877. The Revolution made Napoleon possible: that is its justification. We ought to desire the anarchical collapse of the whole of our civilisation if such a reward were to be its result. Napoleon made nationalism possible: that is the latter s excuse. The value of a man (apart, of course, from morality and immorality: because with these concepts a man s worth is not even skimmed) does not lie in his utility; because he would continue to exist even if there were nobody to whom he could be useful. And why could not that man be the very pinnacle of manhood who was the source of the worst possible effects for his race: so high and so superior, that in his presence everything would go to rack and ruin from envy?
878. To appraise the value of a man according to his utility to mankind, or according to what he costs it, or the damage he is able to inflict upon it, 315 is just as good and just as bad as to appraise the value of a work of art according to its effects. But in this way the value of one man compared with another is not even touched upon. The " moral valuation," in so far as it is social, measures men altogether according to their effects. But what about the man who has his own taste on his tongue, who is surrounded and concealed by his isolation, uncommunicative and not to be communicated with; a man whom no one has fathomed yet that is to say, a creature of a higher, and, at any rate, different species: how would ye appraise his worth, seeing that ye cannot know him and can compare him with nothing? Moral valuation was the cause of the most enormous obtuseness of judgment: the value of a man in himself is underrated, well-nigh over looked, practically denied. This is the remains of simple-minded teleology: the value of man can only be measured with regard to other men.
879. To be obsessed by moral considerations pre supposes a very low grade of intellect: it shows that the instinct for special rights, for standing apart, the feeling of freedom in creative natures, in " children of God " (or of the devil), is lacking. And irrespective of whether he preaches a ruling morality or criticizes the prevailing ethical code from the point of view of his own ideal: by doing these things a man shows that he belongs 316 to the herd even though he may be what it is most in need of that is to say, a " shepherd."
880. We should substitute, morality by the will to our own ends, and consequently to the means to them.
881. Concerning the order of rank. What is it that constitutes the mediocrity of the typical man? That he does not understand that things neces sarily have their other side; that he combats evil conditions as if they could be dispensed with; that he will not take the one with the other; that he would fain obliterate and erase the specific character of a thing, of a circumstance, of an age, and of a person, by calling only a portion of their qualities good, and suppressing the remainder. The " desirability " of the mediocre is that which we others combat: their ideal is something which shall no longer contain anything harmful, evil, dangerous, questionable, and destructive. We recognise the reverse of this: that with every growth of man his other side must grow as well; that the highest man, if such a concept be allowed, would be that man who would represent the antag onistic character of existence most strikingly, and would be its glory and its only justification...Ordinary men may only represent a small corner and nook of this natural character; they perish the moment the multifariousness of the elements composing them, and the tension between their 317 antagonistic traits, increases: but this is the pre requisite for greatness in man. That man should become better and at the same time more evil, is | my formula for this inevitable fact. The majority of people are only piecemeal and fragmentary examples of man: only when all these creatures are jumbled together does one whole man arise. Whole ages and whole peoples in this sense, have a fragmentary character about them; it may perhaps be part of the economy of human development that man should develop himself only piecemeal. But, for this reason, one should not forget that the only important con sideration is the rise of the synthetic man; that inferior men, and by far the great majority of people, are but rehearsals and exercises out of v which here and there a whole man may arise; a man who is a human milestone, and who indicates how far mankind has advanced up to a certain point. Mankind does not advance in a straight line; often a type is attained which is again lost (for instance, with all the efforts of three hundred years, we have not reached the men of the Renais sance again, and in addition to this we must not forget that the man of the Renaissance was already behind his brother of classical antiquity).
882. The superiority of the Greek and the man of the Renaissance is recognized, but people would like to produce them without the conditions and causes of which they were the result.
883. " Purification of taste " can only be the result of the strengthening of the type. Our society today represents only the cultivating systems; the cultivated man is lacking. The great synthetic man, in whom the various forces for attaining a- purpose are correctly harnessed together, is alto gether wanting. The specimen we possess is the multifarious man, the most interesting form of chaos that has ever existed: but not the chaos preceding the creation of the world, but that fol lowing it: Goethe as the most beautiful expression of the type (completely and utterly un- Olympian!)* 884. Handel, Leibniz, Goethe, and Bismarck, are characteristic of the strong German type. They lived with equanimity, surrounded by contrasts. They were full of that agile kind of strength which cautiously avoids convictions and doctrines, by using the one as a weapon against the other, and reserving absolute freedom for themselves.
885. Of this I am convinced, that if the rise of great and rare men had been made dependent upon the voices of the multitude (taking for granted, of *Tbe Germans always call Goethe the Olympian. TR. 319 course, that the latter knew the qualities which belong to greatness, and also the price that all greatness pays for its self-development), then there would never have been any such thing as a great man! The fact that things pursue their course inde- pendently of the voice of the many, is the reason why a few astonishing things have taken place on earth.
886. The Order of Rank in Human Values. (a] A man should not be valued according to isolated acts. Epidermal actions. Nothing is more rare than a personal act. Class, rank, race, environment, accident all these things are much more likely to be expressed in an action or deed than the " personality " of the doer. (b] We should on no account jump to the con clusion that there are many people who are per sonalities. Some men are but conglomerations of personalities, whilst the majority are not even one. In all cases in which those average qualities pre ponderate, which ensure the maintenance of the species, to be a personality would involve un necessary expense, it would be a luxury in fact, it would be foolish to demand of anybody that he should be a personality. In such circumstances everybody is a channel or a transmitting vessel. (c] A " personality " is a relatively isolated phen omenon; in view of the superior importance of- 7 the continuation of the race at an average level, a 320 personality might even be regarded as something hostile to nature. For a personality to be possible, timely isolation and the necessity for an existence of offence and defence, are prerequisites; something in the nature of a walled enclosure, a capacity for, shutting out the world; but above all, a much lower degree of sensitiveness than the average man has, who is too easily infected with the views of others. The first question concerning the order of rank: how far is a man disposed to be solitary or gre- garioust (in the latter case, his valueconsists in those qualities which secure the survival of his tribe or his type; in the former case, his qualities are those which distinguish him from others, which isolate and defend him, and make his solitude possible). Consequence: the solitary type should not be valued from the standpoint of the gregarious type, or vice versa. Viewed from above, both types are necessary; as is likewise their antagonism, and nothing is more thoroughly reprehensible than the " desire " which would develop a third thing out of the two (" virtue " as hermaphroditism). This is as little worthy of desire as the equalisation and reconcilia tion of the sexes. The distinguishing qualities must be developed ever more and more, the gulf must be made ever wider...The concept of degeneration in both cases: the approximation of the qualities of the herd to those of solitary creatures: and vice versa in short, when they begin to resemble each other. This concept of degeneration is beyond the sphere of moral judgments.
887. Where the strongest natures are to be sought. The ruin and degeneration of the solitary species is much greater and more terrible: they have the in stincts of the herd, and the tradition of values, against them; their weapons of defence, their in stincts of self-preservation, are from the beginning insufficiently strong and reliable fortune must be peculiarly favourable to them if they are to prosper (they prosper best in the lowest ranks and dregs of society; if ye are seeking personalities it is there that ye will find them with much greater certainty than in the middle classes!) When the dispute between ranks and classes, which aims at equality of rights, is almost settled, the fight will begin against the solitary person. (In a certain sense the latter can maintain and develop himself most easily in a democratic society there where the coarser means of defence are no longer necessary, and a certain habit of order, honesty, justice, trust, is already a general condition.) t The strongest must be most tightly bound, most strictly watched, laid in chains and supervised: this is the instinct of the herd. To them belongs a regime of self-mastery, of ascetic detachment, of " duties " consisting in exhausting work, in which one can no longer call one s soul one s own.
888. I am attempting an economic justification of virtue. The object is to make man as useful as I. X, possible, and to make him approximate as nearly as one can to an infallible machine: to this end he must be equipped with machine- like virtues (he must learn to value those states in which he works in a most mechanically useful way, as the highest of all: to this end it is necessary to make him as disgusted as possible with the other states, and to represent them as very dangerous and despicable). Here is the first stumbling-block: the tedious- ness and monotony which all mechanical activity brings with it. To learn to endure this and not only to endure it, but to see tedium enveloped in a ray of exceeding charm: this hitherto has been the task of all higher schools. To learn something which you don t care a fig about, and to find pre cisely your " duty " in this " objective " activity; to learn to value happiness and duty as things apart; this is the invaluable task and performance of higher schools. It is on this account that the philologist has, hitherto, been the educator per se: because his activity, in itself, affords the best pattern of magnificent monotony in action; under his banner youths learn to " swat ": first pre requisite for the thorough fulfilment of mechanical duties in the future (as State officials, husbands, slaves of the desk, newspaper readers, and soldiers). Such an existence may perhaps require a philosoph ical glorification and justification more than any other: pleasurable feelings must be valued by some sort of infallible tribunal, as altogether of inferior rank; " duty per se" perhaps even the pathos of re verence in regard to everything unpleasant, must be demanded imperatively as that which is above all 323 useful, delightful, and practical things...A mechanical form of existence regarded as the highest and most respectable form of existence, worshipping itself (type: Kant as the fanatic of the formal concept " Thou shalt ").
889. The economic valuation of all the ideals that have existed hitherto that is to say, the selection and rearing of definite passions and states at the cost of other passions and states. The law-giver (or the instinct of the community) selects a number of states and passions the existence of which guarantees the performance of regular actions (mechanical actions would thus be the result of the regular requirements of those passions and states). In the event of these states and passions con taining ingredients which were painful, a means would have to be found for overcoming this pain- fulness by means of a valuation; pain would have to be interpreted as something valuable, as some thing pleasurable in a higher sense. Conceived in a formula: " How does something unpleasant become pleasant? " For instance, when our obedience and our submission to the law become honored, thanks to the energy, power, and self-control they entail. The same holds good of our public spirit, of our neighbourliness, of our patriotism, our " humanisa- tion," our " altruism," and our " heroism." The object of all idealism should be to induce people To do unpleasant things cheerfully. 324 890. The belittlement of man must be held as the chief aim for a long while: because what is needed in the first place is a broad basis from which a stronger species of man may arise (to what extent hitherto has every stronger species of man arisen from a substratum of inferior people?).
891. The absurd and contemptible form of idealism which would not have mediocrity mediocre, and which instead of feeling triumphant at being ex ceptional, becomes indignant at cowardice, false ness, pettiness, and wretchedness. We should not wish things to be any different, we should make the gulfs even wider The higher types among men should be compelled to distinguish themselves by means ot the sacrifices which they make to their own existence. Principal point of view: distances must be es tablished, but no contrasts must be created. The middle classes must be dissolved, and their influence decreased: this is the principal means of maintaining distances.
892. Who would dare to disgust the mediocre of their mediocrity! As you observe, I do precisely the reverse: every step away from mediocrity thus do I teach leads to immorality.
893. To hate mediocrity is unworthy of a philosopher: it is almost a note of interrogation to his " right to philosophy." It is precisely because he is the exception that he must protect the rule and ingratiate all mediocre people.
894. What I combat: that an exceptional form should make war upon the rule instead of understanding that the continued existence of the rule is the first condition of the value of the exception. For in stance, there are women who, instead of consider ing their abnormal thirst for knowledge as a dis tinction, would fain dislocate the whole status of womanhood.
895. The increase of strength despite the temporary ruin of the individual: A new level must be established; We must have a method of storing up forces for the maintenance of small performances, in opposition to economic waste; Destructive nature must for once be reduced to an instrument of this economy of the future; The weak must be maintained, because there is an enormous mass of finicking work to be done; The weak and the suffering must be upheld in their belief that existence is still possible; Solidarity must be implanted as an instinct opposed to the instinct of fear and servility; War must be made upon accident, even upon the accident of " the great man."
896. War upon great men justified on economic grounds. Great men are dangerous; they are accidents, exceptions, tempests, which are strong enough to question things which it has taken time to build and establish. Explosive material must not only be discharged harmlessly, but, if possible, its discharge must be prevented altogether; this is the fundamental instinct of all civilised society.
897. I He who thinks over the question of how the type man may be elevated to its highest glory and, power, will realize from the start that he must place himself beyond morality; for morality was directed in its essentials at the opposite goal that is to say, its aim was to arrest and to annihilate i that glorious development wherever it was in pro- * cess of accomplishment. For, as a matter of fact, development of that sort implies that such an enormous number of men must be subservient to it, that a counter-movement is only too natural: the weaker, more delicate, more mediocre existences, find it necessary to take up sides against that glory of life and power; and for that purpose they must get a new valuation of themselves by means of which they are able to condemn, and if possible to destroy, life in this high degree of plenitude. Morality is therefore essentially the expression of ( hostility to life, in so far as it would overcome vital types.
898. The strong of the future. To what extent neces sity on the one hand and accident on the other have attained to conditions from which a stronger species may be reared: this we are now able to understand and to bring about consciously; we can now create those conditions under which such an elevation is possible. Hitherto education has always aimed at the utility of society: not the greatest possible utility for the future, but the utility of the society actually extant. What people required were " instruments" for this purpose. Provided the wealth of forces were greater it would be possible to think of a draft being made upon them, the aim of which would not be the utility of society, but some future utility. The more people grasped to what extent the present form of society was in such a state of transition as sooner or later to be no longer able to exist for its own sake, but only as a means in the hands of a stronger race, the more this task would have to be brought forward. The increasing belittlement of man is precisely the impelling power which leads one to think of 328 the cultivation of a stronger race-, a race which would have a surplus precisely there where the dwarfed species was weak and growing weaker (will, responsibility, self-reliance, the ability to postulate aims for one s self). The means would be those which history teaches: isolation by means of preservative interests which would be the reverse of those generally accepted; exercise in revalued valuations; distance as pathos; a clean conscience in what today is most despised and most prohibited. The levelling of the mankind of Europe is the great process which should not be arrested; it should even be accelerated. The necessity of cleaving gulfs, of distance, of the order of rank, is therefore imperative; but not the necessity of re tarding the process above mentioned. This levelled- down species requires justification as soon as it is attained: its justification is that it exists for the service of a higher and sovereign race which stands upon it and can only be elevated upon its shoulders to the task which it is destined to perform. Not only a ruling race whose task would be consummated in ruling alone: but a race with vital spheres of its own, with an overflow of energy for beauty, bravery, culture, and manners, even for the most abstract thought; a yea-saying race which would be able to allow itself every kind of great luxury strong enough to be able to dis pense with the tyranny of the imperatives of virtue, rich enough to be in no need of economy or pedantry; beyond good and evil; a forcing-house for rare and exceptional plants.
899. Our psychologists, whose glance dwells in voluntarily upon the symptoms of decadence, lead us to mistrust intellect ever more and more. People persist in seeing only the weakening, pam pering, and sickening effects of intellect, but there are now going to appear: The union of Cynics intellectual New Experi ment- superiority barbarians alists with well-be * Conquerors ing and an overflow of strength.
900. I point to something new: certainly for such a democratic community there is a danger of barbarians; but these are sought only down below. There is also another kind of barbarians who come from the heights: a kind of conquering and ruling natures, which are in search of material that they can mould. Prometheus was a barbarian of this stamp.
901. Principal standpoint: one should not suppose the mission of a higher species to be the leading of inferior men (as Comte does, for instance); but the inferior should be regarded as the foundation upon which a higher species may live their higher life upon which alone they can stand. The conditions under which a strong, noble species maintains itself (in the matter of intellectual discipline) are precisely the reverse of those under which the industrial masses the tea-grocers a la Spencer subsist. Those qualities which are within the grasp only of the strongest and most terrible natures, and which make their existence possible leisure, adventure, disbelief, and even4isb. station would necessarily ruin mediocre natures and does do so when they possess them. In the case of the latter industry, regularity, moderation, and strong " conviction " are in their proper place in short, all " gregarious virtues ": under their influence these mediocre men become perfect.
902. Concerning the ruling types. The shepherd as opposed to the " lord " (the former is only a means to the maintenance of the herd; the latter, the purpose for which the herd exists).
903. The temporary preponderance of social valuations is both comprehensible and useful; it is a matter of building a foundation upon which a stronger species will ultimately be made possible. The standard of strength: to be able to live under the revalued valuations, and to desire them for all eternity. State and society regarded as a sub structure: economic point of view, education con- ceived as breeding.
904. A consideration which " free spirits lack: that the same discipline which makes a strong nature still stronger, and enables it to go in for big under takings, breaks up and withers the mediocre: doubt la largeur de cceur experiment independence.
905. The hammer. How should men who must value in the opposite way be constituted? Men who possess all the qualities of the modern soul, but are strong enough to convert them into real health? The means to their task.
906. The strong man, who is mighty in the instincts of a strong and healthy organization, digests his deeds just as well as he digests his meals; he even gets over the effects of heavy fare: in the main, iB| however, he is led by an inviolable and severe instinct which prevents his doing anything which goes against his grain, just as he never does any thing against his taste.
907. Can we foresee the favourable circumstances under which creatures of the highest value might arise? It is a thousand times too complicated, and the probabilities of failure are very great: on that account we cannot be inspired by the thought of striving after them! Scepticism. To oppose this we can enhance courage, insight, hardness, inde pendence, and the feeling of responsibility; we can also subtilise and learn to forestall the delicacy of the scales, so that favourable accidents may be enlisted on our side.
908. Before we can even think of acting, an enormous amount of work requires to be done. In the main, however, a cautious exploitation of the present con ditions would be our best and most advisable course of action. The actual creation of conditions such as those which occur by accident, presupposes the existence of iron men such as have not yet lived. Our first task must be to make the personal ideal prevail and become realized. He who has understood the nature of man and the origin of mankind's greatest specimens, shudders before man and takes flight from all action. This is the result of inherited valuations!! My consolation is, that the nature of man is evil, and this guarantees his strength.
909. The typical forms of self-development, or the eight principal questions: 1. Do we want to be more multifarious or more simple than we are? 2. Do we want to be happier than we are, or more indifferent to both happiness and un- happiness? 3. Do we want to be more satisfied with ourselves, or more exacting and more inexorable? 4. Do we want to be softer, more yielding, and more human than we are, or more in human? 5. Do we want to be more prudent than we are, or more daring? 6. Do we want to attain a goal, or do we want to avoid all goals (like the philosopher, for t instance, who scents a boundary, a cul-de- sac, a prison, a piece of foolishness in every goal)? 7. Do we want to become more respected, or more feared, or more despised? 8. Do we want to become tyrants, and seducers, or do we want to become shepherds and gregarious animals?
910. The type of my disciples. To such men as con cern me in any way I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities of all kinds. I wish them to be acquainted with profound self- contempt, with the martyrdom of self-distrust, with the misery of the defeated: I have no pity for them; because I wish them to have the only thing which today proves whether a man has any value or not, namely, the capacity of sticking to his guns.
911. The happiness and self-contentedness of the lazzaroni, or the blessedness of " beautiful souls," or the consumptive love of Puritan pietists, proves nothing in regard to the order of rank I among men. As a great educator one ought in- i exorably to thrash a race of such blissful creatures into unhappiness. The danger of belittlement and of a slackening of powers follows immediately I am opposed to happiness a la Spinoza or a la Epicurus, and to all the relaxation of contemplative states. But when virtue is the means to such happiness, well then, one must master even virtue.
912. I cannot see how any one can make up for having missed going to a good school at the proper ( time. Such a person does not know himself; he walks through life without ever having learned to walk. His soft muscles betray themselves at every step. Occasionally life itself is merciful enough to make a man recover this lost and severe schooling: by means of periods of sickness, perhaps, which exact the utmost will-power and self-control; or j by means of a sudden state of poverty, which threatens his wife and child, and which may force a man to such activity as will restore energy to his slackened tendons, and a tough spirit to his will to life. The most desirable thing of all, however, is, under all circumstances to have severe discipline at the right time, i.e. at that age when it makes us proud that people should expect great things from us. For this is what distinguishes hard schooling, as good schooling, from every other schooling, namely, that a good deal is demanded, that a good deal is severely exacted; that goodness, nay even excellence itself, is required as if it were normal; that praise is scanty, that leniency is non-existent; that blame is sharp, practical, and without reprieve, and has no regard to talent and antecedents. We are in every way in need of such a school: and this holds good of corporeal as well as of spiritual things; it would be fatal to draw distinctions here! * The same discipline makes the soldier and the scholar efficient; and, looked at more closely, there is no true scholar who has not the instincts of a true soldier in his veins. To be able to command and to be able to obey in a proud fashion; to keep one s place in rank and file, and yet to be ready at any moment to lead; to prefer danger to comfort; not to weigh what is permitted and what is forbidden in a tradesman s balance; to be more hostile to pettiness, slyness, and parasitism than to wickedness. What is it that one learns in a hard school? to obey and to command.
913. We should repudiate merit and do only that which stands above all praise and above all understanding.
914. The new forms of morality: Faithful vows concerning that which one wishes to do or to leave undone; complete and definite abstention from many things. Tests as to whether one is ripe for such discipline.
915. It is my desire to naturalise asceticism: I would substitute the old intention of asceticism, " self-denial," by my own intention, " self -strengthening ": a gymnastic of the will; a period of abstinence and occasional fasting of every kind, even in things intellectual; a casuistry in deeds, in regard to the opinions which we derive from our powers; we should try our hand at adventure and at deliberate dangers. (Diners chez Magny: all intellectual gourmets with spoilt stomachs.) Tests ought also to be devised for discovering a man s power in keeping his word.
916. The things which have become spoilt through having been abused by the Church: (i) Asceticism. People have scarcely got the courage yet to bring to light the natural utility and necessity of asceticism for the purpose of the. education of the will. Our ridiculous world of education, before whose eyes the useful State official hovers as an ideal to be striven for, believes that it has completed its duty when it has in structed or trained the brain; it never even suspects that something else is first of all necessary i the education of will-power; tests are devised for everything except for the most important thing of all: whether a man can will, whether he can promise, the young man completes his education without a question or an inquiry having been made concerning the problem of the highest value of his nature. (2) Fasting. In every sense even as a means of maintaining the capacity for taking pleasure in all good things (for instance, to give up reading for a while, to hear no music for a while, to cease from being amiable for a while: one ought also to have fast days for one s virtues). (3) The monastery. Temporary isolation with severe seclusion from all letters, for instance; a kind of profound introspection and self-recovery, which does not go out of the way of " temptations," but out of the way of " duties "; a stepping out of the daily round of one s environment; a detach ment from the tyranny of stimuli and external influences, which condemns us to expend our power only in reactions, and does not allow it to gather volume until it bursts into spontaneous activity (let anybody examine our scholars closely: they only think reflexively, i.e. they must first read before they can think). (4) Feasts. A man must be very coarse in order not to feel the presence of Christians and Christian values as oppressive, so oppressive as to send all festive moods to the devil. By feasts we under stand: pride, high-spirits, exuberance; scorn of all kinds of seriousness and Philistinism; a divine saying of Yea to one s self, as the result of physical plenitude and perfection all states to which the Christian cannot honestly say Yea. A feast is a pagan thing par excellence. (5) The courage of one s own nature: dressing- up in morality. To be able to call one s passions I. Y 338 good without the help of a moral formula: this is the standard which measures the extent to which a man is able to say Yea to his own nature, namely, how much or how little he has to have recourse to morality. (6) Death. The foolish physiological fact must be converted into a moral necessity. One should, live in such a way that one may have the will to die at the right time 917. To feel one s self stronger or, expressed other wise: happiness always presupposes a comparison (not necessarily with others, but with one s self, in the midst of a state of growth, and without being conscious that one is comparing). Artificial accentuation: whether by means of exciting chemicals or exciting errors (" halluci nations.") Take, for instance, the Christian s feeling of security; he feels himself strong in his confidence, in his patience, and his resignation: this artificial accentuation he owes to the fancy that he is pro tected by a God. Take the feeling of superiority, for instance: as when the Caliph of Morocco sees only globes on which his three united kingdoms cover four-fifths of the space. Take the feeling of uniqueness, for instance: as when the European imagines that culture belongs to Europe alone, and when he regards himself as a sort of abridged cosmic process; or, as when the Christian makes all existence revolve round the " Salvation of man." The question is, where does one begin to feel the pressure of constraint: it is thus that different degrees are ascertained. A philosopher, for instance, in the midst of the coolest and most transmontane feats of abstraction feels like a fish that enters its element: while colors and tones oppress him; not to speak of those dumb desires of that which others call " the ideal."