by relating these things, to grant that a moderate life is better than an intemperate one, or do I not persuade you?
_Cal._ You do not persuade me, Socrates. For he that has filled his casks has no longer any pleasure: but this is, what I just now mentioned, to live like a stone, when he has filled them, neither rejoicing any more nor grieving: but a pleasant life consists in as much flowing in as possible.
107. _Socr._ Is it not, therefore, necessary, if much flows in, that much also should go out, and that there should be certain large holes for its flowing out?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ You speak now of the life of a sea-lark[73], and not of a corpse, or a stone. But tell me, do you mean such a thing as being hungry, and, when hungry, eating?
----- Footnote 73: Χαραδριὸς, a bird which Aristotle tells us (Hist. Anim., l. ix. c. 11) “appears in the night and runs off in the day.” See note to Cary’s Birds of Aristophanes, act i. sc. 4.
----- _Cal._ I do.
_Socr._ And of being thirsty, and, when thirsty, drinking?
_Cal._ I do mean that, and that he who has all other desires, and, having the power to do so, satisfies them, lives a joyful and happy life.
_Socr._ Well done, my excellent friend! Proceed as you have begun, and take care not to be ashamed. But it is right, too, as it seems, that neither should I be ashamed. And first of all, tell me if, when a man, who is scabby and itches, is able to scratch himself without stint, and passes his life in scratching himself, this is to live happily?
_Cal._ How absurd you are, Socrates, and a mere babbler.
_Socr._ Hence it is, Callicles, that I have astonished Polus and Gorgias, and made them ashamed. You, however, will not be astonished nor ashamed, for you are courageous: but only answer me.
108. _Cal._ I say, then, that he who scratches himself lives pleasantly.
_Socr._ Therefore, if pleasantly, also happily?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Will this be the case if he only itches in his head, or must I ask you still further? Consider, Callicles, what answer you would give, if any one asks you respecting all the parts of the body in succession.
And to take that which is the chief of all, is not the life of catamites dreadful, base, and wretched? Will you dare to call them happy, if they have what they desire, without stint?
_Cal._ Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to lead the discussion to such subjects?
_Socr._ Do I lead it hither, noble Sir, or does he who asserts thus broadly, that such as rejoice, in whatever way they rejoice, are happy, and does not distinguish between pleasures, what are good and what are bad? But tell me further still, whether do you say that the pleasant and the good are the same: or that there is something pleasant which is not good?
_Cal._ In order that my argument may not contradict itself, if I should say they are different, I say that they are the same.
109. _Socr._ You subvert your former statements, Callicles, and no longer search for the truth with me properly, if you speak contrary to your real opinion.
_Cal._ And you do the same, Socrates.
_Socr._ Neither, then, do I act rightly, if I do so, nor do you. But, good Sir, consider whether to rejoice in any way be not good. For it is clear that many base consequences, which were just now hinted at, will follow, if this should be the case, and many others besides.
_Cal._ As you think, at least, Socrates.
_Socr._ Do you in reality, Callicles, persist in your assertion?
_Cal._ I do.
_Socr._ Shall we then enter on the discussion, as if you were in earnest?
_Cal._ Most certainly.
_Socr._ Come, then, since you are of that opinion, explain this to me.
Do you call science any thing?
_Cal._ I do.
_Socr._ And did you not just now say, that there is a certain courage joined with science?
_Cal._ I did say so.
_Socr._ Did you speak of these two, as if courage was different from science?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ But what? Are pleasure and science the same, or different?
_Cal._ Different, surely, most wise friend.
_Socr._ Is courage also different from pleasure?
_Cal._ Undoubtedly.
110. _Socr._ Come, then, let us retain these things in our memory; that Callicles of Acharne said that the pleasant and the good are the same; but that science and courage are different both from each other and the good.
_Cal._ But Socrates of Alopecia does not agree to this; does he agree?
_Socr._ He does not agree: and I think neither will Callicles when he has rightly examined himself. For tell me, do you not think that those who fare well are affected in a manner quite contrary to those who fare ill?
_Cal._ I do.
_Socr._ If these, therefore, are contrary to each other, is it not necessary that the case should be the same with them as it is with health and disease? For, surely, a man is not at the same time well and diseased, nor at the same time separated from health and disease.
_Cal._ How say you?
_Socr._ For instance, take any part of the body you please, and consider. Has not a man sometimes a disease in the eyes, which is called ophthalmia?
_Cal._ Undoubtedly.
_Socr._ And his eyes, surely, are not at the same time well?
_Cal._ Certainly not.
_Socr._ But what? When he is freed from the ophthalmia, does he then also lose the health of his eyes, and, in a word, is he at the same time freed from both?
_Cal._ By no means.
_Socr._ For that, I think, would be wonderful and absurd. Would it not?
_Cal._ Assuredly.
111. _Socr._ But I think he, alternately, receives one, and loses the other.
_Cal._ I admit it.
_Socr._ And will it not be the same with regard to strength and weakness?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ And swiftness and slowness?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And with respect to things good and happiness, and their contraries, things evil and wretchedness, does he receive and part from each of these alternately?
_Cal._ Most assuredly.
_Socr._ If, therefore, we should find certain things which a man at the same time parts from and possesses, it is clear that these would not be both good and evil. Do we agree to this? Consider well and answer me.
_Cal._ I agree entirely.
_Socr._ Let us then recur to what was before agreed on. Did you say that to be hungry is pleasant, or painful? I mean the very fact of being hungry.
_Cal._ I said it was painful: though to eat when hungry is pleasant.
_Socr._ I understand you: but to be hungry of itself is painful; is it not so?
_Cal._ I admit it.
_Socr._ And also to be thirsty?
_Cal._ Assuredly.
112. _Socr._ Whether, then, shall I ask you any more questions? Or do you allow that all want and desire is painful?
_Cal._ I allow it; so do not ask.
_Socr._ Be it so. And do you not say that for a man to drink when he is thirsty is pleasant?
_Cal._ I do.
_Socr._ In the instance then of which you are speaking, to be thirsty is, doubtless, painful?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ But to drink is the satisfying of a want, and a pleasure?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ Therefore as to drinking you say that the man rejoices?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ But as to being thirsty?
_Cal._ I say— _Socr._ That he suffers pain?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ Do you perceive then what follows? that you say he who is in pain at the same time rejoices, when you say that he who is thirsty drinks. And does not this happen at the same place and time, with respect either to the soul or body, whichever you please? For I think there is no difference. Is this so, or not?
_Cal._ It is.
_Socr._ You admitted, however, that it was impossible for one who fares well at the same time to fare ill.
_Cal._ I allow it.
_Socr._ But you have granted that it is possible for one who is in pain to rejoice.
_Cal._ It appears so.
_Socr._ To rejoice, therefore, is not to fare well, nor to be in pain, ill: so that the pleasant is different from the good?
_Cal._ I know not what subtleties you are using, Socrates.
113. _Socr._ You know, though you pretend not, Callicles.
_Cal._ Proceed still further, trifling as you are, that you may know how wise you are who take upon yourself to admonish me.
_Socr._ Does not each of us at the same time cease to be thirsty, and to receive pleasure from drinking?
_Cal._ I do not know what you mean.
_Gorg._ Say not so, Callicles; but answer for our sakes, that the discussion may be brought to a conclusion.
_Cal._ But this is always the way with Socrates, Gorgias, he asks trifling questions, and things that are of no consequence, and then refutes them.
_Gorg._ But what difference does that make to you? That is no concern at all of yours: but suffer Socrates to argue in whatever way he pleases.
_Cal._ Ask, then, these trifling and petty questions, since Gorgias thinks proper.
_Socr._ You are happy, Callicles, in that you have been initiated in the great mysteries before you were in the small: but I thought that was not allowed. Answer me, then, from the point where you left off, does not each of us at the same time cease to be thirsty, and to receive pleasure?
_Cal._ I admit it.
_Socr._ And does not one cease to be hungry and to feel other desires and pleasures at the same time?
_Cal._ Such is the case.
_Socr._ Does one not, then, at the same time cease to feel both pains and pleasures?
_Cal._ Yes.
114. _Socr._ However one does not at the same time cease to experience good and evil, as you admitted; but now do you not admit it?
_Cal._ I do. But what then?
_Socr._ It follows, my friend, that good things are not the same with such as are pleasant, nor evil things with such as are painful. For, from these one ceases at the same time, but not from those, because they are different. How, therefore, can pleasant things be the same with such as are good, or painful things with such as are evil? But, if you please, consider it in this way: for I think that you are not even thus agreed with yourself. Consider then. Do you not call the good good, from the presence of good things, just as you call those beautiful to whom beauty is present?
_Cal._ I do.
_Socr._ But what? Do you call foolish men and cowards good men? For you did not just now; but you said the brave and prudent were so. Do you not call these good?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ But what? Have you ever seen a boy without understanding, rejoicing?
_Cal._ I have.
_Socr._ And have you not also seen a man without understanding, rejoicing?
_Cal._ I think I have. But to what purpose is this?
_Socr._ Nothing: answer however.
_Cal._ I have seen it.
_Socr._ But what? have you seen a man endued with intellect grieving and rejoicing?
_Cal._ I have.
115. _Socr._ But which rejoice and grieve the more; the wise, or the foolish?
_Cal._ I think there is not much difference.
_Socr._ That is enough. In war have you ever seen a coward?
_Cal._ Most assuredly.
_Socr._ What then? On the departure of the enemy which appeared to you to rejoice the more, the cowards or the brave?
_Cal._ Both appeared to me to rejoice more: or, if not, in nearly the same degree.
_Socr._ It is of no consequence. Cowards, then, also rejoice?
_Cal._ Very much so.
_Socr._ And the foolish, as it seems?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ But, when the enemy approaches, do cowards only grieve? or do the brave also?
_Cal._ Both.
_Socr._ In an equal degree?
_Cal._ Cowards perhaps more.
_Socr._ But, when the enemy departs, do they not rejoice more?
_Cal._ Perhaps so.
_Socr._ Do not, therefore, as you say, the foolish and the wise, cowards and the brave, similarly grieve and rejoice, much in the same degree, but cowards more than the brave?
_Cal._ I admit it.
_Socr._ The wise however and the brave are good, but cowards and the foolish bad?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ The good and the bad, therefore, rejoice and grieve equally?
_Cal._ I admit it.
116. _Socr._ Are, then, the good and the bad, good and bad in an equal degree? or are the bad yet more good and bad?
_Cal._ By Jupiter, I do not know what you mean.
_Socr._ Do you not know that you said the good are good, through the presence of good things, and the bad through the presence of evil things? And that pleasures are good things, and pains evil?
_Cal._ I did.
_Socr._ Are not, therefore, good things, viz., pleasures, present with those that rejoice, if they do rejoice?
_Cal._ Undoubtedly.
_Socr._ And since good things are present are not they who rejoice good?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ But what? Are not evil things, viz., pains, present with those that suffer pain?
_Cal._ They are present.
_Socr._ But do you not say that the bad are bad, through the presence of evil things? Or do you say so no longer?
_Cal._ I do.
_Socr._ Those, therefore, that rejoice, are good; but those that suffer pain are bad?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And those that are more so, more, but those that are less so, less? and those that are equally so, equally?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ Do you not say, then, that the wise and the foolish, cowards and the brave, rejoice and grieve in an equal degree, or cowards even more?
_Cal._ I do.
117. _Socr._ Now in common with me, draw the inferences that result from these admissions. For, they say, it is beautiful to repeat and consider beautiful things twice, and even thrice. We say, that the prudent and brave man is good; do we not?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ But that the foolish man and a coward is bad?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Again, that he who rejoices is good?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ And that he who suffers pain is bad?
_Cal._ Necessarily so.
_Socr._ And that the good and the bad suffer pain and rejoice equally, but perhaps the bad more?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ Therefore, the bad man becomes equally bad and good, with the good man, or even more good? Do not these results follow, as well as the former ones, if one says that the pleasant and the good are the same?
Are not these consequences necessary, Callicles?
_Cal._ I have been long listening to you, Socrates, and making concessions, considering with myself that if any one grants you any thing, even in jest, you seize it eagerly as boys do. And can you suppose that I or any other person in the world does not believe that some pleasures are better, and others worse?
118. _Socr._ Ho, Ho! Callicles, how cunning you are! You treat me as a child, now asserting that these things are in this manner, and now in another manner; trying to deceive me. Though, at the outset, I did not think that I should be purposely deceived by you, because you are my friend. But now I have been mistaken, and as it seems, must needs, according to the old proverb, make good use of what I have, and receive what you give me. What you now say, as it appears, is this, that some pleasures are good, others bad; is it not so?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ And are not the profitable good, and the noxious bad?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And those which effect a certain good, are profitable, but those which effect a certain evil, bad?
_Cal._ I admit it.
_Socr._ Do you not speak then of such as the following; as for instance, with respect to the body, those pleasures which we just now mentioned of eating and drinking; and if some of these produce in the body health or strength, or some other bodily excellences, are they not good, but those that produce the contraries of these, evil?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And are not pains, in like manner, some beneficial, others injurious?
_Cal._ Undoubtedly.
_Socr._ Ought we not, therefore, both to choose and to exercise ourselves in such pleasures and pains as are beneficial?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ But not such as are injurious?
_Cal._ That is evident.
119. _Socr._ For, if you remember, it was agreed between us, Polus and me, that all things should be done for the sake of what is good. And do you agree with us in thinking, that the good is the end of all actions, and that all other things ought to be done for its sake, but not it for the sake of other things? Do you accord with us and make up the third?
_Cal._ I do.
_Socr._ We ought, then, to do both all other things and such as are pleasant, for the sake of things good, but not good things for the sake of such as are pleasant?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Is every man, therefore, able to choose among pleasant things such as are good, and such as are evil? or is there need of a person skilled in each case?
_Cal._ Of a person skilled.
_Socr._ Let us then again call to mind what I said to Polus and Gorgias.
I said, if you remember, that there are certain occupations which regard pleasure, and are occupied in this alone, but are ignorant of the better and the worse; but that there are others that know both what is good and what is evil. And I have placed among those which have pleasure for their object, cookery, as a skill relating to the body, but not an art; and among those that have the good for their object I placed the medicinal art. 120. And by the god of friendship, Callicles, think not that you ought to jest with me, nor give any answer that may occur to you contrary to your opinion, nor receive what I say as if I were in jest. For you see that our discourse is on a subject, than which there is none that a man endued even with the smallest understanding would take more pains about, namely in what way we ought to live, whether in such a way as that to which you exhort me, engaging in such employments of a man, as speaking among the people, cultivating rhetoric, and applying oneself to political affairs, in the manner which you now do; or whether we should devote ourselves to a philosophic life, and in what the latter differs from the former. Perhaps, then, it is best, as I just now attempted, to make a distinction; and when we have distinguished and agreed with each other, that these are two kinds of life, then to consider in what they differ from each other, and which of them ought to be pursued. Perhaps, however, you do not yet understand what I mean.
121. _Cal._ I do not, indeed.
_Socr._ I will explain it to you more clearly. Since we have agreed, you and I, that there is something good, and something pleasant, and that the pleasant is different from the good, and that there is a certain study and preparation for the acquirement of each of them, one being a search after the pleasant, and the other after the good—however, first of all, grant me this, or not; do you grant it?
_Cal._ I do.
_Socr._ Come then, concede to me also what I said to these men, if at the time I appeared to you to speak the truth. I said that cookery does not appear to me to be an art, but a skill; and that medicine is an art; for I said that medicine considers the nature of that which it cures, and the cause of the things that it does, and is able to give an account of each of these: but that the other, being concerned about pleasure, to which its whole attention is directed, proceeds to it without any art at all, neither considering the nature nor the cause of pleasure, altogether without reason, and in a word incapable of giving any account of itself, a mere practice and skill, only preserving the memory of that which usually takes place, by which also it supplies pleasures. 122.
First of all, then, consider whether these things appear to you to have been sufficiently established, and that there are also certain other corresponding studies relating to the soul, of which some follow rules of art, and regard what is best for the soul; but others that neglect this, and consider only, as in the former case, the pleasure of the soul, in what way it may be procured; but paying no attention to which pleasure is better or worse, nor caring for any thing else than gratification only, whether it be better or worse. For my part, Callicles, there appear to me to be such studies; and I say that such a thing is flattery, as well in relation to the body as the soul, and to any thing else the pleasure of which one sedulously attends to, without paying any regard to the better and the worse. But do you entertain the same opinion as we do respecting these things, or do you gainsay it?
_Cal._ No, but I yield this point in order that our discussion may be brought to a close, and that I may gratify Gorgias here.
_Socr._ Does this take place with respect to one soul, but not with respect to two and several?
_Cal._ No; but it takes place with respect to two and several.
_Socr._ Is it not, then, possible to gratify a number of souls collected together, without considering at all what is best?
_Socr._ Can you tell me, then, what those studies are which produce this effect? Or rather, if you please, on my asking, whichever appears to you to be one of these, say so, and which not, deny it. And first of all, let us consider flute-playing. Does it not appear to you to be such a thing, Callicles, as pursues only our pleasure, but regards nothing else?
_Cal._ It appears so.
_Socr._ And is it not the case with all such studies, as for instance, harp-playing in the public games?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ And what as to the representation of choruses and dithyrambic poetry? does it not appear to you to be of the same kind? Do you think that Cinesias son of Meles cares at all to express himself in such a way that his hearers may become better? or rather what will gratify the crowd of spectators?
_Cal._ The latter is clearly the case, Socrates, with respect to Cinesias.
_Socr._ But what as to his father Meles? Did he appear to you to play on the harp, looking to that which is best? or did not he look to what was most pleasant? For in singing he offended the audience. Consider, however; does not all harp-playing and dithyrambic poetry appear to you to have been invented for the sake of pleasure?
_Cal._ It does.
124. _Socr._ But what of that venerable and wonderful art, tragic poetry, at what does it aim? Do its endeavour and aim appear to you to be only to gratify the spectators? or does it strive, if any thing should be pleasing and grateful to them, but mischievous, to avoid saying this, but if it happens to be unpleasant and beneficial, to say and sing this, whether it gratifies the spectators or not? In which of these two ways do you think tragic poetry is framed?
_Cal._ This is clear, Socrates, that it rather aims at pleasure, and the gratification of the spectators.
_Socr._ Did we not just now say, Callicles, that a thing of this kind is flattery?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Come then, if any one should take from all poetry, melody, rhythm, and measure, would any thing else than words remain?
_Cal._ Necessarily so.
_Socr._ Are not these words, then, addressed to a great multitude, and to the people?
_Cal._ I admit it.
_Socr._ Poetry, therefore, is a kind of popular speaking.
_Cal._ It appears so.
_Socr._ Therefore it must be a rhetorical method of popular speaking: for do not poets appear to you to employ rhetoric in the theatres?
_Cal._ They do.
125. _Socr._ Now, therefore, we have found a certain rhetoric among the people, consisting at the same time of boys and women and men, slaves and free-men, of which we do not altogether approve; for we have called it flattery.
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Well then. But as to the rhetoric addressed to the Athenian people, and the people in other cities consisting of free-men, what shall we say as to that? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to speak with a view to what is best, aiming at this, that the citizens may be made as good as possible by their discourses? or do they, too, endeavour to gratify the citizens, and neglecting the public interest for the sake of their own private advantage, do they treat the people as children, trying only to gratify them, without being in the least concerned whether they shall become better or worse by these means?
_Cal._ This is not a simple question that you ask me. For there are some who, looking to the interest of the citizens, say what they do; but others are such as you describe.
126. _Socr._ That is enough. For, if this also is twofold, one part of it will be flattery, and a base popular speaking, but the other will be honourable, namely, that which endeavours to make the souls of the citizens as good as possible, and strives to speak what is best, whether it be pleasant or unpleasant to the hearers. But you have never yet seen this kind of rhetoric. Or, if you can mention any one of the rhetoricians who is of this stamp, why do you not tell me who he is?
_Cal._ But, by Jupiter, I cannot instance to you any of the rhetoricians of the present day.
_Socr._ But what? Can you instance any one of the ancients through whose means the Athenians have become better, after he had begun to harangue them, when previously they had been worse? For I know not who such a one is.
_Cal._ What? Have you not heard that Themistocles was a good man, and Cimon and Miltiades, and Pericles, who died lately, whom you have also heard?
_Socr._ If that is true virtue, Callicles, which you before mentioned as such, namely, for a man to gratify both his own desires and those of others. But if this is not the case, but, as we were afterwards compelled to confess, those desires which, when satisfied, make a man better, ought to be indulged, but those which make him worse, not so, and if there is a certain art in this, can you say that any one of these was a man of this kind?
_Cal._ I know not what to say.
127. _Socr._ But if you seek well, you will find out. Let us however, consider, and see quietly if any one of these was such. For come, is it not true that a good man, who says what he says with a view to the best, does not speak at random, but looking to some end? just as all other artists, looking each to his own work, does not take at random and employ what he employs in his work, but so that the subject he is at work upon may have a certain form: for instance, if you will look at painters, architects, shipwrights, and any other artists you please, you will see that each places whatever he employs in a certain order, and compels one thing to adapt itself to and harmonize with another, until the whole workmanship is compacted together with order and regularity.
And moreover, those other artificers, whom we just now mentioned, who are employed about the body, teachers of gymnastics, and physicians, adorn the body in a way, and dispose it in an orderly manner. Do we allow that this is so or not?
_Cal._ Let it be so.
128. _Socr._ A house, then, that has acquired order and regularity will be a good house, but when disorder, a bad one.
_Cal._ I admit it.
_Socr._ And a ship in like manner?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ And do we not say the same with respect to our bodies?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ But what as to the soul? when in a state of disorder will it be in a good condition, or when it is in a state of order and regularity?
_Cal._ From what has been said, it is necessary to grant that the latter must be the case.
_Socr._ What, then, in the body, is the name of that which results from order and regularity?
_Cal._ You probably mean health and strength.
_Socr._ I do. But what, again, is the name of that which subsists in the soul from order and regularity? Endeavour to discover and mention it, as you did the name of the former.
_Cal._ Why do not you say what it is yourself, Socrates?
_Socr._ If it pleases you better, I will. But do you, if I seem to you to speak well, assent, if not, confute, and do not spare me. To me, then, it appears that the name belonging to the orderly disposition of the body is the healthful, from which health springs, and every other excellence of the body. Is it so, or not?
_Cal._ It is.
_Socr._ But the name belonging to the orderly and regular disposition of the soul is the legitimate and law; whence men become obedient to law and orderly; but these are justice and temperance. Do you admit this or not?
_Cal._ Be it so.
129. _Socr._ Will not, then, that good rhetorician who follows the rules of art, looking to these things, address the arguments he uses and all his actions to souls, and if he should bestow a gift, will he not bestow it, and, if he should take any thing away, will he not take it away _with the same end_, always directing his attention to this, that justice may be produced in the souls of his fellow-citizens, and injustice banished; that temperance may be produced in them, and intemperance banished; and, in short, that every virtue may be planted in them, but vice driven out. Do you grant this, or not?
_Cal._ I do grant it.
_Socr._ For where is the utility, Callicles, in giving a body diseased, and ill-disposed, abundance of the most agreeable food or drink, or any thing else, which will not be more profitable to it than the contrary, but, according to right reason, even less? Is this so?
_Cal._ Be it so.
_Socr._ For I think it is of no advantage for a man to live with a miserable state of body; for thus it would be necessary for him to live miserably: is it not so?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ And do not physicians generally allow a man in health to satisfy his desires, as, for instance, when hungry to eat as much as he pleases, or when thirsty to drink, but when ill, they scarcely ever allow him to satisfy himself with what he desires? Do you grant this too?
_Cal._ I do.
130. _Socr._ And should not the same method, my excellent friend, be adopted with respect to the soul? So long as it is depraved, as being without understanding, intemperate, unjust and unholy, one ought to restrain it from the indulgence of its desires, and not permit it to do any thing except what will render it better? Do you admit this or not?
_Cal._ I do.
_Socr._ For this surely is better for the soul itself.
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And is not to restrain any one from what he desires to punish him?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ To be punished, therefore, is better for the soul than intemperance, as you just now thought.
_Cal._ I don’t know what you mean, Socrates: ask some one else.
_Socr._ This man will not submit to be benefited and to suffer the very thing of which we are speaking, viz., punishment.
_Cal._ I don’t at all heed what you say; I only answered you thus far for the sake of Gorgias.
131. _Socr._ Be it so. What shall we do then? Shall we break off the discussion in the midst?
_Cal._ You shall determine.
_Socr._ But they say it is not right to leave even fables in the midst, but a head should be placed on them, that they may not wander without a head. Answer, therefore, to what remains, that our discussion may have a head to it.
_Cal._ How importunate you are, Socrates! But, if you will be persuaded by me, you will give up this discussion, or carry it on with some one else.
_Socr._ Who else is willing? for we must not leave the discussion unfinished.
_Cal._ Cannot you go through with it yourself, either speaking by yourself or answering yourself?
_Socr._ That the saying of Epicharmus may be verified in me, “what two men said before, I alone am able to say.” But it appears to be very necessary. If, however, we shall do so, I think we ought all of us to strive heartily that we may understand what is true and what false with respect to the subject we are treating of: for it is for the common interest of all that this should become clear. 132. I will, therefore, go through the matter under discussion, as it appears to me to be: but, if I shall seem to any of you to grant myself what is not true, he must take me up and confute me. For I do not say what I say as knowing it, but I am enquiring in common with you, so that, if he who disputes with me should appear to say any thing to the purpose, I shall be the first to give in to him. I say this, however, in case you think the discussion ought to be finished; but if you do not wish it, let us give it up and depart.
_Gorg._ But it appears to me, Socrates, that we should not depart yet, but that you should pursue the argument: and it is evident that the others think so. And I, for my part, wish to hear you go through the remainder of the subject.
_Socr._ But indeed, Gorgias, I would gladly have continued to carry on the discussion with Callicles here, until I had given him back the saying of Amphion for that of Zethus[74]: but since you are not willing, Callicles, to finish the discussion with me, yet listen to me at least, and take me up if I appear to you to say any thing incorrectly. And if you shall confute me, I shall not be angry with you, as you are with me, but you shall be recorded by me as my greatest benefactor.
----- _Cal._ Speak then yourself, my good friend, and finish the argument.
133. _Socr._ Hear me then repeating the argument from the beginning. Are the pleasant and the good the same? They are not the same, as I and Callicles have agreed. But whether is the pleasant to be done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant for the sake of the good. But is the pleasant that, with which when present we are pleased? and the good that, by which when present we are good? Certainly. Now we are good, both ourselves and all other things that are good, when a certain virtue is present? To me this appears to be necessary, Callicles. But the virtue of each thing, whether instrument, or body, or soul, and moreover of every animal, does not reach a high pitch of perfection by chance, but by order, and rectitude, and the art that is attributed to each of them. Is this so? I admit it.
The virtue, then, of every thing is regulated and adorned by order? I should say so. A certain order, then, proper to each, becoming inherent in each, makes each thing good? It appears so to me. The soul, therefore, that has its own order, is better than that which is without order? Necessarily so. That, however, which has order is orderly? How should it not? And that which is orderly is temperate? Most necessarily.
134. A temperate soul, then, is good? I am not able to say any thing against this, my dear Callicles; but do you, if you can do so, inform me.
_Cal._ Proceed, my good friend.
_Socr._ I say, then, that if a temperate soul is good, that which is affected contrariwise to the temperate is base: and this surely is the foolish and intemperate? Certainly. Moreover, a temperate man would act becomingly both towards gods and towards men? for he would not be temperate if he acted unbecomingly? It must needs be so. Moreover, by acting becomingly towards men he would act justly, and towards the gods piously; but it is necessary that he who acts justly and piously should be just and pious? It must be so. It is moreover necessary that he should be brave? for it is not the part of a temperate man either to pursue or avoid what is not becoming, but to pursue and avoid those things and men, pleasures and pains, which he ought, and to endure patiently wherever he ought. 135. So that it is absolutely necessary, Callicles, that the temperate man, as we have described him, being just, brave, and pious, should be a perfectly good man, and that a good man should do whatever he does well and honourably, and that he who does well should be blessed and happy, but that the wicked, who does ill, should be wretched: but this latter would be directly contrary to the temperate man, namely, the intemperate, whom you praised. I, therefore, thus lay down these things, and affirm that they are true. But if they are true, as it seems, he who wishes to be happy must pursue and practise temperance, and must avoid intemperance, every one of us with all his might, and must endeavour never to stand in need of punishment, but if he does need it, either he or any of his family, whether it be the case of a private person, or a city, justice must be administered,