the statements contained in such works; for their fallacy is manifest to all, especially if any one will have the patience to read the books themselves. Rather do I wish to show that Nature teaches this, that God made nothing that is mortal, but that His works, whatever they are, are immortal, and theirs mortal. And the soul! is the work of God, while the nature of the body is different. And in this respect there is no differ- ence between the body of a bat, or of a worm, or of a frog, . and that of a man; for the matter? is the same, and their cor- ruptible part is alike." Nevertheless I could wish that every one who heard Celsus declaiming and asserting that the treatise entitled Controversy between Jason and Papiscus regarding Christ was fitted to excite not laughter, but hatred, could take the work into his hands, and patiently listen to its contents; that, finding in it nothing to excite hatred, he might condemn Celsus out of the book itself. For if it be impartially perused, it will be found that there is nothing to excite even laughter in a work in which a Christian is described as conversing with a Jew on the subject of the Jewish Scriptures, and proving that the predictions regarding Christ fitly apply to Jesus; although the other disputant maintains the discussion in no ignoble style, and in a manner not unbecoming the character of a Jew.
CHAPTER LIII.
CHAPTER LIII.
I do not know, indeed, how he could conjoin things that do not admit of union, and which cannot exist together at the . same time in human nature, in saying, as he did, that “the above treatise deserved to be treated both with pity and hatred." For every one will admit that he who is the object of pity is not at the same moment an object of hatred, and that he who is the object of hatred is not at the same time a subject of pity. Celsus, moreover, says that it was not his purpose to refute such statements, because he thinks that their absurdity is evident to all, and that, even before offering any logical refutation, they will appear to be bad, and to merit both pity and hatred. But we invite him who peruses this reply of ours to the charges of Celsus to have patience, and to listen to our sacred writings themselves, and, as far as possible, to form an opinion from 1 ψυχὴ. 3 ὕλη.
220 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. [Book rv.
their contents of the purpose of the writers, and of their consciences and disposition of mind; for he will discover that they are men who strenuously contend for what they uphold, and that some of them show that the history which they narrate is one which they have both seen and experienced,’ which was miraculous, and worthy of being recorded for the advantage of their future hearers. Will any one indeed venture to say that it is not the source and fountain of all blessing? [to men] to believe in the God of all things, and to perform all our actions with the view of pleasing Him in everything whatever, and not to entertain even a thought unpleasing to Him, seeing that not only our words and deeds, but our very thoughts, will be the subject of future judgment? And what other argu- ments would more effectually lead human nature to adopt a virtuous life, than the belief or opinion that the supreme God beholds all things, not only what is said and done, but even what is thought by us? And let any one who likes com- pare any other system which at the same time converts and ameliorates, not merely one or two individuals, but, as far as in it lies, countless numbers, that by the comparison of both methods he may form a correct idea of the arguments which dispose to a virtuous life.
CHAPTER LIV.
CHAPTER LIV.
But as in the words which I quoted from Celsus, which are? paraphrase from the Timeus, certain expressions occur, Suc as, “God made nothing mortal, but immortal things alone while mortal things are the works of others, and the soul 1s 4 work of God, but the nature of the body is different, and there is no difference between the body of a man and that of a bat, or of a worm, or of a frog; for the matter is the same, 4? their corruptible part alike,"—let us discuss these points 1 alittle; and let us show that Celsus ‘either does not disclose his Epicurean opinions, or, as might be said by one perso has exchanged them for better, or, as another might say; 8: 1 The reading in the text of Spencer and of the Benedictine ed. 18 an λειφθεῖσαν, for which Lommatzsch has adopted the cohjecture of Bohere καταληγθεῖσαν.
2 ὠφελείας.
Book 1v. ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. 221 nothing in common save the name, with Celsus, the Epicurcan. For he ought, in giving expression to such opinions, and in proposing to contradict not only us, but the by no means obscure sect of philosophers who are the adherents of Zeno of Citium, to have proved that the bodies of animals are not the work of God, and that the great skill displayed in their con- struction did not proceed from the highest intelligence. And he ought also, with regard to the countless diversities of plants, which are regulated by an inherent, incomprehensible nature,’ and which have been created for the by no means despicable? use of man in general, and of the animals which minister to man, whatever other reasons may be adduced for their exist- ence, not only to have stated his opinion, but also to have shown us that it was no perfect intelligence which impressed these qualities upon the matter of plants. And when he had once represented [various] divinities as the creators of all the bodies, the soul alone being the work of God, why did not he, who separated these great acts of creation, and apportioned them among a plurality of creators, next demonstrate by some convincing reason the existence of these diversities among divi- nities, some of which construct the bodies of men, and others —those, say, of beasts of burden, and others—those of wild ani- mals? And he who saw that some divinities were the creators of dragons, and of asps, and of basilisks, and others of each plant and herb according to its species, ought to have explained the causes of these diversities. For probably, had he given himself carefully to the investigation of each particular point, he would either have observed that it was one God who was the creator of all, and who made each thing with a certain object and for a certain reason; or if he had failed to observe this, he would have discovered the answer which he ought to return to those who assert that corruptibility is a thing indifferent in its nature; and that there was no absurdity in a world which consists of diverse materials, being formed by one architect, who constructed the different kinds of things so as to secure the good of the whole. Or, finally, he ought to have expressed no opinion at all on, so important a doctrine, since lie did not l ix’ ἐνυπαρχούση; ἀφαντάστου Φύσεως; διοικουμένων. 3 πρὸς χρείαν οὐκ εὐκαταφρόνητον. 3 ὅπως ποτὲ ἄλλω; ὄντων».
222 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. [Book rv.
intend to prove what he professed to demonstrate; unless, in- deed, he who censures others for professing a simple faith, would have us to believe his mere assertions, although he gave out that he would not merely assert, but would prove his assertions.
CHAPTER Lv.
But I maintain that, if he had had the patience (to use his own expression) to listen to the writings of Moses and the prophets, he would have had his attention arrested by the circumstance that the expression “God made” is applied to heaven and earth, and to what is called the firmament, and also to the lights and stars; and after these, to the great fishes, and to evety living thing among creeping animals which the waters brought forth after their kinds, and to every fowl of heaven after its kind; and after these, to the wild beasts of the earth after their kind, and the beasts after their kind, and to every creeping thing upon the earth after its kind; and last of all to man. The expres sion * made," however, is not applied to other things; but it is deemed sufficient to say regarding light, * And it was light;" and regarding the one gathering together of all the waters that are under the whole heaven, “It was so." And in like manner also, with regard to what grew upon the earth, where it is said, “The earth brought forth grass, and herb yielding seed after its kind and after its likeness, and the fruit-tree yielding fruit, whose seed is in itself, after its kind, upon the earth." He would have inquired, moreover, whether the recorded command: of God respecting the coming into existence of each part of the world were addressed to one thing or to several;? and he would not lightly have charged with being unintelligible, and as having no secret meaning, the accounts related in these books, either by Moses, or, as we would say, by the Divine Spirit speaking? Moses, from whom also he derived the power of prophesy!ng: since he “knew both the present, and the future, and the past,” in a higher degree than those priests who are alleged by the poets to have possessed a knowledge of these things.
CHAPTER LVI.
Moreover, since Celsus asserts that “the soul is the work 1 γίνε ἢ τίσι».
Book rv. ] ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. 223 of God, but that the nature of body is different; and that in this respect there is no difference between the body of a bat, or of a worm, or of a frog, and that of a man, for the matter is the same, and their corruptible part alike,"—we have to say in answer to this argument of his, that if, since the same matter underlies the body of a bat, or of a worm, or of a frog, or of a man, these bodies will differ in no respect from one another, it is evident then that these bodies also will differ in no respect from the sun, or the moon, or the stars, or the sky, or any other thing which is called by the Greeks a god, cognisable by the senses! For the same matter, underlying all bodies, is, pro- perly speaking, without qualities and without form, and derives its qualities from some [other] source, I know not whence, since Celsus will have it that nothing corruptible can be the work of God. Now the corruptible part of everything whatever, being produced from the same underlying matter, must necessarily be the same, by Celsus’ own showing; unless, indeed, finding himself here hard pressed, he should desert Plato, who makes the soul arise from a certain bowl,? and take refuge with Aristotle and the Peripatetics, who maintain that the ether is immaterial, and consists of a fifth nature, separate from the other four elements,* against which view both the Platonists and the Stoics have nobly protested. And we too, who are despised by Celsus, will contravene it, seeing we are required to explain and maintain the following statement of the prophet: * The heavens shall perish, but Thou remainest: and they all shall wax old as a garment; and as a vesture shalt Thou fold them up, and they shall be changed: but Thou art the same."? These remarks, however, are sufficient in reply to Celsus, when he asserts that * the soul is the work of God, but that the nature of body is different;” for from his argument it follows that there is no difference between the body of a bat, or of a worm, or of a frog, and that of a heavenly® being.
CHAPTER LVII.
—. See, then, whether we ought to yield to one who, holding 1 αἰσθητοῦ θεοῦ. 3 Cf. Plato in Timzo. $ ἄῦλον. 4 χέμπτης capa τὼ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα εἶναι Φύσεως. 5 Cf. Ps. cii. 26, 27. © aléspíov.
224 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. [Book rv.
such opinions, calumniates the Christians, and thus abandon a doctrine which explains the difference existing among bodies as due to the different qualities, internal and external, which are implanted in them. For we, too, know that there are * bodies celestial, and bodies terrestrial;” and that “the glory of the celestial is one, and the glory of the terrestrial another;” and that even the glory of the celestial bodies is not alike: for * one is the glory of the sun, and another the glory of the stars;" and among the stars themselves, “one star differeth from another star in glory"! And therefore, as those who expect the resurrection of the dead, we assert that the qualities which are in bodies undergo change: since some bodies, which are sown in corruption, are raised in incorruption; and others, sown in dis- honour, are raised in glory; and others, again, sown in weakness, are raised in power; and those which are sown natural bodies, are raised as spiritual? That the matter which underlies bodies is capable of receiving those qualities which the Creator pleases to bestow, is a point which all of us who accept the doctrine of providence firmly hold; so that, if God so willed, one quality is at the present time implanted in this portion of matter, and afterwards another of a different and better kind. But since there are, from the beginning of the world, laws? established for the purpose of regulating the changes of bodies, and which will continue while the world lasts, I do not know whether, when a new and different order of things has succeeded* after the destruction of the world, and what our Scriptures call the end? [of the ages], it is not wonderful that at the present time a snake should be formed out of a dead man, growing, as the multitude affirm, out of the marrow of the back,’ and that a bee should spring from an ox, and a wasp from a horse, and a beetle from an ass, and, generally, worms from the most of bodies. — Celsus, indeed, thinks that this can be shown to be the consequence of none of these bodies being the work of God, 1 Cf. 1 Cor. xv. 41, ete. 2 Cf. 1 Cor. xv. 44. 3 odor.
4 καινῆς διαδεξαμένης ὁδοῦ καὶ ἀλλοία;, etc. For διαδεξαμένη;, Boherellus would read διαδεξομένης. Cf. Origen, de Princip. iii. c. v.
5 συντέλεια.
6 Cf. Pliny, x. c. 66: ‘* Anguem ex medullá hominis sping gigni accepi- mus ἃ multis" Cf. also Ovid, Metamorphos. xv. fab. iv.
Book 1v.] ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. 225 and that qualities (I know not whence it was so arranged that one should spring out of another) are not the work of a divine intelligence, producing the changes which occur in the qualities of matter.
CHAPTER LVIII.
But we have something more to say to Celsus, when he declares that “ the soul is the work of God, and that the nature of body is different,” and puts forward such an opinion not only without proof, but even without clearly defining his mean- ing; for he did not make it evident whether he meant that every soul is the work of God, or only the rational soul. This, then, is what we have to say: If every soul is the work of God, it is manifest that those of the meanest irrational animals are God's work, so that the nature of alt bodies is different from that of the soul. He appears, however, in what follows, where he says that ‘irrational animals are more beloved by God than we, and have a purer knowledge of divinity,” to maintain that not only is the soul of man, but in a much greater degree that of irrational animals, the work of God; for this follows from their being said to be more beloved by God than we. Now if the rational soul alone be the work of God, then, in the first place, he did not clearly indicate that such was his opinion; and in the second place, this deduction follows from his indefi- nite language regarding the soul—viz. whether not every one, but only the rational, is the work of God—that neither is the nature of all bodies different [from the soul]. Butif the nature of all bodies be not different, although the body of each animal correspond to its soul, it is evident that the body of that animal whose soul was the work of God, would differ from the body of that animal in which dwells a soul which was not the work of God. And so the assertion will be false, that there is no differ- ence between the body of a bat, or of a worm, or of a frog, and that of a man.
CHAPTER LIX.
For it would, indeed, be absurd that certain stones and buildings should be regarded as more sacred or more profane than others, according as they were constructed for the honour ORIG.—VOL. II. "t d 226 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. | BOOK IV.
of God, or for the reception of dishonourable and accursed persons;* while bodies should not differ from bodies, according as they are inhabited by rational or irrational beings, and according as these rational beings are the most virtuous or most worthless of mankind. Such a principle of distinction, indeed, has led some to deify the bodies of distinguished men,’ as having received a virtuous soul, and to reject and treat with dishonour those of very wicked individuals. I do not maintain that such a principle has been always soundly exercised, but that it had its origin in a correct idea. Would a wise map, indeed, after the death of Anytus and Socrates, think of bury- ing the bodies of both with like honours? And would he raise the same mound or tomb to the memory of both? These instances we have adduced because of the language of Celsus, that “none of these is the work of God” (where the words * of these" refer to the body of a man, or to the snakes which come out of the body; and to that of an ox, or of the bees which come from the body of an ox; and to that of a horse, or of an ass, and to the wasps which come from a horse, and the beetles which proceed from an ass); for which reason we have been obliged to return to the consideration of his state- ment, that “the soul is the work of God, but that the nature of body is different."
CHAPTER LX.
CHAPTER LX.
He next proceeds to say, that a common nature pervades all the previously mentioned bodies, and one which goes and returns the same amid recurring changes"? In answer to this, it is evident from what has been already said, that not only does a common nature pervade those bodies which have been previously enumerated, but the heavenly bodies as well. And if this is the case, it is clear also that, according to Celsus (although I do not know whether it is according to truth), it 8 one nature which goes and returns the same through all bodies amid recurring changes. It is evident also. that this is the case in the opinion of those who hold that the world is to perish; while those also who hold the opposite view will endeavour fo 1 σωμάτων. 3 τῶν διαφερόντων. ὃ καὶ μία εἰς εἱβοοιβὴν παλίντροπον ἰοῦσα καὶ ixavioves.
Boox rv. ] ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. 227 show, without the assumption of a fifth substance,! that in their judgment too it is one nature “which goes and returns the same through all bodies amid recurring changes.” And thus, even that which is perishable remains in order to undergo a change;? for the matter which underlies [all things], while its properties perish, still abides, according to the opinion of those who hold it to be uncreated. If, however, it can be shown by any arguments not to be uncreated, but to have been created for certain purposes, it is clear that it will not have the same nature of permanency which it would possess on the hypothesis of being uncreated. But it is not our object at present, in answering the charges of Celsus, to discuss these questions of natural philosophy. - CHAPTER LXI.
CHAPTER LXI.
He maintains, moreover, that *no product of matter is immortal? Now, in answer to this it may be said, that if no product of matter is immortal, then either the whole world is immortal, and thus not a product of matter, or it is not im- mortal. If, accordingly, the world is immortal (which is agree- able to the view of those who say that the soul alone is the work of God, and was produced from a certain bowl), let Celsus show that the world was not produced from a matter devoid of qualities, remembering his own assertion that * no product of matter is immortal" If, however, the world is not immortal (seeing it is a product of matter), but mortal, does it also perish, or does it not? For if it perish, it will perish as being a work of God; and then, in the event of the world perishing, what will become of the soul, which is also a work of God? Let Celsus answer this! But if, perverting the notion of immortality, he will assert that, although perishable, it is immortal, because it does not really perish; that it is capable of dying, but does not actually die,—it is evident that, according to him, there will exist something which is at the same time mortal and immortal, by being capable of both con- ditions; and that which does not die will be mortal, and that Which is not immortal by nature will be termed in a peculiar sense immortal, because it does not die! According to what 1 σῶμα. 2 οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπολλύμενον slg μεταβολὴν διαμένει.
228 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. [Book 1v.
distinction, then, in the meaning of words, will he maintain that no product of matter is immortal? And thus you see that the ideas contained in his writings, when closely examined and tested, are proved not to be sound and incontrovertible.! And after making these assertions he adds: “On this point ‘these remarks are sufficient; and if any one is capable of hearing and examining further, he will come to know [the truth]. ^ Let us, then, who in his opinion are unintelligent individuals, see what will result from our being able to listen to him for a little, and so continue our investigation.
CHAPTER LXII.
CHAPTER LXII.
After these matters, then, he thinks that he can make us acquainted in a few words with the questions regarding the nature of evil, which have been variously discussed in many important treatises, and which have received very opposite explanations. His words are: “There neither were formerly, nor are there now, nor will there be again, more or fewer evils in the world [than have always been]. For the nature of all things is one and the same, and the generation of evils is always the same.” He seems to have paraphrased these words from the discussions in the Theetetus, where Plato makes Socrates say: ‘ It is neither possible for evils to disappear from among men, nor for them to become established among the gods,” and so on. But he appears:to me not to have under- stood Plato correctly, although professing to include all truth? in this one treatise, and giving to his own book against us the title of A True Discourse. For the language in the 7imeus, where it is said, “ When the gods purify the earth with water,” shows that the earth, when purified with water, contains less evil than it did before its purification, And this assertion, that there at one time were fewer evils in the world, is one which we make, in harmony with the opinion of Plato, because of the language in the Theetetus, where he says that “evils cannot disappear from among men.”
1 διελέγχεται οὐκ ἐπιδεχόμενω τὸ γενναῖον xal dyarrvipfuvor. 3 ὁ τὴν οἐλήθειαν ἐχπεριλαμιβάνων.
Book 1v.] ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. 229 CHAPTER LXIII.
I do not understand how Celsus, while admitting the existence of Providence, at least so far as appears from the language of this book, can say that there never existed [at any time] either more or fewer evils, but, as it were, a fixed number; thus annihilat- ing the beautiful doctrine regarding the indefinite! nature of evil, and asserting that evil, even in its own nature,” is infinite. Now it appears to'follow from the position, that there never have been, nor are now, nor ever will be, more or fewer evils in the world; that as, according to the view of those who hold the indestructibility of the world, the equipoise of the elements is maintained by a Providence (which does not permit one to gain the preponderance over the others, in order to prevent the destruction of the world), so à kind of Providence presides, as it were, over evils (the number of which is fixed)? to prevent their being either increased or diminished! In other ways, too, are the arguments of Celsus concerning evil confuted, by those philosophers who have investigated the subjects of good and evil, and who have proved also from history that in former times it was without the city, and with their faces concealed by masks, that loose women hired themselves to those who wanted them; that subsequently, becoming more impudent, they laid aside their masks, though not being permitted by the laws to enter the cities, they [still] remained without them, until, as the dissoluteness of manners daily increased, they dared [finally] even to enter the cities. Such accounts are given by Chrysippus in the introduction to his work on Good and Evil. From this also it may be seen that evils both increase and decrease, viz. that those individuals who were called * Ambiguous" * used formerly to present themselves openly to view, suffering and committing all shameful things, while subserving the passions of those who frequented their society; but recently they have been expelled [from the city] by the authorities And of countless evils which, owing to the spread of wickedness, have made their appearance in human life, we may say that formerly they did not exist. For the most ancient histories, which bring 1 ἀόριστον. 2 xal τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ. 8 τοσοϊσὸς τυγχάνουσιν. 4 ᾿Ακφίβολοι. S ᾿Αγορανόμοι.
230 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. [Booz rv.
innumerable other accusations against sinful men, know nothing of the perpetrators of abominable! crimes.
CHAPTER LXIV.
And now, after these arguments, and others of a similar kind, how can Celsus escape appearing in a ridiculous light, when he imagines that there never has been in the past, nor will be in the future, a greater or less number of evils? For although the nature of all things is one and the same, it does not at all follow that the production of evils is a constant quantity.’ For although the nature of a certain individual is one and the same, yet his mind, and his reason, and his actions, are not always alike:* there being a time when he had not yet attained to reason; and another, when, with the possession of reason, he had become stained with wickedness, and when. this increased to a greater or less degree; and again, a time when he devoted himself to virtue, and made greater or less progress therein, attaining sometimes the very summit of perfection, through longer or shorter periods of contemplation.* In like manner, we may make the same assertion in a higher degree of the nature of the universe,® that although it is one and the same in kind, yet neither do exactly the same things, nor yet things that are similar, occur in it; for we neither have invariably productive nor unproductive seasons, nor yet periods of continuous rain oF of drought. And so in the same way, with regard to virtuods souls, there are neither appointed periods of fertility nor of barrenness; and the same is the case with the greater or less spread of evil. And those who desire to investigate all things