love. Do not hasten then, for there is yet time.”
Upon this Socrates replied, “These men whom you mention, Crito, do these things with good reason, for they think they shall gain by so doing, and I too with good reason shall not do so; for I think I shall gain nothing by drinking a little later, except to become ridiculous to myself, in being so fond of life, and sparing of it when none any longer remains.
Go then,” he said, “obey, and do not resist.”
152. Crito having heard this, nodded to the boy that stood near. And the boy having gone out, and staid for some time, came, bringing with him the man that was to administer the poison, who brought it ready pounded in a cup. And Socrates, on seeing the man, said, “Well, my good friend, as you are skilled in these matters, what must I do?”
“Nothing else,” he replied, “than when you have drunk it walk about, until there is a heaviness in your legs, then lie down; thus it will do its purpose.” And at the same time he held out the cup to Socrates. And he having received it very cheerfully, Echecrates, neither trembling, nor changing at all in colour or countenance, but, as he was wont, looking stedfastly at the man, said, “What say you of this potion, with respect to making a libation to any one, is it lawful or not?”
“We only pound so much, Socrates,” he said, “as we think sufficient to drink.”
“I understand you,” he said, “but it is certainly both lawful and right to pray to the gods, that my departure hence thither may be happy; which therefore I pray, and so may it be.” And as he said this he drank it off readily and calmly. Thus far, most of us were with difficulty able to restrain ourselves from weeping, but when we saw him drinking, and having finished the draught, we could do so no longer; but in spite of myself the tears came in full torrent, so that, covering my face, I wept for myself, for I did not weep for him, but for my own fortune, in being deprived of such a friend. But Crito, even before me, when he could not restrain his tears, had risen up. 154. But Apollodorus even before this had not ceased weeping, and then bursting into an agony of grief, weeping and lamenting, he pierced the heart of every one present, except Socrates himself. But he said, “What are you doing, my admirable friends? I indeed, for this reason chiefly, sent away the women, that they might not commit any folly of this kind. For I have heard that it is right to die with good omens. Be quiet, therefore, and bear up.”
When we heard this we were ashamed, and restrained our tears. But he, having walked about, when he said that his legs were growing heavy, laid down on his back; for the man so directed him. And at the same time he who gave him the poison, taking hold of him, after a short interval examined his feet and legs; and then having pressed his foot hard, he asked if he felt it: he said that he did not. And after this he pressed his thighs; and thus going higher, he shewed us that he was growing cold and stiff. Then Socrates touched himself, and said, that when the poison reached his heart he should then depart. 155. But now the parts around the lower belly were almost cold; when uncovering himself, for he had been covered over, he said, and they were his last words, “Crito, we owe a cock to Æsculapius; pay it, therefore, and do not neglect it.”
“It shall be done,” said Crito, “but consider whether you have any thing else to say.”
To this question he gave no reply; but shortly after he gave a convulsive movement, and the man covered him, and his eyes were fixed; and Crito, perceiving it, closed his mouth and eyes.
This, Echecrates, was the end of our friend, a man, as we may say, the best of all of his time that we have known, and moreover, the most wise and just.
INTRODUCTION TO THE GORGIAS.
Callicles and Polus, two friends of Gorgias, the famous orator of Leontium in Sicily, happening to meet with Socrates and Chærephon, tell the former that he has sustained a great loss in not having been just now present when Gorgias was exhibiting his art. Chærephon admits that the fault is his, but adds that as Gorgias is his friend he can easily persuade him to exhibit to them either then, or at a future time. They accordingly, all four, adjourn to the house of Callicles, where Gorgias is staying. When arrived there, Chærephon, at the suggestion of Socrates, proposes to question Gorgias as to the art he professes; but Polus, his pupil, somewhat impertinently offers to answer for him, on the ground that Gorgias is fatigued. Chærephon therefore asks, what is the art in which Gorgias is skilled, and what he ought to be called? To which Polus answers, “the finest of the arts.” Socrates, not satisfied with this, as being no answer at all, begs Gorgias himself to answer. He says, that rhetoric is the art he professes, and that he is a rhetorician, and able to make others rhetoricians[45].
----- Socrates, having got Gorgias to promise that he would answer briefly, proceeds to ask him about what rhetoric is employed, and of what it is the science. Gorgias says, “of words,” but Socrates shews, that other arts, in various degrees, make use of words, and that some, such as arithmetic and geometry, are altogether conversant with words; he therefore requests him to distinguish between these arts and rhetoric, and to explain about what particular thing these words are employed.
Gorgias confidently answers, about “the greatest of all human concerns and the best.” But the physician, the teacher of gymnastics, the money-getter, in short all men, would say that the end which their own art aims at is the best; what then is this good which you say is the greatest good to men? Gorgias answers, that it is the power of persuading by words. But Socrates objects that other arts do the same, for that every one who teaches any thing persuades what he teaches; you must therefore say of what kind of persuasion, and on what subject rhetoric is the art. It is that which is produced in courts of justice, and other public assemblies, and relates to matters that are just and unjust. But here again Socrates makes Gorgias admit, that there are two kinds of persuasion, one that produces belief without knowledge, the other that produces knowledge; which of these two then does rhetoric produce? doubtless the former. But supposing the question is about the choice of physicians or shipwrights, or the building of walls, or the construction of ports or docks, will a rhetorician be consulted, or a person skilled in these several matters? Here Gorgias answers that on these and all other subjects a rhetorician will speak more persuasively than any other artist whatever: but it is his duty to use his art justly; though if he uses it unjustly, he and not his teacher is to blame[46].
----- Socrates, here, perceiving an inconsistency in Gorgias’ statement, after deprecating his being offended at the course the discussion might take, asks whether by saying that a rhetorician can speak more persuasively to the multitude on any art, than a person skilled in that art, he does not mean the ignorant by the multitude; and, that being admitted, whether it does not follow that one who is ignorant will be more capable of persuading the ignorant, than one who possesses knowledge? Gorgias allows this to be the case. Is the case, then, the same with respect to what is just and unjust, base and honourable, good and evil? Can a rhetorician persuade the multitude on these subjects, himself being ignorant of them, or must he know them before he learns rhetoric, or will the teacher of rhetoric instruct him in these? Gorgias professes that if a pupil does not know these things he would learn them from him.
But surely he who has learnt carpentering is a carpenter, music a musician, medicine a physician; does it not follow then, that he who has learnt justice, must be just, and wish to do just actions? Gorgias admits this too: and yet he had just now allowed that a rhetorician might make an unjust use of his art, and said, that in that case, the teacher ought not to be blamed, but the person who acts unjustly ought to be punished[47].
----- At this point Polus takes up the discussion, and having elected to ask questions, instead of answering them, begins by asking Socrates what kind of art he considers rhetoric to be. Socrates answers that he does not think it is any art at all, but a kind of skill, employed for procuring gratification and pleasure: in other words, a species of flattery, of which there are many divisions. Polus asks what division it is. “Rhetoric, in my opinion,” says Socrates, “is a semblance of a division of the political art,” and as such is base. This answer, however, is not intelligible either to Gorgias or Polus; at the request of the former, therefore, Socrates explains himself more clearly[48].
----- As there are two kinds of subject matter, he says, namely, soul and body, so there are two arts, that which relates to the soul is political; the other, relating to the body, he is not able to describe by one name, but there are two divisions of it, gymnastics and medicine.
In the political art legislation corresponds to gymnastics, and the judicial art to medicine. But flattery, perceiving that these four take the best possible care of the soul and body respectively, has divided itself fourfold, and feigns itself to be what it pretends, not really caring for what is best, but seducing ignorance by means of pleasure.
Thus cookery puts on the garb of medicine, and pretends that it knows the aliment best for the body; and again, personal decoration feigns itself to be gymnastics. Then, he adds, what personal decoration is to gymnastics, that is sophistry to legislation, and what cookery is to medicine, that is rhetoric to justice; and so being proximate to each other, sophists and rhetoricians are confounded with legislators and judges[49].
----- Are good rhetoricians, then, asks Polus, to be esteemed as vile flatterers in cities? Socrates replies that they appear to him to be of no estimation at all. But have they not the greatest power in cities?
Not, if to have power is a good to him who possesses it. For what is it to have power? is it to do what one wishes, or what appears to one to be best? Polus admits that it is not good for a person devoid of understanding to do what appears to him to be best. He must therefore prove that rhetoricians possess understanding, otherwise, since to have power is a good, they cannot do what they wish. Polus, however, is unable to distinguish between doing what one wishes and doing what appears to be best, and therefore agrees to change positions with Socrates, and to answer instead of asking questions[50].
----- Socrates, then, asks, do men wish what they do for the sake of the thing itself, or for some other end? for instance, do men take medicine because they wish to take it, or in order to health? Again, do men incur the perils of the sea because they wish to be in peril, or for the sake of riches? Clearly the latter, in both and all similar cases. Now some things, such as wisdom, health, and riches, are good, but their contraries evil; but whatever we do, we do for the sake of that which is good. So that if we kill or banish a person, if it is good to do so, we wish it, and do what we wish; but if it is really evil, though it appears to us to be good, we do not what we wish. Polus sees the force of Socrates’ argument, and can only object to it that Socrates himself would like to do what he pleased, and would envy another whom he saw slaying, or spoiling, or imprisoning whom he pleased. But Socrates resolutely denies this, and insists that if he must necessarily either act unjustly or suffer unjustly, he should choose the latter; for that it is better to suffer than to commit injustice[51].
----- Polus imagines that even a child could confute such a position as this; and in order to do so mentions instances of men whom all have accounted happy, though they were unjust, especially that of Archelaus, king of Macedonia. But Socrates denies that any one who acts unjustly can be happy; and further than this, he contends that a person who acts unjustly, and does not suffer punishment, is more miserable than one who meets with punishment for his injustice. To prove this he argues that it is more base to commit injustice than to suffer it, and if more base it must also be worse; Polus admits the premise, but denies the conclusion.
Socrates, therefore, endeavours to make his opponent admit this also by the following arguments. Beautiful things are esteemed beautiful, either on account of their usefulness, or the pleasure they occasion, or both; and in like manner base things are deemed base on account of the pain or evil they occasion, or both; so that when of two things one is more beautiful than the other, it is so because it excels in pleasure or utility, or both; and when of two things one is more base, it must be because it exceeds in pain or evil. But Polus has already admitted that it is more base to commit injustice than to suffer it; it must therefore be so because it exceeds in pain or evil, or both. But to commit injustice does not exceed the suffering it, in pain; it remains, therefore, that it must exceed it in evil: consequently it must be worse, for whatever exceeds another thing in evil must necessarily be worse[52].
----- Having established his point thus far he now goes on to prove that it is the greatest of evils for one who has committed injustice not to be punished. To suffer punishment and to be justly chastised, are one and the same thing. But all just things are beautiful. Moreover wherever there is an agent there must also be a patient; and the patient suffers what the agent does; so that if the agent punishes justly the patient also suffers justly. But it has been just admitted that all just things are beautiful; and it was proved before that all beautiful things are good, either because they are pleasant or useful; whence it follows that he who is punished suffers that which is good, and is benefited in being freed from the greatest evil, which is depravity in the soul. From all this it is evident that rhetoric can be of no use whatever: for it is generally employed for the purpose of excusing injustice, and screening men from the punishment they deserve, which on the contrary they ought rather to court than to shun[53].
----- Footnote 53: § 70-80 ----- Polus having been thus completely silenced, Callicles takes up the argument and begins by asking whether Socrates is really in earnest.
Finding that he is so, he blames Polus for having granted that it is more base to commit injustice than to suffer it; for that there is a difference between nature and law, which Socrates perceiving, confounded that which is more base by nature with that which is so by law, and so made that which is more base by law appear to be more so by nature: whereas by nature it is more base to suffer injustice than to commit it.
For the weak and the many make laws with a view to their own advantage, but nature herself avows that it is just that the better should have more than the worse, and the more powerful than the weaker. Callicles then proceeds to inveigh against philosophy and philosophers, and when he has done, Socrates, after having indulged in a vein of pleasant irony at his expense, returns to the subject, and asks what he means by the superior, the better, and the stronger, whether they are the same or different. Callicles says they are the same. Socrates objects, that if that is the case the many being stronger are also the better, and so, inasmuch as they make the laws, law and nature are not contrary to each other. Callicles therefore is compelled to change his ground, and next says that by the better and superior he means the more wise: and at last he says that they are those who are skilled and courageous in administering the affairs of a city. He adds that it is just that the governors should have more than the governed. Socrates, hereupon, asks whether they ought not to govern themselves also and be temperate, which elicits from Callicles the shameless avowal that a man should have as large desires as he can, and indulge them without restraint[54].
----- Socrates having in vain endeavoured to persuade Callicles to change his opinion by two similitudes of a perforated cask, and a full and an empty one, to which he compares the soul, proceeds to combat his assertion that a happy life consists in having and indulging as large desires as possible. If happiness consists in being hungry and eating, thirsty and drinking, it must follow that to be scabby and itch and scratch one’s self is to live happily. Callicles is forced to admit that this is to live pleasantly, and then if pleasantly, happily; and at length is driven to assert that the pleasant and the good are the same. In order to confute this opinion, Socrates leads him to maintain that science and courage differ from each other and from the good; and then by a series of most subtle questions, too minute to be abbreviated, forces him to this absurd conclusion, that if the pleasant and the good are the same, a bad man, inasmuch as he oftentimes receives more pleasure than a good man, must be accounted better than a good one[55].
----- Callicles to evade this absurdity is compelled to admit that some pleasures are better than others. From this concession Socrates shews that the end of all human actions is the good and not the pleasant; for that so far is it from being the case that we do any thing merely for the sake of pleasure, that we pursue pleasure itself for the sake of the good[56].
----- Having established this point, Socrates brings back the discussion to the original subject, and proposes to enquire whether it is better to live in such a manner as Callicles advises, namely to devote one’s self to public business and to study rhetoric, or in such a manner as philosophy persuades. He recurs therefore to his own former arguments, in which he stated that as there are certain skills, not arts, employed for the gratification of the body, so there are other corresponding ones made use of to please the soul, such as flute-playing, harp-playing, dithyrambic and even tragic poetry; now take from these last melody, rhythm and measure, and what else remains but words, that is to say a kind of flattery addressed to the multitude? And is not popular rhetoric similar? Callicles answers that there is a difference to be observed in this respect, for that some do, as Socrates has observed, speak only in order to please, but that others look to the interest of the citizens.
“That is enough,” says Socrates. At all events one part of rhetoric is flattery, and when has an instance of that which is honourable, which strives to speak what is best, whether it be pleasant or unpleasant to the hearers, ever been seen? Callicles instances Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades and Pericles, but Socrates will by no means admit that any of these really endeavoured to make the people better. But before this, Callicles, being hard pressed in argument, breaks off the discussion, and Socrates, at the request of Gorgias, carries it on by himself, and shews at length and with great force and perspicuity the advantages of a virtuous and well regulated life; and in conclusion he describes the future judgment when each man will give account of himself in another world, and be rewarded or punished according as he has lived a good or a bad life.
GORGIAS, OR, ON RHETORIC.
CALLICLES, SOCRATES, CHÆREPHON, GORGIAS, AND POLUS.
------- _Cal._ They say, Socrates, that we should thus take part in war and battle[57].
----- Footnote 57: That is, come too late, and so take no part at all.
----- _Socr._ Have we then, as the saying is, come after the feast, and are we too late?
_Cal._ And a very elegant feast. For Gorgias has just now exhibited many fine things to us.
_Socr._ Chærephon here, Callicles, is the cause of this, by having compelled us to waste our time in the forum.
_Chær._ It’s of no consequence, Socrates; for I will also find a remedy; for Gorgias is my friend, so that he will exhibit to us now, if you please, or, if you prefer it, at some future time.
2. _Cal._ What, Chærephon? is Socrates desirous of hearing Gorgias?
_Chær._ We are come for this very purpose.
_Cal._ Whenever you please, then, come to my house; Gorgias lodges with me, and will exhibit to you.
_Socr._ You say well[58], Callicles. But would he be inclined to converse with us? For I wish to learn from him what is the power of his art, and what it is that he professes and teaches: the rest of the exhibition, as you say, he may make at some other time.
----- Footnote 58: Or, “you are very obliging.”
----- _Cal._ There is nothing like asking him, Socrates: for this is one part of his exhibition: he just now bade all that were in the house ask what question they pleased, and promised to answer every thing.
3. _Socr._ You say well in truth. Ask him, Chærephon.
_Chær._ What shall I ask him?
_Socr._ What he is.
_Chær._ How mean you?
_Socr._ Just as, if he happened to be a maker of shoes, he would surely answer you, that he is a shoemaker. Do you not understand what I mean?
_Chær._ I understand, and will ask him. Tell me, Gorgias, does Callicles here say truly that you promised to answer whatever any one should ask you?
_Gorg._ Truly, Chærephon: for I just now made that very promise: and I affirm that for many years no one has asked me any thing new.
_Chær._ Without doubt, then, you will answer easily, Gorgias.
_Gorg._ You may make trial of that, Chærephon.
_Pol._ By Jupiter, Chærephon, if you please, _make trial_ of me: for Gorgias appears to me to be fatigued; as he has just now been speaking a great deal.
4. _Chær._ What, Polus, do you think you can answer better than Gorgias?
_Pol._ What matters that, if I answer well enough for you?
_Chær._ Not at all: since you wish it then, answer.
_Pol._ Ask.
_Chær._ I ask then, If Gorgias happened to be skilled in the same art as his brother Herodicus is skilled, what name should we rightly give him?
Would it not be the same as his brother?
_Pol._ Certainly.
_Chær._ In calling him a physician, then, we should speak correctly?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Chær._ But if he were skilled in the same art as Aristophon, son of Aglaophon, or his brother, what should we properly call him?
_Pol._ Evidently, a painter.
_Chær._ But now, since he is skilled in a certain art, what can we properly call him?
5. _Pol._ Chærephon, there are many arts among men by experience experimentally discovered: for experience causes our life to proceed according to art, but inexperience according to chance. Of each of these different persons partake of different arts, in different manners; but the best of the best; in the number of whom is Gorgias here, who possesses the finest of the arts.
_Socr._ Polus appears, Gorgias, to be very well prepared for speaking: but he does not do what he promised Chærephon.
_Gorg._ How so, Socrates?
_Socr._ He does not appear to me to answer the question that was asked.
6. _Gorg._ Do you then, if you please, ask him.
_Socr._ No, but if yourself would be willing to answer me, I would much rather ask you. For it is evident to me that Polus, from what he has said, has studied more what is called rhetoric, than conversation.
_Pol._ Why so, Socrates?
_Socr._ Because, Polus, when Chærephon asked you in what art Gorgias was skilled, you praised his art, as if some one had blamed it, but you did not say what the art itself is.
_Pol._ Did I not answer, that it was the finest of all arts?
_Socr._ Certainly. But no one asked you what was the quality of the art of Gorgias, but what it was, and by what name we ought to call Gorgias; just as Chærephon proposed the former questions to you, and you answered him well and in few words. Now, therefore, tell me in the same manner, what art Gorgias professes, and what we ought to call him. Or rather, Gorgias, do you tell us yourself what we ought to call you as skilled in what art.
_Gorg._ In rhetoric, Socrates.
7. _Socr._ Ought we, then, to call you a rhetorician?
_Gorg._ And a good one, Socrates, if you wish to call me, as Homer says, what “I boast myself to be.”
_Socr._ But I do wish.
_Gorg._ Call me so, then.
_Socr._ Shall we say too that you are able to make others rhetoricians?
_Gorg._ I profess this not only here but elsewhere.
_Socr._ Are you willing then, Gorgias, to continue, as we are now doing, partly to ask questions and partly to answer, and to defer to some other occasion that prolixity of speech, such as Polus just now began with?
But do not belie what you promised, but be willing to answer each question briefly.
_Gorg._ There are some answers, Socrates, which must necessarily be made at length: however, I will endeavour to make them as short as possible.
For this is one of the things which I profess, that no one can say the same things in fewer words than me.
8. _Socr._ There is need of this now, Gorgias; give me therefore a specimen of this very thing, conciseness of speech, and of prolixity at some other time.
_Gorg._ I will do so; and you will admit that you never heard any one speak more concisely.
_Socr._ Well then, since you say that you are skilled in the art of rhetoric, and that you can teach another this art, tell me about what is rhetoric employed? just as the art of weaving is employed in the making of garments, is it not so?
_Gorg._ It is.
_Socr._ And is not music also employed in the composing of melodies?
_Gorg._ Yes.
_Socr._ By Juno, Gorgias, I admire your answers, for you answer as briefly as possible.
_Gorg._ I think, Socrates, that I do this well enough.
9. _Socr._ You say well. Come then, answer me thus respecting rhetoric, of what is it the science?
_Gorg._ Of words.
_Socr._ What kind of words, Gorgias? Are they such as inform the sick by what kind of diet they may become well?
_Gorg._ No.
_Socr._ Rhetoric, then, is not concerned with all kinds of words?
_Gorg._ Certainly not.
_Socr._ Yet it makes men able to speak?
_Gorg._ Yes.
_Socr._ And does it not enable men to think on the same things on which it enables them to speak?
_Gorg._ Without doubt.
_Socr._ Does not, then, the medicinal art, of which we just now spoke, make men able to think and speak about the sick?
_Gorg._ Necessarily so.
_Socr._ The medicinal art, then, as it appears, is conversant with words?
_Gorg._ Yes.
_Socr._ And those that concern diseases?
_Gorg._ Just so.
_Socr._ And is not the gymnastic art also conversant with words that relate to the good and bad habit of bodies?
_Gorg._ Certainly.
10. _Socr._ And it is the same with other arts, Gorgias: each of them is conversant with those words that are employed about that particular thing of which each is the art.
_Gorg._ It appears so.
_Socr._ Why, then, do you not call other arts rhetorical, as being conversant with words, since you call that rhetoric which is employed about words?
_Gorg._ Because, Socrates, almost the whole[59] science of other arts is conversant with manual operations and such-like actions; in rhetoric, however, there is no such manual operation, but all its activity and efficiency is by means of words. For this reason, I consider that the art of rhetoric is conversant with words, herein speaking correctly, as I affirm.
----- Footnote 59: The expression ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν qualifies the word πᾶσα, “_almost_ the whole,” or “the whole, so to speak.”
----- _Socr._ Do I understand what kind of art you wish to call it? but I shall soon comprehend it more clearly. However, answer me. We have arts, have we not?
_Gorg._ Yes.
11. _Socr._ Of all the arts, some, I think, consist principally in workmanship, and stand in need of but few words, and others of none at all, but their work may be accomplished in silence, as painting, statuary, and many others. With such arts, you appear to me to say rhetoric has nothing to do? is it not so?
_Gorg._ You apprehend my meaning perfectly, Socrates.
_Socr._ On the other hand, there are other arts which accomplish all by means of words, and require no work at all, or very little, such as theoretical[60] and practical arithmetic, geometry, the game of dice, and many other arts; some of which require almost as many words as actions, and most of them more, so that altogether their whole activity and efficiency is by means of words. You appear to me to say that rhetoric is among arts of this kind.
----- Footnote 60: ἀριθμητική means the theory, λογιστική the practice of arithmetic.
----- 12. _Gorg._ You say truly.
_Socr._ However, I do not think you mean to call any one of these rhetoric, although in the expression you used you so said, that rhetoric has its efficiency by means of words; and any who wished to catch at your words might reply, Do you say then, Gorgias, that arithmetic is rhetoric? But I do not think that you call either arithmetic or geometry rhetoric.
_Gorg._ You think rightly, Socrates, and apprehend my meaning correctly.
_Socr._ Come then, complete the answer to my question. Since rhetoric is one of those arts which make great use of words, and there are others of the same kind, endeavour to tell me in reference to what rhetoric has its efficiency in words. 13. Just as if any one should ask me respecting any of the arts which I but now mentioned: Socrates, what is the arithmetical art? I should say to him, as you did just now, That it is one of the arts that have their efficiency in words. And if he should further ask me, In reference to what? I should answer, In reference to the knowledge of even and odd, how many there may be of each. But if again he should ask me, What do you mean by the art of computation? I should answer, that this also is one of those arts whose whole efficiency consists in words. And if he should further ask me, In reference to what? I should answer, as they do who draw up motions in the assemblies of the people, That in other respects computation is the same as arithmetic, for it has reference to the same object, that is to say, the even and the odd; but it differs in this respect, that computation considers what relation even and odd have to themselves and to each other in regard to quantity. 14. And if any one should ask me about astronomy, and after I had said that its whole efficiency consists in words, should say, But Socrates, to what do words employed about astronomy refer? I should answer, That they are employed about the course of the stars, and of the sun and the moon, how they are related to each other with respect to velocity.
_Gorg._ And you would answer rightly, Socrates.
_Socr._ Now then do you answer, Gorgias. For rhetoric is one of those arts which accomplish and effect every thing by means of words: is it not so?
_Gorg._ It is so.
_Socr._ Tell me then in reference to what? what is the particular thing about which these words are, which rhetoric uses?
_Gorg._ The greatest of all human concerns, Socrates, and the best.
_Socr._ But, Gorgias, what you say is questionable, and by no means clear. For I think you must have heard at banquets men singing that song in which the singers enumerate that the best thing is health, the second beauty, and the third, as the author of the song says, riches gained without fraud.
_Gorg._ I have heard it; but with what object do you mention this?
15. _Socr._ Because the artificers of those things which the author of the song has commended, namely, the physician, the master of gymnastics, and the money-getter, will forthwith present themselves, and the physician will say: Socrates, Gorgias deceives you. For his art is not employed about the greatest good to men, but mine is. If, then, I should ask him, Who are you that say this? he would probably answer, I am a physician. What then do you say? that the object of your art is the greatest good? How can it be otherwise, Socrates, he would probably say, since its object is health? and what greater good can men have than health? And if after him again the master of gymnastics should say, I too should wonder, Socrates, if Gorgias could shew you any greater good from his art than I can from mine, I should again say to him, And who are you, Sir, and what is your employment? A master of gymnastics, he would say, and my employment is to make men beautiful and strong in their bodies. 16. After the master of gymnastics, the money-getter would say, as I imagine, despising all others, Consider, I beg, Socrates, whether there is any greater good than riches, either with Gorgias, or any one else? I should thereupon say to him, What, then, are you the artificer of this good? He would say, I am. Who are you then? A money-getter. What then? Do you consider riches to be the greatest good to men? I shall say. Assuredly, he will answer. However, Gorgias here contends that his art is the cause of greater good than yours. It is clear then that after this he would ask, And what is this good? let Gorgias answer. Come then, Gorgias, suppose that you are asked by them and by me, and answer, What is this, which you say is the greatest good to men, and of which you are the artificer?
_Gorg._ That which is in reality, Socrates, the greatest good, and is at the same time the cause of liberty to men, and of their being able to rule over others in their several cities.
_Socr._ What then do you say it is?
_Gorg._ I say it is the power of persuading by words judges in a court of justice, senators in the senate-house, and the hearers in a public assembly, and in every other convention of a political nature. Moreover, by this power you will make the physician your slave, and the master of gymnastics your slave, and the money-getter will be found to have gained money, not for himself, but for another, for you who are able to speak, and persuade the multitude.
_Socr._ At length you appear to me, Gorgias, to have shewn as nearly as possible what kind of art you consider rhetoric to be; and if I understand you rightly, you say that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, and that its whole employment and the sum of it terminates in this. Can you say that rhetoric has any further power than that of producing persuasion in the minds of the hearers?
_Gorg._ By no means, Socrates; but you appear to me to have defined it sufficiently. For that is the sum of it.
18. _Socr._ Listen then, Gorgias. Be assured that I, as I persuade