After this, Celsus, desirous of maintaining that Providence created the products of the earth, not more on our account than on that of the most savage animals, thus proceeds: ** We indeed by labour and suffering earn a scanty and toilsome subsistence,” while all things are produced for them without their sowing and ploughing.” He does not observe that God, wishing to exercise the human understanding in all countries (that it might not remain idle and unacquainted with the arts), created man a being full of wants? in order that by virtue of his very needy condition he might be compelled to be the inventor of arts, some of which minister to his subsistence, and others to his protection. For it was better that those who would not have sought out divine things, nor engaged in the study of philosophy, should be placed in a condition of want, in order that they might employ their understanding in the invention of the arts, than that they should altogether neglect the cultivation of their minds, because their condition was one of abundance. The want of the necessaries of human life led to the invention on the one hand of the art of husbandry, on the other to that of the cultivation of the vine; again, to the art of gardening, and the arts of carpentry and smithwork, by means of which were formed the tools required for the arts which mini- ster to the support of life. The want of covering, again, intro- duced the art of weaving, which followed that of wool-carding and spinning; and again, that of house-building: and thus the intelligence of men ascended even to the art of architecture. The want of necessaries caused the products also of other places to be conveyed, by means of the arts of sailing and pilotage; to those who were without them; so that even on that account one might admire the Providence which made the rational being 1 Cf. Ecclus. xxxix. 21, and 16, 17. 3 μόλις καὶ ἐπεπόκως. 8 ἐχιδεῆ. 4 30 ναυτικῆς καὶ κυβερνητοιῆς.
Boox 1v.] ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. 243 subject to want in a far higher degree than the irrational animals, and yet all with a view to his advantage. For the irrational animals have their food provided for them, because there is not in them even an impulse’ towards the invention of the arts. They have, besides, a natural covering; for they are provided either with hair, or wings, or scales, or shells. Let the above, then, be our answer to the assertions of Celsus, when he says that “ we indeed by labour and suffering earn a scanty and toilsome subsistence, while all things are produced for them without their sowing and ploughing."
CHAPTER LXXVII.
In the next place, forgetting that his object is to accuse both Jews and Christians, he quotes against himself an iambic verse of Euripides, which is opposed to his view, and joining issue with the words, charges them with being an erroneous state- ment. His words are as follow: * But if you will quote the saying of Euripides, that ‘The Sun and Night are to mortals slaves,’?
why should they be so in a greater degree to us than to ants and flies? For the night is created for them in order that they may rest, and the day that they may see and re- sume their work.” Now it is undoubted, that not only have . certain of the Jews and Christians declared that the sun and the heavenly bodies? are our servants; but he also has said this, who, according to some, is the philosopher of the stage, and who was a hearer of the lectures on the philosophy of nature delivered by Anaxagoras. But this man asserts that all things in the world are subject to all rational beings,—one rational nature being taken to represent all, on the principle of a part standing for the whole;° which, again, clearly appears from the verse: *C The Sun and Night are to mortals slaves.”
Perhaps the tragic poet meant the day when he said the sun, 1 ἀφορμήν. 2 Cf. Eurip. Pheniss. v. 512. ὃ τὸ iv οὐρανῷ.
4 ὁ xard τινας Σκηνικὸς Φιλόσοφο;. Euripides himself is the person alluded to. He is called by Athenzeus and Clemens Alexandrinus (Strom. v.), ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηγῆς Φιλόσοφο;.---Ὲ LA RUE.
, ὅ συνεχδοχικῶς.
244 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. [Boox rv.
inasmuch as it is the cause of the day,—teaching that those things which most need the day and night are the things which are under the moon, and other things in a less degree than those which are upon the earth. Day and night, then, are subject to mortals, being created for the sake of rational beings. And if ants and flies, which labour by day and rest by night, have, besides, the benefit of those things which were created for the sake of men, we must not say that day and night were brought into being for the sake of ants and flies, nor must we suppose that they were created for the sake of nothing, but, agreeably to the design of Providence, were formed for the sake of man.
CHAPTER LXXVIII.
CHAPTER LXXVIII.
He next proceeds further to object against himself! what is said on behalf of man, viz. that the irrational animals were created on his account, saying: “If one were to call us the lords of the animal creation because we hunt the other animals and live upon their flesh, we would say, Why were not we rather created on their account, since they hunt and devour us? Nay, we require nets and weapons, and the assistance of many persons, along with dogs, when engaged in the chase; while they are immediately and spontaneously provided by nature with weapons which easily bring us under their power.” And here we may observe, that the gift of understanding has been be- stowed upon us as a mighty aid, far superior to any weapon which wild beasts may seem to possess. We, indeed, who are far weaker in bodily strength than the beasts, and shorter in stature than some of them, yet by means of our understanding obtain the mastery, and capture the huge elephants. We subdue by our gentle treatment those animals whose nature it is to be tamed, while with those whose nature is different, or which do not appear likely to be of use to us when tamed, we take such precautionary measures, that when we desire it, we keep such wild beasts shut up; and when we need the flesh of their bodies for food, we slaughter them, as we do those beasts which are not of a savage nature. The Creator, then, has constituted all things the servants of the rational being l ἑαντξ ἀνθυποζέρει.
Book rv. ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. 245 and of his natural understanding. For some purposes we require dogs, say as guardians of our sheep-folds, or of our cattle-yards, or goat-pastures, or of our dwellings; and for other purposes we need oxen, as for agriculture; and for others, again, we make use of those which bear the yoke, or beasts of burden. And so it may be said that the race of lions, and bears, and leopards, and wild boars, and such like, has been given to us in order to call into exercise the elements of the manly character that exists within us.
CHAPTER LXXIX.
In the next place, in answer to the human race, who per- ceive their own superiority, which far exceeds that of the irra- tional animals, he says: “ With respect to your assertion, that God gave you the power to capture wild beasts, and to make your own use of them, we would say that, in all probability, before cities were built, and arts invented, and societies such as now exist were formed, and weapons and nets employed, men were generally caught and devoured by wild beasts, while wild beasts were very seldom captured by men." Now, in reference to this, observe that although men catch wild beasts, and wild beasts make prey of men, there is a great difference between the case of such as by means of their understanding obtain the mastery over those whose superiority consists in their savage and cruel nature, and that of those who do not make use of their understanding to secure their safety from injury by wild beasts. But when Celsus says, * before cities were built, and arts invented, and societies such as now exist were formed," he appears to have forgotten what he had before said, that *the world was uncreated and incorruptible, and that it was only the things on earth which underwent deluges and con- flagrations, and that all these things did not happen at the same time.” Now let it be granted that these admissions on his part are entirely in harmony with our views, though not at all with him and his statements made above; yet what does it all avail to prove that in the beginning men were mostly captured and devoured by wild beasts, while wild beasts were never caught by men? For, since the world was created in con- formity with the will of Providence, and God presided over the 246 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. [Boox rv.
universe of things, it was necessary that the elements! of the human race should at the commencement of its existence be placed under some protection of the higher powers, so that there might be formed from the beginning a union of the divine nature with that of men. And the poet of Ascra, per- ceiving this, sings: * For common then were banquets, and common were seats, Alike to immortal gods and mortal men."? CHAPTER LXXX.
Those Holy Scriptures, moreover, which bear the name of Moses, introduce the first men as hearing divine voices and oracles, and beholding sometimes the angels of God coming to visit them. For it was probable that in the beginning of the world's existence human nature would be assisted to a greater degree [than afterwards], until progress had been made towards the attainment of understanding and the other virtues, and the invention of the arts, and they should thus be able to maintain life of themselves, and no longer stand in need of superintendents, and of those to guide them who do so with a miraculous manifestation of the means which subserve the will of God. Now it follows from this, that it is false that ‘in the beginning men were captured and devoured by wild beasts, while wild beasts were very seldom caught by men." And from this, too, it is evident that the following statement of Celsus is untrue, that “in this way God rather subjected men to wild beasts." For God did not subject men to wild beasts, but gave wild beasts to be a prey to the understanding of man, and to the arts, which are directed against them, and which are the product of the understanding. For it was not without the help of God* that men desired for themselves the means of protection against wild beasts, and of securing the mastery over them.
CHAPTER LXXXI.
CHAPTER LXXXI.
Our noble opponent, however, not observing how many philosophers there are who admit the existence of Providence, 1 ζώπυρα. 2 Cf. Hesiod, Fragmenta Incerta, ed. Goettling, p. 281. 3 οὐ yep ἐθεεί.
Book 1v.] ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. 247 and who hold that Providence created all things for the sake οὗ rational beings, overturns as far as he can those doctrines which are of use in showing the harmony that prevails in these matters between Christianity and philosophy; nor does he see how great is the injury done to religion from accepting the statement that before God there is no difference between a man and an ant or a bee, but proceeds to add, that “if men appear to be superior to irrational animals on this account, that they have built cities, and make use of a political constitution, and forms of government, and sovereignties,! this is to say nothing to the purpose, for ants and bees do the same. Bees, indeed, have a sovereign, who has followers and attendants; and there occur among them wars and victories, and slaughterings of the vanquished,’ and cities and suburbs, and a succession of labours, and judgments passed upon the idle and the wicked; for the drones are driven away and punished." Now here he did not observe the difference that exists between what is done after reason and consideration, and what is the result of an irrational nature, and is purely mechanical. For the origin of these things is not explained by the existence of any rational principle in those who make them, because they do not possess any such principle; but the most ancient Being, who is also the Son of God, and the King of all things that exist, has created an irrational nature, which, as being irrational, acts as a help to those who are deemed worthy of reason. Cities, accordingly, were established among men, with many arts and well-arranged laws; while constitutions, and governments, and sovereignties among men are either such as are properly so termed, and which exemplify certain virtuous tendencies and workings, or they are those which are improperly so called, and which were devised, so far as could be done, in imitation of the former: for it was by contemplating these that the most successful legislators established the best constitutions, and governments, and sovereignties. None of these things, however, can be found among irrational animals, although Celsus may transfer 1 ἡγεμονίαις.
2 τῶν ἡττημένων αἱρίσεις. ‘* Nota αἱρέσεις hoc loco sumi pro internecioni- bus, czdibus. Haud scio an alibi reperiatur pari significatu. Forte etiam scribendum x«a:cíct;. " —RUJEUS.
248 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. [Book 1v.
rational names, and arrangements which belong to rational beings, as cities and constitutions, and rulers and sovereignties, even to ants and bees; in respect to which matters, however, ants and bees merit no approval, because they do not act from reflec- tion. But we ought to admire the divine nature, which extended even to irrational animals the capacity, as it were, of imitating rational beings, perhaps with a view of putting rational beings to shame; so that by looking upon ants, for instance, they might become more industrious and more thrifty in the man- agement of their goods; while, by considering the bees, they might place themselves in subjection to their Ruler, and take their respective parts in those constitutional duties which are of use in ensuring the safety of cities.
CHAPTER LXXXII.
CHAPTER LXXXII.
Perhaps also the so-called wars among the bees convey in- struction as to the manner in which wars, if ever there arise a necessity for them, should be waged in a just and orderly way among men. But the bees have no cities or suburbs; while their hives and hexagonal cells, and succession of labours, are for the sake of men, who require honey for many purposes, both for cure of disordered bodies, and as a pure article of food. Nor ought we to compare the proceedings taken by the bees against the drones with the judgments and punishments inflicted on the idle and wicked in cities. But, as I formerly said, we ought on the one hand in these things to admire the divine nature, and on the other to express our admiration of man, who is capable of considering and admiring all things (as co-operating with Providence), and who executes not merely the works which are determined by the providence of God, but also those which are the consequences of his own foresight.
CHAPTER LXXXIIT.
After Celsus has finished speaking of the bees, in order to depreciate (as far as he can) the cities, and constitutions, and governments, and sovereignties not only of us Christians, but of all mankind, as well as the wars which men undertake on behalf of their native countries, he proceeds, by way of digres- sion, to pass a eulogy upon the ants, in order that, while Book ιν. ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. 249 praising them, he may compare the measures which men take to secure their subsistence with those adopted by these insects,! and so evince his contempt for the forethought which makes provision for winter, as being nothing higher than the irrational providence of the ants, as he regards it. Now might not some of the more simple-minded, and such as know not how to look into the nature of all things, be turned away (so far, at least, as Celsus could accomplish it) from helping those who are weighed down with the burdens [of life], and from sharing their toils, when he says of the ants, that “they help one another with their loads, when they see one of their number toiling under them?" For he who needs to be disciplined by the word, but who does not at all understand? its voice, will say: ‘Since, then, there is no difference between us and the ants, even when we help those who are weary with bearing their heavy burdens, why should we continue to do so to no purpose?” And would not the ants, as being irrational creatures, be greatly puffed up, and think highly of themselves, because their works were com- pared to those of men? while men, on the other hand, who by means of their reason are enabled to hear how their philan- thropy? towards others is contemned, would be injured, so far as could be effected by Celsus and his arguments: for he does not perceive that, while he wishes to turn away from Christianity those who read his treatise, he turns away also the sympathy of those who are not Christians from those who bear the heaviest burdens [of life]. Whereas, had he been a philo- sopher, who was capable of perceiving the good which men may do each other, he ought, in addition to not removing along with Christianity the blessings which are found amongst men, to have lent his aid to co-operate (if he had it in his power) with those principles of excellence which are common to Christianity and the rest of mankind. Moreover, even if the ants set apart in a place by themselves those grains which sprout forth, that they may not swell into bud, but may continue throughout the year as their food, this is not to be deemed as evidence of the exist- ence of reason among ants, but as the work of the universal 1 παραβάλῃ τῷ λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς μύρμηκας. ‘Verba: τῷ λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς μύρμηκας addititia videntur et recidenda."—R Eus.
3 ἱπαΐων. 8 ro κοινωνικόν.
4, 250 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. [Boox rv.
mother, Nature, which adorned even irrational animals, so that even the most insignificant is not omitted, but bears traces of the reason implanted in it by nature. Unless, indeed, by these assertions Celsus means obscurely to intimate (for in many instances he would like to adopt Platonic ideas) that all souls are of the same species, and that there is no difference between that of a man and those of ants and bees, which is the act of one who would bring down the soul from the vault of heaven, and cause it to enter not only a human body, but that of an animal. Christians, however, will not yield their assent to such opinions: for they have been instructed before now that the human soul was created in the image of God; and they see that it is impossible for a nature fashioned in the divine image to have its [original] features altogether obliterated, and to assume others, formed after I know not what likeness of irra- tional animals.
CHAPTER LXXXIV.
CHAPTER LXXXIV.
And since he asserts that, * when ants die, the survivors set apart a special place [for their interment], and that their ancestral sepulchres such a place is,” we have to answer, that the greater the laudations which he heaps upon irrational animals, so much the more does he magnify (although against his will) the work of that reason which arranged all things in order, and points out the skill which exists among men, and which is capable of adorning by its reason even the gifts which are bestowed by nature on the irrational creation. But why do I say "irrational," since Celsus is of opinion that these animals, which, agreeably to the common ideas of all men, are termed irrational, are not really so? Nor does he regard the ants as devoid of reason, who professed to speak of “ universal nature," and who boasted of his truthfulness in the inscription of his book. For, speak- ing of the ants conversing with one another, he uses the fol- lowing language: “And when they meet one another they enter into conversation, for which reason they never mistake their way; consequently they possess a full endowment of reason, and some common ideas on certain general subjects, and a voice by which they express themselves regarding accidental ἐντρέχειαν.
ἐντρέχειαν.
Book ιν. ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. 251 things.”* Now conversation between one man and another is carried on by means of a voice, which gives expression to the meaning intended, and which also gives utterances concerning what are called “ accidental things;" but to say that this was the case with ants would be & most ridiculous assertion.
CHAPTER LXXXV.
He is not ashamed, moreover, to say, in addition to these statements (that the unseemly character? of his opinions may be manifest to those who will live after him): “Come now, if one were to look down from heaven upon earth, in what respect would our actions appear to differ from those of ants and bees?" Now does he who, according to his own supposition, looks from heaven upon the proceedings of men and ants, look upon their bodies alone, and not rather have regard to the con- troling reason which is called into action by reflection;* while, on the other hand, the guiding principle of the latter is irrational, and set in motion irrationally by impulse and fancy, in conjunction with a certain natural apparatus?‘ Bat it is absurd to suppose that he who looks from heaven upon earthly things would desire to look from such a distance upon the bodies of men and ants, and would not rather consider the nature of the guiding principles, and the source of impulses, whether that be rational or irrational. And if he once look upon the source of all impulses, it is manifest that he would behold also the difference which exists, and the superiority of man, not only over ants, but even over elephants. For he who looks from heaven will see among irrational creatures, however large their bodies, no other principle* than, so to speak, irration- -ality;° while amongst rational beings he will discover reason, the common possession of men, and of divine and heavenly beings, .and perhaps of the supreme God Himself, on account of which 1 οὐχοῦν καὶ λόγον συμπλήρωσις ἐστι weep’ αὐτοῖς, καὶ κοιναὶ syvosees καθολι- κῶν, τένων καὶ Φωνὴ, καὶ τυγχάνοντα σηριαινόῤοενα.
3 ἀσχημοσύνην.
5. οὐ κατανοεῖ δὲ τὸ λογικὸν ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ λογισμῷ κινούμενον; 4 μετά τινος Φυσικῆς ὑποκατασκευῆ;.
5 downy.
8 τὴν ἀλογίαν.
252 | ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. [Book rv.
man is said to have been created in the image of God, for tlie image of the Supreme God is his reason.’
CHAPTER LXXXVI.
Immediately after this, as if doing his utmost to reduce the human race to a still lower position, and to bring them to the level of the irrational animals, and desiring to omit not a single circumstance related of the latter which manifests their great- ness, he: declares that “in certain individuals among the irra- tional creation there exists the power of sorcery;" so that even in this particular men cannot specially pride themselves, nor wish to arrogate a superiority over irrational creatures. And the following are his words: “If, however, men entertain lofty notions because of their possessing the power of sorcery, yet even in that respect are serpents and eagles their superiors in wisdom; for they are acquainted with many prophylactics against persons and diseases, and also with the virtues of certain stones which help to preserve their young. If men, however, fall in with these, they think that they have gained a wonderful pos- session.” Now, in the first place, I know not why he should designate as sorcery the knowledge of natural prophylactics displayed by animals,—whether that knowledge be the result of experience, or of some natural power of apprehension;? for the term “sorcery” has by usage been assigned to something else. Perhaps, indeed, he wishes quietly, as an Epicurean, to censure the entire use of such arts, as resting only on the professions of sorcerers. However, let it be granted him that men do pride themselves greatly upon the knowledge of such arts, whether they are sorcerers or not: how can serpents be in this respect wiser. than men, when they make use of the well-known fennel? to sharpen their power of vision and to produce rapidity of movement, having obtained this natural power not from the exercise of reflection, but from the con- stitution of their body,* while men do not, like serpents, arrive at such knowledge merely by nature, but partly by experiment, partly by reason, and sometimes by reflection and knowledge? So, if eagles, too, in order to preserve their yous l λόγος. 2 φυσικήν tive κατάληψιν. 3 τῷ μαοάθρῳ. 4 ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ κατασκευῆς.
Book tv. ] ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. - 253 in the nest, carry thither the eagle-stone when they have dis- covered it, how does it appear that they are wise, and more intelligent than men, who find out by the exercise of their reflective powers and of their understanding what has been bestowed by nature upon eagles as a gift?
CHAPTER LXXXVII.
Let it be granted, however, that there are other prophylac- tics against poisons known to animals: what does that avail to prove that it is not nature, but reason, which leads to the dis- covery of such things among them? For if reason were the discoverer, this one thing (or, if you will, one or two more things) would not be (exclusive! of all others) the sole discovery made by serpents, and some other thing the sole discovery of the eagle, and so on with the rest of the animals; but as many discoveries would have been made amongst them as among men. But now it is manifest from the determinate inclina- tion of the nature of each animal towards certain kinds of help, that they possess neither wisdom nor reason, but a natural ' constitutional tendency implanted by the Logos? towards such things in order to ensure the preservation of the animal. And, indeed, if I wished to join issue with Celsus in these matters, I might quote the words of Solomon from the book of Proverbs, which run thus: “ There be four things which are little upon the earth, but these are wiser than the wise: The ants are a people not strong, yet they prepare their meat in the summer; the conies? are but a feeble folk, yet make they their houses in the rocks; the locusts have no king, yet go they forth in order at one command; and the spotted lizard,* though lean- ing upon its hands, and being easily captured, dwelleth in kings' fortresses." I do not quote these words, however, as taking them in their literal signification, but, agreeably to the title of the book (for it is inscribed ** Proverbs”), I investigate them as containing a secret meaning. For it is the custom of these l ὠποτεταγμένως.
3 ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγον γεγενημένη.
5. χοιρογρύλλιοι. Heb. Ds. 4 ἀσκαλαβώτης.
δ Cf. Prov. xxx. 24-28.
254 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. [ Book rv.
writers [of Scripture] to distribute into many classes those writ- ings which express one sense when taken literally,’ but which convey a different signification as their hidden meaning; and one of these kinds of writing is * Proverbs." And for this reason, in our Gospels too, is our Saviour described as saying: “ These things have I spoken to you in proverbs, but the time cometh when I shall no more speak unto you in proverbs.” It is not, then, the visible ants which are “ wiser even than the wise," but they who are indicated as such under the “ pro- verbial” style of expression. And such must be our conclusion regarding the rest of the animal creation, although Celsus regards the books of the Jews and Christians as exceedingly simple and commonplace,’ and imagines that those who give them an allegorical interpretation do violence to the meaning of the writers. By what we have said, then, let it appear that Celsus calumniates us in vain, and let his assertions that serpents and eagles are wiser than men also receive their refutation.
CHAPTER LXXXVIII.