already existing mythology. There is no mention of Zeus, or Athene, or Apollo, or any of the Olympians, neither do we meet with any mere abstract term personified. I cannot find any proof that the Greeks ever personified Wisdom. Pindar, indeed, in his poem On a Solar Eclipse, speaks of "the path of Wisdom/' and 1 doubt not but similar expressions might be found elsewhere; still this does not amount to a personification of Wisdom. If we observe carefully, we shall, I think, be able to discover the name of the goddess meant. In lines 26, 27, we are informed that it was not an evil fate (Mot pa) that had brought the philosopher to the goddess, but that it was Justice and Right (Themis). Now we know already what part Justice (Dike) has taken in bringing him thither; but, so far as we know, Themis has done nothing towards it. Now we know in regaid to Themis that she stood in very close relation to Zeus (Odyssey II. 68); that she was by some held to be the eldest of the gods; that iEschylus consid- ered her identical with Gaia (Earth); that she was the goddess of law and order; that she was endowed with knowledge of the future, and that the Delphic oracle belonged to her. before it passed over to Apollo.
Pindar tells us, that "First the Fates bore the well-counselled, celes- tial Themis in their golden chariot from the springs of Ocean to the awful slope of Olympus, along the shining path, to be the time-honored spouse of Zeus the Saviour." The Fates, who led Themis to Olym- pus, are daughters of Night, whereas the guides of Parmenides are the daughters of the Sun; this fact would almost seem to throw light upon line 7. However this may be, if we consider all the attributes and the lofty position of Themis, we shall probably be convinced that she is the goddess referred to by Parmenides. If this be true, Parmenides may be supposed to have meant that insight led him to justice or right action, from which he passed to the mother or source of justice, which explained everything to him.
8. The goddess here mentions two paths, and, a few lines farther on, adds that they are the only ones open to thinking. In line 45, she mentions another path, which however is not open to thinking, being trod only by "unreasoning cattle. " 9. This line I have translated in a manner entirely different from that of any of the editors of the Fragments. In doing so, I have re- jected Mullach's entirely unauthorized reading, and retained that of one of the best MSS. I understand the line to mean, that every concept which sets itself up as the first principle must be tested by being made universal. If it can stand without any presuppositions, then it is the "True First Principle"; if it does not, it must be rejected. (See Jour, of Spec. Phil., Vol. III., No. 3, p. 288.)
10. Some space has been devoted to elucidating this Introduction, 1 2 Parmenides.
because the interpretation put upon it by Sextus Empeiricus has gene- rally been accepted as the true one.
11. The goddess now begins her discourse on Truth, the burden of which is that is is the universal predicate, and that there is no not-is. She warns her hearer to avoid believing the opposite doctrine. She sustains the true one by the argument that nothing can be thought or affirmed of that which has no being, and thence arrives at the famous conclusion that being and thinking are identical. Plotinus remarks upon this passage: "Previously (to Plato) Parmenides likewise touched upon this view, inasmuch as he reduced Being and mind to the same thing, and affirmed that mind did not lie in the objects of sensation. For when he says that to think and to be are the same thing, he says that this is immovable, and, although he attributes to it the power of thinking, he deprives it of all corporeal movement in order that it may remain unchanged, and likens it to the bulk of a sphere because it holds and comprehends everything, and because thinking is not outside but inside of itself." (Enneads, Y. 1, 8.)
12. Proklos's interpretation of these lines runs thus: "For Parmeni- des saw Being itself (as has been said before), that which is abstracted from all things, and the highest of things that are, that wherein the existent was primarily manifested: not that he ignored the multipli- city of objects of intelligence; for it was he who said, 'For Being ap- proaches to Being'; and again, ' To me 'tis indifferent Whence I begin, for thither again thou shalt find me returning;' and elsewhere, ' Everywhere distant alike from the centre' (line 103).
By all these expressions he shows that he considers that the objects of intelligence are many, and that there is a hierarchy among them of first, and middle, and second, and an ineffable union y thus not ignoring the multiplicity of the things that are, but seeing that the whole of this multiplicity has proceeded from the one Being. For there is the foun- tain of Being, and the home thereof, and the hidden Being from which the things that are draw their unity."
13. Plato, in a connection similar to this, says: "For these things are mere word-puzzles, and it is impossible to affirm in thought whether Being, or Non-Being, or both, or neither, belongs to any one of them." (Rep. V. 479, C.) Neither Parmenides nor Plato had an opportunity of reading Hegel's Logic, in which it is expressly affirmed that pure Being and pure Nothing are the same.
14. Plato says: "For the was and the shall be are generated forms of time, although we inadvertently and wrongly apply them to the Parmenides.. 13 eternal essence. For we say that it was, is, and shall be; yet the is only belongs to it truly, whereas was and shall be are properly predi- cated of that generation which goes forward in time." (Tim. 37, E.) Compare The Sentences of Porphyry, Jour, of Spec. Phil., Vol. III., No. 1. The whole of this fragment bears a striking resemblance to one of the hymns in the tenth book of the Big-Yeda. The following translation of it is taken from Max Mtiller's History of Ancient San- skrit Literature, p. 546: "Nor aught nor naught existed; yon bright sky Was not, nor heaven's broad woof outstretched above. What covered all? what sheltered? what concealed? Was it the water's fathomless abyss? There was not death — hence was there naught immortal, There was no confine betwixt day and night; The only One breathed breathless in itself, Other than it there nothing since has been. Darkness there was, and all at first was veiled In gloom profound — an ocean without light. The germ that still lay covered in the husk Burst forth, one nature, from the fervent heat. Then first came Love upon it, the new spring Of mind/ yea, poets in their hearts discerned, Pondering, this bond between created things And uncreated. Comes this spark from earth, Piercing and all-pervading, or from heaven? Then seeds were sown and mighty power arose — NatujjB below, and Power and Will above. WtuFknows the secret? who proclaimed it here, Whence, whence this manifold creation sprang? — The gods themselves came later into being. — Who knows from whence this great creation sprang? — He from whom all this great creation came, Whether his will created or was mute, The Most High Seer that is in highest heaven, He knows it — or, perchance, e'en he knows not."
15. Aristotle seems to have this passage in view, when he says: "Parmenides seems to hold to the One of reason, and Melissos to the One of mattei*. Accordingly the former affirms that the One is finite, the latter that it is infinite." Simplicius put the argument of Par- menides in a syllogistic form. "If Being is, and not Non-Being, it must be free from deficiency: but, being free from deficiency, it is per- fect; and being perfect, it must have an end, and is therefore not end« less. Having an end, it has a limit and a boundary." It is impos- sible to render into English the word-quibble on riXoq and ziXecov to which Simplicius here condescends.
16. This is a very clear statement of the doctrine promulgated by Spinoza — the Parmenides of modern philosophy. Hegel (History of 14 Parmenides.
Philosophy, Vol. III., p. 372) says: "The simple thought of the ideal- ism of Spinoza is: what is true is simply and solely the one substance whose attributes are thinking and extension (Nature): and this abso- lute unity alone is actual, is the actuality — it alone is God" (p. 376). "This, in general terms, is the Spinozan idea. It is the same as the $v of the Eleatics. It is the oriental view, which Spinoza was the first to utter in the "West. In general, we may remark that thought had of necessity to occupy the standpoint of Spinozism; that is the true beginning of all philosophy. If one begins to philosophize, ho must begin by being a Spinozist. The soul must bathe in this ether of the one substance, wherein all that was held to be true has vanished. It is to this negation of all particularity that every philosopher must come: it is the freeing of the spirit, and forms its absolute basis. The difference between the latter and the Eleatic philosophy is simply this, that, owing to the influence of Christianity in the modern world, there is present in the mind generally a more concrete individuality. Not- withstanding this infinite demand for the wholly concrete, however, substance is not defined as concrete in itself. Inasmuch, therefore, as the concrete does not lie in the content of substance, it must fall back upon the reflective thinking, and then it is only from the infinite antitheses of the latter that the unity results. Of substance as such nothing more can be predicated; we can speak only of philosophizing concerning it, and of the antitheses cancelled in it. All distinction depends simply upon the nature of the antitheses that are cancelled in it. Spinoza has been very far from demonstrating this as clearly as the ancients took the trouble to do." The two following propositions from Spinoza's JEthics will illustrate this: Book I. Prop. XIV. JBesides God no substance can be or be conceived. Demonstration. Since God is an absolutely infinite Being, of which no attribute expressing the essence of substance can be denied, and he exists of necessity; if there were any substance besides God, it would have to be explained by some attribute of God, and thus two substan- ces having the same attribute would exist, which is absurd. Where- fore there can be no substance besides God, and hence none such can be conceived. For if it could be conceived, it would necessarily be conceived as existing, and this, according to the former part of this demonstration, is absurd. Wherefore, besides God, &c. Q. B. D.
Book II. Prop. I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.
17. Simplicius, in commenting upon this passage, says: " We need not wonder if he says that the one Being is Hike to the bulk of a well- rounded sphere'; for by this figure he merely aims at a sort of mytho- logical image."
Parmenides. 15 18. Aristotle, Metaph. I, 5, says: u Parmenides seems to speak more circumspectly. For laying down Being, and considering ]STot-Being to be nothing, he of necessity thinks Being to be one, and nothing eke. * * * But being compelled to follow the phenomena, and assuming that the One is according to reason, and plurality according to sense, he again lays down the two causes and two first principles, hot and cold — meaning, for example, fire and earth. The former of these, the hot, he arranges on the side of Being, the other on that of Non-Being." In the extant fragments of Parmenides there is no mention of heat or cold, but only of light and darkness.
19. The word for circlets "does not occur in the original, but Cicero (J)e Naturd Deorum I. 11) tells us: " Parmenides makes a sort of fic- tion in the likeness of a crown. He gives it the name of arecpdvq, as encircling with a glow of light the sphere which surrounds the heav- en, and which he calls God, wherein no one can perceive either divine figure or sense." One is almost tempted, in reading this fragment, to believe that, according to the view of Parmenides, the sun occupied the centre of the material universe, and that the Anima Mundi, or Power that governed all thiDgs, was situated in the centre of the sun. There is extant a hymn of Proklos To the Sim, of which the opening lines may be translated thus: " Give ear, O'king of intellectual light; Gold-reined Titan, light's Dispenser, hear! O king, that holdest in thy hands the key Of life's sustaining fount, and from above Dost lead throughout the wide material worlds, In streams, the brimming fount of harmony, Give ear; for, seated on the central throne Above the ether, in the fulgent orb, The Universe's heart, thou fillest all With thine own spirit-waking forward thought. The planets, life-lit at thy fadeless torch, Forever in their ceaseless and unwearied rounds Send life-engendering beams to all on earth, While underneath thine ever-circling car, By firm decree, the sister seasons spring. The din of clashing elements was staid When thou appeard'st, sprung from a nameless sire. To thee the Fates' unvanquished band gave way, And backward twist the thread of destiny At thy behest; for thou art mightier far, And rnlest mightily with royal power."
There are many points of resemblance between this poem and the fragments of Parmenides, and, as Proklos was well acquainted with the work of the latter, we may with some probability suppose that he adopted his cosmological views. Erdmann, in his Grundriss der Ge- 16 Parmenides.
16 Parmenides.
schichte cler Philosophie,. says: "Parmenides' ideas of the construction of the Universe are cither incorrectly handed down, or are unintelli- gible from their peculiarity of expression. They did not prevent him from having, for his time, important astronomical information." This is clear from lines 143-4, which evidently refer to the moon.
20. This agrees somewhat with Hesiod's statement that Eros (Love) was the child of Chaos and Earth. (Theogony, 121.) Compare also note 14, and Preller's Griechische Mythologie, Yol. I., p. 393. We know also from Aristotle that Parmenides made Love one of the prime movers. The other of the two primal causes (afrtac'), mentioned by Aristotle, was doubtless Hate, as indeed we are told by Cicero. This, again, brings us very close to the doctrine of Empedokles, whose two great physical principles are Friendship (^dorvjc) and Strife (wuu?), or, as we should say in modern times, attraction and repulsion.
21. Theophrastos's note on this passage is: "Since there are two elements, the cognition is according to the one that prevails; for, ac- cording as the hot or the cold has the upper hand, the thought will differ."
22. The following Latin version of a passage of Parmenides, proba- bly connected with this, but no longer extant, occurs in Ccelius Aure- lianus De Morb. Chron. IV. 9: "Femina virque simul veneris quum semina miscent Venis, infornians diverso ex sanguine virtus, Temperieni servans, bene condita corpora fingit; At si virtutes permixto semine pugnent Nee faciant unam, permixto in corpore dirse Nascentetn srenimo vexabunt semine sexum."
'V C HML R T of purl of lilt COAST of AFRIC from ( ape S.Ann,, to the RivtrRtonoones, -by LlEUr J. MATTHEWS . \3. Tlitf Chart c.i- not intended for JSTautirnl purposes.
%t- Sta/e of Zeaffues zo fr a JJei/m \ r-" - E JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.
CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME.
Contents of No. 1.
I. To the Reader. II. The Speculative.
III. Herbert Spencer.
IV. Introduction to Fichte's Science ol Knowledge. V. Board's Essay on Hegel's ^Es- thetics. VI. Raphael's Transfiguration. VII. Introduction to Philosophy. VIII. Seed Life. IX. Schopenhauer on Immortality. X. Goethe's Theory of Colors.
Contents of No. 2.
I. Second Part of Goethe's Faust. II. Fichte's " Criticism of Philoso- phical Systems."
III. Notes on Milton's Lycidas.
IV. Hegel's Philosophy of Art. V. Introduction to Philosophy.
VI. Music as a Form of Art. VII. The Alchemists. VI1L Editorials.
Contents of No. 3. I. Translation of Leibnitz's Monad- ology. II. Fichte's "Criticism of Philosophi- cal Systems."
III. Schelling's "Introduction to Idealism."
IV. Genesis.
V. Hegel's Philosophy of Art. VI. The Metaphysics of Materialism. VII. Letters on Faust. VIII. Introduction to Philosophy. IX. The Philosophy of Baader. X. In the Quarry.
Contents of No. 4. I. Schelling's Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature. II. Hegel's Philosophy of Art (Sculp- ture).
III. Dialogue on Music.
IV. Schopenhauer's Doctrine of the Will. V. Introduction to Philosophy. VI. A Thought on Shakespeare. VII. Goethe's Essay on Da Vinci's " Last Supper." VIII. Paul Janet and Hegel.
CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME.
I.
n.
HI.
rv. v.
VI.
VII. VIH.
rx. x.
XI.
i. ii.
HI.
rv. v.
CONTENTS OF No. 1.
Statement of the Problem.
Swcdenborg and Speculative Phil- osophy.
Beethoven's Seventh Symphony.
Pantheon.
Introduction to Philosophy.
The difference of Baader from Hegel.
Nominalism versus Realism.
Leibnitz on the Nature of the Soul.
Book Notices.
Contents of No. 2.
Cousin's Doctrine of the Absolute.
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (translated).
Analysis of Hegel's Phenomenol- ogy.
Questions concerning certain Fac- ulties claimed for Man.
Letters on Faust (second series).
Contents of No. 3. I. Fichte's "Sun-clear Statement.' II. Some Consequences of Four Inca-: pacities.
III. Hegel's Philosophy of Art (Music).
IV. Hegel's. Phenomenology of Spirit (translated). V. New School of Music. VI. Introduction to Philosophy. VIL Analysis of Hegel's Phenomenol- ogy- VIII. TVinckehnann's Remarks on the Torso of Hercules. IX. The Ideal.
X. What is Meant by " Determined^ XL Intuition vs. Contemplation. XII. Book Notice.
Contents of No. 4. I. The Validity of the Lawj II. Gothe's and YVInckeh marks on the Laokjl III. Gothe's Social Romj rv. Sankhya Karika (oj V. Hegel's Phenoiii \ I • oUTsTR CONTENTS OF VOLUME Til.
Contents of No. 1. I. New Exposition of the Science of Knowledge, by Ficlite. II. Bernard's Analysis of Hegel's -<Es- thetics (Poetry).
III. The Sentences of Porphyry the Philosopher.
IV. Michael Angelo's " Last Judgment." V. Leibnitz on Platonic Enthusiasm.
VI. A National Institute. VII. Winckelmann's Description of the Apollo Belvedere.
n, in.
IV V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
Contents of No. 2.
New Exposition of the Science of Knowledge, by Fichte.
Kant's System of Transcendental- ism.
Outlines of Hegel's Phenomenology.
The Speculative vs. the Visionary.
" He is not Far."
Elementary School Education.
Practical Effects of Modern Philoso- phy.
Contents of No. 3.
I. New Exposition of the Science of Knowledge, by Fichte. II. Kant's System of Transcendental- ism.
III. Outlines of Hegel's Logic.
IV. B^nard's Analysis of Hegel's ^Esthetics.
V. The True First Principle.
Contents of No. 4.
I. New Exposition of the Science of Knowledge, by Fichte. II. Be"nard's Analysis of Hegel's 2Es- thetics.
III. Berkeley's Doctrine on the Nature of Matter.
IV. Hegel's First Principle.
V. The Problems of Philosophy at the Present Time. VI. Is Thought the Thinker? VII. Preface to Vol. III.