618. OF all the interpretations of the world attempted heretofore, the mechanical one seems today to stand most prominently in the front. Apparently it has a clean conscience on its side; for no science believes inwardly in progress and success unless it be with the help of mechanical procedures. Every one knows these procedures: " reason " and " purpose " are allowed to remain out of considera tion as far as possible; it is shown that, provided a sufficient amount of time be allowed to elapse, everything can evolve out of everything else, and no one attempts to suppress his malicious satisfac tion, when the " apparent design in the fate " of a plant or of theyolk of an egg, may be traced to stress and thrust in short, people are heartily glad to pay respect to this principle of profoundest stupidity, if I may be allowed to pass a playful remark concerning these serious matters. Meanwhile, among the most select intellects to be found in this move- 109 IIO ment, some presentiment of evil, some anxiety is noticeable, as if the theory had a rent in it, which sooner or later might be its last: I mean the sort of rent which denotes the end of all balloons inflated with such theories. Stress and thrust themselves cannot be " ex plained," one cannot get rid of the actio in distans. The belief even in the ability to explain is now lost, and people peevishly admit that one can only describe, not explain that the dynamic interpreta tion of the world, with its denial of " empty space " and its little agglomerations of atoms, will soon get the better of physicists: although in this way Dynamis is certainly granted an inner quality.
619. The triumphant concept "energy" with which our physicists created God and the world, needs yet to be completed: it must be given an inner will which I characterise as the " Will to Power" that is to say, as an insatiable desire to manifest power; or the application and exercise of power as a creative instinct, etc. Physicists cannot get rid of the " actio in distans " in their principles; any more than they can a repelling force (or an attracting one). There is no help for it, all movements, all " appearances," all " laws " must be understood as symptoms of an inner phenomenon, and the analogy of man must be used for this purpose. It is possible to trace all the instincts of an animal to the will to power; as also all the functions of organic life to this one source.
620. Has anybody ever been able to testify to a force? No, but to effects, translated into a com pletely strange language. Regularity in sequence has so spoilt us, that we no longer wonder at the wonderful process.
621. A force of which we cannot form any idea, is an empty word, and ought to have no civic rights in the city of science: and the same applies to the purely mechanical powers of attracting and repel ling by means of which we can form an image of the world no more!
622. Squeezes and kicks are something incalculably recent, evolved and not primeval. They pre suppose something which holds together and can press and strike! But how could it hold together?
623. There is nothing unalterable in chemistry: this is only appearance, a mere school prejudice. We it was who introduced the unalterable, taking it from metaphysics as usual, Mr. Chemist. It is a mere superficial judgment to declare that the diamond, graphite, and carbon are identical. Why? Simply because no loss of substance can be traced in the scales! Well then, at least they have something in common; but the work of the molecules in the process of changing from one form to the other, an action we can neither see nor weigh, is just exactly what makes one material something different with specifically different qualities.
624. Against the physical atom. In order to under stand the world, we must be able to reckon it up; in order to be able to reckon it up, we must be aware of constant causes; but since we find no such constant causes in reality, we invent them for ourselves and call them atoms. This is the origin of the atomic theory. The possibility of calculating the world, the possibility of expressing all phenomena by means of formulas is that really " understanding "? What would be understood of a piece of music, if all that were calculable in it and capable of being expressed in formulae, were reckoned up? Thus " constant causes," things, substanr.es, something "unconditioned," were therefore invented; what has been attained thereby?
625. The mechanical concept of " movement " is already a translation of the original process into the language of symbols of the eye and the touch. The concept atom the distinction between the " seat of a motive force and the force itself," is a language of symbols derived from our logical and cpsyhical world. It does not lie within our power to alter our 113 means of expression: it is possible to understand to what extend they are but symptomatic. To demand an adequate means of expression is non sense: it lies at the heart of a language, of a medium of communication, to express relation only...The concept " truth " is opposed to good sense. The whole province of " truth falseness " only applies to the relations between beings, not to an " abso lute." There is no such thing as a " being in itself " (relations in the first place constitute being), any more than there can be " knowledge in itself."
626. "The feeling of force cannot proceed from movement: feeling in general cannot proceed from movement." "Even in support of this, an apparent experience is the only evidence: in a substance (brain) feeling is generated through transmitted motion (stimuli). But generated? Would this show that the feeling did not yet exist there at all"? So that its appearance would have to be regarded as the creative act of the intermediary--motion? The eelingless condition of this substance is only an hypotesis! Not an experience! Feeling, therefore is the quality of the substance: there actually are substances that feel." "Do we learn from certain substances that they have no feeling? No, all we learn is, that they haven't any. It is impossible to seek the origin of feeling in non-sensitive substance." Oh what hastiness!
627. "To attract" and "to repel," in a purely mechanical sense, is pure fiction: a word. We cannot imagine an attraction without a purpose. Either the will to possess one s self of a thing, or the } will to defend one s self from a thing or to repel it that we ""understand ": that would be an interpreta tion which we could use. In short, the psychological necessity of believ ing in causality lies in the impossibility of imagining a process without a purpose: but of course this says nothing concerning truth or untruth (the justifica tion of such a belief)! The belief in causes col lapses with the belief in TeXrj (against Spinoza and his causationism).
628. It is an illusion to suppose that something is known, when all we have is a mathematical formula of what has happened: it is only characterised, described, no more!
629. If I bring a regularly recurring phenomenon into a formula, I have facilitated and shortened my task of characterising the whole phenomenon, etc. But I have not thereby ascertained a " law," I have only replied to the question: How is it that some thing recurs here? It is a supposition that the formula corresponds to a complex of really unknown forces and the discharge of forces: it is 1 15 pure mythology to suppose that forces here obey a law, so that, as the result of their obedience, we have the same phenomenon every time.
630. I take good care not to speak of chemical "laws": to do so savors of morality. It is much more a question of establishing certain relations of power: the stronger becomes master of the weaker, in so far as the latter cannot maintain its degree of independence, here there is no pity, no quarter, and, still less, any observance of " law."
631. The unalterable sequence of certain phenomena does not prove any " law," but a relation of power between two or more forces. To say, " But it is precisely this relation that remains the same! " is no better than saying, " One and the same force cannot be another force." It is not a matter of sequence but a matter of interdependence, a process in which the procession of moments do not determine each other after the manner of cause and effect...The separation of the " action " from the "agent "; of the phenomenon from the worker of that phenomenon; of the process from one that is not process, but lasting, substance thing, body, soul, etc.; the I attempt to understand a life as a sort of shifting of things and a changing of places; of a sort of " being " or stable entity: this ancient mythology established the belief in " cause and effect," once it had found a lasting form in the functions of speech and grammar.
632. The " regularity " of a sequence is only a metaphorical expression, not a fact, just as if & rule were followed here! And the same holds good of " conformity to law." We find a formula in order to express an ever-recurring kind of succession of phenomena: but that does not show that we have discovered a law; much less a force which is the cause of a recurrence of effects. The fact that something always happens thus or thus, is inter preted here as if a creature always acted thus or thus as the result of obedience to a law or to a law giver: whereas apart from the " law " it would be free to act differently. But precisely that in ability to act otherwise might originate in the creature itself, it might be that it did not act thus or thus in response to a law, but simply because it was so constituted. It would mean simply: that something cannot also be something else; that it cannot be first this, and then something quite different; that it is neither free nor the reverse, but merely thus or thus. The fault lies in thinking a subject into things.
633. To speak of two consecutive states, the first as "cause," and the second as "effect," is false. The first state cannot bring about anything, the second has nothing effected in it. 117 It is a question of a struggle between two elements unequal in power: a new adjustment is arrived at, according to the measure of power each possesses. The second state is something funda mentally different from the first (it is not its effect): the essential thing Is, that the factors which engage in the struggle leave it with different quanta of power.
634. A criticism of Materialism. Let us dismiss the two popular concepts, " Necessity " and " Law," from this idea: the first introduces a false con straint, the second a false liberty into the world. " Things " do not act regularly, they follow no rule: there are no things (that is our fiction); neither do they act in accordance with any necessity. There is no obedience here: for, the fact that something is as it is, strong or weak, is not the result of obedience or of a rule or of a constraint...The degree of resistance and the degree of superior power this is the question around which all phenomena turn: if we, for our own purposes and calculations, know how to express this in formulae and " laws," all the better for us! But that does not mean that we have introduced any " morality " into the world, just because we have fancied it as obedient. There are no laws: every power draws its last consequence at every moment. Things are calcul able precisely owing to the fact that there is no possibility of their being otherwise than they are. A quantum of power is characterised by the Il8 effect it produces and the influence it resists. The adiaphoric state which would be thinkable in itself, is entirely lacking. It is essentially a will to vio lence and a will to defend one s self against violence. It is not self-preservation: every atom exercises its influence over the whole of existence it is thought out of existence if one thinks this radia tion of will-power away. That is why I call it a quantum of " Will to Power "; with this formula one can express the character which cannot be ab stracted in thought from mechanical order, without suppressing the latter itself in thought. The translation of the world of effect into a visible world a world for the eye is the concept " movement." Here it is always understood that something- has been moved, whether it be the fiction of an atomic globule or even of the abstrac tion of the latter, the dynamic atom, something is always imagined that has an effect that is to say, we have not yet rid ourselves of the habit into which our senses and speech inveigled us. Subject and object, an agent to the action, the action and that which does it separated: we must not forget that all this signifies no more than semeiotics and nothing real. Mechanics as a teaching of movement is already a translation of phenomena into man s language of the senses.
635. We are in need of " unities " in order to be able to reckon: but this is no reason for supposing that " unities " actually exist. We borrowed the lip concept " unity" from our concept " ego," our very oldest article of faith. If we did not believe our selves to be unities. we should never have formed the concept " thing." Now that is to say, some what late in the day, we are overwhelmingly convinced that our conception of the concept " ego " is no security whatever for a real entity. In order to maintain the mechanical interpretation of the world theoretically, we must always make the reserve that it is with fictions that we do so: the concept of movement (derived from the language of our senses) and the concept of the atom ( = entity, derived from our psychical experience) are based S upon a sense-prejudice and z. psychological prejudice. V Mechanics formulates consecutive phenomena, and it does so semeiologically, in the terms of the senses and of the mind (that all influence is move ment; that where there is movement something is at work moving): it does not touch the question of the causal force. The mechanical world is imagined as the eye and the sense of touch alone could imagine a world (as " moved "), in such a way as to be calculable, as to simulate causal entities " things " (atoms) whose effect is constant (the transfer of the false concept of subject to the concept atom). The mixing together of the concept of numbers, of the concept of thing (the idea of subject), of the concept of activity (the separation of that which is the cause, and the effect), of the concept of movement: all these things are phenomenal; our eye and our psychology are still in it all. If we eliminate these adjuncts, nothing remains 120, over but dynamic quanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta: the essence of which resides in their relation to all other quanta, in their | " influence " upon the latter. The will to power, not Being, not Becoming, but a pathos is the I elementary fact, from these first results a Becoming, [ an influencing...
636. The physicists believe in a " true world " after their own kind; a fixed systematizing of atoms to perform necessary movements, and holding good equally of all creatures, so that, according to them, the " world of appearance " reduces itself to the side of general and generally-needed Being, which is accessible to every one according to his kind (accessible and also adjusted, made " sub jective "). But here they are in error. The atom which they postulate is arrived at by the logic of that perspective of consciousness; it is in itself therefore a subjective fiction. This picture of the world which they project is in no way essentially different from the subjective picture: the only difference is, that it is composed simply with more extended senses, but certainly with our senses...And in the end, without knowing it, they left something out of the constellation: precisely the necessary perspective factor, by means of which every centre of power and not man alone con structs the rest of the world from its point of view that is to say, measures it, feels it, and moulds it according to its degree of strength...They forgot to reckon with this perspective-- power, 121 in " true being," or, in school-terms, subject- being. They suppose that this was " evolved " and added; but even the chemical investigator needs it: it is indeed specific Being, which de termines action and reaction according to circum stances. Perspectivity is only a complex form of specific- ness.
My idea is that every specific body strives to become master of all space, and to extend its r (its will to power), and to thrust back everything that resists it. But inasmuch as it is continually meeting the same endeavours on the part of other bodies, it concludes by coming to terms with those (by " combining " with those) which are sufficiently related to it and thus they conspire together for power. And the process continues.
637. Even in the inorganic world all that concerns an atom of energy is its immediate neighbourhood: distant forces balance each other. Here is the root of perspectivity, and it explains why a living organism is " egoistic " to the core.
638. Granting that the world disposed of a quantum of force, it is obvious that any transposition of force to any place would affect the whole system thus, besides the causality of sequence, there would also be a dependence, contiguity, and coincidence.
639. The only possible way of upholding the sense of the concept " God " would be: to make Him not the motive force, but the condition of maximum power, an epoch; a point in the further develop ment of the Will to Power by means of which subsequent evolution just as much as former evolution up to Him could be explained. Viewed mechanically, the energy of collective Becoming remains constant; regarded from the economical standpoint, it ascends to its zenith and then recedes therefrom in order to remain eternally rotatory. This " Will to Power " expresses itself in the interpretation, in the manner in which the strength is used. The conversion of energy into life; " life in its highest power " thenceforward appears as the goal. The same amount of energy, at different stages of development, means different things. That which determines growth in Life is the economy which becomes ever more sparing and methodical, which achieves ever more and more with a steadily decreasing amount of energy...The ideal is the principle of the least possible expense...The only thing that is proved is that the world is not striving towards a state of stability. Con sequently its zenith must not be conceived as a state of absolute equilibrium...The dire necessity of the same things happening in the course of the world, as in all other things, is not an eternal determinism reigning over all phenomena, but merely the expression of the fact that the impossible is not possible; that a given force cannot be different from that given force; that a given quantity of resisting force does not manifest itself otherwise than in conformity with its degree of strength; to speak of events as being necessary is tautological.
2. AS LIFE.
(a) The Organic Process.
640. Man imagines that he was present at the generation of the organic world: what was there to be observed, with the eyes and the touch, in regard to these processes? How much of it can be put into round numbers? What rules are noticeable in the movements? Thus, man would fain arrange all phenomena as if they were for the eye and for the touch, as if they were forms of motion: he will discover formula wherewith to simplify the unwieldy mass of these experiences. The reduction of all phenomena to the level of men with senses and with mathematics. It is a matter of making an inventory of human experiences: granting that man, or rather the human eye and the ability to form concepts, have been the eternal witnesses of all things.
641. A plurality of forces bound by a common nutritive process we call "Life." To this nutritive process all so-called feeling, thinking, and imagining belong as means that is to say, (1) in the form of opposing other forces; (2) in the form of an adjustment of other forces according to mould and rhythm; (3) in the form of a valuation relative to assimilation and excretion.
642. The bond between the inorganic and the organic world must lie in the repelling power exercised by every atom of energy. " Life " might be defined as a lasting form of force-estab lishing processes, in which the various contending forces, on their part, grow unequally. To what extent does counter-strife exist even in obedience? Individual power is by no means surrendered through it. In the same way, there exists in the act of commanding, an acknowledgment of the fact that the absolute power of the adversary has not been overcome, absorbed, or dissipated. " Obedience," and " command," are forms of the game of war.
643. The Will to Power interprets (an organ in the process of formation has to be interpreted): it defines, it determines gradations, differences of power. Mere differences of power could not be aware of each other as such: something must be there which will grow, and which interprets all other things that would do the same, according to the value of the latter. In sooth, all interpreta- IN NA f. fjf tion Is but a means in itself to become v something. (Continual interpretation is S principle of the organic process.) dicum does 644. Greater complexity, sharp differentiation, tne contiguity of the developed organs and functions, with the disappearance of intermediate members if that is perfection, then there is a Will to Power apparent in the organic process by means of whose dominating, shaping, and commanding forces it is continually increasing the sphere of its power, and persistently simplifying things within that sphere: it grows imperatively. " Spirit " is only a means and an instrument in the service of higher life, in the service of the elevation of life.
645. " Heredity" as something quite incomprehens ible, cannot be used as an explanation, but only as a designation for the identification of a problem. And the same holds good of "adaptability" As a matter of fact, the account of morphology, even supposing it were perfect, explains nothing; it merely describes an enormous fact. How a given organ gets to be used for any particular purpose is not explained. There is just as little explained in regard to these things by the assumption of causes finales as by the assumption of causes effici- entes. The concept " causa " is only a means of expression, no more a means of designating a thing.
646. *24 are analogies; for instance, our memory process all sggest another kind of memory which makes h iong as felt in heredity, development, and forms. *xpn* inventive and experimentative powers suggest another kind of inventiveness in the application of instruments to new ends, etc. That which we call our " consciousness? is quite guiltless of any of the essential processes of our preservation and growth; and no human brain could be so subtle as to construct anything more than a machine to which every organic process is infinitely superior.
647. Against Darwinism. The use of an organ does not explain its origin, on the contrary! During the greater part of the time occupied in the forma tion of a certain quality, this quality does not help to preserve the individual; it is of no use to him, and particularly not in his struggle with external circumstances and foes. What is ultimately " useful "? It is necessary to ask, " Useful for what? " For instance, that which promotes the lasting powers of the individual might be unfavourable to v his strength or his beauty; that which preserves him might at the same time fix him and keep him stable throughout development. On the other hand, a deficiency, a state of degeneration, may be of the greatest possible use, inasmuch as it acts as a stimulus to other organs. In the same way, a state of need may be a condition of existence, in asmuch as it reduces an individual to that modicum of means which, though it keeps him together, does not allow him to squander his strength. The in dividual himself is the struggle of parts (for nourishment, space, etc.): his development involves the triumph the predominance, of isolated parts; the wasting away, or the " development into organs," of other parts, iThe influence of " environment " is nonsensically overrated in Darwin: the essential factor in the process of life is precisely the tremendous inner power to shape and to create forms, which merely uses, exploits " environment." The new forms built up by this inner power are not produced with a view to any end; but, in the struggle between the parts, a new form does not exist long without becoming related to some kind of semi-utility, and, according to its use, develops itself ever more and more perfectly.
648. " Utility " in respect of the acceleration of the speed of evolution, is a different kind of " utility " from that which is understood to mean the greatest possible stability and staying power of the evolved creature.
649. " Useful " in the sense of Darwinian biology means: that which favours a thing in its struggle with others. But in my opinion the feeling of 128 being surcharged, the feeling accompanying an increase in strength, quite apart from the utility of the struggle, is the actual progress: from these feelings the will to war is first derived.
650. Physiologists should bethink themselves before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength: | " self-preservation " is only one of the results 1 thereof. Let us beware of superfluous teleological principles! one of which is the whole concept of " self-preservation." * 651. The most-fundamental and. most primeval activ ity of a protoplasm cannot be ascribed to a will to self-preservation, for it absjorbs an amount of material which is absurdly out of proportion with the needs of its preservation: and what is more, it does not "preserve itself" in the process, but actually falls to pieces...The instinct which rules here, must account for this total absence in the organism of a desire to preserve itself: " hunger " is already an interpretation based upon the observation of a more or less complex organ ism (hunger is a specialised and later form of the instinct; it is an expression of the system of divided labour, in the service of a higher instinct which rules the whole). * See Beyond Good and Evil, in this edition, Aph. 13. 1 29 652. It is just as impossible to regard hunger as the primum mobile, as it is to take self-preservation to be so. Hunger, considered as the result of in sufficient nourishment, means hunger as the result of a will to power which can no longer dominate. It is not a question of replacing a loss, it is only later on, as the result of the division of labour, when the Will to Power has discovered other and quite different ways of gratifying itself, that the appropriating lust of the organism is reduced to hunger to the need of replacing what has been lost.
653. We can but laugh at the false " Altruism " of biologists: propagation among the amcebae ap pears as a process of jetsam, as an advantage to them. It is an excretion of useless matter.
654. The division of a protoplasm into two takes place when its power is no longer sufficient to subjugate the matter it has appropriated: pro creation is the result of impotence. In the cases in which the males seek the females and become one with them, procreation is the re sult of hunger.
655. The weaker vessel is driven to the stronger from a need of nourishment; it desires to get under it, I. I 130 if possible to become one with it. The stronger, on the contrary, defends itself from others; it refuses to perish in this way; it prefers rather to split itself into two or more parts in the process of growing. One may conclude that the greater the urgency seems to become one with something else, the more weakness in some form is present. The greater the tendency to variety, difference, inner decay, the more strength is actually to hand. The instinct to cleave to something, and the instinct to repel something, are in the inorganic as in the organic world, the uniting bond. The whole distinction is a piece of hasty judgment. The will to power in every combination of forces, defending itself against the stronger and coming down unmercifully upon the iveaker, is more correct. N.B. All processes may be regarded as " beings" 656. The will to power can manifest itself only against obstacles; it therefore goes in search of what resists it this is the primitive tendency of the protoplasm when it extends its pseudopodia and feels about it. The act of appropriation and assimilation is, above all, the result of a desire to overpower, a process of forming, of additional building and rebuilding, until at last the subjected creature has become completely a part of the superior creature s sphere of power, and has in creased the latter. If this process of incorporation does not succeed, then the whole organism falls to pieces; and the separation occurs as the result of the will to power: in order to prevent the escape of that 131 which has been subjected, the will to power falls into two wills (under some circumstances without even abandoning completely its relation to the two). " Hunger " is only a more narrow adaptation, once the fundamental instinct of power has won power of a more abstract kind.