which, instead of flowing outside, flows back into itself in a circle.
It is this (circular) movement of the soul that constitutes time, just as the permanence of intelligence in itself constitutes (aeonial) eternity. Intelligence is not separated from eternity, any more than the soul is from time. Intelligence and eternity form but a single hypostatic form of existence. That which moves simulates eternity by the indefinite perpetuity of its movement, and that which remains immovable, simulates time by seeming to multiply its continual present, in the measure that time passes. That is why some have believed that time manifested in rest as well as in movement, and that eternity was no more than the infinity of time. To each of these two (different things) the attributes of the other were mistakenly attributed. The reason of this is that anything that ever persists in an identical movement gives a good illustration of eternity by the continuousness of its movement; while that which persists in an identical actualization represents time by the permanence of its actualization. Besides, in sense-objects, duration differs according to each of them. There is a difference between the duration of the course of the sun, and that of the moon, as well as that of Venus, and so on. There is a difference between the solar year, and the year of each of these stars. Different, further, is the year that embraces all the other years, and which conforms to the movement of the soul, according to which the stars regulate their movements. As the movement of the soul differs from the movement of the stars, so also does its time differ from that of the stars; for the divisions of this latter kind of time correspond to the spaces travelled by each star, and by its successive passages in different places.
INTELLIGENCE IS MANIFOLD.
33. (10-12) Intelligence is not the principle of all things; for it is manifold. Now the manifold presupposes the One. Evidently, it is intelligence that is manifold; the intelligibles that it thinks do not form unity, but manifoldness, and they are identical therewith.
Therefore, since intelligence and the intelligible entities are identical, and as the intelligible entities form a manifoldness, intelligence itself is manifold.
The identity of intelligence and of intelligible entities may be demonstrated as follows. The object that intelligence contemplates must be in it, or exist outside of itself. It is, besides, evident, that intelligence contemplates; since, for intelligence, to think is to be intelligence,[337] therefore, to abstract its thought would be to deprive it of its "being." This being granted, we must determine in what manner intelligence contemplates its object. We shall accomplish this by examining the different faculties by which we acquire various kinds of knowledge, namely, sensation, imagination and intelligence.
The principle which makes use of the senses contemplates only by grasping exterior things, and far from uniting itself to the objects of its contemplation, from this perception it gathers no more than an image. Therefore when the eye sees the visible object, it cannot identify itself with this object; for it would not see it, unless it were at a certain distance therefrom. Likewise if the object of touch confused itself with the organ that touches it, it would disappear.
Therefore the senses, and the principle that makes use of the senses, apply themselves to what is outside of them to perceive this sense-object.
Likewise imagination applies its attention to what is outside of it to form for itself an image of it; it is by this very attention to what is outside of it that it represents to itself the object of which it forms an image as exterior.
That is how sensation and imagination perceive their objects. Neither of these two faculties folds itself back on itself, nor concentrates on itself, whether the object of their perception be a corporeal or incorporeal form.
Not in this manner is intelligence perceived; this can occur only by turning towards itself, and by contemplating itself. If it left the contemplation of its own actualizations, if it ceased to be their contemplation (or, intuition), it would no longer think anything.
Intelligence perceives the intelligible entity as sensation perceives the sense-object, by intuition. But in order to contemplate the sense-object, sensation applies to what is outside of it, because its object is material. On the contrary, in order to contemplate the intelligible entity, intelligence concentrates in itself, instead of applying itself to what is outside of it. That is why some philosophers have thought that there was only a nominal difference between intelligence and imagination; for they believed that intelligence was the imagination of the reasonable animal; as they insisted that everything should depend on matter and on corporeal nature, they naturally had to make intelligence also depend therefrom. But our intelligence contemplates natures (or, "beings"). Therefore, (according to the hypothesis of these philosophers) our intelligence will contemplate these natures as located in some place. But these natures are outside of matter; consequently, they could not be located in any place. It is therefore evident that the intelligible entities had to be posited as within intelligence.
If the intelligible entities be within intelligence, intelligence will contemplate intelligible entities and will contemplate itself while contemplating them; by understanding itself, it will think, because it will understand intelligible entities. Now intelligible entities form a multitude, for[338] intelligence thinks a multitude of intelligible entities, and not a unity; therefore, intelligence is manifold. But manifoldness presupposes unity; consequently, above intelligence, the existence of unity will be necessary.
34. (5) Intellectual being is composed of similar parts, so that existing beings exist both in individual intelligence, and in universal Intelligence. But, in universal Intelligence, individual (entities) are themselves conceived universally; while in individual intelligence, universal beings as well as individual beings are conceived individually.
SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR.
The One and Identical Being Is Everywhere Present As a Whole.
OF THE INCORPOREAL.
35. The incorporeal is that which is conceived of by abstraction of the body; that is the derivation of its name. To this genus, according to ancient sages, belong matter, sense-form, when conceived of apart from matter, natures, faculties, place, time, and surface.
All these entities, indeed, are called incorporeal because they are not bodies. There are other things that are called incorporeal by a wrong use of the word, not because they are not bodies, but because they cannot beget bodies. Thus the incorporeal first mentioned above subsists within the body, while the incorporeal of the second kind is completely separated from the body, and from the incorporeal that subsists within the body. The body, indeed, occupies a place, and the surface does not exist outside of the body. But intelligence and intellectual reason (discursive reason), do not occupy any place, do not subsist in the body, do not constitute any body, and do not depend on the body, nor on any of the things that are called incorporeal by abstraction of the body. On the other hand, if we conceive of the void as incorporeal, intelligence cannot exist within the void. The void, indeed, may receive a body, but it cannot contain the actualization of intelligence, nor serve as location for that actualization. Of the two kinds of the incorporeal of which we have just spoken, the followers of Zeno reject the one (the incorporeal that exists outside of the body) and insist on the other (the incorporeal that is separated from the body by abstraction, and which has no existence outside of the body); not seeing that the first kind of incorporeality is not similar to the second, they refuse all reality to the former, though they ought, nevertheless, to acknowledge that the incorporeal (which subsists outside of the body), is of another kind (than the incorporeal that does not subsist outside of the body), and not to believe that, because one kind of incorporeality has no reality, neither can the other have any.
RELATION BETWEEN THE INCORPOREAL AND THE CORPOREAL.
34. (2, 3, 4) Everything, if it be somewhere, is there in some manner that conforms to its nature. For a body that is composed of matter, and possesses volume, to be somewhere, means that it is located in some place. On the contrary, the intelligible world, and in general the existence that is immaterial, and incorporeal in itself, does not occupy any place, so that the ubiquity of the incorporeal is not a local presence. "It does not have one part here, and another there;" for, if so, it would not be outside of all place, nor be without extension; "wherever it is, it is entire; it is not present here and absent there;" for in this way it would be contained in some one place, and excluded from some other. "Nor is it nearer one place, and further from some other," for only things that occupy place stand in relations of distance. Consequently, the sense-world is present to the intelligible in space; but the intelligible is present to the sense-world in space; but the intelligible is present to the sense-world without having any parts, nor being in space. When the indivisible is present in the divisible, "it is entire in each part," identically and numerically one. "If simple and indivisible existence become extended and manifold, it is not in respect to the extended and manifold existence which possesses it, not such as it really is, but in the manner in which (simple existence) can possess (manifold existence)." Extended and manifold existence has to become unextended and simple in its relation with naturally extended and simple existence, to enjoy its presence. In other terms, it is conformable to its nature, without dividing, nor multiplying, nor occupying space, that intelligible existence is present to existence that is naturally divisible, manifold, and contained within a locality; but it is in a manifold, divisible and local manner that a located existence is present to "the existence that has no relation to space." In our speculations on corporeal and incorporeal existence, therefore, we must not confuse their characteristics, preserving the respective nature of each, taking good care not to let our imagination or opinion attribute to the incorporeal certain corporeal qualities. Nobody attributes to bodies incorporeal characteristics, because everybody lives in daily touch with bodies; but as it is so difficult to cognize incorporeal natures ("beings"), only vague conceptions are formed of it, and they cannot be grasped so long as one lets oneself be guided by imagination.
One has to say to oneself, a being known by the senses is located in space, and is outside of itself because it has a volume; "the intelligible being is not located in space, but in itself," because it has no volume. The one is a copy, the other is an archetype; the one derives its existence from the intelligible, the other finds it in itself; for every image is an image of intelligence. The properties of the corporeal and the incorporeal must be clearly kept in mind so as to avoid surprise at their difference, in spite of their union, if indeed it be permissible to apply the term "union" to their mutual relation; for we must not think of the union of corporeal substances, but of the union of substances whose properties are completely incompatible, according to the individuality of their hypostatic form of existence.
Such union differs entirely from that of "homoousian" substances of the same nature; consequently, it is neither a blend, nor a mixture, nor a real union, nor a mere collocation. The relation between the corporeal and the incorporeal is established in a different manner, which manifests in the communication of "homoousian" substances of the sense nature, of which, however, no corporeal operation can give any idea. The incorporeal being is wholly without extension in all the parts of the extended being, even though the number of these parts were infinite. "It is present in an indivisible manner, without establishing a correspondence between each of its parts with the parts of the extended being;" it does not become manifold merely because, in a manifold manner, it is present to a multitude of parts. The whole of it is entire in all the parts of the extended being, in each of them, and in the whole mass, without dividing or becoming manifold to enter into relations with the manifold, preserving its numerical identity.[339] It is only to beings whose power is dispersed that it belongs to possess the intelligible by parts and by fractions. Often these beings, on changing from their nature, imitate intelligible beings by a deceptive appearance, and we are in doubt about their nature ("being"), for they seem to have exchanged it for that of incorporeal "being," or essence.
THE INCORPOREAL HAS NO EXTENSION.
37. (5) That which really exists has neither great nor small. Greatness and smallness are attributes of corporeal mass. By its identity and numerical unity, real existence is neither great nor small, neither very large nor very small, though it cause even greatest and smallest to participate in its nature. It must not, therefore, be represented as great, for in that case we could not conceive how it could be located in the smallest space without being diminished or condensed.
Nor should it be represented as small, which conception of it would hinder our understanding how it could be present in a whole large body without being increased or extended. We must try to gain a simultaneous conception of both that which is very large and very small, and realize real existence as preserving its identity and its indwelling in itself in any chance body whatever, along with an infinity of other bodies of different sizes. It is united to the extension of the world, without extending itself, or uniting, and it exceeds the extension of the world as well as that of its parts, by embracing them within its unity.
Likewise, the world unites with real existence by all its parts, so far as its nature allows it to do so, though it cannot, however, embrace it entirely, nor contain its whole power. Real existence is infinite and incomprehensible for the world because, among other attributes, it possesses that of having no extension.
38. Great[340] magnitude is a hindrance for a body, if, instead of comparing it to things of the same kind, it is considered in relation with things of a different nature; for volume is, as it were, a kind of procession of existence outside of itself, and a breaking up of its power. That which possesses a superior power is alien to all extension; for potentiality does not succeed in realizing its fulness until it concentrates within itself; it needs to fortify itself to acquire all its energy. Consequently the body, by extending into space, loses its energy, and withdraws from the potency that belongs to real and incorporeal existence; but real existence does not weaken in extension, because, having no extension, it preserves the greatness of its potency. Just as, in relation to the body, real existence has neither extension nor volume, likewise corporeal existence, in relation to real existence, is weak and impotent. The existence that possesses the greatest power does not occupy any extension. Consequently, though the world fill space, though it be everywhere united to real extension, it could not, nevertheless, embrace the greatness of its potency. It is united to real existence, not by parts, but in an indivisible and indefinite manner. Therefore, the incorporeal is present to the body, not in a local manner, but by assimilation, so far as the body is capable of being assimilated to the incorporeal, and as the incorporeal can manifest in it. The incorporeal is not present to the material, in so far as the material is incapable of being assimilated to a completely immaterial principle; however, the incorporeal is present to the corporeal in so far as the corporeal can be assimilated thereto.
Nor is the incorporeal present to the material by receptivity (in the sense that one of these two substances would receive something from the other); otherwise the material and the immaterial would be altered; the former, on receiving the immaterial, into which it would be transformed, and the latter, on becoming material. Therefore, when a relation is established between two substances that are as different as the corporeal and the incorporeal, an assimilation and participation that is reciprocal to the power of the one, and the impotence of the other, occurs. That is why the world always remains very distant from the power of real existence, and the latter from the impotence of material nature. But that which occupies the middle, that which simultaneously assimilates and is assimilated, that which unites the extremes, becomes a cause of error in respect to them, because the substances it brings together by assimilation are very different.
RELATION OF INDIVIDUAL SOULS TO THE UNIVERSAL SOUL.
39. "It[341] would be wrong to suppose that the manifoldness of souls was derived from the manifoldness of bodies. The individual souls, as well as the universal Soul, subsist independently of the bodies, without the unity of the universal Soul absorbing the manifoldness of individual souls, and without the manifoldness of the latter splitting up the unity of the universal Soul." Individual souls are distinct without being separated from each other, and without dividing the universal Soul into a number of parts; they are united to each other without becoming confused, and without making the universal Soul a mere total; "for they are not separated by limits," and they are not confused with each other; "they are as distinct from each other as different sciences in a single soul." Further, individual souls are not contained in the universal Soul as if they were bodies, that is, like really different substances (?), for they are qualitative actualizations of the soul. Indeed, "the power of the universal Soul is infinite," and all that participates in her is soul; all the souls form the universal Soul, and, nevertheless, the universal Soul exists independently of all individual souls. Just as one does not arrive at the incorporeal by infinite division of bodies, seeing that such a division would modify them only in respect to magnitude, likewise, on infinitely dividing the soul, which is a living form, we reach nothing but species (not individuals); for the Soul contains specific differences, and she exists entire with them as well as without them. Indeed, though the Soul should be divided within herself, her diversity does not destroy her identity. If the unity of bodies, in which manifoldness prevails over identity, is not broken up by their union with an incorporeal principle; if, on the contrary, all of them possess the unity of "being" or substance, and are divided only by qualities and other forms; what shall we say or think of the species of incorporeal life, where identity prevails over manifoldness, and where there is no substrate alien to form, and from which bodies might derive their unity? The unity of the Soul could not be split up by her union with a body, though the body often hinder her operations.
Being identical, the Soul discovers everything by herself, because her actualizations are species, however far the division be carried. When the Soul is separated from bodies, each of her parts possesses all the powers possessed by the Soul herself, just as an individual seed has the same properties as the universal Seed (seminal reason). As an individual seed, being united to matter, preserves the properties of the universal Seed (seminal reason), and as, on the other hand, universal Seed possesses all the properties of the individual seeds dispersed within matter, thus the parts which we conceive of in the (universal) Soul that is separated from matter, possess all the powers of the universal Soul.[342] The individual soul, which declines towards matter, is bound to the matter by the form which her disposition has made her choose; but she preserves the powers of the universal Soul, and she unites with her when the (individual soul) turns away from the body, to concentrate within herself.
Now as in the course of her declination towards matter, the soul is stripped entirely bare by the total exhaustion of her own faculties; and as, on the contrary, on rising towards intelligence, she recovers the fulness of the powers of the universal Soul,[343] the ancient philosophers were right, in their mystic phrasing, to describe these two opposite conditions of the Soul by the names of Penia and Poros, (Wealth and Poverty).[344] SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE.
The One and Identical Being is Everywhere Present In Its Entirety.[345] THE INCORPOREAL BEING IS ENTIRE IN EVERYTHING.
40. Better[346] to express the special nature of incorporeal existence the ancient philosophers, particularly Parmenides,[347] do not content themselves with saying "it is one," but they also add "and all," just as a sense-object is a whole. But as this unity of the sense-object contains a diversity (for in the sense-object the total unity is not all things in so far as it is one, and as all things constitute the total unity). The ancient philosophers also add, "in so far as it is one." This was to prevent people from imagining a collective whole and to indicate that the real being is all, only by virtue of its indivisible unity. After having said, "it is everywhere," they add, "it is nowhere." Then, after having said, "it is in all," that is, in all individual things whose disposition enables them to receive it, they still add, as an entire whole. They represent it thus simultaneously under the most opposite attributes, so as to eliminate all the false imaginations which are drawn from the natures of the bodies, and which will only obscure the genuine idea of real existence.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE INTELLIGIBLE BEING, AND THE BEING OF SENSATION.
41. Such[348] are the genuine characteristics of the sensual and material; it is extended, mutable, always different from what it was, and composite; it does not subsist by itself, it is located in a place, and has volume, and so forth. On the contrary, the real being that is self-subsisting, is founded on itself, and is always identical; its nature ("being") is identity, it is essentially immutable, simple, indissoluble, without extension, and outside of all place; it is neither born, nor does it perish. So let us define these characteristics of the sensual and veritable existence, and let us put aside all other attributes.
42. Real[349] existence is said to be manifold, without its really being different in space, volume, number, figure, or extension of parts; its division is a diversity without matter, volume, or real manifoldness. Consequently, the real being is one. Its unity does not resemble that of a body, of a place, of a volume, of a multitude. It possesses diversity in unity. Its diversity implies both division and union; for it is neither exterior nor incidental; real existence is not manifold by participation in some other (nature), but by itself. It remains one by exercising all its powers, because it holds its diversity from its very identity, and not by an assemblage of heterogeneous parts, such as bodies. The latter possess unity in diversity; for, in them, it is diversity that dominates, the unity being exterior and incidental. In real existence, on the contrary, it is unity that dominates with identity; diversity is born of the development of the power of unity. Consequently, real existence preserves its indivisibility by multiplying itself; while the body preserves its volume and multiplicity by unifying itself. Real existence is founded on itself, because it is one by itself. The body is never founded upon itself, because it subsists only by its extension. Real existence is, therefore, a fruitful unity, and the body is a unified multitude. We must, therefore, exactly determine how real existence is both one and manifold, how the body is both manifold and one, and we must guard from confusing the attributes of either.
THE DIVINITY IS EVERYWHERE AND NOWHERE.
43. The divinity[350] is everywhere because it is nowhere. So also with intelligence and the soul. But it is in relation to all beings that it surpasses, that the divinity is everywhere and nowhere; its presence and its absence depend entirely on its nature and its will.[351] Intelligence is in the divinity, but it is only in relation to the things that are subordinated to it, that intelligence is everywhere and nowhere (?). The body is within the soul and in divinity. All things that possess or do not possess existence proceed from divinity, and are within divinity; but the divinity is none of them, nor in any of them.
If the divinity were only present everywhere, it would be all things, and in all things; but, on the other hand, it is nowhere; everything, therefore, is begotten in it and by it, because it is everywhere, but nothing becomes confused with it, because it is nowhere. Likewise if intelligence be the principle of the souls and of the things that come after the souls, it is because it is everywhere and nowhere; because it is neither soul, nor any of the things that come after the soul, nor in any of them; it is because it is not only everywhere, but also nowhere in respect to the beings that are inferior to it. Similarly the soul is neither a body, nor in the body, but is only the cause of the body, because she is simultaneously everywhere and nowhere in the body. So there is procession in the universe (from what is everywhere and nowhere), down to what can neither simultaneously be everywhere and nowhere, and which limits itself to participating in this double property.
THE HUMAN SOUL IS UNITED TO UNIVERSAL BEING BY ITS NATURE.
44. "When[352] you have conceived of the inexhaustible and infinite power of existence in itself, and when you begin to realize its incessant and indefatigable nature, which completely suffices itself," which has the privilege of being the purest life, of possessing itself fully, of being founded upon itself, of neither desiring nor seeking anything outside of itself, "you should not attribute to it any special determination," or any relation; for when you limit yourself by some consideration of space or relation, you doubtlessly do not limit existence in itself, but you turn away from it, extending the veil of imagination over your thought. "You can neither transgress, nor fix, nor determine, nor condense within narrow limits, the nature of existence in itself, as if it had nothing further to give beyond (certain limits), exhausting itself gradually." It is the most inexhaustible spring of which you can form a notion. "When you will have achieved (?) that nature, and when you will have become assimilated to eternal existence, seek nothing beyond." Otherwise, you will be going away from it, you will be directing your glances on something else. "If you do not seek anything beyond," if you shrink within yourself and into your own nature, "you will become assimilated to universal Existence, and you will not halt at anything inferior to it. Do not say, That is what I am. Forgetting what you are (?), you will become universal Existence. You were already universal Existence, but you had something besides; by that mere fact you were inferior, because that possession of yours that was beyond universal Existence was derived from nonentity. Nothing can be added to universal Existence." When we add to it something derived from nonentity, we fall into poverty and into complete deprivation. "Therefore, abandon nonentity, and you will fully possess yourself, (in that you will acquire universal existence by putting all else aside; for, so long as one remains with the remainder, existence does not manifest; and does not grant its presence)." Existence is discovered by putting aside everything that degrades and diminishes it, ceasing to confuse it with inferior objects, and ceasing to form a false idea of it. Otherwise one departs both from existence and from oneself. Indeed, when one is present to oneself, he possesses the existence that is present everywhere; when one departs from himself, he also departs from it. So important is it for the soul to acquaint herself with what is in her, and to withdraw from what is outside of her; for existence is within us, and nonentity is outside of us. Now existence is present within us, when we are not distracted from it by other things. "It does not come near us to make us enjoy its presence. It is we who withdraw from it, when it is not present with us." Is there anything surprising in this?
To be near existence, you do not need to withdraw from yourselves; for "you are both far from existence and near it, in this sense that it is you who come near to it, and you who withdraw from it, when, instead of considering yourselves, you consider that which is foreign to you." If then you are near existence while being far from it; if, by the mere fact of your being ignorant of yourselves, you know all things to which you are present, and which are distant from you, rather than yourself who is naturally near you, is there anything surprising in that, that which is not near you should remain foreign to you, since you withdraw from it when you withdraw from yourself? Though you should always be near yourself, and though you cannot withdraw from it, you must be present with yourself to enjoy the presence of the being from which you are so substantially inseparable as from yourself. In that way it is given you to know what exists near existence, and what is distant from it, though itself be present everywhere and nowhere. He who by thought can penetrate within his own substance, and can thus acquire knowledge of it, finds himself in this actualization of knowledge and consciousness, where the substrate that knows is identical with the object that is known. Now when a man thus possesses himself, he also possesses existence. He who goes out of himself to attach himself to external objects, withdraws also from existence, when withdrawing also from himself. It is natural to us to establish ourselves within ourselves, where we enjoy the whole wealth of our own resources, and not to turn ourselves away from ourselves towards what is foreign to ourselves, and where we find nothing but the most complete poverty.
Otherwise, we are withdrawing from existence, though it be near us; for it is neither space, nor "being" (substance), nor any obstacle that separates us from existence; it is our reversion towards nonentity. Our alienation from ourselves, and our ignorance are thus a just punishment of our withdrawal from existence. On the contrary, the love that the soul has for herself leads her to self-knowledge and communion with the divinity. Consequently, it has rightly been said that man here below is in a prison, because he has fled from heaven[353]...and because he tries to break his bonds; for, when he turns towards things here below, he has abandoned himself, and has withdrawn from his divine origin.
It is, (as Empedocles says), "a fugitive who has deserted his heavenly fatherland."[354] That is why the life of a vicious man is a life that is servile, impious, and unjust, and his spirit is full of impiety and injustice.[355] On the contrary, justice, as has been rightly said, consists in each one fulfilling his function (?). To distribute to each person his due is genuine justice.
PSYCHOLOGICAL FRAGMENTS.
A. On the Faculties of the Soul, by Porphyry.[356] OBJECT OF THE BOOK.
We propose to describe the faculties of the soul, and to set forth the various opinions on the subject held by both ancient and modern thinkers.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SENSATION AND INTELLIGENCE.
Aristo (there were two philosophers by this name, one a Stoic, the other an Aristotelian) attributes to the soul a perceptive faculty, which he divides into two parts. According to him, the first, called sensibility, the principle and origin of sensations, is usually kept active by some one of the sense-organs. The other, which subsists by itself, and without organs, does not bear any special name in beings devoid of reason, in whom reason does not manifest, or at least manifests only in a feeble or obscure manner; however, it is called intelligence in beings endowed with reason, among whom alone it manifests clearly. Aristo holds that sensibility acts only with the help of the sense-organs, and that intelligence does not need them to enter into activity. Why then does he subordinate both of these to a single genus, called the perceptive faculty? Both doubtless perceive, but the one perceives the sense-form of beings, while the other perceives their essence. Indeed, sensibility does not perceive the essence, but the sense-form, and the figure; it is intelligence that perceives whether the object be a man or a horse. There are, therefore, two kinds of perception that are very different from each other; sense-perception receives an impression, and applies itself to an exterior object; on the contrary, intellectual perception does not receive any impression.
There have been philosophers who separated these two parts; they called intelligence or discursive reason the understanding which is exercised without imagination and sensation; and opinion, the understanding which is exercised with imagination and sensation. Others, on the contrary, considered rational "being," or nature, a simple essence, and attributed to it operations whose nature is entirely different.
Now it is unreasonable to refer to the same essence faculties which differ completely in nature; for thought and sensation could not depend on the same essential principle; and if we were to call the operation of intelligence a perception, we would only be juggling with words.
We must, therefore, establish a perfectly clear distinction between these two entities, intelligence and sensibility. On the one hand, intelligence possesses a quite peculiar nature, as is also the case with discursive reason, which is next below it. The function of the former is intuitive thought, while that of the latter is discursive thought. On the other hand, sensibility differs entirely from intelligence, acting with or without the help of organs; in the former case, it is called sensation; in the latter, imagination. Nevertheless, sensation and imagination belong to the same genus. In understanding, intuitive intelligence is superior to opinion, which applies to