SigPhi · Plutarch

Plutarch's Lives, Volume 3 (of 4)

Page 17 of 38

diverting him from that pure tyrannical office. Bibulus, who was an enemy of Pompeius, was the first to propose in the Senate to choose Pompeius sole consul[330] and he said that the city would thus either be relieved from the present disorder, or they would be slaves to the best man among them. This opinion appeared strange from such a person, when Cato rising for the purpose as it was expected of speaking against Bibulus, as soon as there was silence, said that for his part he would not have introduced the proposed measure, but as it was introduced by another he advised that it should be adopted, for he preferred any government to no government, and he thought that nobody would administer affairs better than Pompeius at a time of such disorder. The Senate accepted the proposal and passed a decree that Pompeius if elected should be solo consul, and that if he wanted a colleague, he might choose any person whom he approved of, but not before two months had elapsed; and Pompeius being made consul on these terms and declared by Sulpicius the Interrex, addressed Cato in a friendly manner, admitting his great obligations to him and urging him to give him his advice as a private man in the discharge of his office. But Cato would not admit that Pompeius was under any obligations to him, for he had said nothing that he did say out of regard to him, but out of regard to the state: he added that he would give him his advice if he were privately applied to; and if Pompeius did not invite him, he would publicly tell him his opinion. Such was Cato in everything.

LV. After entering the city, Pompeius married Cornelia,[331] a daughter of Metellus Scipio, who was not a virgin, but had lately been left a widow by Publius, the son of Crassus, who had lost his life among the Parthians, and whose virgin bride she was. The young woman possessed many charms besides her youthful beauty, for she was well instructed in letters, in playing on the lyre, and in geometry, and she had been accustomed to listen to philosophical discourses with profit. In addition to this she had a disposition free from all affectation and pedantic display, faults which such acquirements generally breed in women: her father also, both in respect to family and reputation, was above all imputation. Still the marriage did not please some people on account of the disparity of years; for the youth of Cornelia made her a fitter match for a son of Pompeius. But those who were more judicious considered that Pompeius had overlooked the state, which was in an unfortunate condition, to cure which the state had selected him for her physician, and put herself solely in his hands; and he was wearing chaplets and celebrating a marriage, when he ought to have considered his consulship a calamity, as it would not have been conferred on him so contrary to all constitutional practice, if his country were in a prosperous condition. However, he presided at the trials for corruption and bribery,[332] and drew up laws, pursuant to which the trials were conducted, and with the exception presently to be mentioned, he conducted all the proceedings with dignity and fairness, and he secured to the courts safety, order, and quiet, by taking his own place there with armed men; but when his father-in-law Scipio was under trial, he sent for the three hundred and sixty judices to his house and obtained their support for him, and the accuser gave up the prosecution when he saw Scipio conducted from the Forum by the judices.[333] This brought Pompeius again into bad report, which was still further increased when he came forward to speak in praise of Plancus,[334] though he had by special law put an end to encomiums on persons under trial. Cato, who happened to be one of the judices, stopped his ears with his hands, saying it was not right in him to listen to the encomiums which were contrary to law. In consequence of this Cato was rejected before the votes were given, but Plancus was convicted by the votes of the rest and to the shame of Pompeius. Now, a few days after, Hypsæus,[335] a consular man, who was under prosecution, watched for Pompeius as he was going to sup after taking the bath, and clasping his knees, suppliantly entreated him; but Pompeius passed by contemptuously, saying that Hypsæus was spoiling his supper, and doing nothing more. By showing himself thus partial he got blame. However, in every other respect he established good order, and took his father-in-law as his colleague for the remaining five months. A decree also was made that he should hold the provinces for another four years, and should receive yearly a thousand talents, out of which he was to feed and maintain his troops.

LVI. Cæsar's friends taking advantage of this, claimed some notice for Cæsar also, who was fighting so many battles for the supremacy of Rome; they said that he deserved either another consulship, or to have a fresh period added to his command, during which no other should supersede him and carry off the glory due to his labours, but that he who had accomplished those things should hold the command and quietly enjoy the honour. A debate arose on those subjects, on which Pompeius, affecting to deprecate the odium against Cæsar out of regard to him, said that he had letters of Cæsar, who was willing to have a successor and to be relieved from service, but still Cæsar thought it fair that he should be allowed to be a candidate for the consulship though he was not at Rome. To this Cato made opposition, and said that Cæsar ought to become a private person and lay down his arms, and then get any favour that he could from the citizens; and when Pompeius did not prosecute the debate, but submitted as if he were worsted, his real opinions about Cæsar became more suspected. He also sent to Cæsar and demanded back the troops[336] which he had lent him, pretending that he wanted them for the Parthian war. But Cæsar, though he knew why he was required to give up the troops, sent them back after handsomely rewarding them.

LVII. After this Pompeius had a dangerous illness at Neapolis, from which he recovered. Upon the suggestion of Praxagoras, the people of Neapolis offered sacrifices for his restoration to health. The neighbouring people followed their example, and the thing thus going the round of Italy, every city, small and great, celebrated a festival for several days. No place was large enough to contain the people, who flocked together from all parts, but the roads were filled and the villages and ports with the people rejoicing and sacrificing. Many persons also with chaplets on their heads and lighted torches received Pompeius, and accompanied him throwing flowers over him, so that his journey and progress was a most beautiful sight and very splendid.

However, it is said that this circumstance contributed to bring about the war as much as anything else. For an arrogant feeling entered the mind of Pompeius, and, with the greatness of the rejoicing, carried off all reflection on the present state of affairs; and throwing away the caution which had always secured his good fortune and his measures, he fell into a state of such unmingled confidence and contempt of Cæsar's power, as to suppose that he would require neither arms to oppose him nor any troublesome preparation, but that he could put him down much easier than he had raised him. Besides this, Appius came from Gaul with the troops which Pompeius had lent to Cæsar; and he greatly disparaged Cæsar's exploits there, and uttered much abuse against Cæsar; and he said that Pompeius did not know his own power and reputation, if he intended to strengthen himself against Cæsar by other troops, for that he could put down Cæsar with Cæsar's own troops, as soon as he made his appearance; so great, as he said, was their hatred of Cæsar and their affection towards Pompeius.

Accordingly Pompeius was so much elated, and through his confidence filled with such contempt, that he even ridiculed those who were afraid of the war; and to those who said that, if Cæsar advanced against the city, they saw no troops sufficient to repulse him, with smiling countenance and tranquil mien he bade them give themselves no trouble about that, "for in whatever part of Italy," he said, "I stamp the earth with my foot, there will spring up forces both men and horse."

LVIII. And now Cæsar also stuck to public affairs more vigorously, himself keeping at no great distance from Italy, and continually sending his soldiers to the city to attend the elections, and with money insinuating himself into the favour of many of the magistrates and corrupting them; among whom was Paulus[337] the consul who changed sides for fifteen hundred talents, and Curio[338] the tribune who was released by Cæsar from countless debts, and Marcus Antonius who through friendship for Curio was involved in his obligations. Now it was said that one of the centurions who had come from Cæsar, while standing near the Senate-house and hearing that the Senate were refusing to allow Cæsar a prolongation of his term of government, said as he struck his hand on his sword, "But this will give it." And all that was doing and preparing had this design in view. Yet the claims and reasons urged by Curio in favour of Cæsar were of a more constitutional character. For he asked one of two things, either that they should require Pompeius also to give up his force, or they should not take Cæsar's troops from him: he said, "Whether they become private persons on fair terms or continued a match for one another by each keeping what he had, they would remain quiet; but he who proposed to weaken one of them would double the power which he feared." Upon this Marcellus the consul called Cæsar a robber, and urged the Senate to vote him an enemy, if he should not lay down his arms. Yet Curio with the assistance of Antonius and Piso, prevailed so far as to have it put to a regular vote. Accordingly he proposed that those senators should move off to one side who were in favour of Cæsar alone laying down his arms and Pompeius remaining in command; and the majority went over to that side. Again, upon his proposing that all should withdraw who were of opinion that both should lay down their arms and that neither should hold a command, only two-and-twenty were in favour of Pompeius, and all the rest were on the side of Curio. Curio considering that he had gained his point, rushed forth to the people exulting with delight, and the people received him with clapping of hands and threw on him chaplets and flowers. Pompeius was not in the Senate, for those who are in command of an army do not enter the city.

But Marcellus rose up and said that he would not sit still to listen to words, but that as he spied ten legions already appearing in sight above the Alps and on their march, he also would dispatch a man to oppose them and to defend their country.

LIX. Upon this they changed their garments as was usual in a public calamity. Marcellus[339] advanced to Pompeius through the Forum with the Senate following him, and standing in front of him said, "I bid you, Pompeius, defend your country and employ the forces that are in readiness and raise others." Lentulus also said the same, who was one of the consuls elect for the coming year. But when Pompeius began to raise recruits, some refused and a few came together tardily and without any readiness, but the greater part cried out that some terms should be come to. For Antonius in spite of the Senate had read a letter of Cæsar to the people which contained proposals likely to conciliate the mass; for Cæsar proposed that both he and Pompeius should give up their provinces and dismiss their troops, and so put themselves in the hande of the people and render an account of what they had done. Lentulus who was now consul would not assemble the Senate; but Cicero who had just returned from Cilicia[340] attempted an amicable settlement on the terms, that Cæsar should quit Gaul and give up all his army except two legions with which he should hold Illyricum and wait for his second consulship. As Pompeius was dissatisfied with this, the friends of Cæsar so far yielded as to agree that Cæsar should dismiss one of these two legions; but as Lentulus made opposition and Cato called out that Pompeius was blundering again if he allowed himself to be deceived, the attempt at a settlement came to no conclusion.

LX. In the mean time intelligence arrived that Cæsar had taken Ariminum,[341] a large city of Italy, and was marching straight upon Rome with all his force. But this was false; for he was advancing with only three hundred horsemen and five thousand legionary soldiers, and he did not wait for the rest of his force which was beyond the Alps, choosing to fall upon his enemies when they were in confusion and did not expect him, rather than to give them time to prepare to fight with him. Upon reaching the river Rubico, which was the boundary of his province, he stood in silence and lingered, reflecting, as we may presume, on the magnitude of the risk. Then, like those who throw themselves into a huge abyss from a precipice, closing the eyes of calculation and wrapping himself up to meet the danger, he called out in Greek to those who were present these words only, "Let the die be cast," and took his army over. As soon as the report reached Rome, and tumult and fear, such as were never known before, together with consternation filled the city, the Senate immediately hurried in a body to visit Pompeius, and the magistrates with them; but upon Tullus[342] asking about an army and force, and Pompeius after some delay saying in a tone of no great confidence, that he had the men in readiness who had come from Cæsar, and he thought he should soon be able to get together those who had been before enrolled to the number of thirty thousand, Tullus cried aloud, "You have deceived us, Pompeius," and he advised to send commissioners to Cæsar. One Favonius,[343] in other respects no bad man, but who with his self-will and insolence often supposed that he was imitating the bold language of Cato, bade Pompeius strike the ground with his foot and call up the troops which he promised. Pompeius mildly submitted to this ill-timed sarcasm; and when Cato reminded him of what he had originally predicted to him about Cæsar, Pompeius replied that what Cato had said was in truth more prophetic, but what he had done was of a more friendly character.

LXI. Cato advised that Pompeius should be appointed general Imperator, adding, that it was the business of those who caused great mischief to put an end to it. Cato immediately left the city for Sicily, for he had obtained that island as his province; and of the rest each went to the province which had been assigned to him by lot. But as nearly all Italy was in commotion, the events that happened caused much perplexity; for those who were out of Rome hurried from all parts and crowded into the city, and the inhabitants of Rome hastened to leave the city, which in such tempest and confusion was weak in available means, but strong in insubordination and the difficulty that it caused to the magistrates. For it was not possible to allay the fear, nor did any one allow Pompeius to follow his own judgment, but in whatever way a man was affected, whether by fear, grief or perplexity, he carried it to Pompeius and filled him with it; and opposite measures prevailed in the same day, and it was impossible for Pompeius to get any true intelligence about the enemy, because there were many who reported anything that they chanced to hear, and were vexed if he did not believe them. Under these circumstances after declaring by an edict that he saw nothing but confusion, and bidding all the senators follow him, and giving notice that he should consider all who stayed behind as partisans of Cæsar, he left the city late in the evening; and the consuls fled without even making the sacrifices which were usual before wars. But even in the midst of danger Pompeius was fortunate in the general affection of the people, for though many blamed the generalship, there was not one who hated the general, but one might have found that those who were not willing to leave Pompeius were more numerous than those who left the city for the cause of liberty.

LXII. A few davs after, Cæsar entered and took possession of Rome.[344] He behaved with moderation to all and pacified everybody, except Metellus[345] one of the tribunes who attempted to hinder him from taking money out of the treasury, on which Cæsar threatened him with death and added to his threat still harsher words, for he said, That to say this was harder for him than to do it. Having thus put Metellus to flight and taken what he wanted, Cæsar pursued Pompeius, being anxious to drive him out of Italy before his troops from Iberia arrived. Pompeius who had got possession of Brundisium and had plenty of ships, immediately put on board the consuls and with them thirty cohorts and sent them over before him to Dyrrachium: Scipio his father-in-law and his own son Cneius he sent to Syria to get a fleet ready. After barricading the gates and placing on the walls the soldiers who were most lightly armed, he ordered the people of Brundisium[346] to keep quiet in their houses, and he then broke up all the ground in the city and intersected it with ditches, and filled up all the streets with stakes except two through which he went down to the sea. On the third day he had already embarked at his leisure all the troops with the exception of those who were guarding the walls, to whom he suddenly gave a signal, upon which they all ran down quickly and being taken on board got out to sea. When Cæsar saw the walls deserted, he concluded that the enemy were making off, and in his pursuit of them he narrowly escaped getting involved among the stakes and trenches; but as the people of Brundisium gave him warning, he avoided the city and, making a circuit round it, he found that all had got under sail, except two vessels which contained only a few soldiers.

LXIII. Now everybody else reckons the sailing away of Pompeius among the best military stratagems, but Cæsar[347] wondered that Pompeius, who was in possession of a strong city and was expecting his troops from Iberia and was master of the sea, should desert and abandon Italy. Cicero[348] also blames Pompeius for imitating the generalship of Themistokles rather than that of Perikles, the circumstances being like those of Perikles and not those of Themistokles. And Cæsar showed by what he did that he was greatly afraid of time:[349] for when he had taken prisoner Numerius, a friend of Pompeius, he sent him to Brundisium with instructions to bring about a reconciliation on fair terms; but Numerius sailed off with Pompeius. Upon this Cæsar, who in sixty days had become master of Italy without shedding any blood, was desirous of pursuing Pompeius immediately, but as he had no vessels, he turned about and marched to Iberia with the design of gaining over the troops there.

LXIV. During this time Pompeius got together a great force: his naval power was completely irresistible, for the fighting ships were five hundred, and the number of Liburnian vessels[350] and other small craft was immense; the cavalry, the flower of the Romans and Italians, was seven thousand, distinguished by family, and wealth and courage; his infantry, which was a mixed body and required discipline, he exercised in Berœa,[351] not sitting still lazily, but practising himself in gymnastic exercises[352] as if he were still in the vigour of his age. And it was a great motive to confidence, when men saw Pompeius Magnus, who was now sixty years of age save two, exercising himself among the infantry under arms, then mounting his horse and drawing his sword without any trouble while his horse was galloping and easily sheathing it again; and in the throwing of his spear showing not only an exactness of aim, but a strength of arm in the distance to which he sent it, which many of the young men could not surpass. Both kings of nations and governors came to him; and of the men of rank about him from Rome there were sufficient to make up a complete Senate.[353] There came also Labeo,[354] who left Cæsar though he had been his friend and had served with him in Gaul; and Brutus,[355] son of the Brutus who was put to death in Gaul, a man of noble spirit who had never yet spoken to Pompeius or saluted him because Pompeius had put his father to death, but now he took service under him as the liberator of Rome. Cicero,[356] though he had both in his writings and his speeches in the Senate recommended other measures, was ashamed not to join those who were fighting in defence of their country. There came also to Macedonia Tidius Sextius,[357] a man of extreme old age, lame of one leg; and while others were laughing and jeering, Pompeius on seeing him rose up and ran to meet him, for he considered it a great testimony for men of advanced age and feeble strength to choose danger with him in preference to safety.

LXV. A Senate being formed, upon the proposition of Cato they came to a resolution to put no Roman to death except in battle, and not to plunder any city that was subject to the Romans, which increased still further the popularity of the party of Pompeius; for those who were unconcerned about the war by reason of being far removed from it or who were disregarded on account of their weakness, gave Pompeius the benefit of their good wishes at least, and as far as words could go contended on his behalf in favour of the right, considering every man an enemy to gods and to men who did not wish Pompeius to be victorious. Cæsar also showed much moderation in his success, for after he had captured and defeated the forces of Pompeius in Iberia,[358] he let the generals go and employed the troops. After crossing the Alps again and hurrying through Italy, he arrived at Brundisium about the winter solstice. He then crossed the sea and putting in at Oricum sent Jubius,[359] a friend of Pompeius, who was his prisoner, to Pompeius[360] to propose that they should both meet together on the third day, disband all their forces, and after being reconciled and confirming their union by oath, return to Italy.

Pompeius again considered this to be an ambuscade, and hastily going down to the sea he took possession of the posts and places which presented very strong positions for an army; he also seized the naval stations and landing places which were favourable for those who came by sea, so that every wind which blew brought to Pompeius corn or troops or money; but Cæsar being confined in straits both on the sea and land side was of necessity glad to fight, and he attacked the lines of Pompeius and continually provoked him to battle, in which Cæsar had generally the advantage and the superiority in the skirmishing. But on one occasion he narrowly escaped being completely crushed and losing his army, for Pompeius fought with great courage and routed all the enemy, who lost two thousand men; but he was either unable or was afraid to force his way into Cæsar's camp and to enter with the fugitives, which made Cæsar say to his friends, "To-day the victory would have been with the enemy, if they had had a commander who knew how to conquer."

LXVI. The partisans of Pompeius being greatly elated at this success were eager to have a decisive battle. Pompeius wrote to the distant kings and generals and cities to inform them that he was victorious, but he feared the risk of a battle, thinking that by delay and reducing the enemy to straits he should finally vanquish men who were invincible in arms and had long been accustomed to conquer together, but as to the other military duties, and marches, and change of position, and digging of trenches and building of walls, were not efficient by reason of age and on this account were eager to come to close fighting and to engage hand to hand. However, previous to the last contest Pompeius had been able in some degree to draw his men from their purpose by persuading them to keep quiet; but when Cæsar after the battle was compelled by want of provisions to break up his camp, and began his march into Thessaly through the country of the Athamanes,[361] the confidence of the soldiers of Pompeius could no longer be kept in check, and calling out that Cæsar was flying, some were for following and pursuing him, and others for crossing over into Italy, and others were sending to Rome their slaves and friends to get possession of houses near the Forum, with the intention of forthwith becoming candidates for office. Many of their own accord sailed to Cornelia who was in Lesbos bearing the good tidings of the war being at an end; for Pompeius had sent her there out of the way of danger.

The Senate being assembled, Afranius gave his opinion that they should stick to Italy, for Italy was the chief prize of the war, and would bring to those who were masters of it the possession of Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Iberia, and all Gaul; and as to that which was the greatest concern to Pompeius, his native country who was stretching out her hands only at a short distance from them, it was not honourable to leave her to be insulted and enslaved by slaves and flatterers of tyrants. But Pompeius did not consider it to be consistent with his reputation to run away from Cæsar a second time and to be pursued, when fortune gave him the opportunity of being the pursuer, nor did he think it consistent with his duty to desert Scipio[362] and the consular men in Hellas and Thessaly who would immediately fall into Cæsar's hands with their military chests and large forces; he thought also that Rome was best cared for by fighting in her defence as far from her as possible, that she might wait for the conqueror without feeling or hearing of any misfortunes.

LXVII. Having come to this decision, Pompeius pursued Cæsar, resolved to avoid a battle, but by following close up to hem him in and wear him out by privation. He had other reasons for thinking this to be the best plan, and it also reached his ears that it was a subject of common conversation among the cavalry that they ought to defeat Cæsar as soon as they could and then put down Pompeius also. Some say that this was also the reason why Pompeius employed Cato[363] in no matter of importance, but even when he was marching against Cæsar left him on the coast to look after the stores, through fear that if Cæsar were destroyed, Cato might forthwith compel him also to lay down his command. Accordingly as he followed the enemy leisurely he was much censured and there was a clamour against him, that his object was not to defeat Cæsar by his generalship, but his native country and the Senate, that he might always keep the command and never give over having as his attendants and guards those who considered themselves the masters of the world. Domitius Ahenobarbus also by always calling him Agamemnon and King of Kings made him odious. Favonius too made himself no less disagreeable by his scoffing manner than others by the unseasonable freedom of their language, calling out, "Men, we shall not eat figs in Tusculum[364] even this year!" Lucius Afranius who had lost his forces in Iberia and on that account had fallen under the imputation of treachery, now seeing that Pompeius avoided a battle, said he was surprised that those who accused him did not advance and fight against the trafficker in provinces. By these and like expressions often repeated they at last prevailed over Pompeius, a man who was a slave to public fame and the opinion of his friends, and drew him on to follow their own hopes and impetuosity and to give up the best considered plans, a thing which would have been unbefitting even in the master of a vessel, to say nothing of the commander-in-chief of so many nations and forces. Pompeius approved of the physician who never gratifies the desires of his patients, and yet he yielded to military advisers who were in a diseased state, through fear of offending if he adopted healing measures. And how can one say those men were in a healthy state, some of whom were going about among the troops and already canvassing for consulships and prætorships, and Spinther and Domitius[365] and Scipio were disputing and quarrelling about the priesthood of Cæsar and canvassing, just as if Tigranes the Armenian were encamped by them or the King of the Nabathæans, and not that Cæsar and that force with which he had taken a thousand cities by storm, and subdued above three hundred nations, and had fought with Germans and Gauls unvanquished in more battles than could be counted, and had taken a hundred times ten thousand prisoners, and had slaughtered as many after routing them in pitched battles.

LXVIII. However, by importunity and agitation, after the army had descended into the plain of Pharsalus,[366] they compelled Pompeius to hold a council of war, in which Labienus, who was commander of the cavalry, got up first, and swore that he would not leave the battle till he had routed the enemy; and they all swore to the same effect.

In the night Pompeius dreamed that as he was entering the theatre, the people clapped, and that he was decorating a temple of Venus the Victorious[367] with many spoils. And in some respects he was encouraged, but in others rather depressed by the dream, lest fame and glory should accrue from him to the race of Cæsar, which traced its descent from Venus; and certain panic alarms which were rushing through the camp aroused him. In the morning-watch a bright light[368] shone forth above the camp of Cæsar, which was in a state of profound tranquillity, and a flame-like torch springing from this light descended upon the camp of Pompeius; and Cæsar himself says that he witnessed this as he was visiting the watches. At daybreak, as Cæsar was going to move to Scotussa,[369] and the soldiers were engaged in taking down the tents and sending forward the beasts and camp-followers, the scouts came with intelligence that they spied many arms in the enemy's encampment moving backwards and forwards, and that there was a movement and noise as of men coming out to battle. After them others came announcing that the vanguard was already putting itself in battle order. Upon this, Cæsar observing that the expected day had arrived on which they would have to fight against men, and not against hunger and poverty, quickly gave orders to hang out in front of his tent the purple colours,[370] which is the signal for battle among the Romans. The soldiers at the sight of it left their tents with loud shouts and rejoicing and hurried to arms; as the centurions led them to their several ranks, every man, just as if he belonged to a chorus, without confusion, being well trained, quietly took his place.

LXIX. Pompeius commanded the right wing, intending to oppose Antonius; in the centre he placed his father-in-law Scipio against Calvinus Lucius;[371] and the left was commanded by Lucius Domitius, and strengthened with the main body of the cavalry. For nearly all the horsemen had crowded to that point, with the design of overpowering Cæsar and cutting to pieces the tenth legion, which had a very great reputation for courage, and Cæsar was accustomed to take his station in this legion when he fought a battle. But Cæsar, observing that the enemy's left wing was strengthened by so large a body of cavalry, and fearing their brilliant equipment, summoned six cohorts from the reserve, and placed them in the rear of the tenth legion, with orders to keep quiet and not let the enemy see them; but as soon as the cavalry advanced, they had orders to run forwards through the first ranks, and not to throw their javelins, as the bravest soldiers are used to do in their eagerness to get to fighting with the sword, but to push upwards and to wound the eyes and faces of the enemy, for those handsome, blooming pyrrichists would not keep their ground for fear of their beauty being spoiled, nor would they venture to look at the iron that was pushed right into their faces. Now Cæsar was thus employed. But Pompeius, who was examining the order of battle from his horse, observing that the enemy were quietly awaiting in their ranks the moment of attack, and the greater part of his own army was not still, but was in wavelike motion through want of experience and in confusion, was alarmed lest his troops should be completely separated at the beginning of the battle, and he commanded the front ranks to stand with their spears presented, and keeping their ground in compact order to receive the enemy's attack. But Cæsar finds fault[372] with this generalship of Pompeius; for he says that he thus weakened the force of the blows which a rapid assault produces; and the rush to meet the advancing ranks, which more than anything else fills the mass of the soldiers with enthusiasm and impetuosity in closing with the enemy, and combined with the shouts and running increases the courage--Pompeius, by depriving his men of this, fixed them to the ground and damped them. On Cæsar's side the numbers were twenty-two thousand; on the side of Pompeius the numbers[373] were somewhat more than double.

LXX.[374] And now, when the signal was given on both sides, and the trumpet was beginning to urge them on to the conflict, every man of this great mass was busy in looking after himself; but a few of the Romans, the best, and some Greeks who were present, and not engaged in the battle, as the conflict drew near, began to reflect to what a condition ambition and rivalry had brought the Roman State. For kindred arms and brotherly battalions and common standards,[375] and the manhood and the might of a single state in such numbers, were closing in battle, self-matched against self, an example of the blindness of human nature and its madness, under the influence of passion. For if they had now been satisfied quietly to govern and enjoy what they had got, there was the largest and the best portion of the earth and of the sea subject to them; and if they still wished to gratify their love of trophies and of triumphs, and their thirst for them, they might have their fill of Parthian or German wars. Scythia, too, and the Indians were a labour in reserve, and ambition had a reasonable pretext for such undertaking, the civilization of barbaric nations. And what Scythian horse, or Parthian arrows, or Indian wealth could have checked seventy thousand Romans advancing in arms under Pompeius and Cæsar, whose name these nations heard of long before they heard of the name of Rome? Such unsociable, and various, and savage nations had they invaded and conquered. But now they engaged with one another in battle, without even feeling any compunction about their own glory, for which they spared not their native country, up to this