Select Works of Plotinus

II. ii.

I. Since evils are here, and revolve from necessity about this [terrestrial] place, but the soul wishes to fly from evils, it is requisite to fly from hence. What therefore is the fljg!^? To become similar, says Plato, to God. But thi^mlrnbe effected, if we become just and holy, in con- junction with [intellectual] prudence, and in short if we are [truly] virtuous. If therefore we are assimilated through virtue, is it to one who possesses virtue? But to whom are we assimilated? To divinity. Are we then assimilated to that nature which appears to possess the virtues in a more eminent degree, and also to the sovl of the world, and to the intellect which is the leader in it, in which there is an admirable wisdom? For it is reasonable to suppose that while we are here, we are assimilated to this intellect. Or is it not in the first place dubious, whether all the virtues are present with this intellect, such as temperance and fortitude, since there is nothing which can be dreadful to it? For nothing externally happens to it, nor does any ^ See the additional notes at the end of this Volume, for a copious account of the political^ cathartic and theoretic virtues, the subject of the present treatise of Plotinus.

SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINL'S.

thing pleasing approach to it, which when not present it may become desirous of poasessing, or apprehending. But if it also has an appetite directed to the intetligibles, after which our aoula aspire, it is evident that ornament and the virtues are from thence derived to us. Has therefore this intellect these virtues? Or may we not say, it is not reasonable to suppose, that it possesses what are called the p<^ttical virtues, viz. prudence indeed, about the part that deliberates and consults; fortitude about the irascible part; temperance, in the agreement and concord of the part that desires, with the reasoning power; and justice, in each of these parts perfonning its proper office, with respect to governing and being governed. Shall we say therefore, that we are not assimilated to divinity according to the political virtues, but according to greater virtues which employ the same appellation? But if according to others, are we not at all assimilated according to the political virtues? Or is it not absurd that we should not in auy respect be assimilated according to these? For rumour also says, that these are divine. We must say, therefore, that we are after a manner assimilated by them; but that the assimilation is according to the greater virtues. In either way, however, it happens that divinity has virtues, though not such as the political.

If, therefore, some one should grant, that though it is not possible to be assimilated according to such virtues as these, since we subsist difEerently with reference to other virtues, yet nothing hinders but that we by our virtues may be assimilated to that which does not possess virtue. But after what manner ':" Thus, if any thing is heated by the presence of heat, it is necessary that also should be hot from whence the heat is derived. And if any thing is hot by the presence of fire, it is necessary that tire itself also should he hot by the presence of heat.' To the first of ' For BT^ilf Bipfiui liere, I read esp/iurtjToi;.

it may be eaid, that there is heat in fire, but a connaacent heat, so that it will follow from analog, that virtue is indeed adventitious to the soul, Lut eonnascent with Ihat nature from whence it is derived by imifaition. Aud with respect to the argument from fire, it may be said that divinity posseases virtue, but that virtue in him is in reality greater than virtue [because it aubaists causally]. But if that virtue indeed, of which the -bouI participates, was the same with that froni which it is derived, it would be neceasary to speak in this manner. Mow, however, the one is different from the other. For neither is the sensible the same with the intelligible house with that which is the object of intellectual conception] though it is similar to it. And the seneible house parti- cipates of order and ornament; though there is neither order, nor ornament, nor symmetry, in the productive principle of it in the mind, Thus, therefore, we partici- pate from thence [i.e. from divinity] of ornament, order and consent, and these things pertain to virtue, but there consent, ornament and order, are not want«d, and therefore divinity has no need of virtue. We are, however, never- theless assimilated to what he posseaaea, through the pre- aence of virtue. And thua much for the purpose of ahow- ang, that it is not necessary virtue ahould be there, though aasimiisted to divinity by virtue. But it is also troduce persuasion to what has been said, and not to be satisfied with compulsion aJoue.

n. In the first place, therefore, the virtues muat be ftflHumed, according to which we aay that we are assimilated [to divinity,] in order that we may discover the aame ;hing. For that which is virtue with us, being an imita- ia there an archetype as it were, and not virtue. By -which we signify that there is a twofold similitude, one of ■which requires a sameness in the things that are similar, itheae being such as are equally assimilated from the same 6 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.

thing; but the other being that in which one thing is assimilated to another, but the latter ranks as first, and is not converted to the other, nor is said to be similar to it. Here, therefore, the similitude must be assumed after another manner; since we do not require the same, but rather another form, the assimilation being effected after a different manner. What, therefore, is virtue, both that which is universal, and that which is particular? The discussion, however, will be more manifest by directing our attention to each of the virtues; for thus that which is common, according to which all of them are virtues, will be easily apparent. The political virtues, therefore, of which we have spoken above, truly adorn and render us better, bounding and moderating the desires, and in short the passions, and taking away false opinions from a more excellent nature, by limiting and placing the soul beyond the immoderate and indefinite, and by themselves receiving measure and bound. Perhaps, too, these measures are in soul as in matter, are assimilated to the measure which is in divinity, and possess a vestige of the best which is there. For that which is in every respect deprived of measure, being matter, is entirely dissimilar [to divinity]. But so far as it receives form, so far it is assimilated to him who is without form. But things which are nearer to divinity, participate of him in a greater degree. Soul, however, is nearer to, and more allied to him than body, and therefore participates of him more abundantly, so that appearing as a God, it deceives us, and causes us to doubt whether the whole of it is not divine. After this manner, therefore, these are assimilated.

in. Since, however, Plato indicates that this similitude to God pertains to a greater virtue [than that which is political], let us speak concerning it; in which discus- sion also, the essence of political virtue will become more manifest, and likewise the virtue which is essentially more ON THE VIRTCJES. 7 excellent, which will in short be found to be different from that which is political. Plato, therefore, when he says that a similitude to God is a flight from terrestrial concerns, and when besides this he does not admit that the virtues belonging to a polity are simply virtues, but adds to them the epithet political, and elsewhere calls all the virtues purifications, evidently admits that the virtues are twofold, and that a similitude to divinity is not effected according to political virtue. How, therefore, do we call these purifications? And how being purified, are we especially assimilated to divinity? Shall we say, that since the soul is in an evil condition when mingled with the body, be- coming similarly passive and concurring in opinion with it in all things, it will be good and possess virtue, if it neither consents with the body, but energizes alone, (and this is to perceive intellectually and to be wise,) nor is similarly passive with it, (and this is to be temperate,) nor dreads a separation from the body, (and this is to possess fortitude,) but reason and intellect are the leaders (and this will be justice). If any one, however, calls this disposi- tion of the soul, according to which it perceives intellect- tually, and is thus impassive, a resemblance of God, he will not err. For divinity is pure, and the energy is of such a kind, that the being which imitates it will possess wisdom. What then? Is not divinity also disposed after this manner? Or may we not say that he is not, but that the disposition pertains to the soul; and that soul per- ceives intellectually, in a way different from divinity? It may also be said, that of the things which subsist with him, some subsist differently from what they do with us, and others are not at all with him. Again, therefore, is intel- lectual perception with him and us homonymous? By no means; but the one is primary, and that which is derived from him secondary. For as the discourse which is in voice is an imitation of that which is in the soul, so like- 8 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.

■wise, that which is in the soul, is an imitation o£ thi which is in souiething else [i.e. in intellect]. As, then fore, external discourse is divided and distributed, yrht compared to that which is in the soul, thus also ths which is in the aonl, and which is the interpreter c intellectual discourse, is divided when compared with i Virtue, however, pertains to the soul; Lut not to inteileit^B nor to that which is beyond intellect.

IV. It must, however, be enquired whether purificatitx ^ is the same with _a virtue of^this kind?Or~does piinfii^ tion indeed precede, but virtue follow? And whether do* virtue consist in purifying, or in the being perfectly purifiedH For virtue, while in the act of purifying, is more imperfeo than iJiat which consists in complete purification, which u now as it were the end. But to be perfectly purified, is atti ablation of every thing foreign. Good, however, is some-B thing else besides this. Or may we not say, that if the soul, I was good prior to her impurity, purification m sufficient P Purification, indeed, is sufficient; but that which remains will be good, and not purification. And what that is which remains, is to be investigated. Tor perhaps the nature which is left was not good; since otherwise, it would not have been situated in evil. Shall we say, therefore, that it has the form of good? Or that it is not sufficiently able to abide [perpetually] in good? For it is naturally adapted to vei^e both to good and evil. Its good, therefore, con- sists in associating with its kindred nature; but its evil in associating with the contraries to this. It is necessary, therefore, that it should associate with this nature, being purified. And this will take place, through being converted to it. Will it therefore be converted after purification f Or may we not say, that after purification it is converted!■' This, therefore, is the virtue of the soul, or rather that which happens to it from conversion. What then is this? The vision and impression of that which is seen, inserted ON THE VIRTUES. 9 and energizing in the soul, in tlie same manner as sight about a visible object. She did not, therefore, possess these, nor recollect them. Or perhaps she possessed them, yet not energizing, but deposited in an unilluminated state. In order, however, that they may be illuminated, and that the soul may know them to be inherent in herself, it is necessary that she should apply herself to that which illuminates. But she will not possess these, but the im- pressions of them. It is necessary, therefore, to adapt the impression to the true objects from which the impressions are derived. Perhaps, likewise, she may thus be said to possess them, because intellect is not foreign, and espe- cially is not so, when it looks to the illuminating cause. But if it does not, it is foreign even when this cause is pre- sent. For sciences also are foreign, if we do not at all energize according to them.

V. We must, however, show how far purifica tion pro- ceeds. For thus it will be evident to whom the similitude is made, and with what God the soul becomes the same. But this is especially to enquire how far it is possible to be purified from anger and desire, and all the other perturba- tions, such as pain, and things of a kindred nature, and to separate the soul from the body. And perhaps, indeed, to separate the soul from the body, is for the soul to collect itself as it were, from different places, so as to become en- tirely impassive, and to make the necessary sensations of pleasures to be only remedies and liberations from pain,^ in order that the soul may not be disturbed [in its energies]. It likewise consists in taking away pain, and if this is not possible, in bearing it mildly, and diminishing its power, in consequence of [the rational part] not being co-passive with it. And besides this also, in taking away anger to the ^ Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, says, that corporeal pleasures are remedies against pain, and satisfy the indigence of nature, but perfect no energy of the rational part of the soul.

10 SliLKCr WOBKS OF PLOTINUS.

utmost o£ our atility, and if possible, entirely; but if no^.fl the rational part must not at the same time be angry, bu^ thft HJiger must be the passion of another part, and v accompanied with deliberation. And this sudden ii must be Bmall and imbecile. Fear, however, must 1 entirely removed; for the purified kouI will fear nothinj Here, also, the energy must be unattended with delibera tion, except it be requisite to admonish. With respect 6 desire, it is evident that there must not be a desire of a thing base, And as to the desire of meats and drinks for the sake of a remission of pain, the soul herself will be without it. This likewise will be the case with the venereal appetite. But if the soul is desirous of connec- tion, it will be I think in the natural way. and this not un- attended with deliberation. If, however, it should be an unadvised impulse, it will only be so far as it is accom- panied with a precipitate ' imagination. But, in short, the [rational] soul herself will be purified from all these. She will also wish to render the irrational part pure, bo that it may not be agitated. And if it is, that the agitation may not be vehement, but small, and immediately dissolved by proximity to the rational part Just as if some one being near to a wise man, should partake of his wisdom by this proximity, or should become similar to him, or through reverence should not dare to do any thing which the good man ia unwilling to do. Hence, there will be no eontest. For reason being present will be sufficient, which the inferior part will reverence, so as even to be itself indignant, if it is at all moved, in consequence of not being quiet when its master is present; and it will on this account blame its own imbecility.

' In the orifpnal TrpoiuTrorf; bnt it should ilmibtlees he as in tliB above translation, irfioiriTovc, For this is tlie word nsed by Marinufi, in bis Life of Proclnp, wbeii speaking of tbe cathartic virtnesof tliat iihilusojiber, andatluiUng tothispuflsagein Plotinus.

ON THE VIRTUES. 11 VI. In conduct of this kind, therefore, there is no sin, but a correction of the man. Nevertheless the endeavour is not to be without sin, but to be a Q-od. Hence, if any thing among the above mentioned particulars shoidd be done without deliberation, such a one will be both a God and a daemon, being a twofold character; or rather, having another with him, possessing another virtue. But if nothing is done unadvisedly, he will be a God alone. He will however be a God in the number of those that follow the first; for he it is who came from thence. And if he becomes by himself such as he came, he is still there. But coming hither, he will associate with intellect; and will assimilate this to himself,^ according to the power of it. Hence, if possible, he will not be agitated, nor do any thing which may be displeasing to the master [intellect]. What, therefore, is each of the virtues to such a man as this \ Wisdom, indeed, will consist in the contemplation of what intellect contains. But he will possess intellect by contact. Each of the virtues, however, is twofold; for each is both in intellect and in soul. And in intellect, indeed, each is not [properly] virtue, but virtue is in soul. What, then, is it in intellect? The energy of intellect, and that which is. But here that which is in another, is virtue derived from thence. For justice itself, and each of the virtues, are not in intellect such as they are here, but they are as it were paradigms. But that which proceeds from each of these into the soul, is virtue. For virtue pertains to a cer- tain thing. But each thing itself pertains to itself, and not to any thing else. With respect to justice, however, if it is the performance of appropriate duty, does it always con- sist in a multitude of parts? Or does not one kind consist in multitude, when there are many parts of it, but the other is entirely the performance of appropriate duty, though it ^ For avro here, it is necessary to read aury, conformably to the version of Ficinus.

12 SEXECT WORKS OF rLOTlKtl!

should be one thiug'. True justice itself, therefore, is the enei^y of one thing towards itself, in which there is not another and another. Hence justice in the soul is to ener- gize in a greater degree intellectually. But temperance is an inward conreraion to intellect. And fortitude is apathy, aci-ording to a. similitude of that to which the aoul looks. and which is naturally impassiTe. But soul is impaasiTe from virtne, in order that she may not sympathize with her subordinate associate.

VIL These virtues, therefore, follow each other in tlie soul, in the same manner as those paradigms in intellect which are prior to virtue. For there intelligence is wisdom and science; a conversion to itself is temperance; its proper wort is the performance of its appropriate duty, and justice; and that which is as It were fortitude is immateriality, and an abiding with purity in itself. In soul, therefore, percep- tion directed to intellect is wisdom and prudence, which are the virtues of the soul. For soul does not possessthese in the same manner as intellect. Other things also follow after, similarly in soul. They are likewise consequent to purification, since all the virtues are purifications, and uece^arily consist in the soul being purified; for otherwise, no one of them would be perfect. And he indeed, who possesses the greater virtues, has necessarily the less in capacity; but he who possesses the less, has not necessarily the greater. This, therefore, is the life which is the principal and leading aim of a worthy man. But whether he possesses in energy, or in some other way, the less or the greater virtues, mnst be considered by a survey of each of them; as for instance, o£ pmdence. For if it uses the V other virtues, how can it any longer remain what it ie^ } And if also it should not enet^ie r Likewise, it must be / «oasidered whether naturally the virtues proceed to a diffe- } not extent: andfAi«temperancemeasui:«6,bat fiirfeutiiely I takes away what is superHuous. And in a amilar manner ON THE VIRTUES. Id in the other virtues, prudence being wholly excited. Or perhaps the worthy man will see to what extent they pro- ceed. And perhaps sometimes according to circum- stances he will energize according to some of them. But arriving at the greater virtues, he will perform other measures according to them. Thus, for instance, in the exercise of temperance, he will not measure it by political temperance, but in short he will separate himself as much as possible [from the body], and will live, not merely the life of a good man, which political virtue thinks fit to enjoin, but leaving this, he will choose another life, namely, that of the Gk)ds. For the similitude is to these, and not to good men. The similitude, indeed, to good men, is an assimila- tion of one image to another, each being derived from the same thing; but a similitude to God, is an assimilation as to a paradigm.

I. What art, or method, or study, ivill lead as to that end to whicli we ought to proceed? That we ought, indeed, to arrive at the good itself, and the first principle of thingB, is granted, and ie demiinitrated through many arguments. The ai^umentb also through which this is demonstrated, are a certain elevation to this end. But what kind of a ' The dialectic of I'Into, which is here diBciisaed, ix not the saiDB witli that dmle'.tic whicli is the Huliject ij£ opinion, anil ia accurateh invcstif^ated in the Topics of Aristotle. For tlie former is irreprehennible (tnd most expeditions; since it is connate with tilings themseUes and etnphiya a multitude of powers in order to the attjiuiment of truth. It likewise imitates intellect, from which it receives its principles, and ascends through well-ordered Kradations to real being itself. It also tei'minates the wander- ing of the soul about HenHihles; and explores every thing by iiiethixls which cannot be confuted, till it arrives at tbe in- effalile principle of things. The bnainefs, likewise, of this first of sciences, is to employ definitions, divisirms, analyzations, and demonstrations, as primary sciences in the investigation of causes; imitating the progresBioii of beings from the lirst principle of tbings, and their continual conversion to it a£ the ultimate object of desire.

" But there are three energies," (says Proclus in MS. Comment. in Pamienid. ) " of this moat scientific methixi; tbe first of which is adapted to youth, and is useful for tlie purpose uf exciting their ox DIALECTIC. 15 person is it necessary the man should be who is elevated thither? Is it not, as Plato says, one who has seen all, or most things? And who in his first generation has de- scended into the seed of a man who will be a philosopher, or a musician, or a lover? The philosopher, therefore, the musician, and the lover, are naturally adapted to be ele- vated. What, therefore, is the mode? Is there one and intellect, which is, as it were, in a dormant state. For it is a true exercise of the eye of the soul in the speculation of things, leading forth through opposite positions, the essential impression of ideas which it contains, and considering not only the divine path, as it. were, which conducts to truth, but exploring whether the devia- tions from it contain any thing worthy of belief; and lastly, stimu- lating the all-various conceptions of the soul. But the second energy takes place when intellect rests from its former investiga- tions, as becoming most familiar with the speculations of beings, and beholds truth itself firmly established on a pure and holy foundation. This energy, according to Socrates, by a progression through ideas, evolves the whole of an intelligible nature, till it arrives at that which is first; and this by analyzing, defining, demonstrating, and dividing, proceeding upwards and downwards, till having entirely investigated the nature of intelligibles, it raises itself to a nature superior to beings. But the soul being perfectly established in this nature, as in her paternal port, no longer tends to a more excellent object of desire, as she has now arrived at the end of her search. And you may say that what is delivered in the Phsedrus and Sophista, is the employment of this energy, giving a twofold division to some, and a fourfold to other operations of the dialectic art. Hence it is assigned to such as philosophize purely, and no longer require preparatory exercise, but nourish the intellect of their soul in pure intellection. But the third energy, which is declarative according to truth, purifies from twofold ignorance,* when its reasons are employed upon men, full of opinion; and this is spoken of in the Sophista."

See this subject more amply discussed in the additional notes at the end of this volume.

* *. e. AVhen a man is ignorant that he is ignorant; and this is the disease of the multitude.

16 SELECT M'ORKS OF PLOTINUS. ■ tlie Bame mode for all these? Or is there a, different mode for each? There is, indeed, a twofold precession to all of them; one to those who are ascending; but the other to those who have arrived at the supernal realms. For the former proceeds from things beneath; but the latter ranks among those who are now in the intelligible region, and who in that pla«e liaTe as it were fised their footstep. There, also, it is necessary for them to proceed, till they have arrived at the eitreinity of the place. The end of the progression, however, is then obtained, when some one arrives at the summit of the intelligible world. But let this at present remain [without any further discussion]. And let ns first endeavour to speat concerning this elevation.