283. The hatred directed against the privileged in body and spirit: the revolt of the ugly and bungled souls against the beautiful, the proud, and the cheerful. The weapons used: contempt of beauty, of pride, of happiness: " There is no such thing as merit," " The danger is enormous: it is right that one should tremble and feel ill at ease," " Naturalness is evil; it is right to oppose all that is natural even reason " (all that is anti- natural is elevated to the highest place). It is again the priests who exploit this condition, and who win the " people " over to themselves. " The sinner " over whom there is more joy in heaven than over " the just person." This is the struggle against " paganism " (the pang of con science, a measure for disturbing the harmony of the soul). The hatred of the mediocre for the exceptions, and of the herd for its independent members. (Custom actually regarded as " morality.") The revulsion of feeling against " egotism ": that only is worth anything which is done " for another." " We are all equal "; against the love of dominion, against " dominion " in general; against privilege; against sectarians, free- spirits, and sceptics; against philosophy (a force opposing mechanical and automatic instincts); in philosophers themselves " the categorical imperative," the essential nature of morality, " general and universal."
284. The qualities and tendencies which are praised: peacefulness, equity, moderation, modesty, rever ence, respectfulness, bravery, chastity, honesty, fidelity, credulity, rectitude, confidence, resigna tion, pity, helpfulness, conscientiousness, simplicity, mildness, justice, generosity, leniency, obedience, disinterestedness, freedom from envy, good nature, industry. We must ascertain to what extent such qualities are conditioned as means to the attainment of certain desires and ends (often an " evil " end); or as results of dominating passions (for instance, intellectuality]: or as the expressions of certain states of need that is to say, as preservative measures (as in the case of citizens, slaves, women, etc.). In short, every one of them is not considered good" for its own sake, but rather because it approximates to a standard prescribed either by " society " or by the " herd," as a means to the ends of the latter, as necessary for their preserva tion and enhancement, and also as the result of an actual gregarious instinct in the individual; these qualities are thus in the service of an instinct which is fundamentally different from these states of virtue. For the herd is antagonistic, selfish, and pitiless to the outside world; it is full of a love of dominion and of feelings of mistrust, etc. In the " herdsman " this antagonism comes to the fore: he must have qualities which are the reverse of those possessed by the herd. The mortal enmity of the herd towards all order of rank: its instinct is in favour of the leveller (Christ). Towards all strong individuals (the sovereigns] it is hostile, unfair, intemperate, arrogant, cheeky, disrespectful, cowardly, false, lying, pitiless, deceitful, envious, revengeful.
285. My teaching is this, that the herd seeks to maintain and preserve one type of man, and that it defends itself on two sides that is to say, against those which are decadents from its ranks (criminals, etc.), and against those who rise superior to its dead level. The instincts of the herd tend to a stationary state of society; they merely preserve. They have no creative power. The pleasant feelings of goodness and benevol ence with which the just man fills us (as opposed to the suspense and the fear to which the great innovating man gives rise) are our own sensations of personal security and equality: in this way the gregarious animal glorifies the gregarious nature, and then begins to feel at ease. This judgment on the part of the " comfortable " ones rigs itself out in the most beautiful words and thus " morality " is born. Let any one observe, however, the hatred of the herd for all truthful men.
286. Let us not deceive ourselves! When a man hears the whisper of the moral imperative in his 237 breast, as altruism would have him hear it, he shows thereby that he belongs to the herd. When a man is conscious of the opposite feelings, that is to say, when he sees his danger and his undoing in disinterested and unselfish actions, then he does not belong to the herd.
287. My philosophy aims at a new order of rank: not at an individualistic morality.* The spirit of the herd should rule within the herd but not beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally different valuation for their actions, as do also the independent ones or the beasts of prey, etc.
3. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING MORALITY.
288. Morality regarded as an attempt at establishing human pride. The " Free-Will " theory is anti- religious. Its ultimate object is to bestow the right upon man to regard himself as the cause of his highest states and actions: it is a form of the growing feeting of pride. Man feels his power his " happiness "; as they say: there must be a will behind these states * TRANSLATOR S NOTE. Here is a broad distinction be tween Nietzsche and Herbert Spencer. otherwise they do not belong to him. Virtue is an attempt at postulating a modicum of will, past or present, as the necessary antecedent to every exalted and strong feeling of happiness: if the will to certain actions is regularly present in consciousness, a sensation of power may be inter preted as its result. This is a merely psychological point of view, based upon the false assumption that nothing belongs to us which we have not consciously willed. The whole of the teaching of responsibility relies upon the ingenuous psycho logical rule that the will is the only cause, and that one must have been aware of having willed in order to be able to regard one s self as a cause. Then comes the counter-movement that of the moral-philosophers. These men still labour under the delusion that a man is responsible only for what he has willed. The value of man is then made a moral value: thus morality becomes a causa prima; for this there must be some kind of principle in man, and " free will " is posited as prima causa. The arriere pensee is always this: If man is not a causa prima through his will, he must be irresponsible, therefore he does not come within the jurisdiction of morals, virtue or vice is automatic and mechanical...In short: in order that man may respect himself he must be capable of becoming evil.
289. Theatricalness regarded as the result of " Free Will " morality. It is a step in the development 239 of the feeling of power itself, to believe one s self to be the author of one s exalted moments (of one s perfection) and to have willed them...(Criticism: all perfect action is precisely un conscious and not deliberate; consciousness is often the expression of an imperfect and often morbid constitution. Personal perfection regarded as determined by will, as an act of consciousness, as reason with dialectics, is a caricature, a sort of self- contradiction...Any degree of consciousness renders perfection impossible...A form of theatricalness?)
290. The moral hypothesis, designed with a view to justifying God, said: evil must be voluntary (simply in order that the voluntariness of goodness might be believed in); and again, all evil and suffering have an object which is salvation. The notion " guilt " was considered as some thing which had no connection at all with the ultimate cause of existence, and the notion " punishment " was held to be an educating and beneficent act, consequently an act proceeding from a good God. The absolute dominion of moral valuations over all others: nobody doubted that God could not be evil and could do no harm that is to say, perfection was understood merely as moral perfection.
291. How false is the supposition that an action must depend upon what has preceded it in consciousness! And morality has been measured in the light of this supposition, as also crimin ality...The value of an action must be judged by its results, say the utilitarians: to measure it according to its origin involves the impossibility of knowing that origin. But do we know its results? Five stages ahead, perhaps. Who can tell what an action provokes and sets in motion? As a stimulus? As the spark which fires a powder-magazine? Utilitarians are simpletons...And finally, they would first of all have to know what is useful; here also their sight can travel only over five stages or so...They have no notion of the great economy which cannot dispense with evil. We do not know the origin or the results: has an action, then, any value? We have yet the action itself to consider: the states of consciousness that accompany it, the yea or nay which follows upon its performance: does the value of an action lie in the subjective states which accompany it? (In that case, the value of music would be measured according to the pleasure or displeasure which it occasions in us...which it gives to the composer...) Obviously feelings of value must accompany it, a sensation of power, restraint, or impotence for instance, freedom or lightsomeness. Or, putting the question differently: could the value of an action be reduced to physio logical terms? could it be the expression of completely free or constrained life? Maybe its biological value is expressed in this way...241 If, then, an action can be judged neither in the light of its origin, nor its results, nor its accom- paniments in consciousness, then its value must be x unknown...
292. It amounts to a de naturalisation of morality to separate an action from a man; to direct hatred or contempt against " sin "; to believe that there are actions which are good or bad in themselves. The re-establishment of " Nature ": an action in itself is quite devoid of value; the whole question is this: who performed it? One and the same " crime " may, in one case, be the greatest privi lege, in the other infamy. As a matter of fact, it is the selfishness of the judges which interprets an action (in regard to its author) according as to whether it was useful or harmful to themselves (or in relation to its degree of likeness or unlikeness to them).
293. The concept " reprehensible action " presents us with some difficulties. Nothing in all that happens can be reprehensible in itself: one would not dare to eliminate it completely; for everything is so bound up with everything else, that to exclude one part would mean to exclude the whole. A reprehensible action, therefore, would mean a reprehensible world as a whole...And even then, in a reprehensible world even reprehending would be reprehensible...And the consequence of an attitude of mind that. Q 242 condemns everything, would be the affirmation of everything in practice...If Becoming is a huge ring, everything that forms a part of it is of equal value, is eternal and necessary. In all correlations of yea and nay, of preference and rejection, love and hate, all that is expressed is a certain point of view, peculiar to the interests of a certain type of living organism: everything that lives says yea by the very fact of its existence.
294. Criticism of the subjective feelings of value. Conscience. Formerly people argued: conscience condemns this action, therefore this action is reprehensible. But, as a matter of fact, conscience condemns an action because that action has been condemned for a long period of time: all conscience does is to imitate: it does not create values. That which first led to the condemnation of certain actions, was not conscience: but the knowledge of (or the prejudice against) its consequences...The approbation of conscience, the feeling of well- being, of " inner peace," is of the same order of emotions as the artist s joy over his work it proves nothing...Self-contentment proves no more in favour of that which gives rise to it, than its absence can prove anything against the value of the thing which fails to give rise to it. We are far too ignorant to be able to judge of the value of our actions: in this respect we lack the ability to regard things objectively. Even when we condemn an action, we do not do so as judges, but as adversaries...When noble sentiments accompany an action, they prove nothing in its favour: an artist may present us with an absolutely insignificant thing, though he be in the throes of the most exalted pathos during its production. It were wiser to regard these sentiments as misleading: they actually beguile our eye and our power, away from criticism, from caution and from suspicion, and the result often is that we makeiwj of our selves.,.
they actually make fools of us.
295. We are heirs to the conscience-vivisection and self-crucifixion of two thousand years: in these two practices lie perhaps our longest efforts at becoming perfect, our mastery, and certainly our subtlety; we have affiliated natural propensities with a heavy conscience. An attempt to produce an entirely opposite state of affairs would be possible: that is to say, to affiliate all desires of a beyond, all sympathy with things which are opposed to the senses, the intellect, and nature in fact, all the ideals that have existed hitherto (which were all anti-worldly), with a heavy conscience.
296. The great crimes in psychology: (i) That all pain and unhappiness should have been falsified by being associated with what is wrong (guilt). (Thus pain was robbed of its innocence.) (2) That all strong emotions (wantonness, voluptuousness, triumph, pride, audacity, knowledge, assurance, and happiness in itself) were branded as sinful, as seductive, and as suspicious. (3) That feelings of weakness, inner acts of cowardice, lack of personal courage, should have decked themselves in the most beautiful words, and have been taught as desirable in the highest degree. (4) That greatness in man should have been given the meaning of disinterestedness, self-sacrifice for another s good, for other people; that even in the scientist and the artist, the elimination of tJie individual personality is presented as the cause of the greatest knowledge and ability. (5) That love should have been twisted round to mean submission (and altruism), whereas it is in reality an act of appropriation or of bestowal, resulting in the last case from a superabundance in the wealth of a given personality. Only the wholest people can love; the disinterested ones, the " objective " ones, are the worst lovers (just ask the girls!). This principle also applies to the love of God or of the " home country ": a man must be able to rely absolutely upon himself. (Egotism may be regarded as the pre-eminence of the ego, altruism as the pre-eminence of others?) (6) Life regarded as a punishment (happiness as a means of seduction); the passions regarded as devilish; confidence in one s self as godless. The whole of psychology is a psychology of obstacles, a sort of barricade built out of fear; on the one hand we find the masses (the botched and bungled, the mediocre) defending themselves, by means of it, against the strong (and finally destroying them in their growth...); on the other hand, we find all the instincts with which these classes are best able to prosper, sanctified and alone held in honor by them. Let any one examine the Jewish priesthood.
297. The vestiges of the depreciation of Nature through moral transcendence: The value of disinterested ness, the cult of altruism; the belief in a reward in the play of natural consequences; the belief in " goodness " and in genius itself, as if the one, like the other, were the result of disinterestedness; the continuation of the Church s sanction of the life of the citizen; the absolutely deliberate misunder standing of history (as a means of educating up to morality) or pessimism in the attitude taken up towards history (the latter is just as much a result of the depreciation of Nature, as is that pseudo-justification of history, that refusal to see history as the pessimist sees it).
298. " Morality for its own sake " this is an im portant step in the denaturalisation of morals: in itself it appears as a final value. In this phase religion has generally become saturated with it: as, for instance, in the case of Judaism. It likewise goes through a phase in which it separates itself from religion, and in which no God is " moral " enough for it: it then prefers the impersonal ideal...This is how the case stands at present. "Art for Art s sake ": this is a similarly dangerous principle: by this means a false contrast is lent to things it culminates in the slander of reality ("idealising" into the hateful}. When an ideal is severed from reality, the latter is debased, im poverished, and calumniated. " Beauty for Beauty s sake" " Truth for Truths sake" " Goodness for Goodness sake " these are three forms of the evil eye for reality. Art, knowledge, and morality are means. instead of recognising a life-promoting tendency in them, they have been associated with the opposite of Life with " God," they have also been regarded as revelations of a higher world, which here and there transpires through them..." Beautiful" and "ugly? "true" and "false" "good" and "evil" these things are distinctions and antagonisms which betray the preservative and promotive measures of Life, not necessarily of man alone, but of all stable and enduring organisms which take up a definite stand against their opponents. The war which thus ensues is the essential factor: it is a means of separating things, leading to stronger isolation...
299. Moral naturalism: The tracing back of ap parently independent and supernatural values to their real " nature " that is to say, to natural immorality, to natural " utility," etc. Perhaps I may designate the tendency of these observations by the term moral naturalism: my object is to re-translate the moral values which have apparently become independent and un natural into their real nature that is to say, into their natural " immorality." N.B. Refer to Jewish " holiness " and its natural basis. The case is the same in regard to the moral law which has been made sovereign, emancipated from its real nature (until it is almost the opposite of Nature). The stages in the denaturalisation of morality (or so-called " Idealisation "): First it is a road to individual happiness, then it is the result of knowledge, then it is a Categorical Imperative, then it is a way to Salvation, then it is a denial of the will to live. (The gradual progress of the hostility of morality to Life.)
300. The suppressed and effaced Heresy in morality. Concepts: paganism, master-morality, virtu.
301. My problem: What harm has mankind suffered hitherto from morals, as also from its own morality? Intellectual harm, etc.
302. Why are not human values once more deposited nicely in the rut to which they alone have a right as routinary values? Many species of animals have already become extinct; supposing man were also to disappear, nothing would be lacking on earth. A man should be enough of a philo sopher to admire even this " nothing " (Nil admirarf).
303. Man, a small species of very excitable animals, which fortunately- has its time. Life in general on earth is a matter of a moment, an incident, an exception that has no consequence, something which is of no importance whatever to the general character of the earth; the earth itself is, like every star, a hiatus between two nonentities, an event without a plan, without reason, will, or self- consciousness the worst kind of necessity foolish necessity...Something in us rebels against this view; the serpent vanity whispers to our hearts, " All this must be false because it is revolting...Could not all this be appearance? And man in spite of all, to use Kant s words " 4. How VIRTUE is MADE TO DOMINATE.
304. Concerning the ideal of the moralist. In this treatise we wish to speak of the great politics of virtue. We wrote it for the use of all those who are interested, not so much in the process of becoming virtuous as in that of making others virtuous in how virtue is made to dominate. I even intend to prove that in order to desire this one thing the dominion of virtue the other must be systematically avoided; that is to say, one must renounce all hopes of becoming virtuous. This sacrifice is great: but such an end is perhaps a sufficient reward for such a sacrifice. And even greater sacrifices!...And some of the most famous moralists have risked as much. For these, indeed, had already recognized and anticipated the truth which is to be revealed for the first time in this treatise: that the dominion of virtue is absolutely attainable only by the use of the same means which are employed in the attainment of any other dominion, in any case not by means of virtue itself...As I have already said, this treatise deals with the politics of virtue: it postulates an ideal of these politics; it describes it as it ought to be, if anything at all can be perfect on this earth. Now, no philosopher can be in any doubt as to what the type of perfection is in politics; it is, of course, Machiavellianism. But Machiavellianism which is#r, sans melange, cru, vert, dans toute sa force, dans toute son dprete", is superhuman, divine, transcendental, and can never be achieved by man the most he can do is to approximate it. Even in this narrower kind of politics in the politics of virtue the ideal never seems to have been realized. Plato, too, only bordered upon it Granted that one have eyes for concealed things, one can discover, even in the most guileless and most conscious moralists (and this is indeed the name of these moral politicians and of the founders of all newer moral forces), traces showing that they too paid their tribute to human weak ness. They all aspired to virtue on their own account at least in their moments of weariness; and this is the leading and most capital error on the part of any moralist whose duty it is to be an immoralist in deeds. That he must not exactly appear to be the latter, is another matter. Or rather it is not another matter: systematic self- denial of this kind (or, expressed morally: dis simulation) belongs to, and is part and parcel of, the moralist s canon and of his self-imposed duties: without it he can never attain to his particular kind of perfection. Freedom from morality and from truth when enjoyed for that purpose which rewards every sacrifice: for the sake of making morality dominate that is the canon. Moralists are in need of the attitudes of virtue, as also of the attitudes of truth; their error begins when they yield to virtue, when they lose control of virtue, when they themselves become moral or true. A great moralist is, among other things, necessarily a great actor; his only danger is that his pose may unconsciously become a second nature, just like his ideal, which is to keep his esse and his operari apart in a divine way; everything he does must be done sub specie boni a lofty, remote, and exacting ideal! A divine ideal! And, as a matter of fact, they say that 2$ I the moralist thus imitates a model which is no less than God Himself: Gocl, the greatest Immoralist in deeds that exists, but who nevertheless under stands how to remain what He is, the good God...
305. The dominion of virtue is not established by means of virtue itself; with virtue itself, one re nounces power, one loses the Will to Power.
306. The victory of a moral ideal is achieved by the same " immoral " means as any other victory: violence, lies, slander, injustice.
307. He who knows the way fame originates will be suspicious even of the fame virtue enjoys.
308. Morality is just as " immoral " as any other thing on earth; morality is in itself a form of immorality. The great relief which this conviction brings. The contradiction between things disappears, the unity of all phenomena is saved 309. There are some who actually go in search of what is immoral. When they say: " this is 252 wrong," they believe it ought to be done away with or altered. On the other hand, I do not rest until I am quite clear concerning the im morality of any particular thing which happens to come under my notice. When I discover it, I recover my equanimity.
310. A. The ways which lead to power; the presenta tion of the new virtue under the name of an old one, the awakening of " interest " concerning it (" happiness " declared to be its reward, and vice versa}, artistic slandering of all that stands in its way, the exploitation of advantages and accidents with the view of glorifying it, the con version of its adherents into fanatics by means of sacrifices and separations, symbolism on a grand scale. B. Power attained: (i) Means of constraint of virtue; (2) seductive means of virtue; (3) the (court) etiquette of virtue.
311. By what means does a virtue attain to power? With precisely the same means as a political party: slander, suspicion, the undermining of opposing virtues that happen to be already in power, the changing of their names, systematic persecution and scorn; in short, by means of acts of general " immorality" How does a desire behave towards itself in order to become a virtue"} A process of re- christening; systematic denial of its intentions; practice in misunderstanding itself; alliance with established and recognized virtues; ostentatious enmity towards its adversaries. If possible, too, the protection of sacred powers must be purchased; people must also be intoxicated and fired with enthusiasm; idealistic humbug must be used, and a party must be won, which either triumphs or perishes one must be unconscious and naif.
312. Cruelty has become transformed and elevated into tragic pity, so that we no longer recognise it as such. The same has happened to the love of the sexes which has become amour-passion; the slavish attitude of mind appears as Christian obedience; wretchedness becomes humility; the disease of the nervus sympathicus for instance, is eulogised as Pessimism, Pascalism, or Carlylism, etc.
313. We should begin to entertain doubts concerning a man if we heard that he required reasons in order to remain respectable: we should, in any case, certainly avoid his society. The little word " for " in certain cases may be compromising; sometimes a single " for " is enough to refute one. If we should hear, in course of time, that such-and- such an aspirant for virtue was in need of bad reasons in order to remain respectable, it would not conduce to increasing our respect for him. But he goes further; he comes to us, and tells us quite openly: " You disturb my morality with your disbelief, Mr. Sceptic; so long as you cannot believe in my bad reasons that is to say, in my God, in a disciplinary Beyond, in free will, etc., you put obstacles in the way of my virtue...Moral, sceptics must be suppressed: they prevent the moralisation of the masses" 314. Our most sacred convictions, those which are permanent in us concerning the highest values, are judgments emanating from our muscles.
315. Morality in the valuation of races and classes. In view of the fact that.}Q passions and. funda mental instincts in every race and class express the means which enable the latter to preserve themselves (or at least the means which have enabled them to live for the longest period of time), to call them " virtuous " practically means: That they change their character, shed their skins, and blot out their past. It means that they should cease from differen tiating themselves from others. It means that they are getting to resemble each other in their needs and aspirations or, more exactly, that they are declining...It means that the will to one kind of morality 255 is merely the tyranny of the particular species, which is adapted to that kind of morality, over other species: it means a process of annihilation or general levelling in favour of the prevailing species (whether it be to render the non-prevailing species harmless, or to exploit them); the " Abolition of Slavery " a so-called tribute to " human dignity "; in truth, the annihilation of a fundamentally different species (the under mining of its values and its happiness). The qualities which constitute the strength of an opposing race or class are declared to be the most evil and pernicious things it has: for by means of them it may be harmful to us (its virtues are slandered and rechristened). When a man or a people harm us, their action constitutes an objection against them: but from their point of view we are desirable, because we are such as can be useful to them. The insistence upon spreading " humaneness " (which guilelessly starts out with the assumption that it is in possession of the formula " What is human ") is all humbug, beneath the cover of which a certain definite type of man strives to attain to power: or, more precisely, a very particular kind of instinct the gregarious instinct. " The equality of men ": this is what lies concealed behind the tendency of making ever more and more men alike as men. The " interested natre " of the morality of ordinary people. (The trick was to elevate the great passions for power and property to the positions of protectors of virtue.) 256 To what extent do all kinds of business men and money-grabbers all those who give and take credit find it necessary to promote the levelling of all characters and notions of value? the commerce and the exchange of the world leads to, and almost purchases, virtue. The State exercises the same influence, as does also any sort of ruling power at the head of officials and soldiers; science acts in the same way, in order that it may work in security and economise its forces. And the priesthood does the same.