_Pol._ What a strange man!
_Socr._ I deny that they do what they wish: but confute me.
_Pol._ Did you not just now admit that they do what appears to them to be best?
_Socr._ And I now admit it.
_Pol._ They do, therefore, what they wish.
_Socr._ I deny it.
_Pol._ But they do what appears best to them?
_Socr._ I grant it.
_Pol._ You speak absurdly and monstrously, Socrates.
[51.] _Socr._ Do not accuse me, most excellent Polus, that I may address you in your own style; but, if you have any other question to ask me, shew that I am deceived; if not, do you answer me.
_Pol._ I am willing to answer, in order that I may know what you mean.
_Socr._ Whether, then, do men appear to you to wish the thing that they do from time to time, or that for the sake of which they do the thing that they do? As for instance, do those who drink medicine from physicians appear to you to wish the thing that they do, viz., to drink the medicine, and suffer pain, or do they wish to be well, for the sake of which they drink the medicine?
_Pol._ It is clear they wish to be well, for the sake of which they drink the medicine.
_Socr._ In like manner those who sail on the sea, and those who carry on any other commercial business, do not wish the thing that they do from time to time: for who wishes to sail and to encounter danger, and to be harassed with business; but the object for which they sail is to acquire riches; for they sail for the sake of riches.
_Pol._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Is it not so then in all cases? whosoever does any thing for the sake of some thing else, does not wish the thing that he does, but that for the sake of which he does it.
_Pol._ Yes.
52. _Socr._ Is there any thing in the world, then, that is not either good or evil, or between these, neither good nor evil?
_Pol._ It must needs be so, Socrates.
_Socr._ Do you not admit then, that wisdom, and health, and riches, and other things of the same kind, are good, but their contraries evil?
_Pol._ I do.
_Socr._ By the things that are neither good nor evil do you not mean such as sometimes partake of good, sometimes of evil, and sometimes of neither, as to sit, to walk, to run, and to sail, and again, stones, wood, and other things of the same kind? Are not these the things that you mean? Or do you call certain other things neither good nor evil?
_Pol._ No, but these.
_Socr._ Whether, therefore, do men, when they do these intermediate things, do them for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the intermediate.
_Pol._ The intermediate, surely, for the sake of the good.
_Socr._ Pursuing the good, therefore, we both walk when we walk, thinking it better, and, on the contrary, we stand when we stand, for the sake of the same thing, viz., the good. Is it not so?
_Pol._ Yes.
53. _Socr._ Do we not, therefore, if we slay any one, slay, or banish, or deprive him of his possessions, thinking that it is better for us to do so than not?
_Pol._ Certainly.
_Socr._ They, therefore, who do these things do them all for the sake of good.
_Pol._ I allow it.
_Socr._ Are we not agreed, then, that we do not wish those things which we do for the sake of something else, but that for the sake of which we do them?
_Pol._ By all means.
_Socr._ We do not, then, wish simply to slay, or banish from cities, or deprive any one of his possessions; but if these things are useful we wish to do them, but if they are hurtful we do not wish to do them. For we wish, as you admit, things that are good, but we do not wish such as are neither good nor evil, nor such as are evil. Is it not so? Do I seem to you, Polus, to speak the truth, or not? Why do you not answer?
_Pol._ You speak the truth.
_Socr._ Since then we are agreed on these things, if any one slays, banishes from a city, or deprives another of his possessions, whether he is a tyrant or a rhetorician, thinking that it is better for him so to do, though it is really worse, he surely does what seems fit to him: is it not so?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ Does he, then, do what he wishes, if these things are really evil? Why do you not answer?
_Pol._ He does not appear to me to do what he wishes.
54. _Socr._ Is it possible, then, that such a man can have great power in the supposed city, if, according to your admission, to have great power is a good?
_Pol._ It is not possible.
_Socr._ I spoke truly, then, when I said that it is possible for a man to do what he pleases in a city, and yet not have great power, nor do what he wishes.
_Pol._ As if, Socrates, you yourself would not like to be allowed to do what you please in a city, rather than not, and would not be envious when you saw any one either slaying whom he pleased, or taking away his possessions, or putting him in bonds.
_Socr._ Do you mean justly or unjustly?
_Pol._ Whichever he should do, is he not in either case to be envied?
_Socr._ Good words, I pray you, Polus.
_Pol._ But why?
_Socr._ Because it is not right, either to envy those that are not to be envied, or the wretched; but to pity them.
_Pol._ What say you? Does such appear to you to be the case with the men of whom I am speaking?
55. _Socr._ How can it be otherwise?
_Pol._ Does he, then, who slays whom he pleases, slaying him justly, appear to you to be wretched, and an object of pity?
_Socr._ Not at all; nor indeed is he to be envied.
_Pol._ Did you not say just now that he was wretched?
_Socr._ I said, my friend, that he is wretched who slays another unjustly, and more than that, to be pitied; but that he who slays another justly is not to be envied.
_Pol._ He surely who dies unjustly is to be pitied, and is wretched.
_Socr._ Less so, Polus, than he who slays him; and less than he who dies justly?
_Pol._ How so, Socrates?
_Socr._ Thus; because to act unjustly is the greatest of evils.
_Pol._ But is this really the greatest of evils? Is it not a greater evil to suffer unjustly?
_Socr._ By no means.
_Pol._ Had you, then, rather suffer unjustly than act unjustly?
_Socr._ I should wish neither of these: but if I must necessarily either act unjustly or suffer unjustly, I should choose rather to suffer unjustly than to act unjustly.
_Pol._ Would you not, then, consent to be a tyrant?
_Socr._ I would not, if by being a tyrant you mean the same that I do.
_Pol._ I mean by it what I just now said, to have the power to do in a city whatever one pleases; to slay and banish, and do every thing according to one’s own pleasure.
56. _Socr._ My excellent friend, attend to what I say, and confute me if you can. If, when the forum is full, I should take a dagger under my arm, and say to you, Polus, a certain wonderful power and tyranny has just now fallen to my lot: for, if it seems fit to me that any one of these men whom you see ought immediately to die, he shall die; and if it seems fit to me that any one of them ought to have his head broken, he shall immediately have it broken; or if that his garment should be torn to pieces, it shall be torn to pieces: so great is the power I possess in the city. And if, on your disbelieving me, I should shew you the dagger, perhaps, on seeing it, you would say: According to this, Socrates, all men may have great power, since any house that you please might be burnt in this way, and even the dock-yards of the Athenians, and the triremes, and all the shipping, as well public as private. But surely this is not to possess great power, to do whatever one pleases: do you think so?
_Pol._ Certainly not in this way.
_Socr._ Can you tell me, then, why you blame a power of this kind?
_Pol._ I can.
_Socr._ Why then? tell me.
_Pol._ Because it must needs be that one who acts thus should be punished.
_Socr._ But is not the being punished an evil?
_Pol._ Certainly.
57. _Socr._ Therefore, my excellent friend, to have great power appears to you to be, when advantage attends one’s doing what one pleases, and then it is a good; and this, as it seems, is to have great power; but if not, it is an evil, and to have little power. Let us consider this too.
Are we not agreed that it is sometimes better to do the things which we just now spoke of, to slay, to banish men, and deprive them of their property, and sometimes not?
_Pol._ Certainly.
_Socr._ This, then, as it seems, is agreed on both by you and me?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ When, then, do you say it is better to do these things? Tell me what limit you establish?
_Pol._ Do you, Socrates, answer this question.
_Socr._ I say, then, Polus, since it is more agreeable to you to hear it from me, when any one does these things justly, it is better, but when unjustly, it is worse.
_Pol._ Forsooth, it is difficult to confute you, Socrates! but could not even a child convince you that you do not speak the truth?
_Socr._ I should be very much obliged to the child, and equally so to you, if you can confute me, and free me from my extravagances. But be not weary in obliging a man who is your friend, but confute me.
58. _Pol._ However, Socrates, there is no need to confute you by ancient examples. For things that have recently happened are sufficient to confute you, and to prove that many men who have acted unjustly are happy.
_Socr._ What are these?
_Pol._ Do you not see, for instance, this Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, ruler of Macedonia?
_Socr._ If not, at all events I hear of him.
_Pol._ Does he appear to you to be happy or miserable?
_Socr._ I do not know, Polus: for I have never yet had any intercourse with him.
_Pol._ What then? if you had intercourse with him, should you know? And do you not know otherwise, from the circumstances of the case, that he is happy?
_Socr._ By Jupiter, certainly not.
_Pol._ It is evident then, Socrates, you will say, that you do not even know whether the great king is happy?
_Socr._ And I should say the truth. For I do not know what his state is with regard to enlightenment and justice.
_Pol._ What? Does all happiness consist in this?
_Socr._ In my opinion, Polus. For I say that an honest and good man or woman is happy; but an unjust and wicked one is miserable.
_Pol._ This Archelaus, then, is miserable, according to your account?
_Socr._ At least, my friend, if he is unjust.
59. _Pol._ But how can he be otherwise than unjust, who had no right to the empire which he now possesses, as he was born of a woman who was the slave of Alcetas, brother of Perdiccas, and according to justice was the slave of Alcetas, and, if he had wished to do what is just, would have served Alcetas as a slave, and would have been happy, according to your account? whereas now he has become wonderfully miserable, since he has committed the greatest injustice. For, first of all, having sent for this his master and uncle, as if he would restore the government which Perdiccas had taken from him, and having entertained and intoxicated both him and his son Alexander, his own cousin, and nearly his equal in age, he forced them into a carriage, and having carried them off by night, had their throats cut and made away with them both. And after he had committed these wrongs, he was not aware that he had become most miserable, and did not repent, but shortly afterwards, he did not wish to become happy by nurturing his legitimate brother, the son of Perdiccas, a child about seven years of age, to whom the government of right belonged, and by restoring it to him; but having thrown him into a well, and suffocated him, he told his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in in pursuing a goose, and so met with his death. 60. Wherefore since he has committed the greatest wrongs of all in Macedonia, he is the most miserable of all the Macedonians, and not the most happy. And perhaps there are some among the Athenians, beginning with you, who would rather be any other of the Macedonians than Archelaus.
_Socr._ At the beginning of our conference, Polus, I praised you, because you appeared to me to be well instructed in rhetoric, though you had neglected the art of dialectics. And now, what else is this reasoning, by which even a child could confute me, and I, as you suppose, am now confuted by this reasoning of yours, when I said that a man who acts unjustly is not happy? How so, my friend? For I do not grant you any one of the things you assert.
_Pol._ Because you are not willing to do so; though it appears to you as I say.
_Socr._ My excellent friend, you attempt to confute me rhetorically, like those who think they confute their adversaries in courts of justice. For there some fancy they confute others when they produce many reputable witnesses in favour of what they say, whereas the adverse party produces some one only, or none at all. 61. But this mode of confutation is worth nothing with reference to truth. For sometimes a man may be borne down by the false testimony of many witnesses who seem to be somewhat. And now, with respect to what you say, almost all the Athenians and strangers will agree with you, and if you wish to produce witnesses against me to prove that I do not speak the truth, there will testify for you, if you wish it, Nicias, son of Niceratus, and his brothers with him, who gave the tripods that stand in a row in the temple of Bacchus; or again, if you wish it, Aristocrates, son of Scellius, who gave that beautiful offering in the temple of Pythian Apollo; or if you wish it, the whole house of Pericles, or any other family, that you may think proper to choose out of this city. But I, who am but one, do not agree with you. For you do not convince me by arguments, but producing many false witnesses against me, you endeavour to eject me from my substance and the truth. But I, unless I shall be able to adduce you, who are one, as a witness agreeing with what I say, shall think that I have accomplished nothing worthy of mention with respect to the subject of our discussion; nor shall I think that you have done so, unless I, being one, alone testify for you, and you dismiss all those others. 62. This, then, is one mode of refutation, as you and many others think: but there is also another mode, which, on the contrary, I adopt. Let us, therefore, compare them with each other, and consider whether they differ at all from one another. For the matters about which we differ are by no means trifling; but they are indeed such as to know which is most honourable, and not to know most disgraceful, for the sum of them is to know, or to be ignorant, who is happy, and who is not. For instance, in the first place, with respect to the subject of our present discussion, you think it possible that a man may be happy who acts unjustly and is unjust; since you think that Archelaus, though unjust, is happy. Must we not suppose that such is your opinion?
_Pol._ Certainly.
_Socr._ But I say it is impossible. On this one point, then, we differ.
Be it so. But will he who acts unjustly be happy if he meet with justice and is punished?
_Pol._ By no means, for in that case he would be most miserable.
_Socr._ If, therefore, he who acts unjustly does not meet with the punishment he deserves, according to your account he will be happy.
_Pol._ So I say.
63. _Socr._ But, according to my opinion, Polus, he who acts unjustly, and is unjust, is in every way miserable; though more miserable if he does not suffer punishment, and does not meet with chastisement for his unjust actions; but less miserable if he suffers punishment, and meets with his just deserts both from gods and men.
_Pol._ You attempt, Socrates, to advance strange paradoxes.
_Socr._ Yet I shall endeavour, my friend, to make you say the same things as I do: for I consider you as a friend. Now, then, the things about which we differ are these: and do you also consider. I said in a former part of our discussion, that to commit an injustice is worse than to suffer one.
_Pol._ Just so.
_Socr._ But you say it is worse to suffer an injustice.
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ And I said that they who act unjustly are miserable, and was confuted by you.
_Pol._ You were so, by Jupiter.
_Socr._ At least as you think, Polus.
_Pol._ And I probably thought the truth.
_Socr._ But you, on the contrary, said that they who act unjustly are happy, if they do not suffer punishment.
_Pol._ Certainly.
_Socr._ But I say that they are most miserable; and that they who suffer punishment are less so. Do you wish to refute this also?
64. _Pol._ But this is more difficult to refute than the former, Socrates.
_Socr._ By no means, Polus, but it is impossible; for truth can never be refuted.
_Pol._ How say you? If a man should be detected acting unjustly, as in attempting to compass absolute power, and being detected should be put to the torture, be mutilated, and have his eyes burnt out, and after having himself suffered many other great and various torments, and having moreover seen his children and wife suffer the same, should at last be crucified, or covered with pitch and burnt, will he be more happy, than if, having escaped punishment, he should become a tyrant, and ruling in the city, should pass through life doing whatever he pleases, being envied, and accounted happy, both by citizens and strangers? Do you say that it is impossible to refute these things?
_Socr._ You are now trying to terrify me, noble Polus, and do not refute me; but just now you adduced witnesses. However, remind me of a trifling circumstance; did you say, if a person should attempt unjustly to compass absolute power?
_Pol._ I did.
_Socr._ In that case, neither of them will ever be happier than the other, neither he who has unjustly acquired absolute power, nor he who has been punished. For, of two miserable persons, one cannot be happier than the other; but he is more miserable who escapes punishment and acquires absolute power. 65. What is this, Polus? do you laugh? Is this another species of refutation, when any one asserts any thing, to laugh at him, and not refute him?
_Pol._ Do you not think you are already refuted, Socrates, when you say such things as no man in the world would assert? for ask any one of these.
_Socr._ Polus, I am not among the number of politicians: and last year, happening to be chosen a senator, since my tribe held the presidency and it was necessary for me to collect the votes, I occasioned laughter, because I did not know how to collect them. Do not, then, require me to collect the votes of those who are present. But if you have no better mode of refutation than this, as I just now said, give the question up to me in my turn, and make trial of that mode of refutation which I think ought to be adopted. For I know how to procure one witness of what I say, that is, the person with whom I am discoursing, but I let alone the multitude; and I know how to take the vote of one person, but I do not even discourse with the multitude. Consider, then, whether you are willing in your turn to give me an opportunity of refuting by answering the questions I shall put to you. For I think, that you and I, and other men, are of opinion, that to commit injustice is worse than to suffer it; and not to be punished, than to be punished.
66. _Pol._ But I, on the contrary, think that neither myself nor any other man is of this opinion. For would you rather suffer injustice than commit it?
_Socr._ Yes, and you, and all other men.
_Pol._ Far from it; neither would you, nor I, nor any other man.
_Socr._ Will you not answer, then?
_Pol._ By all means. For I am anxious to know what you will say.
_Socr._ Tell me then, that you may know, as if I asked you from the beginning: whether does it appear to you, Polus, worse to commit an injustice or to suffer one?
_Pol._ To suffer one, in my opinion.
_Socr._ What then? whether is it more base to commit an injustice or to suffer one? Answer me.
_Pol._ To commit an injustice.
_Socr._ Is it not, therefore, worse, since it is more base?
_Pol._ By no means.
_Socr._ I understand. You do not think, as it seems, that the beautiful and the good, and the evil and the base, are the same?
_Pol._ Certainly not.
_Socr._ But what do you say to this? Beautiful things in general, such as bodies, colours, forms, sounds, and pursuits, do you call them severally beautiful, without reference to any thing else? As, for instance, first of all, with respect to beautiful bodies, do you not say that they are beautiful, on account of their usefulness, in reference to the particular thing for which each is useful, or on account of some pleasure, if in being seen they give delight to the beholders? Have you any thing else besides this to say respecting beauty of body?
_Pol._ I have not.
67. _Socr._ Do you not, then, denominate all other things in the same manner beautiful, such as forms and colours, either on account of some pleasure, or utility, or both?
_Pol._ I do.
_Socr._ And is not the case the same as to sounds, and every thing that relates to music?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ And moreover, with respect to laws and pursuits, they surely are beautiful, for no other reason except that they are either useful, or pleasant, or both?
_Pol._ So it appears to me.
_Socr._ And is it not the same with the beauty of the sciences?
_Pol._ Certainly. And now, Socrates, you define beautifully, in defining the beautiful by pleasure and good.
_Socr._ Must not, therefore, the base be defined by the contrary, by pain and evil?
_Pol._ Necessarily so.
_Socr._ When, therefore, of two beautiful things, one is more beautiful than the other, it is more beautiful because it excels in one or both of these, either in pleasure, or utility, or both.
_Pol._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And when of two things one is more base than the other, it must be more base because it exceeds in pain or evil: is not this necessarily so?
_Pol._ Yes.
68. _Socr._ Come then; what did we say just now respecting committing injustice and suffering it? Did you not say that to suffer injustice is more evil, but to commit it, more base?
_Pol._ I did say so.
_Socr._ Therefore, since it is more base to commit injustice than to suffer it, it must be more base because it is more painful and exceeds in pain, or evil, or both. Is not this also necessary?
_Pol._ How can it be otherwise?
_Socr._ First, then, let us consider whether to commit injustice exceeds in pain the suffering it; and whether they who commit injustice feel greater pain than they who suffer it.
_Pol._ This is by no means the case, Socrates.
_Socr._ It does not, then, exceed in pain?
_Pol._ By no means.
_Socr._ Therefore, if it does not exceed in pain, it will no longer exceed in both.
_Pol._ It appears not.
_Socr._ It remains, therefore, that it exceeds in the other.
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ In the evil.
_Pol._ So it seems.
_Socr._ Since, therefore, to commit injustice exceeds in evil, it must be more evil than to suffer injustice.
_Pol._ Evidently so.
69. _Socr._ Was it not admitted by men in general, and by you to me formerly, that it is more base to commit injustice than to suffer it?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ Now, however, it appears to be worse.
_Pol._ So it seems.
_Socr._ Would you, then, rather choose that which is worse and more base, than that which is less so? Do not hesitate to answer, Polus, (for you will not be injured by so doing,) but answer, giving yourself up generously to the discussion as to a physician; and either admit or deny the question I ask.
_Pol._ Then I should not rather choose it, Socrates.
_Socr._ Would any other man in the world?
_Pol._ To me it appears not, according to what has been said.
_Socr._ I therefore said truly, that neither you, nor I, nor any other man in the world, would rather choose to commit injustice than to suffer it; for it is worse to do so.
_Pol._ So it appears.
_Socr._ You see then, Polus, that my mode of proof when compared with your mode of proof, does not at all resemble it; but all others agree with you, except myself. For my part you alone are sufficient for my purpose, agreeing with me and testifying for me; and I, having asked your opinion only, disregard that of others. Let this then be settled between us. 70. And next, let us proceed to consider that which we doubted about in the second place, viz. whether it is the greatest of evils for one who has committed injustice to be punished, as you thought, or whether it is not a greater evil not to be punished, as I thought. And let us consider it thus: To suffer punishment and to be justly chastised, when one has committed injustice, do you not call the same thing?
_Pol._ I do.
_Socr._ Can you say, then, that all just things are not beautiful, so far as they are just? When you have well considered, answer me.
_Pol._ It appears to me that they are, Socrates.
_Socr._ Consider this also: When a man does any thing, must there not necessarily be something which is passive to him as an agent?
_Pol._ It appears so to me.
_Socr._ And does not the patient suffer what the agent does, and just such a thing as the agent does? I mean in this way: If any one strikes, is it not necessary that something should be struck?
_Pol._ It is necessary.
_Socr._ And if the striker strikes hard or swiftly, must not the thing struck be stricken accordingly?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ That which is struck, then, undergoes a passion corresponding to that which the striker does.
_Pol._ Certainly.
71. _Socr._ In like manner, if any one burns, is it not necessary that something should be burnt?
_Pol._ How can it be otherwise?
_Socr._ And if he burns vehemently or painfully, that which is burnt must be burnt according as the burner burns?
_Pol._ Certainly.
_Socr._ So, if any one cuts any thing, is not the reasoning the same?
for something is cut.
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ And if the cut is large or deep, or painful, that which is cut is cut with such a cut as the cutter cuts.
_Pol._ It appears so.
_Socr._ In a word, then, see if you grant what I just now said respecting every thing, viz., that according as the agent does, so the patient suffers.
_Pol._ I do grant it.
_Socr._ These things, then, being agreed on, whether is the being punished, to suffer, or to do something?
_Pol._ Necessarily, Socrates, it is to suffer.
_Socr._ Must it not, therefore, be by some agent?
_Pol._ Undoubtedly: by him who chastises.
_Socr._ But does not he who chastises rightly, chastise justly?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ Doing what is just, or not?
_Pol._ What is just.
_Socr._ Then, does not he who is chastised, when he is deservedly punished, suffer justly?
_Pol._ It appears so.
_Socr._ But what is just has been acknowledged to be beautiful.
_Pol._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Of these, then, the one does, and the other, he that is chastised, suffers that which is beautiful.
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ And if beautiful, then good; for _that which is beautiful_ is either pleasant or useful.
_Pol._ Necessarily so.
_Socr._ He therefore who is punished suffers that which is good.
_Pol._ So it seems.
72. _Socr._ He is therefore benefited.
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ Is it with such a benefit as I suppose? Does he become better as to his soul, since he is chastised justly?
_Pol._ That is probable.
_Socr._ He, therefore, who is punished is freed from a vice of the soul.
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ Is he not freed, then, from the greatest evil? Consider the matter thus: in the condition of a man’s property do you perceive any other evil than poverty?
_Pol._ No other than poverty.
_Socr._ Well, in the constitution of the body? would you say that weakness, disease, deformity, and the like, are evils?
_Pol._ I should.
_Socr._ Do you not think, too, that there is a certain depravity in the soul?
_Pol._ How otherwise?
_Socr._ Do you not then call this injustice, ignorance, cowardice, and the like?
_Pol._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Have you not said, then, that of these three, property, body, and soul, there are three corresponding evils, poverty, disease, injustice?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ Then which of these evils is the most base? Is it not injustice, and, in a word, the depravity of the soul?
_Pol._ By far.
_Socr._ But, if it is most base, then is it not also the worst?
_Pol._ How mean you, Socrates?
73. _Socr._ Thus. In every case, that which is most base is so because, from what has been before admitted, it occasions the greatest pain, or harm, or both.
_Pol._ By all means.
_Socr._ But injustice and the whole depravity of the soul, have been just now admitted by us to be most base.
_Pol._ They have been so admitted.
_Socr._ Is it not, therefore, the most troublesome and most base of these _depravities_, because it exceeds either in troublesomeness or hurtfulness, or both?
_Pol._ Necessarily so.
_Socr._ Is then the being unjust, intemperate, cowardly, and ignorant, more painful than to be poor and diseased?
_Pol._ It does not appear so to me, Socrates, from what has been said.
_Socr._ The depravity of the soul, then, is the most base of all, because it exceeds the others by some extraordinarily great harm and wonderful evil, since, according to your argument, it is not exceeded in painfulness.
_Pol._ So it appears.
_Socr._ But, surely, that which exceeds in the greatest harmfulness must be the greatest evil of all?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ Then injustice, intemperance, and the other depravities of the soul, are the greatest evils of all.
_Pol._ So it appears.
74. _Socr._ What art, then, frees from poverty? Is it not that of money-making?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ What, from disease? Is it not the medicinal?
_Pol._ Necessarily so.
_Socr._ What, from depravity and injustice? If in this way you cannot readily answer, consider it thus: whither, and to whom, do we take those that are diseased in body?
_Pol._ To physicians, Socrates.
_Socr._ Whether those who act unjustly, and are intemperate?
_Pol._ Do you mean, to the judges?
_Socr._ Is it not, then, that they may be punished?
_Pol._ I grant it.
_Socr._ Do not then those who chastise rightly chastise by employing a certain justice?
_Pol._ Clearly.
_Socr._ The art of money-making, therefore, frees from poverty, medicine from disease, and justice from intemperance and injustice.
_Pol._ So it appears.
_Socr._ Which of these, therefore, is the most beautiful?
_Pol._ Of what are you speaking?
_Socr._ The art of money-making, medicine, and justice.
_Pol._ Justice, Socrates, is far superior.
_Socr._ Does it not, then, produce the greatest pleasure, or utility, or both, since it is the most beautiful?
_Pol._ Yes.
75. _Socr._ Is it, then, pleasant to be under the care of a physician?
and do they who are under such charge rejoice?
_Pol._ It does not appear so to me.
_Socr._ But it is useful. Is it not?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ For they are freed from a great evil; so that it is advantageous to endure pain and be restored to health.
_Pol._ How can it be otherwise?
_Socr._ Would the man then, thus be most happy with respect to his body who is under the care of a physician, or who is not diseased at all?
_Pol._ Clearly he that is not diseased.
_Socr._ For this is not happiness, as it seems, the being freed from evil; but the never possessing it at all.
_Pol._ It is so.
_Socr._ But what? Of two men that have evil, either in body or soul, which is the more miserable, he that is under the care of a physician, and is freed from the evil, or he that is not under the care of a physician, and retains the evil?
_Pol._ It appears to me, he that is not under the care of a physician.
_Socr._ And is not punishment the being freed from the greatest evil, depravity?
_Pol._ It is.
_Socr._ For justice produces a sound mind, makes men more just, and becomes the medicine of depravity?
_Pol._ Yes.
76. _Socr._ He, then, is most happy who has no vice in his soul, since this is proved to be the greatest of evils.
_Pol._ It is evident.
_Socr._ The second, surely, is he who is freed from it.
_Pol._ So it seems.
_Socr._ But this is he who is admonished, reproved, and punished.
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ He, therefore, lives worst, who is afflicted with injustice, and is not freed from it.
_Pol._ It appears so.
_Socr._ Is not, then, he one who, having committed the greatest injustice, and employing the greatest injustice, contrives that he may be neither admonished, nor chastised, nor punished, as you said was the case with Archelaus, and other tyrants, rhetoricians, and powerful men?
_Pol._ So it seems.
_Socr._ For these, my excellent friend, have managed much the same as one who being afflicted with the worst diseases should contrive not to have his bodily maladies corrected or subjected to medical treatment, fearing, as if he were a child, to be burnt and cut, because these operations are painful. Does it not appear so to you?
_Pol._ It does.
_Socr._ Being ignorant, as it seems, of what health is, and a good habit of the body. 77. Now from what we have just agreed on, Polus, those who flee from punishment appear to do something of this kind; they look to the pain attending it, but are blind to its utility, and are ignorant how much more miserable than an unhealthy body it is to dwell with an unhealthy soul, that is corrupt, unjust, and impious. Whence they do every thing that they may not be punished, nor freed from the greatest evil, procuring for themselves riches and friends, and the power of speaking as persuasively as possible. But if we have agreed on what is true, Polus, do you perceive what consequences result from our discourse? do you wish that we should draw the conclusions from them?
_Pol._ I do, unless you think otherwise.
_Socr._ Does it not follow that injustice and to act unjustly is the greatest evil?
_Pol._ It appears so.
_Socr._ And to suffer punishment was proved to be a means of freedom from this evil.
_Pol._ It appears to be so.
_Socr._ But not to suffer punishment is a continuance of the evil.
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ To act unjustly, therefore, is the second of evils in magnitude; but to act unjustly and not to suffer punishment is the greatest and chief of all evils.
_Pol._ So it seems.
78. _Socr._ Was not this the point, my friend, with respect to which we differed, you considering Archelaus happy, for that having committed the greatest injustice he suffers no punishment; but I on the contrary thinking, that whether Archelaus, or any other man whatever, is not punished when he commits injustice, he must needs be far more wretched than all other men, and that he who commits injustice is ever more wretched than he who suffers it, and he that is not punished than he that is. Are not these the things that I said?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ And has it not been demonstrated that they were said truly?
_Pol._ It appears so.
_Socr._ Well then, if these things are true, Polus, what is the great utility of rhetoric? For, from what has been now agreed on, every one ought especially to beware of acting unjustly, for that, _if he does so act_, he will sustain great evil. Is it not so?
_Pol._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And if a man has committed injustice, either himself, or any one else for whom he has regard, he ought of his own accord to betake himself thither, where as soon as possible he will be punished, to a judge as to a physician, taking every pains lest the disease of injustice becoming inveterate should render the soul corrupt and incurable; or what must we say, Polus, if our former admissions are to stand? Do not these things necessarily harmonize with the former in this, but in no other way?
79. _Pol._ For what else can we say, Socrates?
_Socr._ For the purpose, then, of excusing injustice, our own, or that