mzfajtjxmtag-ious...This " virtue " made Whdllyabstract was the highest form of seduction; to make oneself abstract means to turn one s back on the world. The moment is a very remarkable one: -the. Sophists.are, withiiusight of the first rriticismof morality, the_first knowledge of morality: they classify the majority of moFal valuations (in view of their dependence upon local conditions) together; they lead one to understand_thatevery form of morality is capable" of belrTgupJheld dialectically?: that isrtcT say, they guessed that all the funefa- -men1sri~rjriTTc1pTeir ofa morality must Jx a propositiorr-whrch "wasafter wards proved in the grandest possible style by the ancient philoso phers from Plato onwards (up to Kant); they postulate the primary truth that there is no such thing as a " moral per se" a " good per se" and that it is madness to talk of " truth " in this respect. Wherever was intellectual uprightness to be found in those days? The Greek culture of the Sophists had grown out of all the Greek instincts; it "Belongs to the* culture of the age of Pericles as necessarily as* Plato does noFPit has its predecessorsin Hera- clftus7 Democritus, and irT iFe~scientific types of the old philosophy; it finds expression in the elevated culture of Thucydides, for instance. And FTTaTuliimately shown itseTTto~be right: every step m the science of psychology and morality has confirmed the_attitude of the Sophists...~T Our 49 modern attitude of mind is, to a great extent, HeracIItean, Democritean7~and Pro tagoreafTT.. to say that i_s_Protagorean is even sufficient: because Protagoras was in himself a synthesis of the two men Heraclitus and Democritus. (Plato: a great Cagliostro, let us think of how Epicurus judged him; how Timon, Pyrrho s friend, judged him Is Plato s integrity by any chance beyond question?...But we at least know what he wished to have taught as absolute truth namely, things which were to him not even relative truths: the separate and immortal life of " souls.")
429. The Sophists _are nothing more nor Jess than realists: they elevate all the values and practices which are common property to the rank of values they have the courage, peculiar to all strong intellects, which consists in knowing their im morality...Is it to be sjjposed_that__these__smallreek independent republics, so filled with rage and envy that. tjiey_woulcT faTn~TTave~o evbured each other, were led by principles_of humanity and honesty? Is Thucydides by any chance reproached with the words he puts into the mouths of the Athenian ambassadors when they were treating with the Melii anent the question of destruction or sub mission? Only the most perfect Tartuffes could have been able to speak of virtue in the midst of that dreadful strain or if not Tartuffes, at least detached philosophers, anchorites, exiles, and fleers 35O from reality...All of them, people who denied things in order to be able to exist. The Sophists were Greeks: when Socrates and Plato adopted.the-xaiise_Qf.virtue and justice, they "were Jews or I know not what. Grate s tactics in the defence of the Sophists are false: he would like to raise them to the rank of men of honor and moralisers but it was their honor not to indulge in any humbug with grand words and virtues.
430. The great reasonableness underlying all moral education lay in the fact that it always attempted to attain to the certainty of an instinct: so that neither good intentions nor good means, as such, first required to enter consciousness. Just as the soldier learns his exercises, so should man learn how to act in life. In truth this unconsciousness belongs to every kind of perfection: even the mathematician carries out his calculations un consciously...What, then, does Socrates reaction mean, which recommended dialectics as the way to virtue, and which was charmed when morality was unaBleT to justify itself logically? But_thjs_is precisely what proves its superiority without unconsciousness it is worth nothing _In_ reaHty_jt means the dissolution of Greek instincts, when demonstrability is posited as Ue first "condition of personal excellence in virtue. All these great " men of virtue " and of words are themselves types of dissolution. 51 In practice, it means that moral judgments have been torn from the conditions among which they grew and in which alone they had some sense, from their Greek and Graeco-political soil, in order to _ be denaturalised under the cover of being made sublime. The great concepts " good " and " just " are divorced from the first principles of which they form a part, and, as " ideas " become free, degenerate into subjects for discussion. A certain truth is sought behind them; they are regarded as entities or as symbols of entities: a world is invented where they are " at home," and from which they are supposed to hail. In short: the scandal reaches its ajpotheosis in Plato...And then it was necessary to invent the perfectly abstract man also: good, just, wise? anoTa dialectician to boot -in short, the scarecrow of Trief ancient philosopher: aplant without any soil whatsoever; a human race devoid of all definite ruling instincts; a virtue which "justifies" itself with reasons. The perlectly absurd " in- dividual "~per seTthe highest form of Artifici ality...Briefly, the denaturalisation of moral values resulted in the creation of a degenerate type of man " the good man," " the happy man," " the wise man." Socrates represents a moment of the most profound perversity in the history of values.
431. Socrates. This veering round of Greek taste in favour of dialectics is a great question. What really happened then? Socrates, the roturier who was responsible for it, was thus able to triumph over a more noble taste, the taste of tJie noble:-the mob gets the upper hand along with dialectics. Previous to Socrates dialectic manners were repudiated_in good society; they were re garded as indecent; the youths were warned against them. W T hat was the purpose of this display of reasons? Why demonstrate? Against others one could use authority. One commanded, and that sufficed. Among friends, inter pares, there was tradition also a form of authority: and last but not least, one understood each other. There was no room found for dialectics. Besides, all such modes of presenting reasons were dis trusted. All honest things do not carry their reasons in their hands in such fashion. It is indecent to show all the five fingers at the same time. That which can be " demonstrated " is little worth. The instinct of every party-speaker tells him that dialectics excites mistrust and carries little conviction. Nothing is more easily wiped away than the effect of a dialectician. It can only be a last defence. One must be in an extremity; it is necessary to have to extort one s rights; otherwise one makes no use of dialectics. That is why the Jews were dialecticians, Reynard the Fox was a dialectician, and so was Socrates. As a dialectician a person has a merciless instru ment in his fianil: he can play the tyrant with it; he compromises when He conquers. The fljalgptician leaves if to hiV~ pjntwvj- fr demon strate that hfi_ iajiojLan Jdio4he is made furious 53 and helpless, while the dialectician himself remains calm and still possessed of his triumphant reason ing powers he paralyses hisopponent s jntellect. The dialectician s irony is a form of mob- revenge: the ferocity of the oppressed lies in the cold knife-cuts of the syllogism...In Plato, as in all men of excessive sensuality and wild fancies, the charm of concepts was so great, that he involuntarily honored and deified the concept as a form of ideal. Dialectical intoxi cation: as th consciousness of being able to exercise_cpntrol over one s self by means of it as an instrument of the Will to Power.
432. The problem of Socrates. The two antitheses: ancT &~Socratic spirits measured atcording~to the law ot Lite. T6~ wTiat extent is the Socratic spirit a decadent phenomenon? to what extent are" "robust health" and power still revealed by the whole attitude of the scientific man, his dialectics, his ability, and his severity? (the health of the plebeian; whose malice, esprit frondeur, whose astuteness, whose rascally depths, are held in check by his cleverness; the whole type is " ugly "). Uglification; self-derision, dialectical dryness, intelligence in the form of a tyrant against the " tyrant " (instinct). Everything in Socrates is exaggeration, eccentricity, caricature; he is a buffoon with the blood of Voltaire in his veins.. Z 354 He discovers a new form of agon; he is the first fencing-master in the superior classed of Athens; he stands for nothing else than the higJiest form oj cleverness: he calls it " virtue " (he regarded it as a means of salvation; he did not choose to be clever, cleverness was de rigueur); the proper thing is to control one s self in suchwise that one enters into a struggle not with passions but with reasons as one s weapons (Spinoza s stratagem the unravelment of the errors of passion); it is desirable to discover how every one may be caught once he is goaded into a passion, and to know how illogically passion proceeds; self-mockery is practiced in order to injure the very roots of the feelings of resentment. It is my wish to understand which idiosyncratic states form a part of the Socratic problem: its association of reason, virtue, and happiness. With this absurd doctrine of the identity of these things it succeeded in charming the world: ancient philo sophy could not rid itself of this doctrine...Absolute lack of objective interestj__hatrgd of science: the idiosyncrasy of considering one s self a problem. AcousticnTaWcIna.tions in Socrates: morbid element. When the intellect is ricrrtfnd independent, it most strongly resists preoccupying itself with morality. How is it that Socrates is.a moral-maniac? Every " practical" philosophy immediately steps into the foreground in times of distress. When morality and religion become the chief interests of a com munityneVlire~ signs of a +-9. a* state of distress.
433. InteXljgHr-lcarncos, hardness, aad._lQgic__ag weapons against the wildness of the instincts. The latter must be dangerous and must threaten ruin, Otherwise no purpose can be served by developing intelligence to this degree of tyranny. In order to mate li tyran7~oT~ intelligence ~ffle instincts must first have proved themselves tyrants. This is the problem. It was a very timely one in those days. Reason became virtue virtue equalled,, happiness. Solution; Greek philosophers stand upon the same fundamental fact of their inner experiences as Socrates does; five feet from excess, from anarchy and from dissolution all decadent men. TKey regard him as a doctor: Logic as will to power, as will to control self, as will to TiappinessT The" wlldhess ancFanarchy of Socrates instincts is a sign of decadencies is also the superfcetation of logic and clear reasoning in him. Both are abnormities, each belongs to the other. Criticism. Decadence reveals itself in this con cern about " happiness " (i.e. about the " salvation of the soul "; i.e. to feel that one s condition is a danger}. Tts_ fanatical interest -- JQ ihappines shows the pathological conditicm of the subcon scious self: it was a vital interest. The alternative "which faced them all was: to be reasonable or to perish. The morality of Greek philosophers shows that they felt they were in danger.
434. Why everything resolved itself into mummery. Rudimentary psychology, which only considered the conscious lapses of men (as causes), which re garded " consciousness " as an attribute of the soul, and which sought a will behind every action (i.e. an intention), could only answer " Happiness " to the question: " What does man desire? " (it was impossible to answer " Power," because that would have been immoral}; consequently behind all men s actions there is the intention of attaining to happiness by means of them. Secondly: if man as a matter of fact does not attain to happi ness, why is it? Because he mistakes the means thereto. What is the unfailing means of acquiring happiness f Answer: virtue. Why virtue? Be cause virtue is supreme rationalness, and rational- ness makes mistakes in the choice of means impossible: virtue in the form of reason is the way to happiness. Dialectics is the constant occupation of virtue, because it does away with passion and intellectual cloudiness. As a matter of fact, man does not desire " happiness." Pleasure is a sensation of power: if the passions are excluded, those states of the mind are also excluded which afford the greatest sensation of power and therefore of pleasure. The highest rationalism is a state of cool clearness, which is very far from being able to bring about that feeling of power which every kind of exalta tion involves...combat everything 57 that intoxicates and exalts everything that im pairs the perfect coolness and impartiality of the mind...They were consistent with their first false principle: that consciousness was the highest, the supreme state of mind, the prerequisite of perfection whereas the reverse is true...Any kind of action is imperfect in proportion as it has been willed or conscious. The philosophers of antiquity were the greatest duffers in practice, because they condemned themselves theoreticaj]y_ to dufferdom...7"Th practice everything resolved itself into theatricalness: and he who saw through it, as Pyrrho did, for instance, thought as every body did that is to say, that in goodness and uprightness " paltry people " were far superior to philosophers. All the deeper natures of antiquity were dis- gusted at the philosophers of vW#?7~alFpeople saw m them was brawlers and actors. (This was the judgment passed on Plato by Epicurus and Pyrrho} Result; In practical life, in patience, goodness, and mutual assistance, paltry people were above them: this is something like the judgment Dostoiewsky or Tolstoy claims for his muzhiks: they are more philosophical in practice, they are more courageous in their way of dealing with the exigencies of life...
435. A criticism of the philosopher. Philosophers and moralists merely deceive themselves when they imagine that they escape from decadence by opposing it. _ That lies beyond their wills: afj d however lyttle they may be aware of the lact. it is generally discovered subsequently_Jhat they were among the most powerful promoters of decadence. ~~IIeFus examine the philosophers of Greece Plato, for instance. He it was who separated the ingtjjrf s fmm te polis, Jrom the love of contest, from military efficiency, from art, beauty, the mysteries, and the___bgli_ef in tradition and in ancestors...He was the seducer ortEeTnbbies: he himself seduces through the roturier Socrates...He denied all the first principles of the " noble Greek " of sterling worth; he made dialectics an everyday practice, conspired with the tyrants, dabbled In politics for~the future, and was jthe e_xa nipple of a man whose instincts were m QSt_ perfec: tly separated from tradition. He is profound and passionate in everything that is One after the other, these great philosophers represent the typical forms of decadence: the moral and religious idiosyncrasy, anarchy, nihilism, (a&idfopa), cynicism, hardening principles, hedon ism, and reaction. The question of " happiness," of " virtue," and of the " salvation of the soul," is the expression of physiological contradictoriness in these declining natures: their instincts lack all balance and purpose.
436. To what extent do dialectics and the faith in reason rest upon moral prejudices? With Plato we are as the temporary inhabitants of an in telligible world of goodness, still in possession of a bequest from former times: divine dialectics taking its root in goodness leads to everything good (it follows, therefore, that it must lead " backwards "). Even Descartes had a notion of the fact that, according to a thoroughly Christian and moral attitude of mind, which includes a belief in a good God as the Creator of all things, the truthfulness of God guarantees the judgments of our senses for us. But for this religious sanction and warrant of our senses and our reason, whence should we obtain our right to trust in existence? That thinking must be a measure of reality, that what cannot be the subject of thought, cannot exist, is a coarse non plus ultra of a moral blind confidence (ih the essential principle of truth at the root of all things); this in itself is a mad assumption which our experience contradicts every minute. We cannot think of anything precisely as it is...
437. The real philosophers of Greece are those which came before Socrates (with Socrates something changes). They are all distinguished men, they take their stand away from the people and from usage; they have travelled; they are earnest to the point of sombreness, their eyes are calm, and they are not unacquainted with the business of state and diplomacy. They anticipated all the great concepts which coming sages were to have concerning things in general: they themselves re presented these concepts, they made systems out of themselves. Nothing can g?vi_a higher idea of Greek intellect than tins sudden fruitfulness in typesthan_this involunTary completeness in trie!rawing up of all the~~great possibilities of- the philosophical ideal. I can see_only one original" figure in those that came afterwards: a late arrival but_ jiecessarily the last Pyrrho the" nihilist. His instincts were opposed to the in-" 1 fluences which had become ascendant in the mean time: the Socratic school, Plato, and the artistic optimism of Heraclitus (Pyrrho goes back Q Democritus via Protagoras...) Wise weariness: Pyrrho. To live humbly among the humble. Devoid of pride. To live in the vulgar way; to honor and believe what every one believes. To be on one s guard against science and intellect, and against everything that puffs one out...To be simply patient in the extreme, careless and mild; aTrddeia, or, better still, Trpavrrjs. A Buddhist for Greece, bred amid the tumult of the Schools; born after his time"; Aweary; an example ol the protesT against the eagerness of dialectician s the credulity of the tired man m regard to the hn- 61 portance of everything. He had seen Alexander; fie~TTad seen the Indian penitents. To such late- arrfvals aricTcreatures of great subtlety, everything lowly, poor, and idiotic, is seductive. It narcoti- cises: it gives them relaxation (Pascal). On the other hand, they mix with the crowd, and get con founded with the rest. These weary creatures need warmth...To overcome contradiction; to do away with contests; to haye__nowill to excel in any way; fro He.py the Greek instincts? (Pyrrho lived with his sister, who was a midwife.) To rig out wisdom in _such a way that it no longer dis~ tinguishesj to give it the ragged mantle of poverty; "to perform the lowest offices, and to go to market ancl sell sucking-pigs...Sweetness, clearness, IfTdTfference; no need of virtues that require atti tudes; to be equal to all even in virtue: final conquest of one s self, final indifference. _ Pyrrho and Epicurusj - twc_forrns of Greek decadence, they are_relatcd in their hatred of dialectics and all theatrical virtues. These two things together were then Called pKilosopEjTT ~~Pyrrho and Epicurus intentionally held that which they loved in low esteem; they chose common and even contemptible names for it, and they re presented a state in which one is neither ill, healthy, lively, nor dead...Epicurus was more naif, more idyllic, more grateful; Pyrrho had more experience of the world, had travelled more, and was more nihilistic. His life was a protest against_ thejyreat doctrine of Identity = Knowledge). _ The proper way ot living is not promoted by science: wisdom does not make "wise."...The proper way ofliving does not desire happiness, it turns away from happiness...
438. The war against the " old faith," as Epicures waged it, was, strictly speaking, a struggle against pre-existing Christianity theTtruggle against a world then already gloomy, moralised, acidified throughout with feelings of guilt, and grown old and sick. Not the " moral corruption " of antiquity, but precisely its moral infectedness was the prerequisite which enabtett~CfTristiamty to" become its master. Moral fanaticism (in short: Plato) destroyed pliganism by trnnsvaluing its values and jpoispning its innocence. We~~6ught at lastto understand {Eat what was then destroyed was higher than what prevailed! Christianity grew on the soil of psychological corruption, and could only take root in rotten ground.
439. Science; as a disciplinary tnj.asure_qr as an instinct. I see a decline of the _in$_titt.cts jrjL_Greek philosophers,;, otherwise they could not have been guilty of the profound error of regarding the conscious state as the more valuable state. The intensity of consciousness stands in the inverse ratio to the ease and speed of cerebral transmis sion. Greek philosophy upheld the opposite view, which is always the sign of weakened instincts. We must, in sooth, seek perfect life there where it is least conscious (that is to say, there where it is least aware of its logic, its reasons, its means, its intentions, and its utility]. The return to the facts of common sense, the facts of the common man and of " paltry people." Honesty and intelli-_ jrence_ stored up forjenerations by people who are quite unconscjousof their principles, and who even have some fear_pf principles It is not reasonable to desire a reasoning virtue...A philosopher is compromised by such a desire.
440. When morality that is to say, refinement, prudence, bravery, and equity have been stored up in the same way, thanks to the moral efforts of a whole succession of generations, the collec tive power of this hoard of virtue projects its rays even into that sphere where honesty is most seldom present the sphere of intellect. When a thing becomes conscious, it is the sign of a state of ill-ease in the organism; something new has got to be found, the organism is not satisfied or adapted, it is subject to distress, suspense, and it is hypersensitive precisely all this is consciousness...Geniua__lies_Jn the instincts goodness does too. One only acts perfectly_when one acts in stinctively. Even from the moral point of view air fRInkTng which is conscious is merely a process of groping, and in the majority of cases an attack on morality. Scientific honesty is always sacrificed when a thinker begins to reason: let any one try the experiment: put the wisest man in the balance, and then let him discourse upon morality...It could also be proved that the whole of a man s conscious thinking shows a much lower standard of morality than the thoughts of the same man would show if they were led by his instincts.
441. The struggle against Socrates, Plato, and all the Socratic schools, proceeds from the proTojancT instrnct"tfactt~man is noTTna de ggj? when he is shown that virtue may be demonstrated or based upon reason...This in the encf!s the nig gardly fact, it was the agonal instinct in all these born dialecticians, which drove them to glorify their personal abilities as the highest of all qualities and to represent every other form of goodness as conditioned by them. Q_anti-scientific spirit _xf all this "philosophy it will neytr admit that it-is not right.
442. This is extraordinary. JFrom its very earliest beginnings, Greek philosophy carries on a struggle* against-science with" the weapons of a "tfieory oT. knowledge,jespeciaTIy of scepticism: and why is this? It is always in favour of morality...f Vhysiqgts apfl tnerliraj rnerfare hatedj Socrates. Aristippus, the Megarian school, the Cynics, Epicurus, and.Pyrrho-a generalonslaughtjirjti 65 knowledge in favour of morality...(Hatred of d]alectics_aliQi There is still a problerntobe solved: they approacrisopriistry in order to -be ricTof science. On the other hand, the physicists are subjected to such an extent that, among their first principles, they include the theory of truth and of real being: for instance, the atom, the four elements {juxtaposition of being, in order to explain its multiformity and its transformations). Contempt of objectivity in interests is taught: return to practical interest, and to the personal utility of all knowledge...The struggle against science is directed at: (i) its pathos (objectivity); (2) its means (that is to say, at its utility); (3) its results (which are considered childish). It is the same struggle which is taken up later on by the Church in the name of piety: the Church inherited the whole arsenal of antiquity for her war with science. The theory of knowledge played the same part in the affair as it did in Kant s or the Indians case. There is no desire whatever to be troubled with it, a free hand is wanted for the " purpose " that is envisaged. Against what powers are they actually defend ing themselves? Against dutifulness, against obedience to law, against the compulsion of going hand in hand I believe this is what is called Freedom...This is how decadence manifests itself: the instinct of solidarity is so degenerate that solidarity itself gets to be regarded as tyranny: no authority or solidarity is brooked, nobody any longer 366 desires to fall in with the rank and file, and to adopt its ignobly slow pace. The slow move ment which is the tempo of science is generally hated, as are also the scientific man s indifference in regard to getting on, his long breath, and his impersonal attitude.
443. At bottom, morality is hostileto science: Socrates was so already too and trie reason *ts", that science "CofiEiders" "certain" things important which have no jrelation whatsoever to " good " and " evil," and which therefore reduce the gravity 1SI our feelings concerning "good" and "~evif5" What morality requires is that the whole" of a man should serve it with all his power: it considers it waste on the part of a creature that can ill afford waste, when a man earnestly troubles his head about stars or plants. That is why science very quickly declined in Greece, once Socrates had inoculated scientificjvork with the disease of morality. The mental - attitudes reached by a Democritus, a Hippocrates, and a Thucydides, have "ribT ~15een reacHe"3 a second Jtime.
444. The problem of the philosopher and of the scientific man. The influence of age; depressing Tfabits (sedentary study a la Kant; over-work; inadequate nourishment of the brain; reading). A more essential question still: is it not already perhaps a symptom of decadence when thinking tends to establish generalities? 67 Objectivity regarded as the disintegration of the will (to be able to remain as detached as possible...). This presupposes a tremendous adiaphora in regard to the strong passions: a kind of isolation, an exceptional position, opposi tion to the normal passions. Type: desertion of home -country; emigrants go ever greater distances afield; growing exoticism; the voice of the old imperative dies away; and the continual question " whither? " (" happiness ") is a sign of emancipation from forms of organisa tion, a sign of breaking loose from everything. Problem: is the man of science more of a decadeni symptom IHanthe _p_hilosopher? as a whole the scientific man is-noi -xut loose_Jrprn everything, only a part of his being is consecrated exclusively__tp_ the service of Jcnowledge and disciplined to maintain a special attitude and pbihT of view; in his departmentJTiejisr in need of all the virtues of a strong race, of robust health, ol great seventy, maHliness, and gence; He-is Fahcr-~asymptonT~oTThe great multiformity~bf culture thar of~the effetenessbf decadent __ scholar is a Inia scholar. Whereas the decadent philosopher has alway_s_ J3eeji_rje_ckoned_ hitherto_ as the typical ~ philosopher.
445. Among philosophers, nothing is more rare than intellectual uprightness: they perhaps say the very reverse, and even believe it. But the prerequisite of all their work is, that they can only admit of 368 certain truths; they know what they have to prove; and the fact that they must be agreed as to these " truths " is almost what makes them recog nise one another as philosophers. There are, for instance, the truths of morality. But belief in morality is not a proof of morality: there are cases and the philosopher s case is one in point when a belief of this sort is simply a piece of immorality.
446. What is the retrograde factor in a philosopher? He teaches that the qualities which he happens to possess are the only qualities that exist, that they are indispensable to those who wish to attain to the " highest good " (for instance, dialectics with Plato). He would have all men raise themselves, gradating to his type as the highest. He de spises what is generally esteemed by him a gulf is cleft between the highest priestly values and the values of the world. He knows what is true, who God is, what every one s goal should be, and the way thereto...The typical philosopher is. thus an absolute dogmatist; if he requires scepti cism at all it is only in order to be able to speak dogmatically of his principal purpose.
447. When the philosopher is confronted with his rival science, for instance, he becomes a sceptic; then he appropriates a form of knowledge which he denies to the man of science; he goes hand in 69 hand with the priest so that he may not be sus pected of atheism or materialism; he considers an attack made upon himself as an attack upon morals, religion, virtue, and order he knows how to bring his opponents into ill repute by calling them " seducers " and " underminers ": then he marches shoulder to shoulder with power. The philosopher at war with other philosophers: he does his best to compel them to appear like anarchists, disbelievers, opponents of authority. In short, when he rights, he fights exactly like a priest and like the priesthood.
3. THE TRUTHS AND ERRORS OF PHILOSOPHERS.
448. Philosophy defined by Kant: " The science of the limitations of reason "!!
449. Accord ing_to Aristotle, Philosophy is the art of discovering truth? Un the other hanctpthe Kplcnrean.s, who availed themselves_ofAristotle s~ sensual theory of knowledge, retorted in ironical opposition Jto jhe searcjh for truth; " Philosophy Is the arfof Life" 450. The three great naivete s: Knowledge as a means of happiness (as if. 2 A 0; 370 Knowledge as a means to virtue (as if...); Knowledge as a means to the " denial of Life " inasmuch as it leads to disappointment (as if...)
451. As if there were a " truth " which one could by some means approach!
452. Error and ignorance are fatal. The assump tion that truth has been found and that ignorance and error are at an end, constitutes one of the most seductive thoughts in the world. Granted that it be generally accepted, it paralyses the will to test, to investigate, to be cautious, and to gather experience: it may even be regarded as criminal that is to say, as a doubt concerning truth..." Truth " is therefore more fatal than error and ignorance, because it paralyses the forces which lead to enlightenment and knowledge. The passion for idleness now stands up for " truth " (" Thought is pain and misery! "), as also do order, rule, the joy of possession, the pride of wisdom in fact, vanity: it is easier to obey than to examine; it is more gratifying to think " I possess the truth," than to see only darkness in all direc tions;...but, above all, it is reassuring, it lends confidence, and alleviates life it " improves " the character inasmuch as it reduces mistrust. " Spirit ual peace," "a quiet conscience" these things 71 are inventions which are only possible provided " Truth be found" " By their fruits ye shall know them."..." Truth " is the truth because it makes men better...The process goes on: all goodness and all success is placed to the credit of " truth." This is the proof by success: the happiness, contentment, and the welfare of a community or of an individual, are now understood to be the result of the belief in morality...Conversely. failure is ascribed to a lack of faith.