that things which he does not know are certain other things that he does not know, or when he thinks that things which he does know are other things that he does know, or that things which he does not know are things that he does know. But none of these things can happen, therefore it is not possible to form false judgments. Again if existence is put for knowledge a similar train of reasoning leads to the same conclusion.
A third method of forming false judgments may be when any one says that any real object is another real object, changing one for the other in his thoughts. But in that case he must think of both of them or one only; if the former he would contradict himself; if the latter he cannot judge that the one is the other, for he thinks of one only, so that neither in this way can false judgment be formed. There still remains another mode in which false judgments may be formed. Suppose that we have in our souls a waxen tablet of various qualities in different persons: on this tablet are impressed the images of our perceptions and thoughts, and whatever is so impressed we remember and know so long as the image remains. But by examining every possible mode by which perception in the senses and impressions in the mind can be varied and inter-changed, it will be found that false judgment takes place where either the perception or the impression is imperfect and indistinct[142].
----- Socrates, however, is not satisfied with this conclusion, that false judgment proceeds from the conjunction of perception with thought, and shews that the mind alone by itself may err, for instance a man may think that seven and five make eleven, though he knows they make twelve; so that there must be either no false judgment at all, or it is possible for a person not to know what he knows. Theætetus is unable to choose between these alternatives. Socrates therefore proposes to abandon their present course of argument and at once to enquire what it is to know.
Some people say it is to have science, Socrates prefers saying it is to possess science; for having differs from possessing in that what we have, we use, but what we possess, we use or not as we please. Suppose the soul then to be a kind of aviary containing all sorts of birds, and let the birds stand for sciences; now all the sciences that are shut up in this aviary a man may be said to possess, but when he has occasion to use any particular science, he may by mistake take one instead of another, thus when he thinks that eleven is twelve he takes the science of eleven instead of that of twelve, and so judges falsely; but when he takes that which he endeavours to take, he judges truly. Still another even worse inconvenience appears to Socrates to follow from this; for it is absurd to suppose that a person who has the science of any thing should at the same time be ignorant of that thing; and if that can be, nothing hinders but that ignorance when present should make us know something. So that after all they have only come round again to the point from whence they started and have still to enquire what science is. Theætetus persists in answering that it is true judgment. But Socrates shews that this cannot be the case; for that judges, who listen to the arguments of lawyers, form true judgments without science, whence it follows that true judgment and science are not the same[143].
----- Theætetus, pressed by this objection, attempts a third definition of science, and says it is true judgment in conjunction with reason. But then, observes Socrates, how are we to distinguish the things that can be known from those that cannot? For instance, elements cannot be defined, but things composed of them can be defined. Again, elements can be perceived but not known, for he who cannot give an explanation of a thing cannot know it, but things compounded of them, because they can be defined, can also be known. Theætetus agrees to this; but Socrates is not satisfied with the statement, that the elements are unknown, but the nature of things compounded of them known. He illustrates his objection by an examination of the component parts of a syllable, and shews that if a whole is known its parts must also be known; if, then, letters are the elements of a syllable, being also the parts of it, they must also be known as well as the syllable[144].
----- But in order to ascertain the accuracy of Theætetus’s last definition of science, it is necessary to determine the meaning of the word _logos_.
First of all, then, it may mean the expressing one’s thoughts by means of words, but in that case there will be no difference between true judgment and science. Secondly, it may mean the being able to describe a thing by its elements; but this has been already answered in considering the elements of syllables. Lastly, it may mean definition; but it is absurd to say that science is true judgment joined to definition, for definition can only be of that which a person already knows, so that this would be to say that science is true judgment joined to science[145].
----- At this point the argument is broken off, without having been brought to any satisfactory conclusion. But Socrates requests that they may meet again the following day and continue the discussion.
THEÆTETUS, OR ON SCIENCE.
FIRST EUCLIDES, AND TERPSION, THEN SOCRATES, THEODORUS, AND THEÆTETUS.
------- _Euc._ Are you just now, Terpsion, or long since come from the country?
_Ter._ A considerable time since, and I have been seeking for you in the forum, and wondered that I could not find you.
_Euc._ I was not in the city.
_Ter._ Where then?
_Euc._ As I was going down to the port, I met with Theætetus, who was being carried from the camp at Corinth to Athens.
_Ter._ Alive or dead?
_Euc._ Alive, though scarcely so; for he is in a bad state from several wounds, though he suffers more from the disease that is prevalent in the army.
_Ter._ Is it dysentery?
_Euc._ Yes.
_Ter._ What a man you speak of as being in danger!
_Euc._ An honourable and good man, Terpsion, and I just now heard some persons highly extolling his conduct in the battle.
_Ter._ Nor is that surprising, but it would be much more wonderful if he had not behaved so. But why did he not stop here at Megara?
_Euc._ He was hastening home; although I begged and advised him, yet he would not. And after I had attended him on his journey, on my return hither I recollected, and was filled with admiration of Socrates, who often spoke prophetically about other things, and especially about him.
2. For if I remember rightly, a little before his death, he met with Theætetus who was then a youth, and being in company and discoursing with him, he very much admired his natural disposition. And when I went to Athens, he related to me the conversation he had had with him, which was very well worth hearing, and he said that he must necessarily distinguish himself, if he lived to a mature age.
_Ter._ And he spoke truly as it seems. But what was the conversation?
are you able to relate it?
_Euc._ No, by Jupiter, not by heart; but as soon as I returned home, I made notes of it, and afterwards at my leisure calling it to mind I wrote it down, and as often as I came to Athens, I asked Socrates to repeat what I did not remember, and, on my return hither, corrected it; so that I have nearly the whole conversation written out.
3. _Ter._ True: I have heard you say so before, and though I always meant to beg you to shew it me, I have hitherto delayed doing so. But what should hinder us from now going through it? For I am in great need of rest, having just come from the country.
_Euc._ I too accompanied Theætetus as far as Erinion, so that I should not be at all sorry to rest myself. Let us go, then, and while we rest the boy shall read to us.
_Ter._ You say well.
_Euc._ This then is the book, Terpsion. But I wrote the conversation thus, not as if Socrates related it to me, as he did, but as if he was conversing with the persons with whom he said he did converse. But these, he said, were Theodorus the geometrician, and Theætetus. 4. In order, then, that phrases interposed in the discourse might not give us trouble in the writing, when Socrates spoke of himself, as “I said,” or “Thereupon I replied,” and again when he spoke of the person who gave the answer, “He assented,” or “He denied,” for this reason I have introduced Socrates himself as conversing with them, and have done away with all such expressions.
_Ter._ And that is not at all improper, Euclides.
_Euc._ Here then, boy, take the book and read.
_Socr._ If I took more interest in the people at Cyrene, Theodorus, I should enquire of you what is going on there, and of the people, whether there are any young men there who devote their attention to geometry, or any other liberal study. But now, for I love them less than these, I am more anxious to know who of our young men promise to become eminent. For I myself examine into this as far as I am able, and enquire of others, with whom I see the young men willingly associating. But no small number attach themselves to you, and justly; for you deserve it, both in other respects, and on account of your geometry. If, therefore, you have met with any one worth mentioning, I should be glad to be informed of it.
5. _Theo._ And indeed, Socrates, it is very well worth while both for me to tell and you to hear, what a youth I have met with among your fellow-citizens. And if he were beautiful, I should be very much afraid to mention him, lest I should appear to any one to be enamoured with him; but now, and don’t be angry with me, he is not handsome, for he resembles you in the flatness of his nose and the prominence of his eyes: but he has these in a less degree than you. You see I speak without reserve. Be assured then, that of all I ever met with, and I have been in company with very many, I never yet knew one of such an admirable disposition. For a man to be apt to learn, as it is at all times difficult, and at the same time remarkably mild, and added to this brave beyond compare, I, for my part, thought could never happen, nor do I see any who are so. But those who are acute, as this one, sagacious, and of a good memory, are for the most part easily roused to anger, and are hurried violently along like ships without ballast, and are naturally rather furious than brave; on the other hand those who are more sedate commonly set about their studies more sluggishly and are forgetful. 6. But he so calmly, steadily, and effectually applies himself to his studies and investigations, with so much gentleness, like oil flowing noiselessly, that one wonders how one at his age can manage to do this.
_Socr._ You bring good news. But whose son is he of our citizens?
_Theo._ I have heard the name, but do not remember it. However he is the middle one of those who are now approaching. For both he and these who are some of his companions were just now anointing themselves in the outer course; and now they appear to me to be coming here after having anointed themselves. Observe, however, if you know him.
_Socr._ I do know him. He is the son of Euphronius of Sunium, who, my friend, was just such a man as you describe the son to be, and who was otherwise a person of consideration, and besides left behind him a very large fortune.
7. _Theo._ Theætetus is his name, Socrates. But I think his guardians have squandered his fortune. However notwithstanding this, he is wonderfully liberal with his money, Socrates.
_Socr._ You describe a noble man. Bid him come here, and sit down by us.
_Theo._ I will. Theætetus, come hither to Socrates.
_Socr._ By all means come, Theætetus, that I may look at myself, and see what sort of a face I have. For Theodorus says I am like you. But if we had each of us a lyre, and he should say that they were modulated alike, should we believe him at once, or consider first whether he speaks as a musician?
_Theæ._ We should consider that first.
_Socr._ Should we not, then, on finding that he was so, believe him, but, if he was ignorant of music, disbelieve him?
_Theæ._ True.
_Socr._ Now, then, I think, if we care at all about the resemblance of our faces, we should consider whether he speaks as a painter, or not.
_Theæ._ It appears so to me.
_Socr._ Is Theodorus a painter then?
_Theæ._ Not that I know of.
_Socr._ And is he not a geometrician either?
_Theæ._ Most assuredly he is, Socrates.
8. _Socr._ Is he also an astronomer, a reasoner, and a musician, and acquainted with all such things as are requisite for a good education?
_Theæ._ He appears so to me.
_Socr._ If, then, he says that we resemble each other in some part of our body, praising or blaming it, it is not very well worth while to pay any attention to him.
_Theæ._ Perhaps not.
_Socr._ But what if he should praise the soul of either of us for virtue or wisdom? would it not be worth while for the one who heard him to take pains to examine him that was praised, and for the latter to discover himself willingly?
_Theæ._ Certainly, Socrates.
_Socr._ It is time then, my dear Theætetus, for you to discover yourself, and for me to examine you; for be assured that Theodorus, though he has ere now praised many both strangers and citizens to me, has never praised any one so much as he praised you just now.
_Theæ._ May it be well, Socrates; but beware that he did not speak in jest.
_Socr._ That is not Theodorus’s habit. But do not retract what you have granted, under the pretence that he spoke in jest, lest he should be compelled to bear witness. For no one assuredly will accuse him of giving false evidence. Therefore adhere firmly to your agreement.
_Theæ._ It is proper to do so, if you think fit.
9. _Socr._ Tell me, then; Do you learn geometry from Theodorus?
_Theæ._ I do.
_Socr._ And, likewise, astronomy, and harmony, and reasoning?
_Theæ._ I endeavour to do so.
_Socr._ I too, my boy, endeavour to learn both from him and from others who I think understand any thing of these matters. However, though I am tolerably well informed in other subjects, yet I am in doubt about a trifle which I wish to consider with you, and these here present. Tell me, then, is not to learn to become wiser in that which one learns?
_Theæ._ How otherwise?
_Socr._ And by wisdom, I think, the wise are wise.
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ But does this differ at all from science?
_Theæ._ What?
_Socr._ Wisdom. Are not men wise in things of which they have a scientific knowledge?
_Theæ._ How not?
_Socr._ Then are wisdom and science the same?
_Theæ._ Yes.
10. _Socr._ This, then, is the thing that I doubt about, and I am not able to determine satisfactorily by myself what science is. Can we then explain it? What do you say? Which of us shall speak first? But he that mistakes, and as often as any one mistakes, shall sit as an ass, as the boys say when they play at ball; but whoever shall get the better without making a mistake shall be our king, and shall order any question he pleases to be answered. Why are you silent? Am I rude at all, Theodorus, from my love of talking, and in my anxiety to bring about a conversation amongst us, and of making us all friends, and sociable with one another?
_Theo._ Such a thing, Socrates, cannot by any means be rude, but bid one of these young men answer you. For I am unaccustomed to this kind of conversation, and am not of an age to accustom myself to it; whereas it is suitable to them, and they will benefit by it much more; for, in truth, youth can derive benefit from every thing. As you begun, therefore, do not let Theætetus off, but question him.
11. _Socr._ You hear, Theætetus, what Theodorus says, whom, I think, you will neither be willing to disobey, nor is it right for a young man not to submit to a wise man, when he commands him in matters of this kind.
Tell me, therefore, frankly and ingenuously, what does science appear to you to be?
_Theæ._ I must then, Socrates, since you bid me. And if I make any mistake you will assuredly correct me.
_Socr._ Certainly, if we are able.
_Theæ._ It appears to me, then, that sciences are such things as one may learn from Theodorus, geometry, and the others which you just now enumerated; and again, the shoemaker’s art, and those of other artizans, all and each of these are nothing else but science.
_Socr._ Nobly and munificently, my friend, when asked for one thing you give many, and various things instead of the single one.
_Theæ._ What mean you by this, Socrates?
_Socr._ Perhaps nothing: but I will tell you what I think. When you speak of the shoemaker’s art, do you mean any thing else than the science of making shoes?
_Theæ._ Nothing.
12. _Socr._ But what of the carpenter’s art? Do you mean any thing else than the science of making implements in wood?
_Theæ._ Still nothing else.
_Socr._ In both, then, do you not define that of which each is the science?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ But the question asked, Theætetus, was not this, of what things there is science, nor how many sciences there are; for we did not enquire, with a view to enumerate them, but to know what science itself is. Do I say nothing to the purpose?
_Theæ._ You speak very correctly.
_Socr._ Consider this too. If any one should ask us about any mean and obvious thing, as, for instance, clay, what it is, if we were to answer him, there is the potters’ clay, the oven-builders’ clay, and the brick-makers’ clay, should we not be ridiculous?
_Theæ._ Probably.
_Socr._ In the first place, _we should be ridiculous_ for thinking that he who asks the question can understand from our answer, when we say Clay, adding, image-makers, or any other artizans whatever. Do you think that any one can understand the name of a thing when he does not know what that thing is?
_Theæ._ By no means.
13. _Socr._ Neither does he understand the science of shoes who does not know what science is?
_Theæ._ He does not.
_Socr._ He then does not understand what is the art of shoe-making, or any other art, who is ignorant of what science is?
_Theæ._ It is so.
_Socr._ It is, therefore, a ridiculous answer for one to give who is asked what science is, when he answers the name of some art. For he answers, of what there is a science, though this is not what he was asked.
_Theæ._ It seems so.
_Socr._ In the next place, when he might have answered plainly and briefly he goes round an endless way. As for instance to the question about clay, it is a plain and simple answer to give, that clay is earth mixed with moisture, without mentioning what use is made of it.
_Theæ._ It appears easy now, in this way, Socrates; for you appear to ask just such a question as lately occurred to me when we were conversing together, I and your namesake here, Socrates.
_Socr._ What was that, Theætetus?
14. _Theæ._ Theodorus here was describing to us something about powers, with respect to magnitudes of three and five feet, shewing that they are not commensurate in length to a magnitude of one foot, and thus proceeding through every number as far as to a magnitude of seventeen feet; at this he stopped. Since then powers appeared to be infinite in multitude, something of the following kind occurred to us, to endeavour to comprehend them in one name, by which we might denominate all these powers.
_Socr._ And did you discover any thing of the kind?
_Theæ._ I think we did. But do you also consider.
_Socr._ Say on.
_Theæ._ We divided all number into two classes; then comparing that in which the factors[146] are the same to a square figure, we called it square and equilateral.
----- Footnote 146: The literal translation instead of “in which the factors are the same,” is “which is able to become equally equal,” by which is meant a number multiplied by itself.
----- _Socr._ Very well.
_Theæ._ But the intermediate numbers, such as three and five, and every one in which the factors are not the same, but a greater number is multiplied by a less, or a less by a greater, so that a greater and a lesser side always enclose them, we compared to an oblong figure, and called them oblong numbers.
_Socr._ Admirable. But what next?
_Theæ._ Such lines as square an equilateral and plane number, we defined to be length, and such as square an oblong number, powers, as not being commensurate with them in length, but with the planes which they produce. And the case is the same with solids.
15. _Socr._ Excellently done, my boys; so that Theodorus appears to me not liable to the charge of having given false testimony.
_Theæ._ However, Socrates, I shall not be able to answer your question about science, as I did that about length and power; though you appear to me to seek something of the same kind. So that Theodorus again appears to be a false witness.
_Socr._ How so? If, praising you for running, he should say that he never met with any youth who ran so swift, and afterwards you should be defeated in running by a man who is full grown and very swift, do you think he would have praised you with less truth?
_Theæ._ I do not.
_Socr._ But with respect to science, as I just now spoke of it, do you think it is a trifling matter to find out what it is, and not in every way difficult?
_Theæ._ By Jupiter, I think it difficult in the extreme.
16. _Socr._ Have confidence, then, in yourself, and think that Theodorus spoke to the purpose, and endeavour by all possible means to comprehend the notion both of other things, and also of science, what it is.
_Theæ._ As far as endeavour goes, Socrates, it shall be found out.
_Socr._ Come then: for you began very well just now; endeavour, in imitation of your answer about powers, as you comprised those, which are many, under one general idea, so likewise to designate many sciences by one notion.
_Theæ._ Be assured, Socrates, I have often attempted to examine this, on hearing the questions that are propounded by you; but I can neither persuade myself that I can say any thing satisfactory, nor can I hear any one else answering in the manner you require, though still I do not desist from the attempt.
17. _Socr._ You are in labour, my dear Theætetus, not because you are empty, but pregnant.
_Theæ._ I know not, Socrates; however I tell you how the case stands with me.
_Socr._ What, absurd youth, have you not heard that I am son of the very noble and awful midwife Phænarete?
_Theæ._ I have heard so.
_Socr._ And have you also heard that I study the same art?
_Theæ._ By no means.
_Socr._ Be assured, however, that it is so: but do not betray me to others. For they are not aware, my friend, that I possess this art? but they, since they are ignorant of it, do not say this of me, but that I am a most absurd man, and make men doubt. Have you not heard this?
_Theæ._ I have.
_Socr._ Shall I tell you the reason of it?
_Theæ._ By all means.
_Socr._ Consider, then, every thing that relates to midwives, and you will more easily understand what I mean. For you doubtless know, that not one of them delivers others, while she herself can conceive and bring forth, but those who can no longer bring forth.
_Theæ._ Certainly.
18. _Socr._ But they say that Diana is the cause of this, because being herself a virgin she has the charge of child-births. Now to barren women she has not given the power of becoming midwives, because human nature is too weak to undertake an art in things of which it has had no experience, but she has imposed that office on those who from their age are incapable of bearing children, doing honour to the resemblance of herself.
_Theæ._ That is reasonable.
_Socr._ And is not this also reasonable and necessary, that who are pregnant and who are not should be better known by midwives than by others?
_Theæ._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Moreover, midwives by applying drugs and using enchantments, are able both to excite and, if they please, to alleviate the pangs, and to deliver those that bring forth with difficulty, and if the child appears to be abortive, they produce a miscarriage.
_Theæ._ It is so.
_Socr._ Have you not also heard this of them, that they are most skilful match-makers, as being perfectly competent to distinguish what kind of woman ought to be united to what kind of man, in order to produce the finest children?
_Theæ._ I did not altogether know that.
19. _Socr._ Be assured, then, that they pride themselves more in this than in cutting the navel-string. For consider; do you think it belongs to the same or a different art to cultivate and gather in the fruits of the earth, and again to know in what soil what plant or seed ought to be sown?
_Theæ._ No, but to the same art.
_Socr._ But with respect to women, my friend, do you think that there is one art of that kind[147], and another of gathering in the fruit?
----- Footnote 147: That is, of choosing the soil.
----- _Theæ._ It is not reasonable to suppose so.
_Socr._ It is not. But by reason of the illegitimate and ill-assorted unions of men and women, to which the name of pandering has been given, midwives out of regard to their own dignity avoid match-making also, fearing lest by this they should incur the other imputation, since it doubtless belongs to real midwives only to make marriages properly.
_Theæ._ It appears so.
_Socr._ Such then is the office of midwives, but less important than my task. For it does not happen to women, sometimes to bring forth images, and sometimes realities, which cannot be easily discriminated; for, if it did happen, it would be the greatest and noblest work for midwives to distinguish that which is true and that which is not; do you not think so?
_Theæ._ I do.
20. _Socr._ But in my art of midwifery all other things are the same as in theirs; but it differs in this, that it delivers men and not women, and that it attends to their souls bringing forth and not their bodies.
But the most important thing in my art is, that it is able to test in every possible way whether the mind of a young man is bringing forth an image and a cheat, or what is genuine and true: for the case is the same with me as with midwives; I am barren of wisdom, and as to what many have reproached me with, that I question others, but give no answer myself on any subject, because I have no wisdom, they reproach me truly.
But the cause of this is as follows: the deity compels me to act the part of a midwife, but forbids me to bring forth myself. I am not, therefore, myself at all wise, and I have no such discovery as is the offspring of my own mind; but those who associate with me at first appear, some of them, exceedingly ignorant, but all, as our intimacy continues, to whom the deity grants that privilege, make a wonderful proficiency, as is evident both to themselves and others; and this is clear, that they make this proficiency without ever learning any thing from me, but from their own resources finding and becoming possessed of many beautiful things; of the midwife’s office, however, the deity and I are the cause. 21. But it is evident from this: many, from not knowing this, and deeming themselves to be the cause, but despising me, either of themselves or through the persuasion of others, have left me sooner than was proper, and after they have left me have miscarried for the future, in consequence of their depraved associations, and badly nurturing what they have been delivered of through me, they have destroyed it, setting a higher value on cheats and images than on that which is true, they have at last appeared to be ignorant both to themselves and others. One of these was Aristides son of Lysimachus, and many others, with some of whom, when they again come to me, begging to renew their intercourse with me, and doing every thing in their power to obtain it, the demon that attends me prevents me from associating, but with others it allows me, and these again make considerable proficiency.
And they that associate with me are in this respect affected in the same way as women who bring forth; they suffer pangs, and are filled with anxieties, to a far greater degree than the women are. But their pangs my art is able both to excite and appease. And these are affected in this way. 22. But sometimes, Theætetus, there are some who do not appear to me to be at all pregnant, and I, knowing that they do not need my assistance, very kindly sue others for them, and with the aid of the deity, conjecture well enough, from associating with whom they will derive benefit. Of these I have handed many over to Prodicus, and many to other wise and divine men. I have dwelt long on this, my excellent friend, for this reason, because I suspect, as you also think yourself, that you are in pain from being pregnant with something inwardly. Deal with me, then, as son of a midwife, and as myself skilled in midwifery, and endeavour to answer the questions I put to you to the best of your ability. And if, on examining any thing that you say, I shall consider it to be an image and not true, and should thereupon remove it and throw it away, do not be angry with me, like women who are delivered for the first time are for their children: for many, my admirable friend, have ere this been so affected towards me as to be actually ready to bite me, when I take away any trifle from them, and they do not think that I do this with a good design, in that they are very far from knowing that no deity designs ill to men, and that neither do I do any thing of this kind through ill-will, but because it is by no means allowable for me to give way to falsehood and conceal the truth. 23. Again, therefore, from the beginning, Theætetus, endeavour to tell me what science is; but never say that you are unable to do so; for if God wills and you strive manfully you will be able.
_Theæ._ Indeed, Socrates, when you are thus urgent, it would be disgraceful for one not to endeavour to the utmost of one’s power to say what one is able. He, then, that knows any thing appears to me to perceive what he knows, and, as it now seems, science is nothing else than perception.
_Socr._ Well and nobly said, my boy; for it is right thus to declare one’s opinion. But come, let us consider this together, whether it is solid or empty. Science, you say, is perception?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ You appear, indeed, to have given no mean definition of science, but that which Protagoras has given; but he said the same thing in a different manner. For he says that man is the measure of all things, of the existence of those that exist, and of the non-existence of those that do not exist. You have doubtless read this?
_Theæ._ I have read it, and that often.
24. _Socr._ Does he not say pretty much, that such as every thing appears to me, such it is to me, and as it appears to you, such it is to you, but you and I are men?
_Theæ._ He does indeed say so.
_Socr._ It is probable however that a wise man does not trifle; let us, therefore, follow him. Does it not sometimes happen that when the same wind blows, one of us is cold, and another not, and one slightly, but another exceedingly?
_Theæ._ Assuredly.
_Socr._ Whether, then, shall we say, that the wind at that time is in itself cold or not cold? or shall we believe Protagoras, that it is cold to him that is cold, but not to him that is not?
_Theæ._ It seems so.
_Socr._ Does it not, then, appear so to both of them?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ But to appear is the same as to be perceived?
_Theæ._ It is.
_Socr._ Appearance then and perception are the same in things hot, and every thing of that kind; for such as every one perceives things to be, such also they seem to be to every one.
_Theæ._ It seems so.
_Socr._ Perception, therefore, has always reference to that which really is, and is free from falsehood, as being science.
_Theæ._ It appears so.
25. _Socr._ By the graces, then, was not Protagoras a very wise man, and did he express himself thus enigmatically to us, the general rabble, but speak the truth to his disciples in secret?
_Theæ._ What mean you by this, Socrates?
_Socr._ I will tell you, and that no mean account; he asserts, that no one thing exists of itself, nor can you correctly designate any thing by any quality, but if you call it great, it will appear small, and if heavy, light, and so with every thing else; as if nothing was one thing, or any thing, or possessed of any quality: but as if all things which we say exist, become so from impulse, motion, and admixture with each other, thereby designating them incorrectly; for nothing ever is, but is always becoming. And in this all the wise men in succession, except Parmenides, agreed, namely, Protagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles, and of the poets, those who rank highest in each kind of poetry, in comedy Epicharmus, and in tragedy Homer; for in saying that[148] “Oceanus is father of the gods, and Tethys mother,” he asserts that all things are ----- Footnote 148: Iliad, xiv. 201.
----- _Theæ._ To me he does.
26. _Socr._ Who then can contend with such an army, with Homer for its leader, and not be ridiculous?
_Theæ._ It is not easy, Socrates.
_Socr._ It is not, indeed, Theætetus. For this is a strong proof in favour of their argument, that motion gives the appearance of existence and of generation, but repose of non-existence and decay; for heat and fire, which engenders and supports other things, is itself engendered by impulse and friction, but this is motion. Are not these the origin of fire?
_Theæ._ Surely they are.
_Socr._ And moreover the race of animals springs from the same causes.
_Theæ._ How not?
_Socr._ But what? Does not the habit of the body perish by rest and inaction, but is it not for the most part preserved by exercise and motion?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ But does not the habit of the soul acquire and retain learning and become better by study and practice, which are motions, but by rest, which is want of practice and ignorance, it neither learns any thing, and forgets what it has learnt?
_Theæ._ Assuredly.
27. _Socr._ Motion, therefore, is good both for the soul and the body; but rest, the contrary.
_Theæ._ It seems so.
_Socr._ Shall I add further, with respect to stillness of the air, and calms and things of that kind, that rest corrupts and destroys, but the contrary preserves. And besides this shall I put the finishing stroke to my argument by compelling you to admit, that by the golden chain Homer meant nothing else than the sun, and intimated that as long as the universe and the sun are moved, all things exist, and are preserved, both amongst gods and amongst men; but if they were to stand still, as it were bound, all things would be destroyed, and, as the saying is, turned upside down.
_Theæ._ He appears to me too, Socrates, to intimate what you say.
_Socr._ Then put the argument thus, my excellent friend: first with respect to the eyes, suppose that what you call white colour is not any thing different, external to your eyes, nor in your eyes; nor can you assign it any place; for then it would have a fixed position, and would continue, and not be liable to production.
28. _Theæ._ But how?