_Theo._ In that way, Socrates, his argument appears to me to be effectually refuted, and it was also refuted by this, that he makes the opinions of others sound; and these were found to consider his arguments as by no means to be true.
_Socr._ In many other ways, too, Theodorus, this may be demonstrated, that not every opinion of every man is true. But, with respect to the manner in which each person is affected, whence perceptions and corresponding opinions are produced, it is more difficult to demonstrate that they are not true. But perhaps I should say, it is quite impossible: for probably they cannot be refuted, and those who say that they are certain and sciences, may possibly say the truth, and in that case Theætetus here did not speak amiss in asserting that perception and science are the same. 92. Let us, then, approach nearer to it, as the argument advanced in behalf of Protagoras enjoined us, and examine this essence, that is said to consist in motion[159], by knocking it, and see whether it sounds whole or cracked. For the contest about it is neither mean nor among a few.
----- _Theo._ It is very far from being mean, but is spreading very much throughout Ionia. For the partisans of Heraclitus advocate this doctrine very strenuously.
_Socr._ Therefore, my dear Theodorus, we should the rather examine it from the beginning, as they propound it.
_Theo._ Assuredly. For, Socrates, with respect to these Heraclitian, or, as you say, Homeric, and even older doctrines, it is no more possible to converse about them with the people of Ephesus who pretend to be acquainted with them, than with persons who are raving mad. For, just as their written doctrines, they are truly in constant motion, but to keep to an argument and a question, and quietly to answer and ask in turn, is less in their power than any thing; or rather the power of rest in these men is infinitely less than nothing. But if you ask any one of them a question, they draw out, as from a quiver, certain dark enigmatical words, and shoot them off, and if you wish to get from him a reason for what he has said, you will be forthwith stricken with another newly coined word, but will never come to any conclusion with any one of them; nor do they with one another, but they take very good care not to allow any thing to be fixed, either in their discourse, or in their souls, thinking, as it appears to me, that this very thing is stationary[160]; and they make constant war upon it, and as far as they are able, expel it from every where.
----- Footnote 160: And so opposed to their doctrine of constant motion.
----- 93. _Socr._ Perhaps, Theodorus, you have seen these men contending, but have never been in their company when peaceable, for they are no friends of yours. But I think they say such things when at leisure, to their disciples, whom they wish to render like themselves.
_Theo._ What disciples, my good friend? Amongst such men, one is not the disciple of another, but they spring up spontaneously, from whatever place each of them happens to be seized with a frenzy, and each thinks that the other knows nothing. From these, therefore, as I was just now saying, you will never get a reason either willingly or unwillingly: but we must take the matter up as if it were a problem and examine it ourselves.
_Socr._ You say right. But have we not received this problem from the ancients, who by the aid of poetry concealed it from the multitude, that Ocean and Tethys, the origin of all things, are streams, and that nothing is at rest, and from the moderns, as being wise, who have declared openly, so that even cobblers on hearing them learn wisdom, and give up their foolish opinion, that some things are at rest and others in motion, and learning that all things are in motion, they pay great respect to their teachers. 94. But I had almost forgotten, Theodorus, that others have declared the very contrary to this, that “that which is called the universe is Immoveable,” and every thing else that the followers of Melissus and Parmenides maintain in opposition to all this, as, that all things are one, and that this is at rest in itself, and has no place in which it can be moved. What then shall we do with all these people, my friend? For advancing by little and little, we have unawares fallen between both of them, and if we do not defend ourselves and escape, we shall be punished like those who in the wrestling grounds play on the line, who, when they are caught by both parties, are dragged in contrary directions. It appears therefore to me, that we should first of all consider those with whom we set out, the advocates of perpetual motion, and, if they shall prove to speak to the purpose, we will join with them, and endeavour to escape from the others; but if those who say that the universe is at rest appear to speak more truly, we will on the other hand fly to them from those who move even things immoveable. 95.
And if both shall be found to speak nothing right, we shall be ridiculous for thinking that we, mean as we are, can say any thing to the purpose, after we have condemned men of great antiquity and wisdom.
Consider therefore, Theodorus, whether it is for our interest to venture on so great a danger.
_Theo._ It would be unpardonable, Socrates, not thoroughly to examine what each of these men say.
_Socr._ We must examine it, since you are so anxious to do so. It appears to me then, that the first thing to be done in an enquiry about motion, is to find out what they mean by saying that all things are in motion. I mean this: whether they say that there is one species of motion, or, as it appears to me, two. Nor should it appear to me only, but do you also join with me, that we may both fall into the same error, if we must err. Tell me, therefore, do you call it being in motion, when a thing passes from one place to another, or is turned round in the same place?
_Theo._ I do.
96. _Socr._ Let this, therefore, be one species. But when it remains in the same place, and grows old, and either becomes black from white or hard from soft, or undergoes any other change, is it not right to say that this is another species of motion?
_Theo._ It appears so to me.
_Socr._ It must be so: I say, then, that there are these two species of motion, change and removal.
_Theo._ You say right.
_Socr._ Having, therefore, made this distinction, let us now address ourselves to those who say that all things are in motion, and ask them: Whether do you say that every thing undergoes both kinds of motion, and is both removed and changed, or that one thing is moved both ways, and another only in one way?
_Theo._ By Jupiter, I know not what to answer; but I think they would say, both ways.
_Socr._ Otherwise, my friend, the same things would appear to them to be both in motion and at rest, and it would not be at all more correct to say that all things are in motion, than that they are at rest.
_Theo._ You speak most truly.
_Socr._ Since, therefore, it is necessary that every thing should be in motion, and that the absence of motion should be in nothing, all things must always be moved with every kind of motion.
97. _Theo._ Necessarily so.
_Socr._ Consider this, then, I beg: did we not say that they explain the generation of heat, or whiteness, or any thing else pretty much in this manner, that each of them is impelled, together with perception, between the agent and the patient, and that the patient becomes affected by perception, but is not yet perception itself, and that the agent becomes affected by a certain quality, but is not quality itself? Perhaps, however, quality may appear to you to be a strange word, and you may not understand it when used in this collective sense. Hear me, then, explain it in detail. For the agent becomes neither heat nor whiteness, but hot and white, and so with respect to other things. For you surely remember that we said before[161], that no one thing exists of itself, neither that which is an agent nor that which is a patient, but that, from the meeting together of each with the other, perceptions and objects of perception being produced cause the one to be of a certain quality, and the other percipient.
_Socr._ Let us then dismiss the rest of their system, whether they speak this way or that way; and let us keep to that point alone which concerns our discussion and ask, Are all things in motion and in a state of flux, as you say? Is it not so?
_Theo._ Yes.
_Socr._ And by both those kinds of motion which we have distinguished, removal and change?
_Theo._ Undoubtedly; if they are to be perfectly moved.
_Socr._ If, therefore, they were only removed, but not changed, we should surely be able to say what kind of things are removed. Must we not say so?
_Theo._ Just so.
_Socr._ But since not even this continues in the same state, namely that that which flows continues to flow white, but it changes so that there is also a flux of this very thing, whiteness, and a transition into another colour, in order that it may not be found continuing in the same state, will it ever be possible to call any thing a colour, so as to designate it correctly?
_Theo._ How is it possible, Socrates? or any thing else of the kind, since, while we are speaking about it, it is constantly escaping, as being in a state of flux?
_Socr._ But what shall we say of any kind of perception, for instance of seeing or hearing? Does it ever continue in the state of seeing or hearing?
_Theo._ It ought not, since all things are in motion.
99. _Socr._ We must not affirm then, that any one sees rather than not sees, or has any other perception rather than not, since all things are in constant motion.
_Theo._ Surely not.
_Socr._ Yet perception is science, as Theætetus and I said.
_Theo._ That is the case.
_Socr._ On being asked, therefore, what science is, we answered, that it is not at all science rather than not science.
_Theo._ You appear to have done so.
_Socr._ A fine correction of our answer it would be, if we endeavour to prove that all things are in motion, in order that our former answer may appear correct. But this, as it seems, is the result, if all things are in motion, every answer on whatever subject it may be given, will be equally correct, whether we say that a thing is so or is not so, or, if you will, becomes so, that we may not fix them by a definite expression.
_Theo._ You say rightly.
_Socr._ Except, Theodorus, that I said “so and not so.” But we ought not to use this word “so,” for in this way it will no longer be in motion; nor again must we use the expression “not so,” for neither does this express motion; but they who maintain this doctrine must find out some other term, since at present they have not words suited to their hypothesis, except perhaps, this, “not in any manner.” This would suit them best, as having an indefinite meaning.
_Theo._ This manner of speaking would indeed be most proper for them.
100. _Socr._ We have done then with your friend, Theodorus, nor can we by any means concede to him, that any man is the measure of all things, except he is wise: nor can we concede to him that science is perception, at least according to the doctrine that all things are in motion; unless Theætetus here says otherwise.
_Theo._ You say admirably well, Socrates; for since these things are brought to a conclusion, it is right that I too should have done with answering according to our agreement, now that our discussion about the doctrine of Protagoras has come to end.
_Theæ._ Not so, Theodorus, until you and Socrates have discussed the doctrine of those who say that the universe is at rest, as you just now proposed to do.
_Theo._ Do you who are so young, Theætetus, teach old men to act unjustly, by violating their compacts. But prepare to give account to Socrates of what remains to be discussed.
_Theæ._ If he wishes it, though I should be very glad to hear you on the subject I mentioned.
_Theo._ You are challenging riders to a race in challenging Socrates to a discussion. Ask therefore and you will hear.
_Socr._ But I think, Theodorus, I shall not comply with the request of Theætetus.
_Theo._ Why not comply?
101. _Socr._ Though I am ashamed of examining with too much freedom Melissus and others, who say that the universe is one and immoveable, yet I am less ashamed to do so with respect to them than Parmenides alone. For Parmenides appears to me, that I may use the words of Homer[162], “both venerable and formidable.” For I was acquainted with him when I was very young and he was very old, and he appeared to me to possess a depth of wisdom altogether extraordinary. I am afraid, therefore, that we should not understand his words, and that we should be much less able to discover the meaning of what he said, and above all, I fear lest with respect to the main subject of our discussion, science, what it is, should be left unconsidered by reason of the digressions that will rush across us, if we listen to them. Besides, the question which we have now raised is of immense extent, and if one should consider it only by the way, it would be treated unworthily, but if as it deserves, the discussion, being extended to too great length, will put out of sight the subject of science. But neither of these things ought to happen; but we ought to endeavour, by the midwife’s art, to deliver Theætetus of his conceptions respecting science.
----- Footnote 162: Iliad, iii. 172.
----- _Theæ._ It is proper to do so, if you think well.
102. _Socr._ Again, therefore, Theætetus, consider this with respect to what has been said. You answered that perception is science; did you not.
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ If then any one should ask you, with what a man sees things white and black, and with what he hears sounds sharp and flat, you would say, I think, with the eyes and ears.
_Theæ._ I should.
_Socr._ The free use of names and words and without excessive precision, is for the most part not unbecoming a person of education, but rather the contrary to this is illiberal, though sometimes it is necessary; as in the present case it is necessary to find fault with your answer, so far as it is not correct. For consider, which answer is more correct, that it is the eyes with which we see or by which we see, and the ears with which we hear, or by which we hear?
_Theæ._ By which we receive each perception, it seems to me, Socrates, rather than with which.
_Socr._ For surely it would be strange, my boy, if many senses were seated in us, as in wooden horses, and they did not all tend to one certain form, whether it is soul, or whatever it is proper to call it, with which, by means of these as instruments, we perceive all objects of perception.
_Theæ._ The case appears to me to be rather in this way than in that.
103. _Socr._ But why do I require so much accuracy from you on this point? For this reason, that we may discover whether by some one and the same part in us we, by means of the eyes, attain to things white and black, and again other things by means of the other senses, and whether, when questioned, you will be able to refer all such things to the bodily organs. But perhaps it will be better that you should say this by answering my questions, than that I should take all this trouble for you. Tell me, then; the things by which you perceive things hot and dry, and light and sweet, do you refer each of them to the body, or to any thing else?
_Theæ._ To nothing else.
_Socr._ Are you also willing to allow, that such things as you perceive by means of one faculty it is impossible for you to perceive by means of another, for instance, that what you perceive by means of hearing you cannot perceive by means of sight, and what you perceive by means of sight, you cannot perceive by means of hearing?
_Theæ._ How should I not be willing to allow it?
_Socr._ If, then, you form a notion of them both together, you cannot receive this perception of both together by means of one organ or the other.
_Theæ._ Surely not.
104. _Socr._ Now with respect to sound and colour, is not this the very first notion that you have of them both, that they both exist.
_Theæ._ It is.
_Socr._ Is it not also, that each is different from the other, and the same with itself?
_Theæ._ How not?
_Socr._ And that both are two, but each one?
_Theæ._ And this also.
_Socr._ Are you not also able to consider whether they are like or unlike each other?
_Theæ._ Probably.
_Socr._ By means of what, then, do you acquire all these notions about them? For it is not possible by means either of hearing or sight to apprehend that which is common between them. Moreover, this too is a proof of what we say. For, if it were possible to examine respecting them both, whether they are salt or not, you know you would be able to say with what you would make this examination, and this proves to be neither sight nor hearing, but something else.
_Theæ._ How not, and that the faculty of taste by means of the tongue?
_Socr._ You say well. But in what does the faculty consist which shews you that which is common to all things, and to these two, to which you give the name of existence and non-existence, and those other names about which we were just now asking? what organs will you attribute to all these, by means of which our perceptive faculty perceives these several things?
105. _Theæ._ You speak of existence and non-existence, similitude and dissimilitude, identity and difference, and moreover of unity and other numbers: and it is evident that you ask about the even and odd and whatever else depends on them, by which of the organs of the body we perceive these things in our soul.
_Socr._ You follow me exceedingly well, and these, Theætetus, are the very things about which I ask.
_Theæ._ But by Jupiter, Socrates, I know not what to say, except that it seems to me that there is no organ at all peculiar to these things as there is to the others, but the soul of itself appears to me to examine that which is common in all things.
_Socr._ You are beautiful, Theætetus, and not ugly, as Theodorus said; for he who speaks beautifully is beautiful and good. But, besides being beautiful, you have done well in having released me from a very long discussion, if it appears to you that the soul beholds some things by itself, and others by the faculties of the body. For this was the very thing that seemed to me, and I wished it might likewise seem so to you.
_Theæ._ And indeed it does appear so to me.
106. _Socr._ To which of the two classes, then, do you refer existence?
For this especially attaches to all things.
_Theæ._ I refer it to those things which the soul of itself reaches after.
_Socr._ Is it the same with similarity and dissimilarity, identity and difference?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ What then? with the beautiful and the ugly, good and evil?
_Theæ._ It appears to me that the soul especially considers the essence of these in reference to each other, comparing within itself things past and present with the future.
_Socr._ Stay: will it not perceive the hardness of that which is hard by the touch, and the softness of that which is soft in like manner?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ But their essence, both what they are, and their opposition to each other, and the nature of this opposition, the soul itself, examining them repeatedly and comparing them with each other, endeavours to determine for us.
_Theæ._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Are not, then, both men and beasts by nature able to perceive as soon as they are born those things that pass by means of the bodily organs to the soul, but comparisons of these with reference to their essence and use they arrive at with difficulty, and after a long time, by means of much labour and study, if ever they do arrive at it?
_Theæ._ Most assuredly.
_Socr._ For is it possible to apprehend the truth of that of which we cannot apprehend the existence?
_Theæ._ Impossible.
107. _Socr._ But can any one possess a scientific knowledge of a thing, of which he cannot apprehend the truth?
_Theæ._ How can he, Socrates?
_Socr._ There is, therefore, no science in sensations, but in reasoning on them; for in this way, as it seems, it is possible to touch upon essence and truth, but in that way impossible.
_Theæ._ It appears so.
_Socr._ Can you, therefore, call that and this the same, when there is so great a difference between them?
_Theæ._ It would not be right to do so.
_Socr._ What name, then, do you give to that, to sight, hearing, smelling, tasting, being hot, and being cold?
_Theæ._ Perceiving; for what other name can be given?
_Socr._ Do you, therefore, call the whole of this perception?
_Theæ._ Necessarily so.
_Socr._ To which, as we said, it does not appertain to touch upon truth, for it does not ever touch upon essence.
_Theæ._ Certainly not.
_Socr._ Nor, therefore, upon science?
_Theæ._ No.
_Socr._ Perception, therefore, and science, Theætetus, can never be the same?
_Theæ._ It appears not, Socrates.
108. _Socr._ And now it has been made perfectly clear that science is something different from perception. But we did not commence this conversation with this view, that we might find out what science is not, but what it is. However, we have advanced so far as not to seek it at all in perception, but in that name, whatever it is, which the soul possesses when it employs itself about things that exist.
_Theæ._ But this, I think, Socrates, is called, to judge.
_Socr._ You think rightly, my friend. And now consider again from the beginning, having obliterated all that has been said before, if you see at all more clearly, now that you have come to this point. And tell me again what science is.
_Theæ._ It is impossible, Socrates, to say that it is every judgment, because there is also false judgment. But it appears that true judgment is science, and let this be my answer. For if, as we proceed, it shall not appear to be so, as it does at present, we will endeavour to say something else.
109. _Socr._ Thus, then, Theætetus, you must speak more promptly, and not, as at first, hesitate to answer. For if we do so, one of two things will happen; we shall either find that which we are in search of, or we shall in a less degree think that we know what we do not know at all; though this would be no despicable reward. Now, then, what do you say?
Since there are two species of judgment, one true, and the other false, do you define science to be true judgment?
_Theæ._ I do; for this at present appears to me to be the case.
_Socr._ Is it, then, worth while again to resume the discussion respecting judgment?
_Theæ._ What do you mean?
_Socr._ Somehow this matter troubles me just now, and has often done so at other times, so that I have had great doubt with respect to myself and others, from not being able to say what this affection in us is, and in what way it is produced.
_Theæ._ What affection?
_Socr._ This, that any one forms false judgments; and I even now still consider and am in doubt whether we shall let this alone, or examine it in a different manner than we did just now.
_Theæ._ How not, Socrates? at least if it appears necessary to be done in some way or other? For you and Theodorus just now remarked, not badly, respecting leisure, that there is no urgency in matters of this kind.
110. _Socr._ You have reminded me very properly. For perhaps it will not be foreign to our purpose in a manner to retrace our steps. For it is better to finish a little well than much insufficiently.
_Theæ._ Why not?
_Socr._ How then? what do we say? do we not affirm that sometimes judgments are false? or that one of us forms false judgments and another true ones, as if this was naturally the case?
_Theæ._ We doubtless do affirm this.
_Socr._ Does not this happen to us with regard to things in general and each particular, that we either know it or do not know it? For learning and forgetting, as being between these, I pass by for the present, for now they have nothing to do with our discussion.
_Theæ._ However, Socrates, there is no other alternative with respect to each particular, except knowing or not knowing it.
_Socr._ Then, is it not necessary, that he who judges should judge either what he does know, or does not know?
_Theæ._ It is necessary.
_Socr._ But that a person who knows should not know the same thing, or that he who does not know it should know it, is impossible.
_Theæ._ How not?
_Socr._ Does not he, then, who forms a false judgment about what he knows, think that these are not the same, but different from what he knows, and thus while he knows both, he is at the same time ignorant of both?
_Theæ._ But this is impossible, Socrates.
111. _Socr._ Does he, then, think that things which he does not know are certain other things that he does not know, and is it possible for one who knows neither Theætetus nor Socrates, to imagine that Socrates is Theætetus, or Theætetus Socrates?
_Theæ._ How could that be?
_Socr._ Neither, surely, does any one think that the things which he knows are the same as those that he does not know, nor again that the things which he does not know, are the same as those that he does know.
_Theæ._ For that would be monstrous.
_Socr._ How then can any one form false judgments? For it is impossible to form judgments in any other way than this, since we either know or do not know all things, and in these it appears to be by no means possible to form false judgments.
_Theæ._ Most true.
_Socr._ Ought we, then, to consider the object of our enquiry, not by proceeding according to knowing and not knowing, but according to being and not being?
_Theæ._ How do you mean?
_Socr._ Whether it is not universally true, that he who thinks things that are not, with respect to any thing whatever, must unavoidably form a false judgment, however intelligent he may be in other respects.
_Theæ._ That is reasonable, Socrates.
_Socr._ How then? what shall we say, Theætetus, if any one should ask us, “Is it possible for any one to do what you say, and can any man think that which is not, whether respecting any real object or abstract essence?” And we, it seems, shall say to this, “When he who thinks does not think what is true.” What else can we say?
_Theæ._ Nothing else.
112. _Socr._ Does a thing of this kind happen also in other cases?
_Theæ._ Of what kind?
_Socr._ If a person sees something, and yet sees nothing.
_Theæ._ But how can that be?
_Socr._ But if he sees some one thing, he sees something that exists; and do you think that one thing is ever among things that do not exist?
_Theæ._ I do not.
_Socr._ He, therefore, who sees some one thing sees that which exists.
_Theæ._ It appears so.
_Socr._ And, therefore, he who hears something, both hears some one thing, and hears that which exists.
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ And doubtless he who touches both touches some one thing, and that which exists, since it is one thing?
_Theæ._ And this too.
_Socr._ Does not he then who judges, judge some one thing?
_Theæ._ Of necessity.
_Socr._ And does not he who judges some one thing, judge something that exists?
_Theæ._ I grant it.
_Socr._ He therefore who judges what does not exist, judges nothing.
_Theæ._ It appears not.
_Socr._ But he who judges nothing, does not judge at all.
_Theæ._ That is evident, as it seems.
_Socr._ It is impossible, therefore, to judge that which is not, either with respect to real objects or abstract essences.
_Theæ._ It appears not.
_Socr._ To form false judgments, therefore, is different from judging things that do not exist.
_Theæ._ It seems to be different.
_Socr._ Neither then in this way nor in the way we considered a little before, is false judgment formed in us.
_Theæ._ On no account.
113. _Socr._ Do we then give that name to what takes place as follows.
_Theæ._ How?
_Socr._ We say that a mistaken judgment is a false judgment, when any one says that any real object is another real object, changing one for the other in his thoughts. For thus he always judges that which exists, but one thing instead of another, and erring in that which he was considering, he may be justly said to form a false judgment.
_Theæ._ You now appear to me to have spoken most correctly: for, when any one forms a judgment that a thing is ugly instead of beautiful, or beautiful instead of ugly, then he truly forms a false judgment.
_Socr._ It is evident, Theætetus, that you esteem me lightly and have no fear of me.
_Theæ._ How so?
_Socr._ I do not seem to you, I imagine, likely to lay hold of your “truly false,” by asking whether it is possible for swift to take place slowly or light heavily, or any other contrary, not according to its own nature, but according to the nature of its contrary, contrariwise to itself. This, however, I dismiss, that your confidence may not be in vain. But are you satisfied, as you say, that to form false judgments is to form mistaken judgments?
_Theæ._ I am.
114. _Socr._ It is possible, then, according to your opinion, for one thing to be comprehended in the mind as another, and not as it is.
_Theæ._ It is possible.
_Socr._ When, therefore, any one’s mind does this, is it not necessary that it should think about both objects, or one of them?
_Theæ._ Quite necessary.
_Socr._ Either together or in turns?
_Theæ._ Very well.
_Socr._ But by thinking do you mean the same that I do?
_Theæ._ What do you mean by it?
_Socr._ The discourse which the soul holds with itself about the objects that it considers. I explain this to you as a person who does not know what he says. For the soul, when it thinks, appears to me to do nothing else than discourse with itself, asking itself questions and answering them, affirming and denying; but when it has decided, whether it has come to its decision more slowly or more rapidly, and now asserts and does not doubt, this we call judgment. So that to form a judgment I call to speak, and judgment a sentence spoken, not indeed to another person nor with the voice but in silence to itself. But what do you call it?
_Theæ._ The same.
_Socr._ When any one, therefore, forms a judgment that one thing is another, he says to himself, as it seems, that one thing is another.
115. _Theæ._ How not?
_Socr._ Recollect, then, whether you have ever said to yourself, that the beautiful is certainly ugly, or the unjust, just, or even, chief of all, consider whether you have ever attempted to persuade yourself, that one thing is certainly another, or, quite contrariwise, whether you have ever ventured even in sleep to say to yourself, that undoubtedly odd is even, or any thing else of the kind.
_Theæ._ You say truly.
_Socr._ But do you think that any one else in his senses or even mad would venture to say seriously to himself, being himself persuaded, that an ox must needs be a horse, or two one?
_Theæ._ Not I, by Jupiter.
_Socr._ If, therefore, to speak to one’s-self is to form judgments, no one, who speaks and forms judgments of both objects, and touches upon both with his soul, would say and judge that one is another. You must therefore give up what you said about the other. For I assert this, that no one thinks that the ugly is beautiful, or any thing else of the kind.
_Theæ._ I give it up then, Socrates, and it appears to me as you say.
_Socr._ It is impossible, then, for one who forms judgments about both, to think that the one is the other.
_Theæ._ It seems so.
116. _Socr._ He, however, who judges one thing only, but the other in no respect, will never judge that the one is the other.
_Theæ._ You say truly: for he would be compelled to touch upon that also of which he does not judge.
_Socr._ It is not possible then for a person who judges either both or one of the two, to judge that one is the other: so that if any one should define false judgment to be the judgment of one thing instead of another, he would say nothing to the purpose; for neither in this way, nor in those before mentioned, does it appear that false judgment pertains to us.
_Theæ._ It seems not.
_Socr._ However, Theætetus, if this should appear not to be so, we shall be compelled to admit many absurdities.
_Theæ._ What are they?
_Socr._ I will not tell you, until I have endeavoured to consider the matter in every point of view; for I should be ashamed for both of us, if, while we are in the difficulty we are, we should be compelled to admit what I now say. But if we discover the object of our search and become free, then we will speak of others, as subject to this, being ourselves placed beyond the reach of ridicule: but if we shall continue still involved in difficulties, we must humble ourselves, I imagine, and give ourselves up to discussion, like those who are sea-sick, to be trampled on and treated as it pleases. Hear, then, how I still find a way out of our enquiry.
117. _Theæ._ Only speak.
_Socr._ I shall deny that we made a correct admission, when we admitted that it is impossible for a person to judge that what he knows is what he does not know and be thus deceived; but in some respect it is possible.
_Theæ._ Do you mean that which I suspected at the time when we said this, might be the case, that sometimes I knowing Socrates, and seeing another person at a distance whom I do not know, have thought it was Socrates, whom I do know? For what you mention happens in a case of this kind.
_Socr._ Are we not, then, driven from that position, because it made us, while we know, not know the things that we do know?
_Theæ._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Let us not, then, make our assumption in this way but as follows; and perhaps it will in some respect succeed for us, and perhaps it will oppose us. For we are in a condition in which it is necessary to examine out whole argument in every point of view. Consider, therefore, whether I say any thing to the purpose. Is it possible for a person who did not know something before, afterwards to learn it?
_Theæ._ It is indeed.
_Socr._ And can he not also learn another thing after another?
118. _Theæ._ Why not?
_Socr._ Suppose, then, I beg, for the sake of argument, that we have in our souls a waxen tablet, in one larger, in another smaller, in one of purer wax, in another of impurer, in some of harder, and in others again of softer, but in some of a moderate quality.
_Theæ._ I do suppose it.
_Socr._ Let us say, then, that this is a gift of Mnemosyne the mother of the Muses; and that, whatever we wish to remember of things that we have seen, or heard, or have ourselves thought of, we impress in this, by placing it under our perceptions and thoughts, as if we were taking off the impressions from rings: and that whatever is imprinted, this we remember and know, as long as its image remains; but when it is effaced, or can be no longer imprinted, we forget and do not know it.
_Theæ._ Be it so.
_Socr._ When, therefore, a person knows these things and considers any of the things that he sees or hears, consider whether in this way he can judge falsely?
_Theæ._ In what way?
_Socr._ By thinking with respect to what he knows, that they are at one time the things that he knows, and at another the things that he does not know. For in a former part of our discussion we made an improper admission in admitting that this was impossible.
119. _Theæ._ But how do you mean now?