men, or are they such as the poets constantly sing, who say that we neither hear nor see any thing with accuracy? If however these bodily senses are neither accurate nor clear, much less can the others be so: for they are all far inferior to these. Do they not seem so to you?”
“Certainly,” he replied.
26. “When then,” said he, “does the soul light on the truth? for, when it attempts to consider any thing in conjunction with the body, it is plain that it is then led astray by it.”
“You say truly.”
“Must it not then be by reasoning, if at all, that any of the things that really are become known to it?”
“Yes.”
“And surely the soul then reasons best when none of these things disturb it, neither hearing, nor sight, nor pain, nor pleasure of any kind, but it retires as much as possible within itself, taking leave of the body, and, as far as it can, not communicating or being in contact with it, it aims at the discovery of that which is.”
“Such is the case.”
“Does not then the soul of the philosopher, in these cases, despise the body, and flee from it, and seek to retire within itself?”
“It appears so.”
“But what as to such things as these, Simmias? Do we say that justice itself is something or nothing?”
“We say it is something, by Jupiter.”
“And that beauty and goodness are something?”
“How not?”
“Now then have you ever seen any thing of this kind with your eyes?”
“By no means,” he replied.
“Did you ever lay hold of them by any other bodily sense? but I speak generally, as of magnitude, health, strength, and, in a word, of the essence of every thing, that is to say, what each is. Is then the exact truth of these perceived by means of the body, or is it thus, whoever amongst us habituates himself to reflect most deeply and accurately on each several thing about which he is considering, he will make the nearest approach to the knowledge of it?”
“Certainly.”
28. “Would not he, then, do this with the utmost purity, who should in the highest degree approach each subject by means of the mere mental faculties, neither employing the sight in conjunction with the reflective faculty, nor introducing any other sense together with reasoning; but who, using pure reflection by itself, should attempt to search out each essence purely by itself, freed as much as possible from the eyes and ears, and, in a word, from the whole body, as disturbing the soul, and not suffering it to acquire truth and wisdom, when it is in communion with it. Is not he the person, Simmias, if any one can, who will arrive at the knowledge of that which is?”
29. “You speak with wonderful truth, Socrates,” replied Simmias.
“Wherefore,” he said, “it necessarily follows from all this, that some such opinion as this should be entertained by genuine philosophers, so that they should speak among themselves as follows: ‘A by-path, as it were, seems to lead us on in our researches undertaken by reason,’ because as long as we are encumbered with the body, and our soul is contaminated with such an evil, we can never fully attain to what we desire; and this, we say, is truth. For the body subjects us to innumerable hindrances on account of its necessary support, and moreover if any diseases befal us, they impede us in our search after that which is; and it fills us with longings, desires, fears, all kinds of fancies, and a multitude of absurdities, so that, as it is said in real truth, by reason of the body it is never possible for us to make any advances in wisdom. 30. “For nothing else but the body and its desires occasion wars, seditions, and contests; for all wars amongst us arise on account of our desire to acquire wealth; and we are compelled to acquire wealth on account of the body, being enslaved to its service; and consequently on all these accounts we are hindered in the pursuit of philosophy. But the worst of all is, that if it leaves us any leisure, and we apply ourselves to the consideration of any subject, it constantly obtrudes itself in the midst of our researches, and occasions trouble and disturbance, and confounds us so that we are not able by reason of it to discern the truth. It has then in reality been demonstrated to us, that if we are ever to know any thing purely, we must be separated from the body, and contemplate the things themselves by the mere soul. And then, as it seems, we shall obtain that which we desire, and which we profess ourselves to be lovers of, wisdom, when we are dead, as reason shews, but not while we are alive. 31. For if it is not possible to know any thing purely in conjunction with the body, one of these two things must follow, either that we can never acquire knowledge, or only after we are dead; for then the soul will subsist apart by itself, separate from the body, but not before. And while we live, we shall thus, as it seems, approach nearest to knowledge, if we hold no intercourse or communion at all with the body, except what absolute necessity requires, nor suffer ourselves to be polluted by its nature, but purify ourselves from it, until God himself shall release us. And thus being pure, and freed from the folly of body, we shall in all likelihood be with others like ourselves, and shall of ourselves know the whole real essence, and that probably is truth; for it is not allowable for the impure to attain to the pure. Such things, I think, Simmias, all true lovers of wisdom must both think and say to one another. Does it not seem so to you?”
32. “If this then,” said Socrates, “is true, my friend, there is great hope for one who arrives where I am going, there, if any where, to acquire that in perfection for the sake of which we have taken so much pains during our past life; so that the journey now appointed me is set out upon with good hope, and will be so by any other man who thinks that his mind has been as it were purified.”
“Certainly,” said Simmias.
“But does not purification consist in this, as was said in a former part of our discourse, in separating as much as possible the soul from the body, and in accustoming it to gather and collect itself by itself on all sides apart from the body, and to dwell, as far as it can, both now and hereafter, alone by itself, delivered as it were from the shackles of the body?”
“Certainly,” he replied.
33. “Is this then called death, this deliverance and separation of the soul from the body?”
“Assuredly,” he answered.
“But, as we affirmed, those who pursue philosophy rightly, are especially and alone desirous to deliver it, and this is the very study of philosophers, the deliverance and separation of the soul from the body, is it not?”
“It appears so.”
“Then, as I said at first, would it not be ridiculous for a man who has endeavoured throughout his life to live as near as possible to death, then, when death arrives, to grieve? would not this be ridiculous?”
“How should it not?”
“In reality then, Simmias,” he continued, “those who pursue philosophy rightly study to die; and to them of all men death is least formidable.
Judge from this. Since they altogether hate the body and desire to keep the soul by itself, would it not be irrational if, when this comes to pass, they should be afraid and grieve, and not be glad to go to that place, where on their arrival they may hope to obtain that which they longed for throughout life; but they longed for wisdom; and to be freed from association with that which they hated? 34. Have many of their own accord wished to descend into Hades, on account of human objects of affection, their wives and sons, induced by this very hope of there seeing and being with those whom they have loved; and shall one who really loves wisdom, and firmly cherishes this very hope, that he shall no where else attain it in a manner worthy of the name, except in Hades, be grieved at dying, and not gladly go there? We must think that he would gladly go, my friend, if he be in truth a philosopher; for he will be firmly persuaded of this, that he will no where else but there attain wisdom in its purity: and if this be so, would it not be very irrational, as I just now said, if such a man were to be afraid of death?”
“Very much so, by Jupiter,” he replied.
35. “Would not this then,” he resumed, “be a sufficient proof to you, with respect to a man whom you should see grieved when about to die, that he was not a lover of wisdom but a lover of his body? and this same person is probably a lover of riches and a lover of honour, one or both of these.”
“It certainly is as you say,” he replied.
“Does not then,” he said, “that which is called fortitude, Simmias, eminently belong to philosophers?”
“By all means,” he answered.
“And temperance also, which even the multitude call temperance, and which consists in not being carried away by the passions, but in holding them in contempt, and keeping them in subjection, does not this belong to those only who most despise the body, and live in the study of philosophy?”
“Necessarily so,” he replied.
36. “For,” he continued, “if you will consider the fortitude and temperance of others, they will appear to you to be absurd.”
“How so, Socrates?”
“Do you know,” he said, “that all others consider death among the great evils?”
“They do indeed,” he answered.
“Then do the brave amongst them endure death, when they do endure it, through dread of greater evils?”
“It is so.”
“All men, therefore, except philosophers, are brave through being afraid and fear; though it is absurd that any one should be brave through fear and cowardice.”
“Certainly.”
“But what, are not those amongst them who keep their passions in subjection, affected in the same way? and are they not temperate through a kind of intemperance? and although we may say, perhaps, that this is impossible, nevertheless the manner in which they are affected with respect to this silly temperance resembles this; for, fearing to be deprived of other pleasures, and desiring them, they abstain from some, being mastered by others. And though they call intemperance the being governed by pleasures, yet it happens to them that, by being mastered by some pleasures, they master others; and this is similar to what was just now said, that in a certain manner they become temperate through intemperance.”
“So it seems.”
37. “My dear Simmias, consider that this is not a right exchange for virtue, to barter pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains, fear for fear, and the greater for the lesser, like pieces of money; but that that alone is the right coin, for which we ought to barter all these things, wisdom; and for this, and with this every thing is in reality bought and sold, fortitude, temperance, and justice, and, in a word, true virtue subsists with wisdom, whether pleasures and fears, and every thing else of the kind, are present or absent; but when separated from wisdom, and changed one for another, consider whether such virtue is not a mere outline, and in reality servile, possessing neither soundness nor truth; but the really true virtue is a purification from all such things, and temperance, justice, fortitude, and wisdom itself, are a kind of initiatory purification. 38. And those who instituted the mysteries for us appear to have been by no means contemptible, but in reality to have intimated long since that whoever shall arrive in Hades unexpiated and uninitiated shall lie in mud, but he that arrives there purified and initiated, shall dwell with the gods. ‘For there are,’ say those who preside at the mysteries, ‘many wand-bearers, but few inspired.’ These last, in my opinion, are no other than those who have pursued philosophy rightly: that I might be of their number, I have, to the utmost of my ability, left no means untried, but have endeavoured to the utmost of my power. But whether I have endeavoured rightly and have in any respect succeeded, on arriving there I shall know clearly, if it please God, very shortly, as it appears to me.
39. “Such then, Simmias and Cebes,” he added, “is the defence I make, for that I, on good grounds, do not repine or grieve at leaving you and my masters here, being persuaded that there, no less than here, I shall meet with good masters and friends. But to the multitude this is incredible. If however I have succeeded better with you in my defence than I did with the Athenian judges, it is well.”
When Socrates had thus spoken, Cebes, taking up the discussion said, “Socrates, all the rest appears to me to be said rightly, but what you have said respecting the soul will occasion much incredulity in many from the apprehension that, when it is separated from the body, it no longer exists any where, but is destroyed and perishes on the very day in which a man dies, and that immediately it is separated and goes out from the body, it is dispersed and vanishes like breath or smoke, and is no longer any where; since, if it remained any where united in itself, and freed from those evils which you have just now enumerated, there would be an abundant and good hope, Socrates, that what you say is true.
40. But this probably needs no little persuasion and proof, that the soul of a man who dies, exists, and possesses activity and intelligence.”
“You say truly, Cebes,” said Socrates, “but what shall we do? Are you willing that we should converse on these points, whether such is probably the case or not?”
“Indeed,” replied Cebes, “I should gladly hear your opinion on these matters.”
“I do not think,” said Socrates, “that any one who should now hear us, even though he were a comic poet, would say that I am talking idly, or discoursing on subjects that do not concern me. If you please, then, we will examine into it. Let us consider it in this point of view, whether the souls of men who are dead exist in Hades, or not. This is an ancient saying, which we now call to mind, that souls departing hence exist there, and return hither again, and are produced from the dead. 41. And if this is so, that the living are produced again from the dead, can there be any other consequence than that our souls are there? for surely they could not be produced again if they did not exist; and this would be a sufficient proof that these things are so, if it should in reality be evident that the living are produced from no other source than the dead. But, if this is not the case, there will be need of other arguments.”
“Certainly,” said Cebes.
“You must not, then,” he continued, “consider this only with respect to men, if you wish to ascertain it with greater certainty, but also with respect to all animals and plants, and, in a word, with respect to every thing that is subject to generation, let us see whether they are not all so produced, no otherwise than contraries from contraries, wherever they have any such quality, as for instance the honourable is contrary to the base, and the just to the unjust, and so with ten thousand other things.
42. Let us consider this, then, whether it is necessary that all things which have a contrary should be produced from nothing else than their contrary. As for instance, when any thing becomes greater is it not necessary that, from being previously smaller, it afterwards became greater?”
“Yes.”
“And if it becomes smaller, will it not, from being previously greater, afterwards become smaller?”
“It is so,” he replied.
“And from stronger, weaker? and from slower, swifter?”
“Certainly.”
“What then? if any thing becomes worse, must it not become so from better? and if more just, from more unjust?”
“How should it not?”
“We have then,” he said, “sufficiently determined this, that all things are thus produced, contraries from contraries?”
“Certainly.”
“What next? is there also something of this kind in them, for instance, between all two contraries a mutual twofold production, from one to the other, and from that other back again? for between a greater thing and a smaller there is increase and decrease, and do we not accordingly call the one to increase, the other to decrease?”
“Yes,” he replied.
43. “And must not to be separated and commingled, to grow cold and to grow warm, and every thing in the same manner, even though sometimes we have not names to designate them, yet in fact be every where thus circumstanced of necessity, as to be produced from each other, and be subject to a reciprocal generation?”
“Certainly,” he replied.
“What then?” said Socrates, “has life any contrary, as waking has its contrary, sleeping?”
“Certainly,” he answered.
“What?”
“Death,” he replied.
“Are not these, then, produced from each other, since they are contraries, and are not the modes by which they are produced twofold, intervening between these two?”
“How should it be otherwise?”
“I then,” continued Socrates, “will describe to you one pair of the contraries which I have just now mentioned, both what it is and its mode of production; and do you describe to me the other. I say that one is to sleep, the other to awake; and from sleeping awaking is produced, and from awaking sleeping, and that the modes of their production are the one to fall asleep, the other to be roused. 44. Have I sufficiently explained this to you or not?”
“Certainly.”
“Do you then,” he said, “describe to me, in the same manner, with respect to life and death? Do you not say that life is contrary to death?”
“I do.”
“Yes.”
“And that they are produced from each other?”
“What then, is produced from life?”
“Death,” he replied.
“What, then,” said he, “is produced from death?”
“I must needs confess,” he replied, “that life is.”
“From the dead, then, O Cebes, living things and living men, are produced.”
“It appears so,” he said.
“Our souls, therefore,” said Socrates, “exist in Hades.”
“So it seems.”
“With respect, then, to their mode of production, is not one of them very clear? for to die surely is clear? is it not?”
“Certainly,” he replied.
“What then shall we do?” he continued; “shall we not find a corresponding contrary mode of production, or will nature be defective in this? Or must we discover a contrary mode of production to dying?”
“By all means,” he said.
“What is this?”
“To revive.”
“Therefore,” he proceeded, “if there is such a thing as to revive, will not this reviving be a mode of production from the dead to the living?”
“Certainly.”
“Thus, then, we have agreed, that the living are produced from the dead, no less than the dead from the living: but, this being the case, there appears to me sufficient proof that the souls of the dead must necessarily exist somewhere, from whence they are again produced.”
45. “It appears to me, Socrates,” he said, “that this must necessarily follow from what has been admitted.”
“See now, O Cebes,” he said, “that we have not agreed on these things improperly, as it appears to me: for if one class of things were not constantly given back in the place of another, revolving as it were in a circle, but generation were direct from one thing alone into its opposite, and did not turn round again to the other, or retrace its course, do you know that all things would at length have the same form, be in the same state, and cease to be produced?”
“How say you?” he asked.
“It is by no means difficult,” he replied, “to understand what I mean; if, for instance, there should be such a thing as falling asleep, but no reciprocal waking again produced from a state of sleep, you know that at length all things would shew the fable of Endymion to be a jest, and it would be thought nothing at all of, because every thing else would be in the same state as him, namely, asleep. And if all things were mingled together, but never separated, that doctrine of Anaxagoras would soon be verified, ‘all things would be together.’ 46. Likewise, my dear Cebes, if all things that partake of life should die, and after they are dead should remain in this state of death, and not revive again, would it not necessarily follow that at length all things should be dead, and nothing alive? for if living beings are produced from other things, and living beings die, what could prevent their being all absorbed in death?”
“Nothing whatever, I think, Socrates,” replied Cebes, “but you appear to me to speak the exact truth.”
“For, Cebes,” he continued, “as it seems to me, such undoubtedly is the case, and we have not admitted these things under a delusion, but it is in reality true that there is a reviving again, that the living are produced from the dead, that the souls of the dead exist, and that the condition of the good is better, and of the evil, worse.”
47. “And indeed,” said Cebes, interrupting him, “according to that doctrine, Socrates, which you are frequently in the habit of advancing, if it is true, that our learning is nothing else than reminiscence, according to this it is surely necessary that we must at some former time have learned what we now remember. But this is impossible, unless our soul existed somewhere before it came into this human form; so that from hence also the soul appears to be something immortal.”
“But, Cebes,” said Simmias, interrupting him, “what proofs are there of these things? remind me of them, for I do not very well remember them at present.”
48. “It is proved,” said Cebes, “by one argument, and that a most beautiful one, that men, when questioned, if one questions them properly, of themselves describe all things as they are: however, if they had not innate knowledge and right reason, they would never be able to do this. Moreover, if one leads them to diagrams, or any thing else of the kind, it is then most clearly apparent that this is the case.”
“But if you are not persuaded in this way, Simmias,” said Socrates, “see if you will agree with us on considering the matter thus. For do you doubt how that which is called learning is reminiscence?”
“I do not doubt,” said Simmias, “but I require this very thing of which we are speaking, to be reminded; and indeed, from what Cebes has begun to say, I almost now remember, and am persuaded; nevertheless, however, I should like to hear now how you would attempt to prove it.”
“I do it thus,” he replied: “we admit surely that if any one be reminded of any thing, he must needs have known that thing at some time or other before.”
“Certainly,” he said.
49. “Do we then admit this also, that when knowledge comes in a certain manner it is reminiscence? But the manner I mean is this; if any one, upon seeing or hearing, or perceiving through the medium of any other sense, some particular thing, should not only know that, but also form an idea of something else, of which the knowledge is not the same, but different, should we not justly say, that he remembered that of which he received the idea?”
“How mean you?”
“For instance; the knowledge of a man is different from that of a lyre.”
“How not?”
“Do you not know, then, that lovers when they see a lyre, or a garment, or any thing else which their favourite is accustomed to use, are thus affected; they both recognise the lyre, and receive in their minds the form of the person to whom the lyre belonged? This is reminiscence: just as any one, seeing Simmias, is often reminded of Cebes, and so in an infinite number of similar instances.”
“An infinite number indeed, by Jupiter,” said Simmias.
“Is not then,” he said, “something of this sort a kind of reminiscence?
especially when one is thus affected with respect to things which, from lapse of time, and not thinking of them, one has now forgotten?”
“Certainly,” he replied.
50. “But what?” he continued, “does it happen, that when one sees a painted horse or a painted lyre, one is reminded of a man, and that when one sees a picture of Simmias one is reminded of Cebes!”
“Certainly.”
“And does it not also happen, that on seeing a picture of Simmias one is reminded of Simmias himself?”
“It does indeed,” he replied.
“Does it not happen, then, according to all this, that reminiscence arises partly from things like, and partly from things unlike?”
“It does.”
“But when one is reminded by things like, is it not necessary that one should be thus further affected, so as to perceive whether, as regards likeness, this falls short or not of the thing of which one has been reminded?”
“It is necessary,” he replied.
“Consider, then,” said Socrates, “if the case is thus. Do we allow that there is such a thing as equality? I do not mean of one log with another, nor one stone with another, nor any thing else of this kind, but something altogether different from all these, abstract equality; do we allow that there is any such thing or not?”
“By Jupiter, we most assuredly do allow it,” replied Simmias.
51. “And do we know what it is itself?”
“Certainly,” he replied.
“Whence have we derived the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we have just now mentioned, and that from seeing logs, or stones, or other things of the kind, equal, we have from these formed an idea of that which is different from these? for does it not appear to you to be different? Consider the matter thus. Do not stones that are equal, and logs sometimes that are the same, appear at one time equal, and at another not?”
“Certainly.”
“But what? does abstract equality ever appear to you unequal? or equality inequality?”
“Never, Socrates, at any time.”
“These equal things, then,” he said, “and abstract equality, are not the same?”
“By no means, Socrates, as it appears.”
“However, from these equal things,” he said, “which are different from that abstract equality, have you not formed your idea and derived your knowledge of it?”
“You speak most truly,” he replied.
“Is it not, therefore, from its being like or unlike them?”
“Certainly.”
“But it makes no difference,” he said. “When, therefore, on seeing one thing, you form, from the sight of it, the notion of another, whether like or unlike, this,” he said, “must necessarily be reminiscence.”
“Certainly.”
52. “What, then, as to this?” he continued; “are we affected in any such way with regard to logs and the equal things we have just now spoken of?
and do they appear to us to be equal in the same manner as abstract equality itself is, or do they fall short in some degree, or not at all, of being such as equality itself is?”
“They fall far short,” he replied.
“Do we admit, then, that when one, on beholding some particular thing, perceives that it aims, as that which I now see, at being like something else that exists, but falls short of it, and cannot become such as that is, but is inferior to it, do we admit that he who perceives this must necessarily have had a previous knowledge of that which he says it resembles, though imperfectly?”
“It is necessary.”
“What then? are we affected in some such way, or not, with respect to things equal and abstract equality itself?”
“Assuredly.”
“It is necessary, therefore, that we must have known abstract equality before the time when on first seeing equal things, we perceived that they all aimed at resembling equality, but failed in doing so.”
“Such is the case.”
53. “Moreover, we admit this too, that we perceived this, and could not possibly perceive it by any other means than the sight, or touch, or some other of the senses: for I say the same of them all.”
“For they are the same, Socrates, so far as our argument is concerned.”
“However, we must perceive by means of the senses, that all things which come under the senses aim at that abstract equality, and yet fall short of it: or how shall we say it is?”
“Even so.”
“Before, then, we began to see, and hear, and use our other senses, we must have had a knowledge of equality itself, what it is, if we were to refer to it those equal things that come under the senses, and observe that all such things aim at resembling that, but fall far short of it.”
“This necessarily follows, Socrates, from what has been already said.”
“But did we not, as soon as we were born, see and hear, and possess our other senses?”
“Certainly.”
“But, we have said, before we possessed these, we must have a knowledge of abstract equality?”
“Yes.”
“We must have had it, then, as it seems, before we were born.”
“It seems so.”
54. “If, therefore, having this before we were born, we were born possessing it, we knew both before we were born, and as soon as we were born, not only the equal and the greater and smaller, but all things of the kind; for our present discussion is not more respecting equality than the beautiful itself, the good, the just, and the holy, and in one word, respecting every thing which we mark with the seal of existence, both in the questions we ask, and the answers we give. So that we must necessarily have had a knowledge of all these before we were born.”
“Such is the case.”
“And if, having once had it, we did not constantly forget it, we should always be born with this knowledge, and should always retain it through life: for to know is this, when one has got a knowledge of any thing, to retain and not lose it; for do we not call this oblivion, Simmias, the loss of knowledge?”
“Assuredly, Socrates,” he replied.
55. “But if, having had it before we were born, we lose it at our birth, and afterwards, through exercising the senses about these things, we recover the knowledge which we once before possessed, would not that which we call learning be a recovery of our own knowledge? and in saying that this is to remember should we not say rightly?”
“Certainly.”
“For this appeared to be possible, for one having perceived any thing, either by seeing or hearing, or employing any other sense, to form an idea of something different from this, which he had forgotten, and with which this was connected by being unlike or like. So that, as I said, one of these two things must follow, either we are all born with this knowledge, and we retain it through life, or those whom we say learn afterwards do nothing else but remember, and this learning will be reminiscence.”
“Such certainly is the case, Socrates.”
56. “Which, then, do you choose, Simmias: that we are born with knowledge, or that we afterwards remember what we had formerly known?”
“At present, Socrates, I am unable to choose?”
“But what? are you able to choose in this case, and what do you think about it? Can a man, who possesses knowledge, give a reason for the things that he knows, or not?”
“He needs must be able to do so, Socrates,” he replied.
“And do all men appear to you, to be able to give a reason for the things of which we have just now been speaking?”
“I wish they could,” said Simmias; “but I am much more afraid, that at this time to-morrow, there will no longer be any one able to do this properly.”
“Do not all men then, Simmias,” he said, “seem to you to know these things?”
“By no means.”
“Do they remember, then, what they once learned?”
“Necessarily so.”
“When did our souls receive this knowledge? not surely, since we were born into the world.”
“Assuredly not.”
“Before then.”
“Yes.”
“Our souls therefore, Simmias, existed before they were in a human form, separate from bodies, and possessed intelligence.”
57. “Unless, Socrates, we receive this knowledge at our birth, for this period yet remains.”
“Be it so, my friend. But at what other time do we lose it? for we are not born with it, as we have just now admitted. Do we lose it then at the very time in which we receive it? Or can you mention any other time?”
“By no means, Socrates: I was not aware that I was saying nothing to the purpose.”
“Does the case then stand thus with us, Simmias,” he proceeded. “If those things which we are continually talking about really exist, the beautiful, the good, and every such essence, and to this we refer all things that come under the senses, as finding it to have a prior existence, and to be our own, and if we compare these things to it, it necessarily follows, that as these exist, so likewise our soul exists even before we are born; but if these do not exist this discussion will have been undertaken in vain. Is it not so? and is there not an equal necessity, both that these things should exist, and our souls also before we are born, and if not the former neither the latter?”
58. “Most assuredly, Socrates,” said Simmias, “there appears to me to be the same necessity, and the argument admirably tends to prove that our souls exist before we are born, just as that essence does which you have now mentioned. For I hold nothing so clear to me as this, that all such things most certainly exist, as the beautiful, the good, and all the rest that you just now spoke of; and as far as I am concerned the case is sufficiently demonstrated.”
“But how does it appear to Cebes,” said Socrates; “for it is necessary to persuade Cebes too.”
“He is sufficiently persuaded, I think,” said Simmias, “although he is the most pertinacious of men in distrusting arguments. Yet I think he is sufficiently persuaded of this, that our soul existed before we were born. But whether when we are dead, it will still exist, does not appear to me to have been demonstrated, Socrates,” he continued, “but that popular doubt, which Cebes just now mentioned, still stands in our way, whether, when a man dies, the soul is not dispersed, and this is the end of its existence. 59. For what hinders its being born, and formed from some other source, and existing before it came into a human body, and yet when it has come, and is separated from this body, its then also dying itself, and being destroyed?”
“You say well, Simmias,” said Cebes; “for it appears that only one half of what is necessary has been demonstrated, namely, that our soul existed before we were born: but it is necessary to demonstrate further, that when we are dead, it will exist no less than before we were born, if the demonstration is to be made complete.”
“This has been even now demonstrated, Simmias and Cebes,” said Socrates, “if you will only connect this last argument with that which we before assented to, that every thing living is produced from that which is dead. For if the soul exists before, and it is necessary for it when it enters into life, and is born, to be produced from nothing else than death, and from being dead, how is it not necessary for it also to exist after death, since it must needs be produced again? 60. What you require then, has been already demonstrated. However, both you and Simmias appear to me as if you wished to sift this argument more thoroughly, and to be afraid like children, lest on the soul’s departure from the body the winds should blow it away and disperse it, especially if one should happen to die not in a calm, but in a violent storm.”
Upon this Cebes smiling said, “Endeavour to teach us better, Socrates, as if we were afraid, or rather not as if we were afraid, though perhaps there is some boy[30] within us, who has such a dread. Let us then endeavour to persuade him not to be afraid of death, as of hobgoblins.”
----- Footnote 30: Some boyish spirit.
----- “But you must charm him every day,” said Socrates, “until you have quieted his fears.”
“But whence, Socrates,” he said, “can we procure a skilful charmer for such a case, now that you are about to leave us?”
61. “Greece is wide, Cebes,” he replied, “and in it surely there are skilful men, there are also many barbarous nations, all of which you