idea that a man should esteem the act he performs for a fellow-creature, higher than the one he performs for himself, and that the same fellow-creature should do so too (that only those acts should be held to be good which are performed with an eye to the neighbour and for his welfare) has its reasons namely, as the result of the social instinct which rests upon the valuation, that single individuals are of little importance although collectively their importance is very great. This, of course, pre supposes that they constitute a community with one feeling and one conscience pervading the whole. It is therefore a sort of exercise for keeping one s eyes in a certain direction; it is the will to a kind of optics which renders a view of one s self impossible. My idea: goals are wanting, and these must be individuals. We see the general drift: every individual gets sacrificed and serves as a tool.
Let any one keep his eyes open in the streets is not every one he sees a slave? Whither? What is the purpose of it all?
270. How is it possible that a man can respect himself only in regard to moral values, that he 223 subordinates and despises everything in favour of good, evil, improvement, spiritual salvation, etc.? as, for instance, Henri Fre"d. Amiel. What is the meaning of the moral idiosyncrasy? I mean this both in the psychological and physio logical sense, as it was, for instance, in Pascal. In cases, then, in which other great qualities are not wanting; and even in the case of Schopen hauer, who obviously valued what he did not and could not have...is it not the result of a merely mechanical moral interpretation of real states of pain and displeasure? is it not a par ticular form of sensibility which does not happen to understand the cause of its many unpleasurable feelings, but thinks to explain them with moral hypotheses } In this way an occasional feeling of well-being and strength always appears under the optics of a " clean conscience," flooded with light through the proximity of God and the consciousness of salvation...Thus the moral idiosyncratist has (i) either acquired his real worth in approximating to the virtuous type of society: " the good fellow," " the upright man " a sort of medium state of high respectability: mediocre in all his abilities, but honest, conscien tious, firm, respected, and tried, in all his aspira tions; (2) or, he imagines he has acquired that worth, simply because he cannot otherwise under stand all his states he is unknown to himself; he therefore interprets himself in this fashion. Morality is the only scheme of interpretation by means of which this type of man can tolerate himself: is it a form of vanity? 224 271. The predominance of moral values. The con- quence of this predominance: the corruption of psychology, etc.; the fatality which is associated with it everywhere. What is the meaning of this predominance? What does it point to? To a certain greater urgency of saying nay or yea definitely in this domain. All sorts of im peratives have been used in order to make moral values appear as if they were for ever fixed: they have been enjoined for the longest period of time: they almost appear to be instinctive, like inner commands. They are the expression of society s preservative measures, for they are felt to be almost beyond question. The practice that is to say, the utility of being agreed concerning superior values, has attained in this respect to a sort of sanction. We observe that every care is taken to paralyse reflection and criticism in this depart ment: look at Kant s attitude! not to speak of those who believe that it is immoral even to prosecute " research " in these matters.
272. My desire is to show the absolute homogeneity of all phenomena, and to ascribe to moral differ entiations but the value of perspective; to show that all that which is praised as moral is essentially the same as that which is immoral, and was only made possible, according to the law of all moral development that is to say, by means of immoral artifices and with a view to immoral ends just as all that which has been decried as immoral is, from the standpoint of economics, both superior and essential; and how development leading to a greater abundance of life necessarily involves progress in the realm of immorality. " Truth," that is the extent to which we allow ourselves to comprehend this fact.
273. But do not let us fear: as a matter of fact, we require a great deal of morality, in order to be immoral in this subtle way; let me speak in a parable: A physiologist interested in a certain illness, and an invalid who wishes to be cured of that same illness, have not the same interests. Let us suppose that the illness happens to be morality, for morality is an illness, and that we Europeans are the invalid: what an amount of subtle torment and difficulty would arise supposing we Europeans were, at once, our own inquisitive spectators and the physiologist above-mentioned! Should we under these circumstances earnestly desire to rid ourselves of morality? Should we want to? This is of course irrespective of the question whether we should be able to do so whether we can be cured at all?. p 226 2. THE HERD.
2. THE HERD.
274. Whose will to power is morality? The common factor of all European history since the time of Socrates is the attempt to make the moral values dominate all other values, in order that they should not be only the leader and judge of life, but also: (i) knowledge, (2) Art, (3) political and social aspirations. " Amelioration " regarded as the only duty, everything else used as a means thereto (or as a force distributing, hindering, and endangering its realization, and therefore to be opposed and annihilated...). A similar move ment to be observed in China and India. What is the meaning of this will to power on the part of moral values, which has played such a part in the world s prodigious evolutions? Answer: Three powers lie concealed behind it; (i) The instinct of the herd opposed to the strong and the independent; (2) the instinct of all sufferers and all abortions opposed to the happy and well-constituted; (3) the instinct of the mediocre opposed to the exceptions. Enormous advantage of this movement, despite the cruelty, falseness, and narrow-mindedness which has helped it along (for the history of the struggle of morality with the fundamental instincts of life is in itself the greatest piece of- immorality that has ever yet been witnessed on earth...).
275. The fewest succeed in discovering a problem behind all that which constitutes our daily life, and to which we have become accustomed throughout the ages our eye does not seem focussed for such things: at least, this seems to me to be the case in so far as our morality is concerned. " Every man should be the preoccupation of his -Hows"; he who thinks in this way deserves honor: no one ought to think of himself. "Thou shalt": an impulse which, like the sexual impulse, cannot fathom itself, is set apart and is not condemned as all the other instincts are on the contrary, it is made to be their standard and their judge! The problem of " equality in the face of the fact that we all thirst for distinction: here, on the contrary, we should demand of ourselves what we demand of others. That is so tasteless and obviously insane; but it is felt to be holy and of a higher order. The fact that it is opposed to common sense is not even noticed. Self-sacrifice and self-abnegation are considered distinguishing, as are also the attempt to obey morality implicitly, and the belief that one should be every one s equal in its presence. The neglect and the surrender of Life and of well-being is held to be distinguished, as are also the complete renunciation of individual valuations and the severe exaction from every one of the same sacrifice. "The value of an action is once 228 and for all fixed; every individual must submit to this valuation." We see: an authority speaks who speaks? We must condone it in human pride, if man tried to make this authority as high as possible, for he wanted to feel as humble as he possibly could by the side of it. Thus God speaks! God was necessary as an unconditional sanction which has no superior,as a "Categorical Imperator": or, in so far as people believed in the authority of reason, what was needed was a "Unitarian metaphysics " by means of which this view could be made logical. Now, admitting that faith in God is dead: the question arises once more: " who speaks? " My answer, which I take from biology and not from metaphysics, is: " the gregarious instinct speaks" This is what desires to be master: hence its " thou shalt! " it will allow the individual to exist only as a part of a whole, only in favour of the whole, it hates those who detach themselves from every thing it turns the hatred of all individuals against him.
276. The whole of the morality of Europe is based upon the values which are useful to the herd-, the sorrow of all higher and exceptional men is explained by the fact that everything which distinguishes them from others reaches their consciousness in the form of a feeling of their own smallness and egregiousness. It is the virtues of modern men which are the causes of pessimistic gloominess; the mediocre, like the herd, are not troubled much with questions or with conscience they are cheerful. (Among the gloomy strong men, Pascal and Schopenhauer are noted examples.) The more dangerous a quality seems to the herd, the more completely it is condemned.
277. The morality of truthfulness in the herd. " Thou shalt be recognisable, thou shalt express thy inner nature by means of clear and constant signs otherwise thou art dangerous: and sup posing thou art evil, thy power of dissimulation is absolutely the worst thing for the herd. We despise the secretive and those whom we cannot identify. Consequently thou must regard thyself as recognisable, thou mayest not remain concealed from thyself, thou mayest not even believe in the possibility of thy ever changing? Thus, the in sistence upon truthfulness has as its main object the recognisability and the stability of the individual. As a matter of fact, it is the object of education to make each gregarious unit believe in a certain definite dogma concerning the nature of man: education first creates this dogma and thereupon exacts " truthfulness."
278. Within the confines of a herd or of a com munity that is to say, inter pares, the over-estima tion of truthfulness is very reasonable. A man must not allow himself to be deceived and con sequently he adopts as his own personal morality that he should deceive no one! a sort of mutual obligation among equals! In his dealings with the outside world caution and danger demand that he should be on his guard against deception: the first psychological condition of this attitude would mean that he is also on his guard against his own people. Mistrust thus appears as the source of truthfulness.
279. A criticism of the virtues of the herd. Inertia is active: (i) In confidence, because mistrust makes suspense, reflection, and observation necessary. (2) In veneration, where the gulf that separates power is great and submission necessary: then, so that fear may cease to exist, everybody tries to love and esteem, while the difference in power is interpreted as a difference of value: and thus the relationship to the powerful no longer has any thing revolting in it. (3) In the sense of truth. What is truth? Truth is that explanation of things which causes us the smallest amount of mental exertion (apart from this, lying is extremely fatiguing). (4) In sympathy. It is a relief to know one s self on the same level with all, to feel as all feel, and to accept a belief which is already current; it is something passive beside the activity which appropriates and continually carries into practice the most individual rights of valua tion (the latter process allows of no repose). (5) In 231 impartiality and coolness of judgment: people scout the strain of being moved, and prefer to be detached and " objective." (6) In uprightness: people prefer to obey a law which is to hand rather than to create a new one, rather than to command themselves and others: the fear of commanding it is better to submit than to rebel. (7) In toleration: the fear of exercising a right or of enforcing a judgment.
280. The instinct of the herd values the juste milieu and the average as the highest and most precious of all things: the spot where the majority is to be found, and the air that it breathes there. In this way it is the opponent of all order of rank; it regards a climb from the level to the heights in the same light as a descent from the majority to the minority. The herd regards the exception, whether it be above or beneath its general level, as something which is antagonistic and dangerous to itself. Their trick in dealing with the ex ceptions above them, the strong, the mighty, the wise, and the fruitful, is to persuade them to be come guardians, herdsmen, and watchmen in fact, to become their head-servants: thus they convert a danger into a thing which is useful. In the middle, fear ceases: here a man is alone with nothing; here there is not much room even for misunderstandings; here there is equality; here a man s individual existence is not felt as a reproach, but as the right existence; here contentment reigns supreme. Mistrust is active only towards the exceptions; to be an exception is to be a sinner.
281. If, in compliance with our communal instincts, we make certain regulations for ourselves and forbid certain acts, we do not of course, in common reason, forbid a certain kind of "existence," nor a certain attitude of mind, but only a particular application and development of this " existence " and " attitude of mind." But then the idealist of virtue, the moralist, comes along and says: " God sees into the human heart! What matters it that ye abstain from certain acts: ye are not any better on that account! " Answer: Mr. Longears and Virtue-Monger, we do not want to be better at all, we are quite satisfied with ourselves, all we desire is that we should not harm one another and that is why we forbid certain actions when they take a particular direction that is to say, when they are against our own interests: but that does not alter the fact that when these same actions are directed against the enemies of our community against you, for instance we are at a loss to know how to pay them sufficient honor. We educate our children up to them; we develop them to the fullest extent. Did we share that " god-fearing " radicalism which your holy craziness recommends, if we were green horns enough to condemn the source of those for bidden " acts " by condemning the " heart " and the " attitude of mind " which recommends them, that would mean condemning our very existence, and with it its greatest prerequisite an attitude of mind, a heart, a passion which we revere with all our soul.
By our decrees we prevent this attitude of mind from breaking out and venting itself in a useless way we are prudent when we prescribe such laws for ourselves; we are also moral in so doing...Have you no idea how ever vague what sacrifices it has cost us, how much self-control, self-subjection, and hardness it has compelled us to exercise? We are vehement in our desires; there are times when we even feel as if we could devour each other...But the " communal spirit " is master of us: have you observed that this is almost a definition of morality?
282. The weakness of the gregarious animal gives rise to a morality which is precisely similar to that resulting from the weakness of the decadent man: they understand each other; they associate with each other (the great decadent religions always rely upon the support of the herd). The gregarious animal, as such, is free from all morbid characteristics, it is in itself an invaluable creature; but it is incapable of taking any initiative; it must have a " leader " the priests understand this...The state is not subtle, not secret enough; the art of " directing consciences " slips its grasp. How is the gregarious animal infected with illness by the priest?