and punishment inflicted, if he is to be happy. This appears to me to be the mark to which we ought to look for the guidance of our life, and referring all private and public actions to this point, that justice and temperance may be ever present with him who will be blessed, and to act accordingly, not suffering his desires to be intemperate, nor endeavouring to satisfy them, which is an irremediable evil, causing a man to live like a robber. For such an one could neither be dear to any other man, nor to God; for it is impossible there can be any communion between them; and where there is no communion there can be no friendship. 136. The sages[75] too, say, Callicles, that heaven and earth, gods and men, are held together by communion, friendship, order, temperance, and justice, and for this reason, my friend, they call this universe, order[76], and not disorder or intemperance. You, however, appear to me not to attend to these things, and this though you are wise; but it has escaped your observation that geometrical equality has great power both among gods and among men; on the contrary you think that every one should strive to get more than others; for you neglect geometry. Well then; either this argument of mine must be confuted, _and it must be shewn_ that the happy are not happy from the possession of justice and temperance, and the wretched, wretched from vice; or, if the argument is true, we must consider what are its results. Now, Callicles, all those things before mentioned, with respect to which you asked me if I was speaking in earnest, result from it, to the effect that a man should accuse himself, his son, and his friend, if he committed any injustice, and should employ rhetoric for this purpose. And what you thought Polus granted through shame was therefore true, that by how much it is more base to do an injury than to be injured, by so much is it worse: and that he who would be a good orator ought to be just and skilled in the knowledge of things just; which, again, Polus said Gorgias acknowledged through shame.
----- Footnote 75: The Pythagoreans, especially Empedocles.
Footnote 76: Κόσμος, “order,” signifying also “the world.”
----- 137. This then being the case, let us consider what it is that you find fault with in me, and whether you are right or not in saying that I can neither assist myself, nor any of my friends or domestics, nor save myself from the greatest dangers, but that I am in the power of any one who chooses, like men marked with infamy, if he pleases, according to that petulant expression of yours, to strike me on the face, or to take away my property, or expel me from the city, or, worst of all, to kill me, and that to be thus circumstanced, is the most disgraceful of all things, according to your opinion. But mine is this, it has indeed been often mentioned, yet nothing prevents its being again repeated; I deny, Callicles, that to be struck in the face unjustly is most disgraceful, or for my body or purse to be cut, but that to strike unjustly and to cut me and mine, is both more disgraceful and worse, and that to rob, enslave, break open a house, and, in short, to injure in any respect me and mine, is both more disgraceful and worse for him who does the injury than for me who am injured. 138. These things, that were proved to be thus in the former part of our discussion, as I affirm, are held and bound (though it is somewhat rude to say so) in reasons of iron and adamant, as would really appear to be the case, so that unless you or some one stronger than you can break them, it is not possible that any one who says otherwise than as I now say can speak correctly; for my statement is always the same, that I know not how these things are, but that of all the persons with whom I have ever conversed, as now with you, no one, who says otherwise, can avoid being ridiculous. I therefore again assert that these things are so. But if this is the case, and injustice is the greatest of evils to him that commits it, and if, great as this evil is, it is still a greater, if possible, for one who acts unjustly not to be punished, what kind of help will that be, which, if a man cannot procure for himself, he would be really ridiculous? will it not be that which would avert from us the greatest harm? But there is an absolute necessity that this should be most disgraceful, for a man not to be able to assist either himself, or his friends and domestics, next to that, an inability to avoid the second evil, and the third, an inability to avoid the third evil, and so on with the rest; in proportion to the magnitude of each evil, so is it beautiful to be able to avoid each of them, and disgraceful not to be able. Is the case thus or otherwise, Callicles?
_Cal._ No otherwise.
139. _Socr._ Of these two things then, the doing injustice and receiving an injury, we say that to do injustice is a greater evil, but to receive an injury a less one. By recourse to what means, then, could a man so assist himself as to have both these advantages, that of not doing injustice, and that of not receiving an injury? Is it by power, or will?
I mean thus: whether, if a man wishes not to be injured, will he not be injured, or, if he has acquired the power of not being injured, will he not be injured?
_Cal._ It is clear that he will not, if he has acquired the power.
_Socr._ But what with respect to doing injustice? Whether, if any one wishes not to do injustice, is this sufficient, (for in that case he will not do it,) or, besides this, is it requisite to acquire a certain power and art, so that, unless he has learned and practised them, he will do injustice? Come then, answer me this question, Callicles; whether do Polus and I appear to you to have been compelled, rightly or not, to make that admission in the former part of our discussion, when we admitted that no one willingly commits injustice, but that all who do commit it do so unwillingly?
_Cal._ Let that point be granted, Socrates, in order that you may bring the argument to a conclusion.
_Socr._ For this purpose, then, as it appears, we must acquire a certain power and art, in order that we may not commit injustice.
_Cal._ Certainly.
140. _Socr._ What then is the art by means of which a man will receive no injury at all, or scarcely any? Consider, if it appears to you the same as it does to me. For to me it appears thus; either that he ought to govern in a city or even have absolute power, or be a friend of the existing government.
_Cal._ Do you observe, Socrates, how ready I am to praise you, if you say any thing well? This you appear to me to have said remarkably well.
_Socr._ Consider also, whether I appear to you to say this well. Each person seems to me for the most part to be a friend to each, according as the ancient sages say “like to like:” does it not seem so to you?
_Cal._ It does.
_Socr._ Wherever, therefore, a savage and uneducated tyrant governs, if there should be any one in the city much better than him, would not the tyrant fear him, and never be able to be cordially his friend?
_Cal._ Such is the case.
_Socr._ Nor yet, if any one should be much worse than the tyrant, would he become his friend; for the tyrant would despise him, nor ever feel any affection for him as a friend.
_Cal._ This also is true.
141. _Socr._ It remains, therefore, that he alone would be a friend, worthy of notice, to such a man, who, having a similar disposition, should blame and praise the same things, and be willing to be governed by and submit to his sway. Such a person will have great influence in this city, and no one will injure him with impunity. Is it not so?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ If, therefore, any young man in this city should consider within himself, “How could I obtain influence, and be injured by no one?” this, as it seems, must be his method, he must from his very youth accustom himself to rejoice and grieve at the same things as the despot, and contrive to make himself as like him as possible. Is it not so?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ Will not he, then, have managed so as not to be injured, and to have great power in that city, according to your argument?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Will he also manage not to commit injustice? or far from it, since he will be like the governor, who is unjust, and will have great influence with him? I think, for my part, that quite contrariwise he will contrive so as to be able to commit the greatest injustice and not to be punished for it. Will he not?
_Cal._ It appears so.
_Socr._ Will not, then, the greatest evil befal him, in consequence of being depraved in his soul, and tainted through imitation of the despot and his influence with him?
142. _Cal._ I know not, Socrates, how you always turn the arguments upside down. Do you not know, that he who imitates can kill him who does not imitate _the despot_ if he pleases, and deprive him of his property?
_Socr._ I do know it, good Callicles, unless I am deaf, since I have just now heard it often both from you and Polus, and from almost every one else in the city. But do you in your turn listen to me: he will kill him if he pleases, but a depraved man, one who is upright and good.
_Cal._ And is not this a thing to be indignant at?
_Socr._ Not to a man of sense, as our argument proves. Do you think that a man should aim at this; to live as long as possible, and should study those arts which always preserve us from dangers, as rhetoric which you bid me study, and which saves us in courts of justice?
_Cal._ I do, by Jupiter, and therein I advise you well.
143. _Socr._ What then, my excellent friend, does the science of swimming too appear to you to be very fine?
_Cal._ No, by Jupiter.
_Socr._ And yet this too saves men from death, when they fall into such a danger as requires this science. But if this appears to you to be mean, I will mention to you one more important than this, namely that of piloting a ship, which not only saves lives, but also bodies and property from extreme danger, just as rhetoric does. And this art is moderate and modest, and does not brag and strut as if it accomplished something wonderful, but when it has accomplished the same thing as the forensic art, if it has brought us safe here from Ægina, it demands, I think, two oboli, and if from Egypt or the Pontus, for so great a benefit in having brought safe what I now mention, ourselves and children, our property and wives, and in having landed them in port, it usually demands two drachms, and the man who possesses this art, and accomplishes these things, when he has disembarked, walks by the sea and his ship, with a modest gait. 144. For he knows, I think, how to reason with himself, that it is uncertain whom of his passengers he has benefited by not allowing them to be drowned, and whom he has injured, knowing that he has not put them ashore in any respect better than they were when they went on board, either as to their souls or bodies. He therefore reasons with himself, that if one who is afflicted in his body with severe and incurable diseases should happen not to be drowned, such a man is indeed miserable for having escaped death, and has received no benefit from him; but if any one labours under many and incurable diseases in that which is more precious than the body, his soul, such a one ought[77] not to live, nor would he benefit him, if he saved him from the sea, or from a court of justice, or from any other danger, for he knows that it is not better for a depraved man to live, because he must needs live badly. For this reason, it is not usual for a pilot to boast, although he saves our lives; nor, my admirable friend, is it usual for an engineer who is sometimes able to save, no less than a general of an army, not to mention a pilot or any other person; for sometimes he saves whole cities. Does it not appear to you that he is fit to be compared with a forensic orator? though, if he chose to speak, Callicles, as you do, extolling his own art, he would overwhelm you with words, urging and exhorting you to the fitness of your becoming an engineer, for that other things are of no consequence; and he would have enough to say. 145. You, however, would nevertheless despise him and his art, and, by way of reproach would call him an engineer, and would neither give your daughter to his son, nor accept his daughter for your son. Though, if from the reasons for which you praise your own art, on what just pretext do you despise the engineer, and the others whom I have just now mentioned? I know that you would say you are better, and of a better family. But if that which is better is not what I say it is, but if excellence consists in this, for a man to save himself and his property, whatever kind of man he may be, then your contempt for the engineer and the physician, and for whatever other arts are pursued for the purpose of preservation, is ridiculous.
----- Footnote 77: The negative particle here expressed, is in the original at the beginning of the paragraph, λογίζεται οὖν, ὅτι οὐκ. See Stallbaum’s lucid note.
----- But, my good friend, consider whether that which is noble and good is not something else than to save and be saved; and whether that principle, that one should live as long as one can, is not to be given up by one who is truly a man, and life not too fondly loved, but that leaving these things to the care of the deity, and believing the women, _who say_ that no man can avoid his fate, one should consider this, by what means one may pass the remainder of one’s life in the best possible manner, whether by conforming one’s-self to the government under which one dwells. 146. And in that case whether it is right that you should resemble as much as possible the Athenian people, if you wish to be dear to them, and to have great influence in their city? Consider whether this is advantageous to you and to me, lest, my admirable friend, we should suffer what they say the Thessalian[78] witches did, who drew down the moon, and our choice of this power in the city should be attended with the loss of what is dearest to us. If, however, you think that any man in the world can teach you any such art, as will cause you to have great power in this city, while you are unlike the character of the people, whether for the better or the worse, as appears to me, Callicles, you are not rightly advised. For you must not only be an imitator of, but like them in your natural disposition, if you mean to do any thing effectual towards gaining the friendship of the Athenian people, and, by Jupiter, you must towards that of the son of Pyrilampes.
Whoever, therefore, shall make you most like them, will make you a politician and an orator, such as you desire to be. For all men are delighted with arguments suited to their own dispositions, but are angry with such as are strange to them; unless you, my dear friend, have any thing to say to the contrary. 147. Have we any objection to make to this, Callicles?
----- Footnote 78: They are said to have lost the use of their eyes and feet.
----- _Cal._ I do not know how it is, Socrates, you appear to me to speak well. Yet that which happens to most happens to me; I am not quite persuaded by you.
_Socr._ For the love of the people, Callicles, dwelling in your soul, resists me; but perhaps, if we should often and more fully examine into these same matters, you would be persuaded. Remember, then, that we said there were two methods for the cultivation of each, both the body and the soul, and that one had reference to pleasure, but the other to that which is best, not by gratifying, but opposing the inclinations. Is not this what we before settled?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ The one, then, that looks to pleasure is ignoble, and nothing else than flattery; is it not?
_Cal._ Be it so, if you please.
_Socr._ But the other endeavours that that which we cultivate may be made as excellent as possible, whether it be the body or the soul?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Must we then so endeavour to cultivate the city and the citizens, that we may make the citizens themselves as good as possible?
For without this, as we discovered before, it is of no advantage to confer any other benefit upon them, unless the mind of those who are about to receive either great riches, or dominion or any other power, be upright and good. Shall we lay this down, as being so?
_Cal._ Certainly, if it is more agreeable to you.
148. _Socr._ If, therefore, Callicles, when setting about some public works, we were to exhort one another to works of architecture, as to very large buildings of walls, or docks or temples, would it be necessary that we should consider and examine ourselves, first, whether we are skilled or not in the art of architecture, and from whom we learnt it? Would this be necessary or not?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Then, secondly, we should consider this, whether we have ever constructed any private building, either for any one of our friends, or for ourselves, and whether this building is beautiful or ugly. And if on examination we found that our masters had been good and famous, and that we have constructed, in conjunction with our masters, many and beautiful buildings, and many privately by ourselves, after we had left our masters, in that case it would become men of sense to undertake public works: but if we were not able to shew that we had a master, nor any building at all, or many and those of no account, it would surely in that case be foolish to attempt public works, and to exhort one another to undertake them. Shall we admit that this is well said, or not?
_Cal._ Certainly.
149. _Socr._ And is not this the case with all other things, and if, attempting to serve the public in the capacity of physicians, we should exhort each other, as if we were skilful physicians, should not you and I examine each other thus: By the gods, in what state is Socrates with respect to bodily health? Has any other person, whether slave or freeman, been cured by Socrates of any disease? And I too, I think, should make similar enquiries about you. And if we did not find that any one, whether stranger or citizen, man or woman, had been improved in health by our means, by Jupiter, Callicles, would it not be truly ridiculous, that men should come to such a pitch of folly, as before they had practised much in private, as best they could, and had succeeded in many cases, and thoroughly exercised the art, to attempt to learn the potter’s art in making a pitcher, as the proverb goes, and attempt to serve the public in the capacity of physician, and exhort others to do the same? Does it not appear to you that it would be foolish to act thus?
_Cal._ It does.
150. _Socr._ But now, O best of men, since you have yourself just now begun to busy yourself in affairs of state, and you exhort and reprove me because I do not busy myself about them, should we not examine each other; Come then, whom of the citizens has Callicles yet made better? Is there any one who, being before depraved, unjust, intemperate, and foolish, has become upright and good through Callicles, whether stranger or citizen, slave or free-man? Tell me, Callicles, if any one should ask you these questions, what will you say? Who will you say has been made better by associating with you? Are you ashamed to answer, whether you have done any such work while you were in a private capacity, before you attempted to interfere in public affairs?
_Cal._ You are cavilling, Socrates.
_Socr._ I do not ask you from a desire to cavil, but really wishing to know in what way you think public affairs ought to be conducted by us; whether on undertaking the management of affairs of state we ought to attend to any thing else than how we may become as good citizens as possible. Have we not already often admitted that a politician ought to do this? Have we admitted it or not? Answer. We have admitted it; I will answer for you. 151. If, then, a good man ought to endeavour to procure this for his city, now call to mind and say with respect to those men whom you a little before mentioned, whether they still appear to you to have been good citizens, Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades and Themistocles.
_Cal._ To me they do.
_Socr._ If, therefore, they were good citizens, it is evident that each of them made their fellow-citizens better instead of worse. Did they so, or not?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ When Pericles, therefore, began to speak in public, were the Athenians worse than when he addressed them for the last time?
_Cal._ Perhaps so.
_Socr._ There is no ‘perhaps’ in the case, my good friend, but this is a necessary consequence from what has been admitted, if he really was a good citizen.
_Cal._ But what then?
_Socr._ Nothing. But tell me this moreover, whether the Athenians are supposed to have become better through Pericles, or quite the contrary, to have been corrupted by him. For so I hear, that Pericles made the Athenians idle, cowardly, talkative and avaricious, having been the first to give them pay.
_Cal._ You hear this, Socrates, from those whose ears have been bruised[79].
----- Footnote 79: The Spartans; see the Protagoras, § 80.
----- 152. _Socr._ However, I no longer hear this, but I know well and so do you, that Pericles at first bore a high character, and that the Athenians passed no ignominious sentence upon him, when they were worse, but when by his means they had become upright and good, towards the close of the life of Pericles, they condemned him for peculation, and were on the point of sentencing him to death, clearly as being a bad citizen.
_Cal._ What then? Was Pericles on this account a bad man?
_Socr._ Such an one, indeed, would be thought a bad manager of asses, horses, and oxen, if having received them, neither kicking, nor butting, nor biting, he should make them do all these things through vice. Does not every trainer of any animal whatever appear to you to be a bad one, who, having received it gentle, has made it more vicious than he received it? Does he appear so, or not?
_Cal._ Certainly, that I may gratify you.
_Socr._ Gratify me, then, by answering this too, whether man is of the class of animals, or not?
_Cal._ How should he not be?
_Socr._ Had not Pericles, then, the care of men?
_Cal._ Yes.
153. _Socr._ What then? Ought they not, as we just now admitted, to have become more just, instead of more unjust, under his management, if he who took charge of them was a good politician?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And are not the just gentle, as Homer[80] says? What say you? Is it not so?
----- Footnote 80: Odyss. vii. 120.
----- _Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ However, he made them more savage than he received them, and this against himself, which he would least of all have wished.
_Cal._ Do you wish that I should agree with you?
_Socr._ If I seem to you to speak the truth.
_Cal._ Be it so, then.
_Socr._ If, then, he made them more savage, he must have made them more unjust, and worse?
_Cal._ Be it so.
_Socr._ According to this reasoning, then, Pericles was not a good politician?
_Cal._ Not, as you say.
_Socr._ By Jupiter, nor as you say either, from what you have admitted.
But, again, tell me with respect to Cimon. Did not they whom he took care of pass a sentence of ostracism upon him, in order that they might not hear his voice for ten years? And did they not do the very same to Themistocles, and beside punish him with exile? And did they not sentence Miltiades, the conqueror at Marathon, to be thrown into the Barathrum, and but for the Prytanis, would he not have been thrown into it? These, however, if they had been good men, as you say, would never have suffered these things. 154. Good drivers, surely, do not at first keep themselves from falling from their cars, but, when they have trained their horses, and have themselves become better drivers, then fall off. This is never the case, either in driving, or in any other employment. Does it appear so to you?
_Cal._ To me it does not.
_Socr._ Our former statements, then, as it appears, are true, that we do not know any man who has been a good politician in this city. You admit that you know of none at present, but you say that formerly there were some, and you have selected these men: but these have appeared to be much the same as those of the present day, so that, if they were orators, they did not make use of the true rhetoric, for in that case they would not have fallen, nor yet did they employ flattery.
_Cal._ However, Socrates, it is far from being the case, that any one of the present day will ever do such deeds as were done by any one of those.
_Socr._ Neither, my excellent friend, do I blame these men, as servants of the city, but they appear to me to have been more efficient than those of the present day, and better able to procure for the city what it desired. But in changing and repressing their desires, by persuading and compelling them to such a course as would make the citizens become better, they scarcely differed at all from those of the present day; yet that is the only duty of a good citizen. But, with respect to providing ships, walls, and docks, and many other such things, I agree with you, that they were more able than the men of our day. 155. You and I, however, act ridiculously in our discussion. For during the whole time that we have been conversing we have not ceased to go round and round the same subject, and to misunderstand each what the other says. I think that you have often admitted and acknowledged that there is a twofold method of treatment, both with respect to the body and with respect to the soul: and that the one is ministerial, by which we are enabled to procure food, if our bodies are hungry, drink, if they are thirsty, and if they are cold, garments, coverlids, shoes, and all other things which the body stands in need of. And I purposely speak to you through these images, in order that you may understand me more easily. For when any one supplies these things, being either a retail tradesman or a merchant, or a manufacturer of any of them, a baker, a cook, a weaver, a shoemaker, or tanner, it is not at all surprising that such a person should appear, both to himself and others, to be concerned in the care of the body, that is, to all who are ignorant that, besides all these, there is a gymnastic and medicinal art, to which the care of the body really belongs, and whose duty it is to rule over all these arts, and to use their respective productions, through knowing what meats or drinks are good and bad for the health of the body, whereas all those others are ignorant of this; for which reason all those other arts are servile, ministerial, and base, as regards the management of the body, but the gymnastic art and medicine are justly the mistresses of these. 156. That the case is the same with respect to the soul, you, at one time, appeared to me to have understood, and admitted it as if you knew what I meant; but shortly afterwards you went on to say that there have been good and upright men in this city, and when I asked you who they were, you appeared to me to adduce men very similar with respect to politics, as if, on my asking with respect to gymnastics, who have been or are good managers of the body, you had very seriously said to me, Thearion the baker, Mithæcus, who wrote on Sicilian cookery, and Sarambus the tavern-keeper, and that they take wonderful care of the body, the first making admirable bread, the second, made-dishes, and the third, wine.
Perhaps, then, you would be angry if I said to you, My friend, you know nothing about gymnastics; you tell me of men who are ministers and purveyors to desires, but who do not understand any thing great and good respecting them, and who, it may so happen, having filled men’s bodies, and made them gross, and having been praised by them, end by ruining their old flesh. These men, on the other hand, through their ignorance, will not blame those who have pampered their appetites, as being the causes of their diseases, and of the loss of their old flesh, but they who may happen to have been with them, and to have given them some advice, when, after a long time, repletion, having been indulged in without any regard to health, comes bringing disease with it, these they will accuse and blame, and do them some mischief if they can, but those others, who are the causes of their maladies, they will extol. 157. And now you, Callicles, act in very much the same way; you extol men who have pampered the Athenians by satiating their desires, and who they say have made the city great; and they do not perceive that it is swollen, and unsound through means of those ancient politicians: for, without considering temperance and justice, they have filled the city with harbours and docks, and walls and tributes, and such trifles. When, therefore, the crisis of their weakness comes, they will blame the advisers who are then present, but will extol Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles, who were the causes of the mischief: and you perhaps, unless you are on your guard, and my friend Alcibiades, they will seize, when they have lost what they had before in addition to what they have acquired, although you are not the causes of the mischief, but perhaps accomplices. 158. Moreover, I both now see a very foolish thing happening, and I hear of it with respect to men of former times. For I perceive that when a city punishes any of its politicians as guilty of wrong, they are angry, and complain bitterly that they are treated shamefully; and having done the city many good services, they are then unjustly ruined by it, as they allege. But the whole is a falsehood. For no president of a city can ever be unjustly ruined by the very city over which he presides. For the case seems to be the same with such as profess themselves to be politicians, as it is with the sophists. For the sophists, though wise in other things, commit this absurdity; whereas they affirm that they are teachers of virtue, they often accuse their disciples of acting unjustly towards them, by defrauding them of their wages, and not making other requitals for the benefits they have received from them. But what can be more unreasonable than such language as this, that men who have become good and just, who have been freed from injustice by their teacher, and have acquired justice, should yet act unjustly from that very quality which they have not? Does not this, my friend, appear to you to be absurd? Of a truth, Callicles, you have compelled me to make a speech by your unwillingness to answer me.
159. _Cal._ But should you not be able to speak unless some one answered you?
_Socr._ It seems as if I could: for now I have carried my discourse to a great length, seeing that you will not answer me. But my good friend, tell me, by Jupiter, the guardian of friendship, does it not appear to you unreasonable, that a man who says he has made another person good, should blame that person, because having been made good through his means, and being so, he has afterwards become bad?
_Cal._ To me it appears so.
_Socr._ Do you not, then, hear those speak in this manner who profess to instruct men in virtue?
_Cal._ I do. But what can you say of men of no worth?
_Socr._ What then can you say of those, who, while they profess to preside over the city, and to take care that it shall be as good as possible, then accuse it, when it so happens, as being very bad? Do you think that these differ at all from the former? My good man, a sophist and an orator are the same thing, or nearly so, and very like, as I said to Polus[81]. But you, through ignorance, think that rhetoric is something exceedingly beautiful, and despise the other. But, in truth, the sophist’s art is as much more beautiful than rhetoric, as the legislative is than the judicial, and the gymnastic art than medicine.
160. But I for my part think that public speakers and sophists alone ought not to complain of the very thing that they teach, as being mischievous to themselves, or that in the very same charge they should at the same time accuse themselves for not having at all benefited those whom they profess to have benefited. Is it not so?
_Socr._ And surely to impart a benefit without a stipulated reward, as is probable, is proper for these men only, if they assert what is true.
For one who has received any other kind of benefit, as, for instance, who has acquired swiftness of foot through the instructions of a teacher of gymnastics, perhaps might deprive him of his gratuity, if the teacher of gymnastics had left it to him, without having made an agreement for a fixed price, that he should be paid the money as nearly as possible at the same time that he imparted his skill to him. For men, I think, do not act unjustly through slowness, but through injustice. Do they not?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ If, therefore, any one should take away this, I mean injustice, there would be no danger of his ever being treated unjustly, but he alone might safely impart this benefit, if in truth he is able to make men good. Is it not so?
_Cal._ I admit it.
161. _Socr._ For this reason then, as it appears, it is not at all disgraceful to take money for giving advice about other things, as, for instance, about architecture, or other arts.
_Cal._ So it appears.
_Socr._ But with respect to this study, by what means a man may become as good as possible, and may best govern his own family or a city, it is reckoned disgraceful to withhold advice, except one should give him money. Is it not so?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ For it is evident that this is the reason that this alone of all benefits makes the person who has received it desirous of requiting it; so that it appears to be a good sign, if he who has imparted this benefit shall be recompensed in return; but otherwise not. Is this so?
_Cal._ It is.
_Socr._ To which method, then, of taking care of the city do you advise me? explain to me; whether to that of thwarting the Athenians, in order that they may become as good as possible, as if I were a physician, or to that by which I should serve them, and curry favour with them. Tell me the truth, Callicles. For, as you begun to speak freely to me, it is right you should continue to say what you think. And now speak well and nobly.
_Cal._ I say, then, that I advise you to serve them.
162. _Socr._ You advise me, therefore, most noble Sir, to employ flattery.
_Cal._ Unless you prefer calling him a Mysian[82], Socrates; for if you will do so— ----- Footnote 82: A name of the utmost contempt.
----- _Socr._ Do not repeat what you have often said, that any one who pleases will kill me, lest I too should say again, that a bad man would slay a good one; nor that he will take away my property, if I have any, lest I too should say again, that after he has taken it away he will not be able to make any use of it, but as he has unjustly taken it from me, so having got it, he will make an unjust use of it; and if unjustly, basely; and if basely, wickedly.
_Cal._ How confident you seem to me to be, Socrates, that you will never