_Socr._ In order that this might not follow, did we not suppose it to be different from them?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ What then? if the elements are not parts of a syllable, can you mention any other things that are parts of a syllable, and yet not its elements?
147. _Theæ._ By no means; for if, Socrates, I should admit that it has parts, it would surely be ridiculous to reject the elements and search for other things.
_Socr._ From what you now say, therefore, Theætetus, a syllable must certainly be some one indivisible form.
_Theæ._ So it seems.
_Socr._ Do you remember then, my friend, that we admitted a little before, and thought it was well said, that there cannot be a definition of first elements, of which other things are composed, because each considered by itself is uncompounded, and neither can the term “being” be correctly attributed to it nor the term “this,” because these things would be said as different and foreign to it; and indeed this very cause makes it undefinable and unknown.
_Theæ._ I do remember.
_Socr._ Is there any other cause, then, than this of its being simple and indivisible? I for my part see no other.
_Theæ._ There does not appear to be any.
_Socr._ Does not the syllable, then, fall under the same class as the elements, since it has not parts, and is one form?
_Theæ._ Assuredly.
148. _Socr._ If, therefore, a syllable is many elements, and a whole, and these are its parts, syllables and elements may be equally known and defined, since all the parts have been found to be the same as the whole.
_Theæ._ By all means.
_Socr._ But if it is one and indivisible, a syllable equally as an element must be undefinable and unknown; for the same cause will make them alike.
_Theæ._ I cannot say otherwise.
_Socr._ We must not, therefore, allow this, if any one should say, that a syllable is known and definable, but an element the contrary.
_Theæ._ We must not, if we admit this reasoning.
_Socr._ What then? should you pay any more attention to one who should assert the contrary of what you are conscious happened to yourself in learning your letters?
_Theæ._ What is that?
_Socr._ That in learning you did nothing else than endeavour to distinguish the elements both by sight and hearing, each separated by itself, in order that their position when pronounced or written, might not confuse you.
_Theæ._ You say most truly.
_Socr._ And at your music-master’s was learning perfectly any thing else than the being able to follow each note, and distinguish to what chord it belonged, which every one would allow is called the elements of music.
_Theæ._ Nothing else.
149. _Socr._ If, therefore, we may conjecture from the elements and syllables in which we are skilled, to others, we shall say that the class of elements are capable of a much more clear and distinct knowledge than that of syllables, in order to our acquiring each study in perfection; and if any one should say that a syllable is known, but that an element is by nature unknown, we shall think that he is jesting either intentionally or unintentionally.
_Theæ._ Most assuredly.
_Socr._ Moreover, other proofs of this might still be found, as it appears to me; but let us not lose sight of the question before us by considering them, that is to say, what is meant by the statement, that reason united to true judgment is the most perfect science.
_Theæ._ This, then, we must consider.
_Socr._ Come then, what is the signification of the word _logos_[164]: for it appears to me to mean one of three things.
----- Footnote 164: As no one English word will express the three different meanings contained in the word λόγος, I have thought it better to retain the original word throughout this part of the argument.
----- _Theæ._ What are they?
_Socr._ The first would be to make one’s thought clear by the voice, through the means of verbs and nouns, impressing one’s judgment on what flows from the mouth, as it were on a mirror, or water; does not _logos_ appear to you to be something of this kind?
_Theæ._ It does: and we say that he who does this speaks.
150. _Socr._ Every one, therefore, is able to do this more quickly or slowly, that is, can shew what he thinks about every thing, unless he is altogether dumb or deaf, and thus all who form right judgments on any matter, will be found to do so in conjunction with _logos_, and right judgment will never subsist without science.
_Theæ._ True.
_Socr._ We must not, therefore, too readily condemn him as having spoken nothing to the purpose, who asserted that science is that which we are now examining. For perhaps he who said it did not mean that, but that a person, when asked what each thing is, should be able to give an answer to the questioner by means of each thing’s element.
_Theæ._ For instance, how do you mean, Socrates?
_Socr._ As Hesiod for instance says of a chariot, that it is made of a hundred pieces of wood, which I, for my part, could not enumerate, neither do I think could you, but we should be contented, if when asked what a chariot is, we could say wheels, axle, frame, rails, and yoke.
_Socr._ But he probably would think us ridiculous, just as if we, when asked concerning your name and having answered syllable by syllable, thereby judging and saying correctly what we do say, should think ourselves grammarians, and that we know and speak grammatically the definition of the name of Theætetus; whereas it is not possible to say any thing scientifically, before one has given a complete account of each thing by means of its elements, together with true judgment, as was observed before, if I mistake not.
_Theæ._ It was observed.
_Socr._ So, too, we have a correct judgment respecting a chariot, but he who is able to describe its nature by means of those hundred pieces, by adding this, both adds _logos_ to true judgment, and instead of forming a mere judgment becomes an artist and knowing in the nature of a chariot, in that he gives a complete account of the whole, by means of its elements.
_Theæ._ Does not this appear to you, Socrates, to be well said?
_Socr._ If it appears to you, my friend, and you allow that the description of each thing by its element is _logos_, and that that made by syllables, or even larger parts is devoid of _logos_, tell me, that we may examine it.
_Theæ._ I certainly do allow it.
_Socr._ Whether do you think that any one has a scientific knowledge of any thing, when the same thing appears to him at one time to belong to the same thing and at another to a different thing, or when he forms at one time one judgment and at another a different judgment about the same thing?
_Theæ._ By Jupiter, not I.
152. _Socr._ Have you forgotten then, that in learning your letters at first both you and others did this?
_Theæ._ Do you mean that we thought that at one time one letter, and at another time another, belonged to the same syllable, and that we placed the same letter at one time to its proper syllable, and at another time to another?
_Socr._ I do mean that.
_Theæ._ By Jupiter, I do not forget, nor do I think that they have knowledge who are in this condition.
_Socr._ What then? when a person at that time of life writing the name Theætetus, thinks that he ought to write and does write _Th_ and _e_, and again attempting to write Theodorus, thinks that he ought to write and does write _T_ and _e_, shall we say that he knows the first syllable of your names?
_Theæ._ We have just now admitted, that a person in this condition does not yet know.
_Socr._ Does any thing, then, hinder the same person from being in this condition with respect to the second, third, and fourth syllable?
_Theæ._ Nothing.
153. _Socr._ Will he not then have the description by means of the elements, and write Theætetus with correct judgment, when he writes it in its proper order?
_Theæ._ Clearly.
_Socr._ Will he not still be void of science, though he judges correctly, as we said?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ And yet he has _logos_ together with correct judgment; for he wrote it knowing the order of the elements, which we allowed to be _logos_.
_Theæ._ True.
_Socr._ There is, therefore, my friend, correct judgment accompanied with _logos_ which must not yet be called science.
_Theæ._ It seems so.
_Socr._ We have been enriched then, as it appears, in a dream, in thinking that we possess the truest definition of science: or shall we not condemn it yet? For perhaps some one may not define _logos_ in this manner, but may consider it to be the remaining species of the three, one of which we said would be adopted by him who defined science to be correct judgment accompanied with _logos_.
_Theæ._ You have rightly reminded me; for there is still one left. For the first was an image of the thought as it were expressed by the voice: and that just now mentioned was a proceeding to the whole by means of the elements: but what do you say the third is?
_Socr._ That which most men would say it is, the being able to mention some mark by which the object of enquiry differs from all other things.
_Theæ._ Can you give me a _logos_ of any thing by way of example?
154. _Socr._ For instance, if you please, with respect to the sun, I think it would be sufficient for you to admit, that it is the most luminous of the heavenly bodies that move round the earth.
_Theæ._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Observe then why this was said. It is that which we just now mentioned, that when you find the difference of each thing, by which it differs from all others, you will find, as some say, the _logos_; but as long as you lay hold of some common quality, you will have the _logos_ of those things to which this common quality belongs.
_Theæ._ I understand; and it appears to me very proper to call such a thing _logos_.
_Socr._ He, therefore, who together with correct judgment respecting any thing whatever can find out its difference from all other things, will have arrived at the knowledge of that of which he before only formed a judgment.
_Theæ._ We say it certainly is so.
_Socr._ Now, however, Theætetus, since I have come near what has been said, as if it were a picture in perspective, I find that I do not understand it in the least, but while I stood at a distance it appeared to me to have some meaning.
155. _Theæ._ How is this?
_Socr._ I will tell you, if I can. If, when I have a correct judgment respecting you, I likewise find your _logos_, then I know you, but if not, I only form a judgment.
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ But _logos_ was the explanation of your difference.
_Theæ._ It was.
_Socr._ When, therefore, I formed a judgment only, is it not true that I reached by my thought none of those things by which you differ from others?
_Theæ._ It seems that you did not.
_Socr._ I, therefore, thought of some common qualities, none of which belong to you more than to any one else.
_Theæ._ Necessarily so.
_Socr._ Come, then, by Jupiter, how in such a case did I form a judgment of you rather than of any one else? For suppose me to be thinking that this is Theætetus, who is a man, and has nose, eyes, a mouth, and so on with each several member. Will this thought cause me to think of Theætetus rather than of Theodorus, or, as the saying is, the last of the Mysians?
_Theæ._ How should it?
156. _Socr._ But if I not only think of one who has nose and eyes, but also of one who has a snub nose and prominent eyes, shall I in that case think of you rather than of myself, or any other persons of that description?
_Theæ._ Not at all.
_Socr._ But I think I shall not form the image of Theætetus in my mind, until his snubbiness shall have impressed on me and left with me some mark different from all other instances of snubbiness that I have seen, and so with respect to the other parts of which you are made up; which, if I should meet you to-morrow, would recal you to my mind, and make me form a correct judgment respecting you.
_Theæ._ Most true.
_Socr._ Right judgment, therefore, respecting each object has to do with difference.
_Theæ._ It appears so.
_Socr._ What then will become of adding _logos_ to correct judgment? For if it means that we should moreover form a judgment of the manner in which any thing differs from others, the injunction will be very ridiculous.
_Theæ._ How so?
_Socr._ It bids us add a right judgment of the manner in which things differ from others, when we have a right judgment of the manner in which they differ from others. And thus the turning round of a scytala, or a pestle, or any other proverb of the kind, would be nothing compared with this injunction, though it might more properly be called the advice of a blind man; for to bid us add those things that we already have, in order that we may learn what we already have formed judgments about, seems remarkably suited to one who is utterly blind.
_Theæ._ Tell me, then, what did you mean by asking me just now?
157. _Socr._ If, O boy, in bidding us add _logos_ it bids us know, but not form a judgment of the difference, this most beautiful of all the definitions of science would be a delightful thing: for to know, surely, is to acquire science. Is it not?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ When asked, therefore, as it appears, what science is, he will answer, that it is correct judgment with the science of difference. For, according to him, this will be the addition of _logos_.
_Theæ._ It seems so.
_Socr._ But it is altogether foolish, when we are searching for science, to say that it is correct judgment with science, either of difference or any thing else. Neither perception, therefore, Theætetus, nor true judgment, nor _logos_ united with true judgment, can be science.
_Theæ._ It seems not.
_Socr._ Are we, then, still pregnant and in labour, my friend, with reference to science, or have we brought forth every thing?
_Theæ._ And by Jupiter, with your help, I have said more than I had in myself.
_Socr._ Does not, then, our midwife’s art pronounce that all these things are empty, and not worth rearing?
_Theæ._ Assuredly.
158. _Socr._ If, therefore, after this you should wish to become pregnant with other things, Theætetus, and if you do become so, you will be full of better things by means of the present discussion; but if you should be empty, you will be less troublesome to your companions, and more meek through modesty, in not thinking that you know what you do not know. For thus much only my art is able to accomplish, but nothing more, nor do I know any of the things which others do who are and have been great and wonderful men. But this midwife’s art I and my mother received from the deity; she about women, and I for young and noble men and such as are beautiful. Now, however, I must go to the king’s porch, to answer the indictment which Melitus has preferred against me: to-morrow, Theodorus, let us meet here again.
INTRODUCTION TO THE EUTHYPHRON.
Euthyphron, a person who professes to be thoroughly conversant in the knowledge of divine things, is represented as meeting Socrates at the king’s porch, that is, the entrance of the court in which trials for murder and impiety were carried on. He is surprised at seeing Socrates at such a spot, for he cannot believe that he has a cause pending there.
Socrates tells him that he is indicted by one Melitus, a person of no note at Athens, but one who knows how to govern the city rightly, for that he charges Socrates with impiety in introducing new gods and corrupting the youth. Socrates then asks Euthyphron whether he too has a cause in the same court, and is informed that he has indicted his own father for murder, because he had occasioned the death of one of their hired servants, who had himself first slain a slave of Euthyphron’s father, and then been cast bound into a ditch, where he died from hunger and cold. On hearing this, Socrates asks whether he has such a perfect knowledge of holiness and impiety that he is sure he is right in bringing his father to trial; and on Euthyphron’s asserting that he has, Socrates begs that he will accept him for his disciple, in order that he may learn how to clear himself in his own approaching trial, and first of all desires to know what holiness and impiety are. Euthyphron confidently answers that what he is now doing is holy, namely, to prosecute any one who acts unjustly, whoever he may be, but that not to prosecute such an one is impious. Socrates, however, is not satisfied with this answer, for that he did not ask about particular actions, but about holiness in the abstract. “That, then, which is pleasing to the gods is holy,” says Euthyphron. But Socrates shews that different things are pleasing to different gods, so that the same things are both loved and hated by divers of them, whence it follows that the same things are both holy and unholy.
Euthyphron, feeling the force of this objection, next says that the holy is that which all the gods love, and the impious that which they all hate: but here again Socrates shews that this cannot be a correct definition of holiness, for that it is not holy because they love it, but they love it because it is holy. To help him out of his difficulty, Socrates suggests that holiness is a part of justice; to which Euthyphron assents, and adds that it is that part of it which is concerned about our care for the gods. But, asks Socrates, what care for the gods will holiness be? A kind of service paid to them, is the answer. But to what end do our services of the gods avail? Euthyphron evades the question by saying they are many and beautiful; but when further pressed, he says that holiness consists in sacrificing and praying to the gods, wherein, he is led to admit, men beg those things that they need, and sacrifice such things as the gods need, from whence Socrates concludes that holiness is a kind of traffic between gods and men. But it is clear that the gods cannot be benefited by men; therefore, as Euthyphron says, it must be that which is most dear. But this definition of holiness had been already rejected. Socrates, therefore, proposes to renew the enquiry, but Euthyphron, finding himself defeated at all points, suddenly breaks off the discussion, on pretence of business elsewhere.
EUTHYPHRON, OR ON HOLINESS.
EUTHYPHRON. SOCRATES.
------- _Euth._ What new thing has happened, Socrates, that you have left your haunts in the Lyceum, and are now waiting about the king’s porch! You surely have not a trial before the king as I have.
_Socr._ The Athenians, Euthyphron, do not call it a trial, but an indictment.
_Euth._ What say you! Some one, it seems, has preferred an indictment against you, for I cannot believe that you have indicted any one else.
_Socr._ Surely not.
_Euth._ Has some one else, then, indicted you?
_Socr._ Certainly.
_Euth._ Who is he?
_Socr._ I do not myself very well know the man, Euthyphron; for he appears to me to be young and unknown; however they call him Melitus, I think; and he is of the borough of Pithos, if you know any Melitus of Pithos, who has lank hair, a thin beard, and a hook nose.
_Euth._ I don’t know him, Socrates, but what indictment has he preferred against you?
_Socr._ What? One not unworthy of a high-minded man, as it appears to me; for it is no contemptible matter for one who is so young, to be versed in so weighty a business. For he knows, as he says, how the youth are corrupted, and who they are that corrupt them. And he appears to be a shrewd man, and, observing my ignorance, he comes before the city, as before a mother, to accuse me of corrupting those of the same age with himself. And he appears to me to be the only one of our statesmen who knows how to govern rightly; for it is right first of all to pay attention to the young, that they may become as virtuous as possible, just as it is proper for a good husbandman first of all to pay attention to the young plants, and afterwards the others: so Melitus probably first purges us who corrupt the blossoms of youth, as he says; then after this it is clear that by paying attention to the older men, he will be the cause of very many and great blessings to the city, as may be expected to happen from one who makes such a beginning.
2. _Euth._ I wish it were so, Socrates; but I dread lest the contrary should happen. For, in reality, he appears to me, in attempting to injure you, to begin by assailing the city from the hearth. But tell me, by doing what does he say that you corrupt the youth?
_Socr._ Absurd even to hear mentioned, my admirable friend: for he says that I am a maker of gods, and, as if I made new gods and did not believe in the ancient ones, he has indicted me on their account, as he says.
_Euth._ I understand, Socrates, it is because you say that a demon constantly attends you. As if, then, you introduced innovations in religion he has preferred this indictment against you, and he comes to accuse you before the court, knowing that such charges are readily entertained by the multitude. And me too, when I say any thing in the public assembly concerning divine things, and predict to them what is going to happen, they ridicule as mad; and although nothing that I have predicted has not turned out to be true, yet they envy all such men as we are. However we ought not to heed them, but pursue our own course.
3. _Socr._ But, my dear Euthyphron, to be laughed at is perhaps of no consequence. For the Athenians, as it appears to me, do not care very much whether they think a man is clever, so long as he does not communicate his wisdom; but when they think a man makes others so, they are angry, either through envy, as you say, or from some other cause.
_Euth._ With respect to that matter, how they are affected towards me I am not very anxious to try.
_Socr._ For perhaps you seem to shew yourself but rarely, and to be unwilling to impart your wisdom; but I am afraid that, from my love of mankind, I appear to them to tell every man too freely whatever I know, not only without pay, but even gladly offering myself, if any one is willing to listen to me. If then, as I just now said, they were going to laugh at me, as you say they do at you, there would be nothing unpleasant in passing some time in a court of justice, jesting and laughing; but if they are in earnest, how this affair may terminate is unknown, except to you prophets.
_Euth._ Perhaps, however, it will be of no consequence, Socrates, but you will conduct your cause to your mind, as I think I shall mine.
4. _Socr._ Have you too a cause, Euthyphron? Do you defend it, or prosecute?
_Socr._ Whom?
_Euth._ One, in prosecuting whom, I seem to be mad.
_Socr._ What then? do you prosecute some one that can fly?
_Euth._ He is very far from being able to fly, for he happens to be very old.
_Socr._ Who is he?
_Euth._ My father.
_Socr._ Your father, my excellent friend?
_Euth._ Certainly.
_Socr._ But what is the charge, and what is the trial about?
_Euth._ Murder, Socrates.
_Socr._ By Hercules! Surely, Euthyphron, the generality of men are ignorant how this can ever be right. For I do not think any common person could do this properly, but he must be very far advanced in wisdom.
_Euth._ Far indeed, by Jupiter, Socrates.
_Socr._ Is it any one of your relations who has been killed by your father? It must be so; for surely you would not prosecute him for the murder of a stranger.
_Euth._ Ridiculous, Socrates, to think that it makes any difference whether the person killed is a stranger or a relation, and that we ought not to consider this only, whether he killed him justly or not, and, if justly, let him go, but if not, prosecute him, even though the murderer should live at the same hearth and the same table with you. For the pollution is equal, if you knowingly associate with such a one, and do not purify both yourself and him by bringing him to justice. However, the deceased was a dependant of our’s, and when we were farming at Naxos, he worked there for us, for hire. This man, then, having drunk too much wine and being in a passion with one of our slaves, slew him.
My father, therefore, having bound his hands and feet, and thrown him into a pit, sends a man here to enquire of the interpreter of religious matters, what he ought to do with him; and in the mean time he neglected the prisoner, and took no care of him as being a murderer, and as if it was of no consequence if he died; which did happen. For he died from hunger, cold, and the chains, before the messenger returned from the interpreter. For this reason my father and all my relatives are angry with me, because I, for the sake of a murderer, accuse my father of murder, who, as they say, did not kill him, and even if he had killed him, as the deceased was a murderer, they say that I ought not to concern myself about such a man; for that it is impious for a son to prosecute his father for murder; little knowing, Socrates, what the divine rule is with respect to holiness and impiety.
_Socr._ But, by Jupiter, Euthyphron, do you think you have such an accurate knowledge of divine things, how they are circumstanced, with respect both to things holy and impious, that those things having been done as you say, you are not afraid, in bringing your father to trial, lest you should commit an impious action?
_Euth._ I should be a sorry person, Socrates, nor would Euthyphron in any respect excel the generality of men, if I did not know all such things accurately.
5. _Socr._ Admirable Euthyphron, it will be a most excellent thing for me to become your disciple, and, before Melitus’s indictment comes on for hearing, to object this very thing to him, saying, that I hitherto deemed it of the utmost consequence to be acquainted with divine things, and that now, since he says I am guilty of acting rashly, and introducing innovations with respect to divine things, I have become your disciple. If then, I should say, Melitus, you admit that Euthyphron is wise in such matters and thinks rightly, suppose that I do so too, and do not bring me to trial; but if otherwise, call him, the teacher, to account before you do me, as one who corrupts the elders, both me and his father, me by teaching me, and him by admonishing and punishing him: and if he is not persuaded by me and does not let me off the trial, or indict you instead of me, it will be necessary to say these very things in the court, which I have already objected to him.
_Euth._ By Jupiter, Socrates, if he should attempt to indict me, I should find, I think, his weak side, and we should much sooner have a discussion in the court about him than about me.
_Socr._ And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am anxious to become your disciple, being persuaded that some others and this Melitus do not appear even to see you, though he has so very keenly and easily seen through me, as to indict me for impiety. 6. Now therefore, by Jupiter, tell me what you just now asserted you know so well; what do you say is piety and impiety, both with respect to murder and other things? Is not holiness itself the same with itself in every action, and again, is not impiety, which is contrary to all holiness, in every case similar to itself, and has not every thing that is impious some one character with respect to impiety?
_Euth._ Most assuredly, Socrates.
_Socr._ Tell me, then, what you say holiness is, and what impiety?
_Euth._ I say, then, that that is holy which I am now doing, to prosecute any one who acts unjustly either with respect to murder or sacrilege, or who commits any similar offence, whether he be one’s father or mother, or whoever else he may be, but not to prosecute him is impious. For observe, Socrates, what a great proof I will give you that the law is so, as I have also said to others, shewing that it is rightly done, when one does not spare one who acts impiously, whoever he may be.
For all men believe that Jupiter is the best and most just of the gods, and yet they admit that he put his own father in chains, because he unjustly swallowed his children, and again, that he mutilated his father for other similar reasons, but they are indignant with me, because I prosecute my father for having acted unjustly, and thus these men contradict themselves with respect to the gods and me.
_Socr._ Is this the reason then, Euthyphron, for which I am defendant in this indictment, because when any one says things of this kind respecting the gods, I admit them with difficulty? on which account, as it seems, some one will say that I am guilty. Now, therefore, if these things appear so to you likewise, who are well versed in such matters, we must of necessity, as it seems, agree with you. For what else can we say, who acknowledge that we know nothing about these things? But tell me, by Jupiter, who presides over friendship, do you think that these things did really happen so?
_Euth._ And things still more wonderful than these, Socrates, which the multitude are unacquainted with.
_Socr._ Do you then think that there is in reality war among the gods one with another, and fierce enmities and battles, and many other things of the kind such as are related by the poets, and with representations of which by good painters both other sacred places have been decorated, and moreover in the great Panathenaic festival a veil full of such representations is carried into the Acropolis. Must we say that these things are true, Euthyphron?
_Euth._ Not these only, Socrates; but, as I just now said, I can, if you please, relate to you many other things respecting divine affairs, which I am sure you will be astonished to hear.
7. _Socr._ I should not wonder; but you shall relate these things to me hereafter, at our leisure. Now, however, endeavour to explain to me more clearly what I just now asked you. For you have not yet, my friend, sufficiently answered my question as to holiness what it is, but you have told me that what you are now doing is holy, prosecuting your father for murder.
_Euth._ And I said the truth, Socrates.
_Socr._ Perhaps so. But, Euthyphron, you may also say that many other things are holy.
_Euth._ For such is the case.
_Socr._ Do you remember, then, that I did not beg this of you, to teach me some one or two from among many holy things, but the particular character itself by which all holy things are holy? For you surely said that unholy things are unholy, and holy things holy, from one character: do you not remember?
_Euth._ I do.
_Socr._ Teach me, then, this very character, what it is, in order that looking to it, and using it as a model, I may say that such a thing of all that you or any one else does is holy, and that what is not such is not holy.
_Euth._ But if you wish it, Socrates, I will also tell you this.
_Socr._ I do indeed wish it.
_Euth._ That, then, which is pleasing to the gods is holy, and that which is not pleasing to them is impious?
_Socr._ Admirably, Euthyphron, you have answered just as I begged you to answer. Whether truly, however, I do not yet know, but you will doubtless convince me that what you say is true.
_Euth._ Certainly.
8. _Socr._ Come then, let us consider what we say. A thing that is pleasing to the gods, and a man who is pleasing to the gods, are holy; but a thing that is hateful to the gods, and a man that is hateful to the gods, are impious; but the holy is not the same with the unholy, but most contrary to it: is it not so?
_Euth._ Assuredly.
_Socr._ And this appears to have been well said.
_Euth._ I think so, Socrates; for it has been said.
_Socr._ And that the gods quarrel, Euthyphron, and are at variance with each other, and that there are enmities amongst them one towards another: has not this also been said?
_Euth._ It has.
_Socr._ But, my excellent friend, variance about what occasions enmity and anger? Let us consider it thus. If you and I differed about numbers, which of two was the greater, would a difference on this point make us enemies and angry with each other, or having recourse to computation, should we soon be freed from such dissension?
_Euth._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And if we differed about the greater and the less, by having recourse to measuring should we not soon put an end to our difference?
_Euth._ Such is the case.
_Socr._ And by having recourse to weighing, as I think, we should be able to decide respecting the heavier and the lighter?
_Euth._ How not?
_Socr._ About what then disagreeing and in what being unable to come to a decision, do we become enemies to, and angry with, each other? Perhaps you cannot readily answer, but consider when I say whether they are these, the just and the unjust, the beautiful and the base, the good and the evil. Are not these the things about which disagreeing, and not being able to arrive at a satisfactory decision respecting them, we become enemies to each other when we do become so, both you and I, and all other men?
_Euth._ This, indeed, is difference itself, Socrates, and it is about these things.
_Socr._ But what? If the gods, Euthyphron, differ at all, must they not differ about these very things?
_Euth._ Most necessarily.
_Socr._ According to your account, then, noble Euthyphron, different gods think different things just, and beautiful and base, and good and evil. For surely they could not quarrel with each other if they did not differ about these things; is it not so?
_Euth._ You say rightly.
_Socr._ Do they not severally, then, love the things which they consider beautiful and good and just, and hate their contraries?
_Euth._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And these same things, as you admit, some consider to be just, and others unjust; disputing about which they quarrel and make war on each other; is it not so?
_Euth._ Just so.
_Socr._ The same things, therefore, as it seems, are both hated and loved by the gods, and these are both hateful to the gods and pleasing to the gods.
_Euth._ It seems so.
_Socr._ From this reasoning also the same things must be holy and unholy, Euthyphron?
_Euth._ It appears so.
9. _Socr._ You have not, therefore, answered my question, my admirable friend: for I did not ask you this, what is at the same time both holy and impious; but what is pleasing to the gods is also hateful to the gods, as it seems. So that, Euthyphron, in punishing your father, as you are now doing, it is not at all wonderful if in doing this you do what is pleasing to Jupiter, but odious to Saturn and Heaven, and what is pleasing to Vulcan, but odious to Juno; and if any other of the gods differs from another on this point, to them also in like manner.
_Euth._ But I think, Socrates, that no one of the gods will differ from another about this, and say that he ought not to be punished who has slain any one unjustly.
_Socr._ But what? Have you ever heard any man doubting, Euthyphron, whether he who has slain another unjustly, or has committed any other injustice, ought to be punished?
_Euth._ They never cease doubting about these things, both elsewhere and in courts of justice. For they who commit very many acts of injustice say and do every thing in their power to escape punishment.
_Socr._ Do they also confess, Euthyphron, that they have acted unjustly,