CHAPTER LXVIII.
That philosophical discourses, however, distinguished by 1 xal τὸ ἑξακουόμενον daro τῆς λίξεως, ὡς δυνατὸν Heir, ἀνετρέψαμεν. ? ixl τέγους. ὃ tunpérreo» ἐνθρώπων.
Boox uz. } ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. 147 orderly arrangement and elegant expression,’ should produce such results in the case of those individuals just enumerated, and upon others? who have led wicked lives, is not at all to be ‘wondered at. But when we consider that those discourses, which Celsus terms “ vulgar,” ὅ are filled with power, as if they were spells, and see that they at once convert multitudes from a life of licentiousness to one of extreme regularity,* and from a life of wickedness to a better, and from a state of cowardice or unmanliness to one of such high-toned courage as to lead men to despise even death through the piety which shows itself within them, why should we not justly admire the power which they contain? For the words of those who at the first assumed the office of [Christian] ambassadors, and who gave their labours to rear up the churches of God,—nay, their preaching also,—were accompanied with a persuasive power, though not like that found among those who profess the philosophy of Plato, or of any other merely human philosopher, which pos- sesses no other qualities than those of human nature. But the demonstration which followed the words of the apostles of Jesus was given from God, and was accredited? by the Spirit and by power. And therefore their word ran swiftly and speedily, or rather the word of God through their instrumen- tality, transformed numbers of persons who had been sinners both by nature and habit, whom no one could have reformed by punishment, but who were changed by the word, *which moulded and transformed them according to its pleasure.
CHAPTER LXIX.
Celsus continues in his usual manner, asserting that “to change a nature entirely is exceedingly difficult" We, how- ever, who know of only one nature in every rational soul, and who maintain that none has been created evil by the Author of all things, but that many have become wicked through educa- tion, and perverse example, and surrounding influences,’ so 1 ᾿Αλλὰ τὴν μὲν τάξιν καὶ σύνθεσιν καὶ φράσιν τῶν dao Φιλοσοφία; λόγων.
2 The reading in the text is ἄλλως, for which ἄλλους has been conjectured by Ruzus and Boherellus, and which has been adopted in the translation.
3 ἰδιωτικοὺς. * εὑσταθέστατον. 5 χιστικὴ ἀπὸ πνεύματος.
δ χαρὰ τὰς ἀἐνωτροφὲς, καὶ τὼ; διαστροφὲς, καὶ τὰς περιηχήσεις.
148 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. [Boox mr.
that wickedness has been naturalized! in some individuals, are persuaded that for the word of God to change a nature in which evil has been naturalized is not only not impossible, but is even a work of no very great difficulty, if a man only believe that he must entrust himself to the God of all things, and do everything with a view to please Him with whom ** Both good and bad are not in the same honour, Nor do the idle man and he who has laboured much Perish alike.”? But even if it be exceedingly difficult to effect a change in some persons, the cause must be held to lie in their own will, which is reluctant to accept the belief that the God over all things is a just Judge of all the deeds done during life. For deliberate choice and practice? avail much towards the accom- plishment of things which appear to be very difficult, and, to speak hyperbolically, almost impossible. Has the nature of man, when desiring to walk along a rope extended in the air through the middle of the theatre, and to carry at the same time numerous and heavy weights, been able by practice and attention to accomplish such a feat; but when desiring to live in conformity with the practice of virtue, does it find it impos- sible to do so, although formerly it may have been exceedingly wicked? See whether he who holds such views does not bring a charge against the nature of the Creator of the rational animal* rather than against the creature, if He has formed the nature of man with powers for the attainment of things of such difficulty, and of no utility whatever, but has rendered it in- capable of securing its own blessedness. But these remarks may suffice as an answer to the assertion that “entirely to change a nature is exceedingly difficult.” He alleges, in the next place, that “they who are without sin are partakers of a better life;” not making it clear what he means by “those who are without sin," whether those who are so from the beginning [of their lives], or those who become so by a transformation. Of those who were so from the beginning of their lives, there cannot possibly be any; while those who are so after a transformation [of heart] are found to be few in number, being those who 1 φυσιωθῆναι. 2 Cf. Iliad, ix. 819, 320.
3 χροαίρεσις καὶ ἄσκησις. 4 τοῦ λογικοῦ ζώου.
Boor u1.] ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. 149 have become so after giving in their allegiance to the saving word. And they were not such when they gave in their alle- giance. For, apart from the aid of the word, and that too the word of perfection, it is impossible for a man to become free from sin.
CHAPTER LXX.
In the next place, he objects to the statement, as if it were maintained by us, that * God will be able to do all things," not seeing even here how these words are meant, and what * the all things" are which are included in it, and how it 1s said that God * will be able." But on these matters it is not necessary now to speak; for although he might with a show of reason have opposed this proposition, he has not done so. Perhaps he did not understand the arguments which might be plausibly used against it, or if he did, he saw the answers that might be returned. Now in our judgment God can do everything which it is possible for Him to do without ceasing to be God, and good, and wise. But Celsus asserts—not comprehending the meaning of the expression * God can, do all things "—" that He will not desire to do anything wicked," admitting that He has the power, but not the will, to commit evil. We, on the. contrary, maintain that as that which by nature possesses the property of sweetening other things through its own inherent sweetness cannot produce bitterness contrary to its own pecu- liar nature, nor that whose nature it is to produce light through its being light can cause darkness; so neither is God able to commit wickedness, for the power of doing evil is con- trary to His deity and its omnipotence. Whereas if any one among existing things is able to commit wickedness from being inclined to wickedness by nature, it does so from not having in its nature the ability not to do evil.
CHAPTER LXXI.
He next assumes what is not granted by the more rational class of believers, but what perhaps is considered to be true by some who are devoid of intelligence, —viz. that “God, like ὥσπερ ov δύναται TO πεφυκὸς γλυκαίνειν TQ γλυκὺ τυγχένειν Tixpacely, παρὼ τὴν αὐτοῦ μόνην αἰτίων.
150 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. [Boox m.
those who are overcome with pity, being Himself overcome, alleviates the sufferings of the wicked through pity for their wailings, and casts off the good, who do nothing of that kind, which is the height of injustice." Now, in our judgment, God lightens the suffering of no wicked man who has not betaken himself to a virtuous life, and casts off no one who is already good, nor yet alleviates the suffering of any one who mourns, simply because he utters lamentation, or takes pity upon him, to use the word pity in its more common acceptation! Bat those who have passed severe condemnation upon themselves because of their sins, and who, as on that account, lament and bewail themselves as lost, so far as their previous conduct is concerned, and who have manifested a satisfactory change, are received by God on account of their repentance, as those who have undergone a transformation from a life of great wicked- ness. For virtue, taking up her abode in the souls of these persons, and expelling the wickedness which had previous pos- . Session of them, produces an oblivion of the past. And even although virtue do not effect an entrance, yet if & considerable progress take place in the soul, even that is sufficient, in the pro- portion that it is progressive, to drive out and destroy the flood of wickedness, so that it almost ceases to remain in the soul.
CHAPTER LXXII.
CHAPTER LXXII.
In the next place, speaking as in the person of a teacher of our doctrine, he expresses himself as follows: * Wise men reject what we say, being led into error, and ensnared by their wisdom.” In reply to which we say that, since wisdom is the knowledge of divine and human things and of their causes, or, as it is defined by the word of God, “the breath of the power of God, and a pure influence flowing from the glory of the Almighty, and the brightness of the everlasting light, and the unspotted mirror of the power of God, and the image of His goodness,” no one who was really wise would reject what is said by a Christian acquainted with the principles of Christianity, or would be led into error, or ensnared by it. For true wisdom does not mislead, but ignorance does, while of existing things 1 fue κοινότερον τῷ ἐλέει χρήσωμαι.
3 Cf. Wisd. of Solom. vii. 25, 26.
Boox 11. ] ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. ‘151 knowledge alone is permanent, and the truth which is derived from wisdom. But if, contrary to the definition of wisdom, you call any one whatever who dogmatizes with sophistical opinions wise, we answer that in conformity with what you call wisdom, such an one rejects the words of God, being misled and ensnared by plausible sophisms. And since, according to our doctrine, wisdom is not the knowledge of evil, but the knowledge of evil, so to speak, is in those who hold false opinions and who are deceived by them, I would therefore in such persons term it ignorance rather than wisdom. CHAPTER LXXIII.
After this he again slanders the ambassador of Christianity, and gives out regarding him that he relates “ ridiculous things,” although he does not show or clearly point out what are the things which he calls “ridiculous.” And in his slanders he says that “no wise man believes the gospel, being driven away by the multitudes who adhere to it.” And in this he acts like one who should say that owing to the multitude of those ignorant persons who are brought into subjection to the laws, no wise man would yield obedience to Solon, for example, or to Lycurgus, or Zaleucus, or any other legislator, and espe- cially if by wise man he means one who is wise [by living] iu conformity with virtue. For, as with regard to these ignorant persons, the legislators, according to their ideas of utility, caused them to be surrounded with appropriate guidance and laws, so God, legislating through Jesus Christ for men in all parts of the world, brings to Himself even those who are not wise in the way in which it is possible for such persons to be brought to a better life. And God, well knowing this, as we have already shown in the preceding pages, says in the books of Moses: “ They have moved me to jealousy with that which is not God; they have provoked me to anger with their idols: and I will move them to jealousy with those which are not a people; I will provoke them to anger with a foolish nation."! And Paul also, knowing this, said, * But God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise,"? calling, in 152 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. [Book rir.
a general way, wise all who appear to have made advances in knowledge, but have fallen into an atheistic polytheism, since “professing themselves to be wise they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things."!
CHAPTER LXXIV.
CHAPTER LXXIV.
He accuses the Christian teacher, moreover, of “seeking after the unintelligent.” In answer, we ask, Whom do you mean by the “unintelligent?” For, to speak accurately, every wicked man is “unintelligent.” If then by “unintelligent ” you mean the wicked, do you, in drawing men to philosophy, seek to gain the wicked or the virtuous?” But it is impossible to gain the virtuous, because they have already given them- selves to philosophy. The wicked, then, [you try to gain;] but if they are wicked, are they “unintelligent?” And many such you seek to win over to philosophy, and you therefore seek the “unintelligent.” But if I seek after those who are thus termed “unintelligent,” I act like a benevolent physician, who should seek after the sick in order to help and cure them. If, however, by *unintelligent" you mean persons who are not clever,’ but the inferior class of men intellectually I shall answer that I endeavour to improve such also to the best of my ability, although I would not desire to build up the Christian community out of such materials. For I seek in preference those who are more clever and acute, because they are able to comprehend the meaning of the hard sayings, and of those passages in the law, and prophecies, and Gospels, which are expressed with obscurity, and which you have despised as not containing anything worthy of notice, because you have not ascertained the meaning which they contain, nor tried to enter into the aim of the writers.
4 The reading in the text is τερωτωδεστέρους, οὗ which Ruseus remarks, ‘ Hic nullum habet locum.” Keradstorépove has been conjectured instead, and has been adopted in the translation.
Book 111. ] ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. 153 CHAPTER LXXV.
But as he afterwards says that “the teacher. of Christianity acts like a person who promises to restore patients to bodily health, but who prevents them from. consulting skilled phy- sicians, by whom his ignorance would be exposed,” we shall inquire in reply, * What are the physicians to whom you refer, from whom we turn away ignorant individuals? For you do not suppose that we exhort those to embrace the gospel who are devoted to philosophy, so that you would regard the latter as the physicians from whom we keep away such as we invite to come to the word of God.” He indeed will make no answer, because he cannot name the physicians; or else he will be obliged to betake himself to those of them who are ignorant, and who of their own accord servilely yield themselves to the worship of many gods, and to whatever other opinions are entertained by ignorant individuals. In either case, then, he will be shown to have employed to no purpose in his argument the illustration of “one who keeps others away from skilled physicians.” “But if, in order to preserve from the philosophy of Epicurus, and from such as are considered physicians after his system, those who are deceived by them, why should we not be acting most reasonably in keeping such away from a dangerous disease caused by the physi- cians of Celsus,—that, yiz. which leads to the annihilation of providence, and the introduction of pleasure as a good? But let it be conceded that we do keep away those whom we encourage to become our disciples from other philo- sopher-physicians,—from the Peripatetics, for example, who deny the existence of providence and the relation of Deity to man,—why shall we not piously train and heal those who have been thus encouraged, persuading them to devote themselves to the God of all things, and free those who yield obedience to us from the great wounds inflicted by the words of such as are deemed to be philosophers? Nay, let it also be admitted that we turn away from physicians of the sect of the Stoics, who introduce a corruptible god, and assert that his essence consists 1 For εὐσεβεῖς in the text, Boherellus conjectures εὐσεβῶς.
154 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. [ Boox rrr.
of a body, which is capable of being changed and altered in all its parts! and who also maintain that all things will one day perish, and that God alone will be left; why shall we not even thus emancipate our subjects from evils, and bring them by pious arguments to devote themselves to the Creator, and to admire the Father of the Christian system, who has so arranged that instruction of the most benevolent kind, and fitted for the conversion of souls, should be distributed throughout the whole human race? Nay, if we should cure those who have fallen into the folly of believing in the trans- migration of souls through the teaching of physicians, who will have it that the rational nature descends sometimes into all kinds of irrational animals, and sometimes into that state of being which is incapable of using the imagination, why should we not improve the souls of our subjects by means of a doctrine which does not teach that a state of insensibility or irrationalism is produced in the wicked instead of punishment, but which shows that the labours and chastisements inflicted upon the wicked by God are a kind of medicines leading to conversion? For those who are intelligent Christians,* keeping this in view, deal with the simple-minded, as parents do with very young’ children. We do not betake ourselves then to young persons and silly rustics, saying to them, “Flee from physicians.” ‘Nor do we say, “See that none of you lay hold of knowledge;" nor do we assert that * knowledge is an evil;” nor are we mad enough to say that “knowledge causes men to lose their soundness of mind.” We would not even say that any one ever perished through wisdom; and although we give 1 βεὸν φθαρτὸν εἰσαγόντων, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ λεγόντων cape τρεπτὸν διόλον καὶ ἀλλοιωτὸν, καὶ μεταβλητὸν.
3 The words in the text are, Φιλανθρωπότατα ἐπιστρεπτικὸν, καὶ ψνχῶν» μαθήματα οἰκονομήσαντα, for which we have adopted in the translation the emendation of Boherellus, Φιλανθρωπότατα xai ψυχῶν ἐπιστρεττικὰ μαθήματα.
8 AA κἄν τοὺς πεπονθότας τὴν περὶ τῆς μετενσωματώσεως ἄνοιαν dto ἰατρῶν, τῶν καταβιβαζόντων τὴν λογικὴν Φύσιν ore μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄλογον TATE, ὁτὲ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀφάνταστον.
4 Instead of οἱ φρονίμως Χριστιανοὶ ζῶντες, a8 in the text, Rucus and * Boherellus conjecture of Qpovitews Χριστιανίζοντε;, etc.
ὅ τοὺς κομιδῇ νητίους.
Boox τη. ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. 155 instruction, we never say, “‘ Give heed to me,” but * Give heed to the God of all things, and to Jesus, the giver of instruction concerning Him.” And none of us is so great a braggart! as to say what Celsus put in the mouth of one of our teachers to his acquaintances, “T alone will save you.” Observe here the lies which he utters against us! Moreover, we do not assert that * true physicians destroy those whom they promise to cure.”
CHAPTER LXXVI.
CHAPTER LXXVI.
And he produces a second illustration to our disadvantage, saying that *our teacher acts like a drunken man, who, entering a company of drunkards, should accuse those who are sober of bemg drunk." But let him show, say from the writ- ings of Paul, that the apostle of Jesus gave way to drunken- ness, and that his words were not those of soberness; or from the writings of John, that his thoughts do not breathe a spirit of temperance and of freedom from the intoxication of evil. No one, then, who is of sound mind, and teaches the doctrines of Christianity, gets drunk with wine; but Celsus utters these calumnies against us in a spirit very unlike that of a philo- sopher. Moreover, let Celsus say who those “sober” persons are whom the ambassadors of Christianity accuse. For in our judgment all are intoxicated who address themselves to in- animate objects as to God. And why do I say “ intoxicated ^ * Insane" would be the more appropriate word for those who hasten to temples and worship images or animals as divinities. And they too are not less insane who think that images, fashioned by men of worthless and sometimes most wicked character, confer any honour upon genuine divinities.
CHAPTER LXXVIL CHAPTER LXXVIL He next likens our teacher to one suffering from ophthalmia, and his disciples to those suffering from the same disease, and says that “such an one amongst a company of those who are afflicted with ophthalmia, accuses those who are sharp-sighted of being blind.” Who, then, would we ask, O Greeks, are they who in our judgment do not see, save those who are un- able to look up from the exceeding greatness of the world and 1 dantur.
156 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. [Boox ur.
its contents, and from the beauty of created things, and to see that they ought to worship, and admire, and reverence Him alone who made these things, and that it is not befitting to treat with reverence anything contrived by man, and applied to the honour of God, whether it be without a reference to the Creator, or with one?! For, to compare with that illimitable excellence, which surpasses all created being, things which ought ‘not to be brought into comparison with it, is the act of those whose understanding is darkened. "We do not then say that those who are sharp-sighted are suffering from ophthalmia or blindness; but we assert that those who, in ignorance of God, give themselves to temples and images, and so-called sacred seasons, are blinded in their minds, and especially when, in addition to their impiety, they live also in licentiousness, not even inquiring after any honourable work whatever, but doing everything that is of a disgraceful character.
CHAPTER LXXVIII.
CHAPTER LXXVIII.
After having brought against us charges of so serious a kind, he wishes to make it appear that, although he has others to adduce, he passes them by in silence. His words are as follow: «These charges I have to bring against them, and others of a similar nature, not to enumerate them one by one, and 1 affirm that they are in error, and that they act insolently towards God, in order to lead on wicked men by empty hopes, and to persuade them to despise better things, saying that if they refrain from them it will be better for them." In answer to which, it might be said that from the power which shows itself in those who are converted to Christianity, it is not at all the “ wicked" who are won over to the gospel, as the more simple class of persons, and, as many would term them, the * unpolished.”* For such individuals, through fear of the punishments that are threat- ened, which arouses and exhorts them to refrain from those actions which are followed by punishments, strive to yield them- selves up to the Christian religion, being influenced by the 1 εἴτε χωρὶς ToU δημιουργοῦ θεοῦ εἴτε καὶ peer’ ἐκείνου. 3 ἱερορεηνίας.
8 The reading in the text is χορεψοί, which is 80 opposed to the sense of the passage, that the conjecture of Guietus, dxouwos, has been adopted in the translation.
* Book 111. | ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. 157 power of the word to such a degree, that through fear of what are called in the word “everlasting punishments,” they despise all the tortures which are devised against them among men,— even death itself, with countless other evils,—which no wise man would say is the act of persons of wicked mind. How can temperance and sober-mindedness, or benevolence and liberality, be practised by a man of wicked mind? Nay, even the fear of God cannot be felt by such an one, with respect to which, because it is useful to the many, the gospel encourages those who are not yet able to choose that which ought to be chosen for its own sake, to select it as the greatest blessing, and one above all promise; for this principle cannot be implanted in him who prefers to live in wickedness.
CHAPTER LXXIX.
CHAPTER LXXIX.
But if in these matters any one were to imagine that it is superstition rather than wickedness which appears in the mul- titude of those who believe the word, and should charge our doctrine with making men superstitious, we shall answer him by saying that, as a certain legislator replied to the question of one who asked him whether he had enacted for his citizens the best laws, that he had not given them absolutely the best, but the best which they were capable of receiving; so it might be said by the Father of the Christian doctrine, I have given the best laws and instruction for the improvement of morals of which the many were capable, not threatening sinners with imaginary labours and chastisements, but with such as are real, and necessary to be applied for the correction of those who offer resistance, although they do not at all understand the object of him who inflicts the punishment, nor the effect of the labours. For the doctrine of punishment is both attended with utility, and is agreeable to truth, and is stated in obscure terms with advantage. Moreover, as for the most part it is not the wicked whom the ambassadors of Christianity gain over, neither do we insult God. For we speak regarding Him both what is true, and what appears to be clear to the multitude, but not so clear to them as it is to those few who investigate the truths of the gospel in a philosophical manner.
158 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS., [Boox m1.
CHAPTER LXXX.
Seeing, however, that Celsus alleges that * Christians are won over by us through vain hopes,” we thus reply to him when he finds fault with our doctrine of the blessed life, and of communion with God: * As for you, good sir, they also are won over by vain hopes who have accepted the doctrine of Pythagoras and Plato regarding the soul, that it is its nature to ascend to the vault! of heaven, and in the super-celestial space to behold the sights which are seen by the blessed spec- tators above. According to you, O Celsus, they also who have accepted the doctrine of the duration of the soul [after death], and who lead a life through which they become heroes, and make their abodes with the gods, are won over by vain hopes. Probably also they who are persuaded that the soul comes [into the body] from without, and that it will be withdrawn from the power of death,? would be said by Celsus to be won over by empty hopes. Let him then come forth to the con- test, no longer concealing' the sect to which he belongs, but confessing himself to be an Epicurean, and let him meet the arguments, which are not lightly advanced among Greeks and barbarians, regarding the immortality of the soul, or its dura- tion [after death], or the immortality of the thinking principle;? and let him prove that these are words which deceive with empty hopes those who give their assent to them; but that the adherents of his philosophical system are pure from empty